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Abstract 
 
Evolutionary novelty, the origin of new characters such as the turtle shell or the 
flower, is a fundamental problem for an evolutionary view of life. Accordingly, it is 
a central research topic in contemporary biology involving input from several 
biological disciplines and explanations at several levels of organization. As such 
it raises questions relative to scientific collaboration and multi-level explanations. 
Novelty is also involved in theoretical debates in evolutionary biology. It has been 
appropriated by evo-devo, a scientific synthesis linking research on evolution and 
development. Thanks to its focus on development, evo-devo claims to explain 
the mechanistic origin of novelties as new forms, while the Modern Synthesis can 
only provide statistical explanation of evolutionary change.  The origin of an 
evolutionary novelty is a historical emergence of a new character involving form 
and function. I focus on three neglected dimensions of the problem of novelty, 
the functional-historical approach to the problem, research on novelty in the 
Modern Synthesis era and novelty in plants.  
 
I compare the evo-devo approach to novelty to a functional-historical approach 
of novelty. I focus on its origin in Darwin and its presence in the Modern 
Synthesis. The comparison of the two approaches reveals distance between 
conceptual frameworks and proximity in explanatory practices. This is partly 
related to unwarranted conceptual opposition. In particular, I list several ways of 
distinguishing novelty and adaptation, some of which are not conceptually sound. 
I then focus on the relation between novelty and adaptation in the Modern 
Synthesis era, and on the relation of novelty to other fundamental biological 
problems (speciation, origin of higher taxa, complexity). Pushing this approach 
further, I challenge the view that the Modern Synthesis excluded development 
and reached a hardened consensus. Finally, I analyse how Günter Wagner’s 
developmental theory of novelty applies to novelties in plant. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 The emergence of organisms with new characters or novelties becomes a 
fundamental problem as soon an evolutionary view of life is adopted What 
exactly is a novelty? It can be non-technically defined as a character that was not 
possessed by any of the ancestors of the organisms that possess it and which 
constitutes a qualitative difference compared to any character present in the 
ancestors For an  
evolutionary theory, the problem is then how did these novelties originate? What 
kind of transformation happened? And what caused this significant 
transformation between ancestor and descendant?  For Darwin’s theory of 
evolution by natural selection, the problem was more precisely how can the latter 
act on small variations to gradually help produce new characters The problem 
was especially acute for complex characters composed of many parts such as 
the vertebrate eye How can evolution by natural selection gradually produce the 
eye when all the parts in their complex and specific arrangement are apparently 
needed to make the eye viable? Problematic were also characters about which it 
was hard to conceive any advantage provided by their hypothetical intermediate 
forms These criticisms against Darwin’s Origin of species were recognised by 
Darwin himself as the deepest challenge to his theory of evolution by natural 
selection (Darwin, 1872, chapter 7) The failure to convince that natural selection 
acting on small gradual variations could produce new characters was one of the 
reasons Darwin’s theory fell out of favour between the end of the 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century It is still today one of the targets of defenders of 
contemporary versions of creationism such as Intelligent Design (Behe, 1996; 
Dembski, 1998; Johnson, 1991)  
 
Conceived in contemporary scientific terms, the origin of a new phenotypic 
character such as the turtle shell or the flower is a complex phenomenon. 
Changes in entities and processes at multiple levels of organisation such as 
genes, gene regulatory networks, morphogenetic gradients, cell adhesion 
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molecules, cell populations etc. can take part in the mechanisms of their origin. 
As historical events often set in the deep past, the occurrence of novelties has to 
be situated within evolutionary sequences with the help of different sources of 
evidence. As transformation occurring within organisms, they call for ecological 
functional and structural considerations.  
 
This complexity and these multiple aspects of evolutionary novelty or innovation1 
make it a multidimensional scientific problem involving numerous disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary research projects. As an object of investigation for the 
philosopher and the historian of science it raises questions related, among 
others, to multi-level explanations, epistemic values, competing sources of 
evidence or research traditions. 
 
Another level of investigation is added by the involvement of novelty, as a concept 
and research problem, within a contemporary scientific controversy. Novelty has 
been particularly promoted and investigated by researchers within the field of 
Evolutionary Developmental Biology or ‘evo-devo’2 As indicated by its name, 
evo-devo is a multidisciplinary scientific endeavour ambitioning to bring together 
the study of evolution and the study of development. It progressively took shape 
in the 1980s and is now an established field with laboratories in many biological 
departments, dedicated scientific journals, international societies and 
conferences. As a synthesis of disciplines, evo-devo contains many research 
programs. However, empirical research in evo-devo is dominated by the study of 
development based on developmental genetic concepts, methods and tools; 
considerations of higher level of organisation and of evolutionary problems are 
undertaken only by a small part of evo-devo scientists (Diogo, 2016, 2018). At 
the same time, evo-devo can refer to a theoretical construct that is opposed by 
some scientists and philosophers to the still dominant paradigm in evolutionary 
                                                 
1 Different meanings have been given to the distinction between novelty and innovation. Some authors 
have argued that ‘innovation’ should be used for novel functions and ‘novelty’ for novel morphological 
structures (Love, 2003, 2006; G. P. Wagner, 2015). It is usually the term ‘innovation’ that is used to 
designate new behaviours in animals (Ramsey, Bastian, & van Schaik, 2007a, 2007b), the term ‘novelty’ 
is rarely used for this category (but see Brown, 2014) The latter usually designates new morphological 
characters. Some authors have used the term ‘innovation’ to describe the process of origin , and 
‘novelty’ the product (Müller & Newman, 2005; Peterson & Müller, 2016). Here I will use ‘novelty’ as a 
default term, and qualify it (as functional, behavioural, genetic etc…) when needed.  
2 I will use the term ‘evo-devo’ throughout the rest of this work  
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biology, the Modern Synthesis. Novelty is, among other problems, at the centre 
of the debate, primarily because it is argued that input from developmental 
biology has been neglected by the dominant framework and that this input is 
necessary to elaborate a mechanistic theory of the origin of novelties (Bonner, 
1982; Carroll, 2005; Raff, 1996; Wagner, 2014; Wagner, Chiu, & Laubichler, 
2000).   
 
FOUR DIFFERENT PROBLEMS 
 
 At least four problems regarding evolutionary novelty can be distinguished 
 
_ The problem of the definition(s) of novelty 
_ The problem of the role of novelty in evolution 
_ The problem of the degrees of novelty in evolution 
_ The problem of the explanation of the origin of novelty 
 
In this thesis, I will only address the first and above all the fourth problem; I will 
however present the four problems in turn in order to provide context to the 
subject of this thesis 
The problem of the definition(s) of evolutionary novelty 
 
Some researchers have linked the value of the concept of novelty to the 
agreement of the community of researchers on a single definition:  
 
“Evolutionary novelty is the subject of several edited works (including this one) 
as well as many papers and books (Jernvall 2000; Love 2006; Love and Raff 
2006; Muller and Newman 2005a; Muller and Newman 2005b; Muller and 
Wagner 1991; Pigliucci 2008; Salazar-Ciudad 2006; Shubin et al. 2009; Stone 
and Hall 2004; Wagner and Lynch 2010), and is frequently used to justify the 
importance of work proposed in grant submissions. The origin of evolutionary 
novelty has even been proposed as the central question linking evolution and 
development (Muller and Newman 2005b; Wagner and Lynch 2010). Given its 
importance to such a broad spectrum of evolutionary biology, novelty must 
therefore either have a workable and agreed upon definition or be discarded.” 
(Hallgrímsson et al., 2012, emphasis added) 
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If one subscribes to the judgment of Hallgrímsson and colleagues, then the 
prospects of the concept of novelty seem grim since a review of past and recent 
literature reveals several coexisting definitions of novelty. At least four criteria to 
define evolutionary novelties and flesh out the idea of a qualitative difference 
stand out in the literature  
 
a) A functional criterion: Ernst Mayr proposed to ground the qualitative 
change associated with novelty in the concept of function. He thus 
defines an evolutionary novelty as:  “any acquired structure or property 
that permits the assumption of a new function” (Mayr, 1960, p 351) 
This definition is used across levels of organisation, for example for 
new metabolic pathways (Wagner, 2011) as well as for new 
morphological characters.  
 
b)  A criterion based on evolutionary significance: this type of definition is 
present both in ecologically minded and developmentally-minded 
researchers. It defines novelty based on its effect on further evolution. 
The concept of key innovation is used to refer to new characters that 
are connected with a rapid diversification of species or the invasion of 
a new ecological zone, such as avian flight (Alfaro, 2014; Galis, 2001; 
Liem, 1973; Schluter, 2000). In evo-devo, some definitions are based 
on the concept of evolvability, that is, a novelty is conceived as a 
change that allows for more developmental change or opens up new 
direction of variation (Brigandt, 2007).  
 
c) A criterion based on the concept of homology (character-based): 
homology is a concept from comparative anatomy A “homologue” was 
originally defined by Richard Owen in 1843 as “the same organ in 
different animals under every variety of form and function” Novelty is 
defined using homology as a new homologue, that is, a trait that cannot 
be considered homologous to any pre-existing trait (Müller & Wagner, 
1991). Because several interpretations of the concept of homology 
exist, there are debates among researchers who adopt this criterion 
(Arthur, 2000; Müller, 2010) 
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d)  A process or explanatory criterion: Qualitative change is brought about 
by a specific process, or by specific processes, such as the overcoming 
of constraints or the switch between adaptive peaks (HallgrÍmsson et 
al., 2012) these processes are different from those governing 
quantitative change. This implies that the nature of the process 
determines the nature of the outcome.  
 
The multiplicity of existing definitions of evolutionary novelty and the still ongoing 
debate among scientists about what is the proper definition (HallgrÍmsson et al., 
2012; Müller & Wagner, 1991; Peterson & Müller, 2013, 2016; Wagner, 2014) 
appears as a first reason for philosophical investigation. The philosopher of 
biology might play a role in conceptual clarification, as with the concepts of 
adaptation and gene for example. Among the philosophers who have considered 
the question, few seem to agree with the judgment of Hallgrimsson and 
colleagues cited above (Brigandt & Love, 2012; Pigliucci, 2008).  
 
Ingo Brigandt and Alan Love have recently pleaded for a move “beyond 
definitional debates” (2012). They argue that the main purpose of definitions of 
novelty is not to determine which traits are novel and which are not, but to 
formulate problems that research should answer. They interpret the plurality of 
definitions as a consequence of the complexity of the problem of novelty. This 
complex problem has to be decomposed into more local problems. By defining 
concepts of novelty as guide for research Love and Brigandt diffuse the problem 
of definitions and turn the attention of philosophers towards other problems. 
Indeed, the requirement of Hallgrimson and colleagues does not seem to fit with 
the nature of contemporary scientific investigation of complex problems. The 
search for the unique appropriate definition of novelty is probably harmful for 
research and bound to fail. However, one can reject the quest for a unique 
definition while defending the benefit of a critical appreciation of definitions and 
distinctions. This may be particularly justified when these definitions and 
distinctions are put to use in the theoretical and polemic literatures within the 
context of the controversy on the theoretical framework of evolutionary biology.  
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The problem of the role of novelties in evolution 
 
A second problem, that I will not address directly in this thesis, is the one 
suggested by the second type of definition of novelty. The concept of key 
innovation is traditionally used in an ecological context, whereas the concept of 
evolvability has emerged from the domain of evo-devo. Despite their different 
disciplinary homes, these concepts share a focus on phenotypic changes that 
have important evolutionary significance, that is, changes that might have been 
responsible for initiating large-scale evolutionary trends, or for altering them in 
one way or another.  
 
The rise of a developmentally oriented concept of novelty was paralleled by a 
move from an interest in how the power of selection is limited by different kind of 
constraints, to a more general and positive interest in the ways genomic and 
developmental changes open or close, broaden or narrow potential directions of 
phenotypic variation (Arthur, 2001; Brigandt, 2015; Wagner & Altenberg, 1996). 
The rise of the concept of evolvability led to a return of the criterion of evolutionary 
significance in the study of evolutionary novelty. Highly interesting were (and still 
are) to the student of adaptive radiation, the phenotypic novelties that opened 
new ecological niches; highly interesting are to the students of evolvability the 
developmental changes that, at various points in the evolution of life, made new 
directions of phenotypic variation developmentally possible, or that increased the 
potential of phenotypic variability of a population of organisms.  
The problem of the degrees of novelty 
 
A third problem that I will leave aside is of a more abstract nature but 
should be mentioned for the sake of perspective. A distinction should be made 
between the question of the definition of novelties as described earlier and the 
question of the degrees of novelty or the hierarchisation of novelty in evolution If 
novelty is defined in terms of uniqueness, unpredictability, or modification of the 
space of possibilities, then debates about the proper definitions of novelty 
presented earlier can be interpreted as focused only on a subset of what is novel 
in evolution.  
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The concept of evolutionary novelty, although it is used to refer to new entities 
across levels of organisation (genes, cell types, metabolic capacities etc.) has 
been mostly used and appropriated to refer to new morphological characters. 
Now, other literatures focus on novel properties of life without using the term 
novelty. The perspective of organisation focuses on life not as evolving but as 
primarily defined by autonomy (Moreno & Mossio, 2015; Varela, 1979). One 
object of focus is however the transitions between different degrees of autonomy, 
especially at the level of cells. The literature on major transitions in evolution 
focuses primarily on transitions such as the origin of the eukaryote cell or the 
transitions from unicellularity to multicellularity (Smith & Szathmary, 1997; 
Szathmáry, 2015). In a sense, the literature on morphological or developmental 
novelty possesses criteria to establish degrees of novelty since the concepts of 
constraints and evolvability can be quantified (e.g. Bedau, 1992; Cheverud, 1984; 
Wagner, 2008). However, the idea of a hierarchy of novelty at a more general 
level might be impossible to operationalise and might not be interesting. Even so, 
the point remains that the literature on phenotypic novelty focuses only on a 
subset of what is novel in evolution and that therefore, I will focus in this thesis 
on only a subset of what is novel in evolution.  
 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF THE 
ORIGIN OF EVOLUTIONARY NOVELTIES 
 
 
 My main focus is on problems related to the origin of evolutionary novelties 
and to their scientific explanation. However, I should admit at this point that no 
single overarching problem nor a single method has guided my investigation. If 
there is a single guiding principle to my research, it is reactive because the study 
of the origin of novelty has often been conceived in terms of the origin of form, I 
focused on functional approaches to novelty; because most philosophical and 
theoretical work on novelty is focused on animals, I turned my attention to plants; 
because many historical investigations of research on novelty have been 
conducted as part of the history of evo-devo, I focused on history of functional 
approaches to novelty and more generally on research on novelty in the Modern 
Synthesis era. Each reactive research choice has brought a different set of 
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problems. Therefore, in this research, I vindicate a use of different styles and 
methods of philosophical and historical analysis This pluralism is not a principled 
choice but proceeds from the subject chosen itself  
 
The functional-historical approach and the evo-devo approach to novelty 
 
The opposition between the Modern Synthesis and evo-devo in relation to 
novelty is sometimes expressed in the following way: The Modern Synthesis, 
centred on, or even reduced to, population genetics, provided statistical 
explanations of evolutionary change and adaptation, while evo-devo provides a 
mechanistic explanation of changes in form (Amundson, 2005; Carroll, 2008; 
Laland et al., 2015; Müller, 2007a; Pigliucci, 2007; Raff, 1996). Some evo-devo 
practitioners and defenders vindicate a separation between the study of function 
and adaptation, and the study of form and changes of form, and they identity the 
problem of novelty with the latter (Amundson, 2005; Carroll, 2008; Müller, 2007a; 
Raff, 1996),  However, the origin of a novelty is the historical emergence of a 
new character, which involves one or several forms (in the case of muscles for 
example) and one or several functions The identification of the explanation of 
novelty with the mechanistic explanation of form is not a universally accepted 
conceptual step. To the profound objections to his theory, described earlier, 
Darwin’s main response was a functional and historical solution. There actually 
is an asymmetry here between formal approaches and functional approaches to 
novelty. While some evo-devo scientists and philosophers conceive novelty as 
the problem of form or the problem of change of form (Amundson, 2005; Carroll, 
2008; Müller, 2007a; Raff, 1996), the functional approach to novelty is not 
symmetrically analytical for the latter, the problem of novelty inseparably involves 
form and function.  
 
Several types of philosophical approaches to the explanation of complex 
scientific phenomena have been undertaken: 
 
The philosophy of mechanism for example can be conceived as descriptive and 
analytical. It describes and analyses scientific explanations in terms of the search 
for mechanisms. Secondly, there are several approaches that can be considered 
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normative. For example, the confrontational strategy consisting in evaluating 
whether a particular scientific explanation, theory, or a field of scientific enquiry, 
fits the normative standards of some philosophical theory of scientific 
explanation, reasoning, and evidence. Belonging to this type are the analysis of 
natural selection as tautological (e.g. Popper, 1976), the critique against methods 
in some research in evolutionary psychology (e.g. Dupré, 2001; Griffiths, 1996), 
and the analysis of flaws in randomised clinical trials (e.g. Cartwright, 2007; 
Cartwright & Munro, 2010) Applied to research on novelty, it could consist in 
evaluating actual research and explanations of novelty according to criteria of 
explanatory adequacy imported from general philosophy of science3 
 
Another kind of normative approach can be called the conceptual strategy. It 
amounts to relying on some form of conceptual analysis evaluate a scientific 
theory, Jerry Fodor and Thomas Nagel critiques of Darwinism may be interpreted 
this way (Fodor, 2007; Richards, 2012). Yet another normative strategy is a form 
of bottom-up approach, abstracting normative standard from the observation of 
scientific practice in the field under consideration.  Because the origin of 
evolutionary novelties is a complex phenomenon and because biology is a 
domain of specialised science, much scientific research addressing the problem 
will be partial, focusing on different research questions that can be seen as parts 
of the wider problem of the origin of novelty (Love, 2008).  
 
It is important to note that these strategies can be used by scientists themselves 
to either criticise past or competing theories and explanations or to elaborate and 
justify their own theories and explanations. They engage in these strategies often 
without explicit reference to work in philosophy of science, or more rarely, they 
can make explicit use of philosophy of science. One example of the latter is the 
use of philosophical concepts of Karl Popper by some proponents of the cladistics 
method in systematics (Hull, 1988). It is also the case of some practitioners of 
evo-devo who have been entertaining a dialogue and have sometimes directly 
collaborated with philosophers of science and who explicitly use concepts from 
                                                 
3 The idea of confrontation has also been used to describe an approach seeking to test theories of 
scientific change by applying them to historical or contemporary scientific case studies (see below).  
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this discipline to elaborate or clarify their own theories (Minelli & Pradeu, 2014; 
Müller & Pigliucci, 2010; Wagner, 2000, 2014). 
 
My approach will not be primarily normative. I focus on the functional-historical 
conception and the evo-devo conception of novelty without presupposing 
whether the explanations they each produce are competing, or partial and 
integrable into more complete explanations, or complementary, focusing on 
different types of phenomena. I will try to understand to what extent the distinction 
between these conceptions of novelty is justified, and what the reasons – 
theoretical, methodological, empirical, historical, sociological - of their distinction 
are. My approach is close to what Jutta Schickore (2011) has called an 
hermeneutic approach in history and philosophy of science. As opposed to a 
normative stance intending to determine the criteria of adequacy of a scientific 
explanation and whether specific scientific explanations meet these criteria, and 
as opposed to a confrontational stance intending to test philosophical theories of 
science on historical case studies, the hermeneutic stance is an interpretative  
process of progressive adjustment of provisional analytic concepts used to make 
sense of particular forms of scientific practice or particular scientific historical 
episodes My approach is hermeneutic in that the concepts of form and function 
and the functional-historical and evo-devo conceptions of novelty, among others, 
are provisional concepts to be refined in order to understand research on 
evolutionary novelty in the last eighty years or so  
 
Plants and the generalisation of theories of novelty 
 
The empirical research on novelties in plants is booming, but the 
conceptual and philosophical work as well as the general theories about novelty 
are elaborated with mostly the animal kingdom in mind  As stated before, the 
renewal of attention on the concept of evolutionary novelty in the last three 
decades is tied to the rise of the evo-devo movement (Müller & Newman, 2005). 
The founders of this movement were mostly developmental biologists, either with 
a molecular focus or a morphological focus, whose empirical work was generally 
based on animal species (Morange, 2011).  The contemporary work on 
evolutionary novelties is still predominantly based on research on animal species. 
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A comprehensive quantitative survey to back this claim is still needed, however 
a look at theoretical writings and review articles on evolutionary novelty gives an 
unambiguous picture (Hall & Kerney, 2012; HallgrÍmsson et al., 2012; Moczek, 
2008; Müller & Pigliucci, 2010; G. P. Wagner, 2014).  
 
In his review article, Mockzek (2008) refers to many examples, mostly from 
research on arthropods (butterflies, beetles, flies, fireflies …) but not one from 
research on plant species. In their review article on novelty, Hall and Kerney 
(2012) review six examples, four from vertebrate species and two from 
invertebrate species (worms).  Hallgrimsson et al. (2012) develop a general 
definition of novelty, relying on four examples, none of them including plant 
species. Meanwhile, Wagner (2014) develops a general theory of novelty, 
devoting five chapters to examples of novelty, with one on new cell types, three 
on different novelties in vertebrates, and one on the evolution of floral organ.  
 
The problem of theoretical generalisation, understood as the problem of the 
scope of applicability of a theory or a finding, is pervasive in biology (Darden, 
1996) and relative significance controversies, that is, controversies about these 
scopes of applicability, arise at every level in biology (Beatty, 1995). The problem 
occurs even at a small phylogenetic scale because of the small number of model 
organisms compared to the large number of extinct and extant species. It should 
become even more complicated when generalisations expand to different 
kingdoms.  
 
The turn towards history 
 
 In many historical narratives of research on novelty in the last decades, 
the rise of evo-devo is presented as the crucial event4 This is because these 
                                                 
4 Problems and questions actually arise from the complexity of evo-devo’s nature and historical roots 
and the multiplicity of conceptual and historical interpretations rather than from a lack of scholarship In 
agreement with the dominant view of evo-devo centred on developmental genetics, there is a dominant 
narrative of the history of evo-devo centred on the progressive discovery of developmental regulatory 
genes  Several conceptual tools have been used by different authors to offer alternative narratives. For 
example, the idea of a romantic, an enthusiastic and an academic phase in the history of evo-devo used 
by Wagner, Laubichler and Chiu (Gunter P. Wagner, 2007; Günter P. Wagner, Chiu, & Laubichler, 2000); 
the distinction between the perspective of problems and the perspective of tools proposed by Alan Love 
(2005) and also used by Gerd Müller (2007) ; the Bachelardian concept of “epistemological obstacle” 
used by Michel Morange (2011) 
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narratives have often been written from the point of view of evo-devo, either by 
practitioners or by historians or philosophers with a sympathetic outlook. Indeed, 
the involvement of scientists with the history of their field is as striking in the case 
of evo-devo as it was in the case of the Modern Synthesis. In analysing the 
relation of evo-devo practitioners to history, Manfred Laublicher and Jane 
Maienschein offer the following reading:  
 
“This historical approach gives a unique perspective on, and informs, current 
developments; in that way, historical awareness can actually improve scientific 
practice. Practitioners of evolutionary developmental biology have long recognized 
this fact, and there is probably no other group of scientists that is currently as 
deeply engaged in discussions about the history of their field. The ambiguous 
status of evolutionary developmental biology as a new “synthesis” and the diversity 
of its multiple research agendas certainly contribute to this interest in history, as 
does the deeply historical character of its main scientific problems.” (2007, p.25) 
 
Some historians or historians-philosophers of science have embraced the 
endeavour of scientists and promoted a form of partisan history For example, 
Ronald Amundson has offered a history of biology from the point of view of evo-
devo (Amundson, 2005) In that case, the historian-philosopher takes part in the 
same historical project as the scientists, picking his side and joining in on the 
battlefield Others have warned against being enrolled or even used by scientists 
as a risk the historian should try to avoid (Cain, 2009) This focus on history could 
be understood in the context of the struggle of a new discipline for power and 
recognition. The search for eminent predecessors can be seen as a way to 
anchor the discipline in a tradition, to show that the new discipline is not an 
anomaly is the history of biology. Georges Canguilhem, for example, has noted 
this use of history “scientists, when they explore new or controversial fields, need 
to find themselves prestigious predecessors to be heard by their peers” 
(Canguilhem & Delaporte, 1994)  
 
A focus on a functional-historical approach to novelty prompts another 
perspective on the history of research on novelty and a reappraisal of the 
question of research on novelty in the Modern Synthesis era.  
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OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
 
 
 Chapter 1 focuses on different characterisations of the problem of the 
origin of novelty in contemporary biology and attempts to tease apart the 
conceptual, theoretical, disciplinary and historical reasons for these differences. 
Since practitioners of evolutionary developmental biology have defined this 
problem of the origin of novelty as central to their endeavour and have produced 
substantial amount of definitional, theoretical and empirical work, the 
characterisations of the problem produced in this literature are a natural place to 
start the investigation. The problem of novelty plays an important part in the 
definition of the identity of evo-devo as distinct from, or alternatively, as 
competing with, the Modern Synthesis. According to an influential group of evo-
devo practitioners, novelty is outside of the scope of the Modern Synthesis as a 
theoretical framework because of the latter’s neglect of development as an 
evolutionary factor and because of the distinction between novelty and 
adaptation, identified as its central explanandum. 
 
I single out another approach to the problem of novelty that I call the functional-
historical approach. I identify its roots, its contemporary manifestations and its 
evolving characterisation of the problem of novelty. I stress its continuity between 
the Modern Synthesis era and the contemporary period. I then focus on the 
reasons for its rejection or neglect by evo-devo practitioners. One important 
reason is the distinction between novelty and adaptation I distinguish several 
forms of the distinction found in the evo-devo literature by relating it to the 
biological and philosophical problem of the creativity of natural selection.  
 
The importance of the functional-historical approach to novelty and the historical 
variations of the conception of the relation between novelty and adaptation call 
for a reappraisal of research on novelty during the Modern Synthesis era. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are mainly devoted to this task In chapter 2, I investigate the 
position of novelty in the landscape of concepts and research central to the 
Modern Synthesis. I identity four essential concepts, each involving several 
disciplines and research programs: species and speciation, origin of higher taxa, 
increase in complexity and adaptation. Focusing on different research programs 
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and different uses of the same concepts reveals a plural picture that is eluded in 
some contemporary representations of the Modern Synthesis. For example, the 
concept of preadaptation is used by George Gaylord Simpson within the 
ecological framework of the theory of adaptive radiations. In contrast, a different 
version of the concept is used by functional morphologists to study the origin of 
evolutionary novelties. The focus on both zoological and botanical research 
reveals important contrasts. For example, the relation of experimental taxonomy 
to novelty is not identical in zoology and in botany Furthermore, the problem of 
the origin of the angiosperm flower, related to research on the origin of the 
angiosperm as a taxon involves methodological problems and research 
strategies that are different from those found in research on animal novelties  
 
In chapter 3, I address debates in the historiography of the Modern Synthesis 
more directly I identify three central characteristics of the dominant view of the 
Modern Synthesis, its gene-centrism, the exclusion of development and the 
consensual nature of the Synthesis, especially of the late Synthesis. A focus on 
research related to the problem of novelty in the Modern Synthesis era can shed 
light on debates about the interpretation of the Modern Synthesis. The idea that 
development was fully excluded from the Modern Synthesis has already been 
nuanced by some historians (Davis, Dietrich, & Jacobs, 2009; Love, 2009). Here, 
I focus on Bernhard Rensch and George Ledyard Stebbins, two well-known 
architects of the Modern Synthesis. I analyse their research and theorisation on 
development and novelty, which are neglected part of their work, and further 
challenge some received views on the Modern Synthesis. Another path to an 
alternative view on the Modern Synthesis is opened by focusing on Ernst Mayr’s 
theory of genetic revolutions as a speculative theory of the rapid origin of 
phenotypic novelties. Although Mayr’s theory has been widely commented on 
and criticised, its relation to the problem of the origin of novelties, explicitly 
theorised by Mayr has not been thoroughly studied. Focusing on the conceptual, 
theoretical and empirical background to Mayr’s theory sheds new light on 
controversies within the late Modern Synthesis.  
 
 
In chapter 4, I focus on the relationship of novelty to the concepts of homology. 
The close relationship between the two concepts will have been presented in 
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chapter 1 and illustrated by the debate on the origin of the angiosperm flower in 
the Modern Synthesis era. The contemporary relationship of developmental 
genetics to homology bears on the question of the origin of the flower and on 
general theories of the origin of novelties.  Some of the most influential 
researchers working on the problem of novelty rely on character-based definitions 
of novelty (Müller & Newman, 2005; Müller & Wagner, 1991; G. P. Wagner, 1989, 
2014) These definitions are crucially dependent on the biological concept of 
homology based on developmental genetics Although research on novelty is 
dependent on phylogenetic systematics, the biological concept of homology 
conflicts with the use of the concept in phylogenetic systematics. I will show that 
the progress in plant developmental genetics has shed new light on the problems 
of the origin of the angiosperm flower and of homologies among plant characters. 
This, I argue, has prompted Günter Wagner to recently apply his general 
developmental genetic theory of the origin of novelty to this problem. I will 
examine Wagner’s application of his theory and show that it raises questions 
regarding generalisations in evo-devo. 
 
 
This historical and philosophical endeavour to document and make sense of 
functional-historical approaches to novelty and their relation to evo-devo 
approaches can be related to  contemporary calls for (Breuker et al, 2006 
Brigandt and Love, 2012 Hallgrímsson et al, 2012) and practice of (eg Budd, 
2006 Galis, 1996 Niklas, 2000 DB Wake, 2009) a functional evo-devo The 
dominance of a structuralist perspective in evo-devo, focusing on changes in form 
without a concern for functional questions, is an uncontroversial fact (Brigandt 
and Love, 2012, p. 423). Criticisms of this bias and attempts at integrating 
structural and functional considerations in evo-devo have recently been 
formulated. This thesis can be viewed as a historical and philosophical 
contribution to this project by providing elements of a history of functional 
approaches to novelty and by showing continuities as well as evolutions between 
research projects of the Modern Synthesis era and some contemporary projects 
in constructional, evolutionary and functional morphology as well as evo-devo.  
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CHAPTER 1: TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF NOVELTY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The issue of the existence of a multiplicity of definitions of novelty and the 
debates about the appropriate definition can be related to and partly diffused by 
the existence of different research programs addressing different questions 
related to the phenomenon of qualitatively new variations in evolution (Brigandt 
& Love, 2012). That there should exist different formulations of the problem of 
novelty and different ways to characterise it in the biological literature should not 
be a surprise considering the complexity of the phenomenon alone However, 
many questions remain regarding the reasons for these differences in formulation 
of the problem and regarding the relations between these formulations  
 
This chapter will involve different levels of investigation. At a first level, the focus 
will be on the formulation and characterisation of the problem of novelty: What is 
the problem of the origin of novelty? How is it distinguished from other problems 
such as the origin of adaptations? How should it be decomposed? What are the 
research questions that need to be addressed? And what are the biological 
disciplines that need to be involved?  
 
I will contrast the formulation and characterisation of the problem by evo-devo 
practitioners and the formulation of the problem according to what I will call the 
functional-historical approach Therefore, another level of investigation will resort 
to understanding the relationship between the two approaches Is it that the evo-
devo and functional-historical appraoch are addressing different problems? 
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Different types of novelties? To what extent can they be considered 
complementary explanations?  
 
Outline of the chapter 
 
 In the first section I will address the evo-devo characterisation of the 
problem of novelty Since the concept of novelty is embedded in theoretical 
controversies, I will first provide some context on the matter and on the situation 
of novelty in the debates In the second section I will turn to the functional-
historical approach by focusing on its formulation and use by Charles Darwin, 
Anton Dohrn and Walter Bock I will then discuss some of its contemporary 
developments In the third section I will focus on some causes of the relative 
separation between the evo-devo and the functional-historical approach In the 
last section I will come back to the distinction between novelty and adaptation 
and compare how it is put to use in an evo-devo and a functional-historical 
explanation of novelty  
 
I – CHARACTERISATION OF THE PROBLEM OF NOVELTY THE VIEW OF EVO-
DEVO 
 
 
 The problem of the origin of evolutionary novelties has been revived and 
appropriated by practitioners of evo-devo since the beginning of the 1980s. Some 
of these practitioners have made considerable efforts both to define the concept 
(HallgrÍmsson et al., 2012; Müller, 2010; Müller & Newman, 2005; Müller & 
Wagner, 1991; Wagner, 2014; West-Eberhard, 2003), determine the research 
questions involved in the problem (Laubichler, 2007; Love, 2005, 2008; Müller & 
Newman, 2005; Wagner, 2000), and to empirically study and explain cases of 
novelty5 Therefore, when trying to characterise the problem of novelty in 
contemporary biology, this literature in evo-devo appears as an appropriate 
starting point.  
 
                                                 
5 Empirical case studies are too numerous to refer here, examples of research on particular novelties 
will be provided along the thesis.  
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In this literature, the characterisation of the problem of novelty is often associated 
with a criticism of the Modern Synthesis, the still dominant theoretical framework 
in evolutionary biology which was elaborated around the middle of the 20th 
century. For the present purpose, the Modern Synthesis theoretical framework 
can be defined with a small set of tenets, as it usually is in the contemporary 
literature (Amundson, 2005; de Ricqlès & Padian, 2009; Futuyma, 2015; 
Kutschera & Niklas, 2004; Laland et al., 2015; Müller & Pigliucci, 2010; Reif, 
Junker, & Hossfeld, 2000): 
 
(1) The central unit of evolution is the population of organisms, and not 
individual organisms (centrality of population genetics).  
(2) The source of variation is inheritable genetic mutations that are not 
directed by the needs of the organisms, but that are not necessarily 
random in other respects. Mutations of small phenotypic effect have a 
more important role in evolution than mutations of large effect, which are 
usually lethal or deleterious. 
(3) Changes in the genetic and phenotypic compositions of populations are 
caused by natural selection, genetic drift, mutations, genetic 
recombination and migrations. 
(4) Among these factors, natural selection acting on individuals in populations 
is the main cause of adaptation of organisms to their environment.  
(5) Species are gradually formed by the splitting of populations and the 
emergence of reproductive isolation between the sub-populations via 
several mechanisms. 
(6) The phenomena of macroevolution, that is, the large-scale patterns of 
evolution and the origin of higher taxa (families, orders, classes, phyla) 
and of their specific characters (novelties) can be explained by the 
accumulated action of factors of microevolution described in (3).  
 
The history of the formation of the Modern Synthesis and the question of its 
theoretical content will be dealt with in more detail in chapters 2 and 3. From the 
inception of evo-devo (Bonner, 1982), to its maturation phase (Hall, 1999; Müller 
& Newman, 2005b, 2005a; Newman & Müller, 2000; Raff, 2000; Wagner, 2000; 
Wagner, Chiu, & Laubichler, 2000), and until recent years (Müller & Pigliucci, 
2010; A. Wagner, 2014; G. P. Wagner, 2014), the problem of novelty has often 
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been negatively characterised as that which is not and cannot be explained within 
the Modern Synthesis framework. More precisely, two claims are recurrent:  
A) The problem of novelty has been put aside by the Modern Synthesis 
 
“Evolutionary innovations are outside the scope of any current research 
program. Through its contribution to the solution of that question, [evo-
devo] genuinely expands the explanatory range of evolutionary theory” 
(Wagner et al., 2000, p.822); 6 
 
B) The Modern Synthesis did not have the theoretical means to explain novelty  
 
“It has become possible to address phenomena of evolution that were 
untreatable by the [Modern Synthesis], and to cast them as “how” 
questions, such as How did body plans originate? How did homoplasies 
arise? How did novelties evolve? How do organisms change phenotypes 
in response to different environments?” (Pigliucci et al., 2010, p12-13) 
 
My focus here is on the characterisation of the problem of novelty; the definitional 
and normative debates about the present and future theoretical framework of 
evolutionary biology have a much wider range, and a detailed analysis of these 
debates is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, because the reference to 
the failures or limitations of Modern Synthesis concepts and research programs 
plays such an important part in the characterisation of the problem of novelty by 
evo-devo practitioners, some contextualisation is required.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Here are a few other examples: “ the majority of the new work concerns problems of evolution that 
had been sidelined in the MS and are now coming to the fore ever more strongly, such as the specific 
mechanisms responsible for major changes of organismal form, the role of plasticity and environmental 
factors, or the importance of epigenetic modes of inheritance.” ((Pigliucci, Müller, & others, 2010, p.12). 
“I will make the argument that one of the main benefits of a deeper understanding of homology is that 
it enables an empirical research program on the major transitions in evolution, in particular the origin of 
evolutionary novelties. I argue that the origin of novel characters and novel body plans is one of the 
most important but least researched questions in evolutionary biology.”(Wagner, 2014, p. 3) 
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Overview of the contemporary debate on the content and structure of evolutionary 
biology 
 
From the 1970s onwards, a series of theories and research programs on 
phenomena absent from or marginal in the Modern Synthesis has been growing 
aside from this dominant framework in evolutionary biology. As a consequence, 
some have expressed a call to replace the framework of the Modern Synthesis 
with a “new synthesis” (Stephen J. Gould, 1987)  or more recently with an evo-
devo synthesis (Müller, 2007), or an “Extended Synthesis” (Laland et al., 2014, 
2015; Müller & Pigliucci, 2010; Pigliucci, 2009). Central behind the idea of a new 
synthesis was the theory of punctuated equilibrium (Eldredge & Gould, 1972), the 
first major attack against the Modern Synthesis7 Punctuated equilibrium is a 
theory of macroevolution opposed to one of the central tenets of the Modern 
Synthesis: extrapolationism (Mayr, 1942; Simpson, 1953), that is, the idea that 
macroevolution obeys the same principles as microevolution and thus can be 
deduced from the study of microevolution by population genetics. Behind the 
more recent call for an Extended Synthesis is a much more diverse constellation 
of theories. It is thus more difficult to determine which tenets of the Modern 
Synthesis, if any, are challenged by these new developments. 
A constellation of disciplines and research programs 
 
 One way to represent changes in evolutionary biology is to focus on the 
evolution of disciplines and research programs. To illustrate this evolution we can 
rely on the analysis of Massimo Pigliucci (2009) who offered the following 
representation of the expansion of evolutionary biology8 
                                                 
7 See (Gayon, 1990) for a review of criticisms against the Modern Synthesis until the end of the 1980s.  
8 Pigliucci’s representation is one among several others (e.g. Kutschera & Niklas, 2004; de Ricqlès & 
Padian, 2009; Müller & Pigliucci, 2010; Laland et al., 2015; Huneman, 2014; Love, 2010) but as I stated 
earlier, my goal is not to review these representations or to argue for one in particular.  
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Figure 1 Representation of the evolution of evolutionary biology since Darwin The small 
circle contains the two fundamental principles proposed by Darwin. The middle circle 
contains the components of the Modern Synthesis. In the largest circle, are, in addition 
to the previous elements, the theories and phenomena absent or marginal in the Modern 
Synthesis (redrawn after Pigliucci, 2009). 
 
Pigliucci notes that this diagram contains “ideas, phenomena studied and fields 
of inquiry” (Pigliucci, 2009, p. 226). The outer circle reflects (parts of) the 
contemporary research landscape. This expansion does not in itself have 
unequivocal consequences in terms of the theoretical content and structure of 
evolutionary theory in biology. There are at least four reasons for this 
indeterminacy: research pluralism, multiple interpretations, relative significance 
and theoretical or explanatory pluralism By research pluralism, I mean the 
multiplicity of approaches and theoretical perspectives contained in the different 
fields of enquiry. This is especially true of evo-devo and will be addressed in more 
detail in the next section. Because this pluralism characterises many of the new 
fields of inquiry, the relationship between them and the dominant theoretical 
framework is not straightforward. Multiple interpretations refer to the different 
possible ways to integrate the same phenomenon within a wider theoretical 
framework. This can be illustrated by a recent formulation of an Extended 
Synthesis (Laland et al., 2015, see also 2014). Laland and colleagues rely on the 
importance of developmental bias, developmental plasticity, inclusive inheritance 
and niche construction to vindicate an Extended Synthesis. According to them, 
what differentiates the Extended Synthesis is the interpretation of these 
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phenomena as ultimate causes, having an effect on the course of evolution, while 
the Modern Synthesis interprets them as only proximate causes, relevant for 
functional biology but not for evolutionary biology (Mayr, 1961; Laland, Sterelny, 
Odling-Smee, Hoppitt, & Uller, 2011).9 Relative significance (Beatty, 1995, 1997) 
refers to the fact that biological sciences are rarely a search for universal laws; 
many debates in evolutionary biology for example are not about whether a theory 
correctly describes all possible cases of evolution but about the proportion of 
cases of evolution that it correctly describes. Some theories can be recognised 
as unorthodox and the existence of the process they describe acknowledged but 
they can still be no threat to the Modern Synthesis because they are considered 
only marginal. For example the occurrence of sudden speciation by a single 
mutation is not contested, especially in plants (e.g. Niklas, 1997), and the debate 
rather regards whether it should be considered as a major factor in evolution. 
Finally, by theoretical or explanatory pluralism, I refer to the combination of 
different causal factors in the same explanation (Mitchell, 2003). The problem is 
then to determine the explanatory weight of each factor. A classic example is the 
determination of the relative contribution of selection and drift in a sequence of 
microevolution.  
Conservatism, expansionism or revolution 
 
 In order to give an overview, three positions can be distinguished in 
ongoing debates: conservative, expansionist and revolutionary. For the strict 
conservative, the supposedly new theories are either already included in the 
Modern Synthesis or genuinely new but too marginal empirically to grant a 
change in the framework. The revolutionary discards one or several central 
principles of the Modern Synthesis. Among these principles, it is natural selection 
that is the main target of attacks. Its predominant role in evolution has been 
questioned from several standpoints: by Gould and others placing contingency 
over natural selection (Gould, 2000); by self-organisation theorists (Kauffman, 
1993; Newman, Forgacs, & Muller, 2006); by developmental or evo-devo 
biologists insisting on the role of developmental constraints (Schwenk & Wagner, 
2003); even by population geneticists attributing a greater role to alternative 
factors such as drift (M. Lynch, 2007a, 2007b).  
                                                 
9 I will come back to the proximate causes/ultimate causes distinction in relation to the problem of 
novelty in the next part of this chapter.  
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However, very few protagonists of the debate present themselves as 
revolutionaries or as strict conservatives. One of the central issues concerns the 
meaning that is given to the term expansion. There is more than one way to be 
an expansionist. On the one side, most defenders of the Modern Synthesis would 
argue for an accommodating expansionism in which new theories fit into already 
formulated problems and explanations as complements or exceptions (Laland et 
al., 2014) . On the other side, proponents of the “new” or the “extended” synthesis 
argue for a quarrelsome expansionism. In this view, expanding the framework 
means formulating and addressing problems of evolutionary biology that have 
not been properly formulated and addressed by the Modern Synthesis, thus 
considering the latter as only a partial framework. For example, the theory of 
punctuated equilibrium states that macroevolution is not properly addressed by 
the Modern Synthesis. Another example is the distinction between the problem 
of adaptation and the problem of form (Amundson, 1994, 2005). According to this 
“structuralist” perspective, the Modern Synthesis addresses the problem of the 
arising of adaptations, this being attested by the central role of population 
genetics and ecology; but it leaves aside the problem of the production and 
change of form, as attested by the absence of embryology in the Modern 
Synthesis. 
 
The old and the new in evo-devo 
  
 I now return to the problem of novelty as it is formulated by practitioners of 
evo-devo. The characterisation of the problem of the origin of novelties as outside 
of the scope of the Modern Synthesis is better understood if replaced in the 
context of a general characterisation of evo-devo in terms of different types of 
contributions to biology, some of which are integrated to pre-existing research 
programs while others involve the creation of new research programs10 While it 
                                                 
10 The terms evo-devo and devo-evo have been used by some practitioners and theorists to draw a 
distinction within research programs associating evolution and development The problem is that there 
is little agreement on the definition of the two terms and their relations Some state that they are 
complementary research programs (e.g. Müller, 2007) On the other hand, Brian Hall sees them as 
conflicting interpretations of the field (Hall, 2000), or as synonyms (Hall, 2003) The difficulty with the 
meaning of the distinction of between evo-devo and devo-evo can partly be explained by the causes of 
indeterminacy mentioned earlier (research pluralism, multiple interpretations, relative significance and 
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is difficult to determine the proportion or evo-devo practitioners who adhere to 
this representation of their field, it has been forcefully vindicated by influential 
figures (Gilbert, 2003; Laubichler, 2007; Müller, 2007; Wagner, 2000, 2001; 
Wagner, Chiu, & Laubichler, 2000) One clear formulation is provided by Günter 
Wagner and colleagues (Wagner, Chiu, & Laubichler, 2000; see also Laubichler, 
2007) Among the contributions of evo-devo to existing research programs, they 
include 
 
_ The evolution of development This is the study of the evolution of 
developmental characters, using the same framework as for the evolution of 
genes and phenotypes It integrates into this existing research program by adding 
one type of entity. The evolution of some of these developmental characters, 
such as developmental pathways, involving DNA, RNA and transcription factor 
proteins, is decoupled from the evolution of the phenotypic characters they 
determine Homological characters can be generated with developmental 
pathways that underwent divergent evolution while the characters stayed the 
same This pervasive phenomenon has been called “developmental system drift” 
(Haag & True, 2001, 2018)  
 
_ The assessment of homologies As stated in the introduction, homology is a 
relation of identity between characters in different organisms explained by 
common descent11 The assessment of homologies is a program initiated in 
comparative anatomy before the Darwinian revolution (Amundson, 2005; 
Panchen, 1994) Gene expression patterns add a level at which to establish 
homologies, as well as a level of evidence to assess relations of homology 
between characters, although, as the phenomenon of developmental system drift 
alone shows, there does not exist a simple relation between homology at the level 
of morphological characters and homology at the level of developmental 
pathways. This has led some to develop a hierarchical view of homology 
(Abouheif, 1997; Hall, 1994) 
 
                                                 
explanatory pluralism). Because of this confusion of meanings and because the distinction seems to 
have faded from the more recent literature, I will not rely on it here. 
11 Several types of homology can actually be distinguished These types, and the impact of competing 
theories of homology on the problem of novelty will be covered in detail in chapter 4  
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_ The genotype-phenotype map of adaptation. The two main disciplines involved 
in the quantitative study of adaptation, population genetics and quantitative 
genetics, focus on genes and phenotypic traits, respectively, leaving aside the 
question of development, that is, the question of the processes of production of 
phenotypes. Populations genetics focuses on the dynamics of gene frequencies 
in populations. Quantitative genetics focuses on the dynamics of different values 
of quantitative phenotypic traits, assumed to be controlled by many genes. Evo-
devo provides information on the developmental genes involved in quantitative 
phenotypic differences within species or between closely related species, such 
as species of Drosophila or stickleback fishes (Chan et al., 2010; Hohenlohe et 
al., 2010; Jones et al., 2012; Peichel et al., 2001; Taylor & McPhail, 2000).  
 
As opposed to the three contributions of evo-devo just reviewed, the study of 
developmental constraints12 and of the origin of evolutionary novelties are the 
research programs that are introduced by evo-devo. Regarding novelty, several 
justifications of its situation outside of the scope of previous research programs 
have been given by different authors  
 
Evo-devo and the origin of novelties as a new research question 
 
Why is the problem of novelty outside the scope of existing research programs?  
 
 In section IV of this chapter, I will argue that the following characterisations 
of the problem of novelty, especially 2) and 3), can be challenged, partly on the 
basis of clarifications of different meanings of the concepts and function, 
adaptation and novelty. For now I will present these different characterisations.  
 
1) A problem distinct from the problem of adaptation 
 
A first way to single out novelty  is to distinguish it from adaptation as two distinct 
problems (Amundson, 2005; Brigandt & Love, 2012; Love, 2013; Müller & 
                                                 
12 There are many definitions of developmental constraints, and perhaps the most widely used is “a bias 
on the production of variant phenotypes caused by the structure, character, composition, or dynamics 
of the developmental system” (Smith et al., 1985). I will not focus directly on developmental constraints 
here.  
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Newman, 2005; Wagner, 2014) Adaptation, understood in its “engineering” 
meaning, denotes the good design of organisms or of their characters. The study 
of how organisms appear designed to perform certain function does not depend 
on an evolutionary view of life and was already undertaken by Aristotle and many 
others after him. Within an evolutionary framework, the question is transformed 
into how this is design produced through evolution, or more exactly this 
evolutionary problem is added to the first descriptive problem.  In contrast, novelty 
is not a problem of design but a problem of differences between organisms. The 
problem of how new characters arise is distinct from the problem of how these 
characters become better designed to perform certain functions. It can be said 
that there is also a pre-evolutionary version of the problem of novelty: just like the 
non-evolutionary counterpart to the origin of adaptation is the study of design or 
functional biology, the non-evolutionary counterpart to the origin of novelty is the 
comparative study of commonalities and differences between organisms, that is, 
comparative anatomy, morphology or physiology.  
  
 
2) Different processes and their different outcomes 
 
While a distinction between novelty and adaptation in terms of  problems 
does not imply any claim on the causal factors involved, a distinction between 
variation and innovation, as different processes, and adaptation and novelty as 
their respective outcomes implies distinct causal factors at play (Müller & 
Newman, 2005; Peterson & Müller, 2013, 2016). The argument goes as follows: 
adaptations are the result of the action of natural selection on existing characters 
presenting heritable variations. So there has to be a pre-existing character in 
order for natural selection to act on small variations of this same character in a 
population to lead to an adaptation. Novelties cannot be the result of this process 
precisely because they are new characters. They are the starting points of the 
process of variation leading to adaptations but they cannot be the result of this 
same process. The process of innovation is thus different from the process of 
variation.  
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3) A different balance of explanatory force 
 
Another way to conceive the specificity of novelty is through the concept of 
explanatory force, taken by Günter Wagner from Ronald Amundson (1989). This 
concept can be related to the notion of explanatory pluralism described earlier. 
The distinction is formulated in epistemic and relative terms rather than in causal 
and absolute terms it is not that natural selection has not causal role in the 
generation of novelty, it is that population genetic processes are only marginally 
explanatory significant in cases of novelty, whereas they are more significant than 
developmental processes in other cases of variation or stasis such as the 
maintenance of the 1:1 sex ratio in populations.  
 
“The question we need to answer is this: in what kind of situations do developmental 
mechanisms contribute more to the explanation of an evolutionary process than 
population genetic mechanisms? Or, alternatively: what are the characteristics of 
situations where population genetics contributes more to an explanation than 
developmental genetics?” (Wagner, 2000, p. 96) 
 
In the case of the stable 1:1 sex ratio, there are many different mechanisms that 
can bias the sex of the offspring in different species. What explains the stability 
of the sex ratio across species are not the particular mechanisms occurring in 
different cases but the frequency dependent selection that favors the sex that is 
underrepresented in the population. In contrast, in cases of novelty, such as the 
origin of eyespot patterns on butterfly wings, the explanatory force is found in the 
properties of the cells that form the organiser of the eyespot and in the co-optation 
of a complex of regulatory genes that are responsible for the formation of the 
anterior-posterior compartmentalization of the larva.  
Characterisation of the problem of novelty 
 
The way in which Wagner and colleagues (2000) conceive the different 
research questions implied by the problem of novelty can be presented by 
focusing on the disciplines that they consider necessary to tackle the problem. 
 
1) Comparative anatomy or morphology is needed to define the 
characters that are to be explained. Establishing relations of homology 
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between characters in different species is essential if one relies on a 
definition of novelty as a non-homologue. As stated in the introduction, 
this definition of novelty is related to a debate about the nature of 
homology that will be addressed in chapter 4. This debate can be left 
aside for now. Regardless of the concept of novelty that one subscribes 
to, comparative anatomy is essential to elaborate hypotheses of 
character transformation. Debates on the origin of particular novelties 
are sometimes partly debates about which ancestral character is 
homologous to the novelty. This will be illustrated in the next chapter 
with research on the origin of the angiosperm flower.  
2) Phylogenetic systematics is needed to establish evolutionary patterns. 
While comparative anatomy establishes non evolutionary relationships 
between characters, phylogenetic systematics establishes pattern of 
evolution of taxa and their characters. Thus, it is necessary either as a 
prerequisite for the establishment of hypotheses of character 
transformation or origination, or as a test of hypotheses. Again the role 
of phylogenetic systematics will be addressed in more details in 
chapters 2 and 4.  
3) Evolutionary genetics provides information on the selective forces 
acting on developmental genes. Wagner and colleagues include 
evolutionary genetics although as show in the last section Wagner 
does not attribute much explanatory power to it.  
4) Paleontology provides information on reconstruct sequences of 
character evolution. 
5) Developmental biology provides the mechanistic explanation of the 
origin of characters. 
 
Although the first four disciplines provide ancillary information, the central 
discipline involved in the explanation of novelty is developmental biology. The 
main component research questions are framed in developmental terms: 
 
_ “What is the developmental mechanism that accounts for the derived character 
(state)?” 
_  “Does the developmental mechanism for the derived character (-state) map to 
the same node on the phylogeny as the derived character (-state)?” 
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_  “What are the developmental changes that occurred at the origin of the derived 
character (-state)?” 
_ “Are the genetic differences sufficient to cause the derived character (-state)?” 
(Wagner, Chiu, & Laubichler, 2000, p. 827‑828) 
 
There are many epistemic difficulties arising from these research questions 
(Love, 2005; Wagner, Chiu, & Laubichler, 2000). I will however not address this 
issue here. My focus is on the characterisations of the problem of novelty and the 
differences in their content and the reasons why multiple characterisations exist. 
Considering the claims of some evo-devo practitioners mentioned earlier, there 
should not exist other approaches to the problem since the origin of novelty is 
said to be absent of any research program except the evo-devo program.  
 
In the next section I will focus on what I will call the functional-historical approach 
to novelty. In section III I will focus on the causes of the divide between the 
functional-historical approach and the evo-devo approach. In section IV I will 
come back to the relation between adaptation and novelty.  
 
 
II – THE FUNCTIONAL-HISTORICAL APPROACH TO NOVELTY 
 
Three stages in the functional-historical approach 
 
 The functional-historical explanation is multi-disciplinary in nature like the 
evo-devo approach, but whereas the latter is centred on developmental 
processes, the former is focused on physiology, functional morphology and 
behaviour. This distinction between the evo-devo approach and a functional-
historical approach relates to the venerable question of which concept, between 
form and function, should have the primacy as an organising principle of life and 
of the sciences of life (Russell, 1916). consequently, such a presentation could 
have started with George Cuvier or even Aristotle. However, my focus is on 
approaches to novelty. Therefore I will narrow my focus on functional theories of 
novelty. I will first present the approach as used by Charles Darwin, Anton Dohrn 
and Walter Bock before reflecting on its characterization of the problem of novelty 
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and justifying the use of the expression functional-historical (rather than simply 
functional, or adaptationist or adaptive-historical). The functional-historical 
approach can be presented in three stages: 
 
_ The origin of the functional-historical approach is found in Charles Darwin’s and 
Anton Dohrn’s tackling of the problem of the origin of novelties and their 
respective concepts of conversion of function and succession of functions 
(Funktionswechsel). 
 
_ The functional-historical approach in the late Modern Synthesis illustrated by  
Ernst Mayr, Walter Bock and Gerd Von Wahlert Mayr’s influential paper on the 
emergence of evolutionary novelty can be seen as a combination of Darwin’s 
conversion of function and Bock’s and Von Wahlert’s ideas in functional 
morphology with a stress on the role of behaviour as the “pacemaker” of 
evolution 
 
_ The third phase corresponds to some contemporary developments in  
functional and evolutionary morphology.  
 
Darwin and Dohrn, conversion and succession of functions 
 
 The concept of conversion of function is developed by Darwin in the first 
edition of the Origin of species (Darwin, 1859, chapter 6) and is expanded and 
given more importance in the sixth edition in reaction to criticisms formulated by 
St George Mivart, in particular regarding “the incompetency of natural selection 
to account for the incipient stages of useful structures” (Darwin, 1872, p. 176; see 
Mivart, 1871, chapter 2).  Darwin first introduced the idea as an answer to the 
difficulty that “organs of extreme perfection and complication” represent He 
notes “We should be extremely cautious in concluding that an organ could not 
have been formed by transitional gradations of some kind”. Conversion of 
function is one type of mechanism, among others, that can explain both the 
transitional gradations towards the production of new organs and the selective 
significance of incipient stages   
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“The illustration of the swimbladder in fishes is a good one, because it shows us 
clearly the highly important fact that an organ originally constructed for one 
purpose, namely flotation, may be converted into one for a wholly different 
purpose, namely respiration.” (Darwin, 1859, chapter 6) 
 
Although Darwin does not give a detailed definition of the principle, the common 
idea in all the examples that he provides is that at least some characters perform 
more than one function These different functions can be either equally important 
for the organism, or there can be a dominant function and another or several 
accessory functions The change in a character or the creation of new characters 
can then occur in different ways  
 
_ A multifunctional organ divides into several new organs, each performing one 
of the original functions  
_ Two structures perform the same functions, and one or both of these structures 
undergo change by specializing in one of the initial functions 
_ One structure has a dominant function and an accessory function, and the 
change occurs through the development of the second function   
 
The expression conversion of function seems to best fit the last case, but all three 
cases answer the problem of the incipient stages of new organs natural selection 
can act even at this early stage because the alternative function is already 
present To illustrate the last type, beside the transition from swim bladder to lung 
in fishes13, Darwin gives an example from barnacles (cirripedes) The branchiae 
of the sessile cirripedes are homologous to the ovigerous frena of the 
pedunculated cirripedes, which are folds of skin that hold the egg via an adhesive 
secretion In sessile cirripedes, the egg rests at the bottom of the sack, protected 
by a more enclosed shell The pedunculated cirripedes have no branchiae and 
breathe through the whole skin including the frena Darwin postulates the 
                                                 
13 This example of the conversion of the swimbladder into a lung is emblematic It is reused for example 
by Simpson (1953) and by Mayr in his article on novelty (1960) Stephen Jay Gould has stressed that 
Darwin’s explanation is “not only wrong, but backwards” (Gould, 2002, p. 1224) The hypothesis 
favoured by Gould (that lung is the ancestral and swimbladder the derived condition) was actually 
already the dominant one in the Modern Synthesis era, as noted by Mayr and Simpson (Simpson, 1953, 
p. 192, note 11; Mayr, 1960, p. 352). The case is still debated today The main competing hypothesis is 
the independent derivation of both organs from a respiratory pharynx (Lambertz and Perry, 2015; Perry 
and Sander, 2004) 
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progressive origin of branchiae from ovigerous frena by growth of their size and 
suppression of the secreting glands, with respiration becoming the primary 
function  
 
Anton Dohrn developed the concept of succession of function in relation to his 
theory of the evolution of vertebrates from annelids The main difference between 
Darwin’s concept and Dohrn’s is the higher degree of systematisation of the 
latter14  
 
“The transformation of an organ takes place by reason of the succession of the 
functions which one and the same organ possesses. Each function is a resultant 
of several components, of which one is the principal or primary function, while the 
others are the subsidiary or secondary functions. The weakening of the principal 
function and the strengthening of a subsidiary function alters the total function; 
the subsidiary function gradually becomes the chief function, the total function 
becomes quite different, and the consequence of the whole process is the 
transformation of the organ (Dohrn 1875, p60 cited by Russel, 1916, p. 276). 
 
This principle is applied by Dohrn to many organs in the hypothesised transition 
from annelids to vertebrates  The principle of succession grants a functional 
approach to phylogenetics and evolutionary morphology that Dohrn opposes to 
purely morphological approaches (Ghiselin, 2003; Nyhart, 2002)  
 
“In the principle of succession of functions a key arises, the assistance of which, 
in the application of all other embryological, palaeontological , comparative 
anatomical and physiological methods of investigation, would appear to move the 
solution of intricate problems towards clarification Hitherto it was the most 
dangerous precipice in genealogical investigations, that they proceeded on a 
one-sided morphological basis, without remembering physiological elements, 
except occasionally and through the very generally expressed term ‘adaptation’ 
The concept of succession of functions is purely physiological It contains the 
elements out of which perhaps an evolutionary history of functions will gradually 
arise But for that very reason it will also be of great use for morphology – and for 
the evolutionary history of structures, which, finally are only the content and the 
                                                 
14 On the relation between the concepts of Darwin and Dohrn, see Caianiello (2015) 
 40 
process of functions projected as form, and cannot even be conceived without 
functions” (Dohrn, 1875, p. 70; Dohrn and Ghiselin, 1994, p. 74) 
 
This functional approach will not have many successors until the late Modern 
Synthesis period (Dohrn & Ghiselin, 1994; Levit, Hossfeld, & Olsson, 2004; 
Sewertzoff, 1931; Waisbren, 1988) 
 
The second phase of the functional-historical approach 
 
Walter Bock the evolution of the avian medial brace as an illustration 
 
 In the Modern Synthesis era, the principle of conversion of function was 
referred to with the term of preadaptation. In chapter 2, I will focus more on the 
history of the concept of preadaptation and argue that it had different meanings 
and was put to different uses in the Modern Synthesis era. Walter Bock’ s version 
of the concept was close to the spirit of Darwin’s principle. In the article in which 
he introduced his version of the concept of preadaptation15, Walter Bock relied 
on the origin of a secondary jaw articulation in some groups of birds as an 
illustration (Bock, 1959). Bock noted that this rarely described articulation 
between the medial process (bony outgrowth) of the articular bone and a ventral 
process of the basitemporal plate, was present in some birds such as the black 
skimmer and the herring gull but absent in others such as the boat-tailed grackle, 
which has prominent bone processes but no articulation. The structure formed by 
the two processes, both in birds with the articulation and in birds without it, is 
called the medial brace. In species with a developed medial brace (that is, with 
prominent abutting bony processes), including those without the articulation, this 
structure limits the movement of the jaw through the contact between the bone 
                                                 
15 In an earlier paper, Bock (1959: 201) defined preadaptation as: "A structure is said to be preadapted 
for a new function if  its present form which enables it to discharge its original function also enables it to 
assume the new function whenever need for this function arises." While this definition is basically 
correct, it was formulated with a loose and rather erroneous concept of function so that it is necessary 
to redefine preadaptation within the framework of concepts developed in this paper. We would define 
preadaptation as follows: A feature is said to be preadapted when its present forms and functions (both 
utilized and non-utilized ones ) allow one of the faculties (either currently utilized or nonutilized) to 
acquire a new biological role and hence establish a new synergical relationship with the umwelt 
whenever the need (= appearance of the selection force) for this new adaptation (the faculty) should 
arise.” (Bock & von Wahlert, 1965, p. 292). I will come back to this double definition in the next section.  
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processes when the jaw is open. Other species of birds do not have a developed 
medial brace; in these species, the bony processes are small and there is no 
contact of the bones when the jaw is open. In all species, these processes serve 
as attachment points for jaw muscles. The question addressed by Bock is thus 
twofold how did the medial brace originate? And how did the basitemporal 
articulation of the medial brace originate? Bock hypothesised a transformation 
series from small bony processes to larger ones producing the medial brace. He 
additionally hypothesised that the basitemporal articulation originated in some 
species through epigenetic induction during ontogeny because of the closer 
contact between the processes. 
 
The most important point here is the method that Bock used to arrive at these 
hypotheses. Bock sketches this method in the following way 
 
“Study of the evolution of a structure must not cease with the establishment of 
correct sequences of the structural modifications. This is a necessary step, but it 
is as important or even more important to determine the ancestral structural form 
and the selection forces guiding the evolution of the structure. In discussions of 
the origin of a new structure, it is also necessary to know the "prehistory" of its 
several component parts.” (Bock, 1959, pp. 195–196) 
 
The study of functional morphology, behaviour and putative selective forces is 
essential in Bock’s elaboration of the evolutionary sequence of origination of the 
structures (medial brace and basitemporal articulation). Bock notes that there is 
a correlation between the presence of the medial brace and feeding behaviours 
involving increased forces on the jaw. For example, the black skimmer, which has 
the most developed medial brace among the known birds, feeds through flying 
low with its mandible in the water and faces strong pressures on the jaw when a 
fish is caught this way (in particular, a stress on the articular-quadrate hinge).  
Bock then infers that “[e]volution of the medial brace begins when a bird ‘acquires’ 
a more ‘active’ method of feeding” (p.196). Bock argues that active methods of 
feeding initiate two distinct selection pressures one for increased support of the 
mandible and one for increased muscular strength of the bill. The initial 
evolutionary trend was the increase in jaw musculature. This muscular increase 
implied an elongation of bony processes to which the muscles are attached. The 
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bony processes grew until they were large enough to be in contact when the 
bird’s bill is open  
 
“The structures are now in position - preadapted - to be acted upon by the 
selection forces for additional support of the mandible. The preadapted stage is 
difficult to recognize, but it may be present in the herons, especially the night-
herons (Nycticorax), and the cuckoos. At this stage in the evolution of the medial 
brace, the sole requirement is that the bones be in contact with one another only 
when the bill is opened.” (p.197) 
 
In some birds with active feeding behaviours exerting especially important forces, 
such as skimming, the mandibular support conferred by the medial brace was 
positively selected. This second selection pressure led to the further development 
of the medial brace until the close proximity of the processes favoured the 
origination of an articulation. Bock does not go into details on mechanism of origin 
of selection but insists that it did not initially required specific genetic changes. 
He refers to Schmallhausen’s theory of stabilizing selection (Schmalhausen, 
1949): the progressive increase in genetic control of initially environmentally or 
epigenetically induced phenotypic traits. 
 
Bock’s hypothesis was rapidly challenged on functional grounds (Zusi, 1962). 
This does not affect the interest of Bock’s explanation as an exemplar of the 
functional-historical approach to the origin of novelty. Two important features of 
Bock’s approach are to be distinguished 1) The functional-historical explanation 
of the origin of an evolutionary novelty; and 2) the method of relying of functional 
and selective factors to reconstruct character transformation and phylogenetic 
histories. The two dimensions (explanation of the origin and evolution of 
character and phylogenetic reconstruction) are intertwined in one single research 
endeavour. In chapter 2, I will focus on a similar situation with research on the 
origin and evolution of the angiosperm flower in the Modern Synthesis era. 
However, the validity of the functional-historical explanation is not dependent on 
the validity of the method of using selective factors for phylogenetic 
reconstruction. The latter will be criticised by proponents of cladistics in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Bock, 1981; Cracraft, 1981; Eldredge & Cracraft, 1980; Richards, 
2009) . 
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Ernst Mayr on the emergence of evolutionary novelties 
 
Mayr’s account of the origin of novelties in his influential paper ‘The 
emergence of evolutionary novelties” (Mayr, 1960) is structured around an 
opposition between gradualism and saltationism 
 
“The exact definition of an "evolutionary novelty" faces the same insuperable 
difficulty as the definition of the species.  As long as we believe in gradual 
evolution, we must be prepared to encounter immediate evolutionary stages. 
Equivalent to the cases in which it is impossible to decide whether a population 
is not yet a species or already a species, will be cases of doubt as to whether a 
structure is already or not yet an evolutionary novelty.  The study of this difficult 
transition from the quantitative to the qualitative is precisely one of the objects of 
this paper. Unwillingness to face such a difficult situation is one of the reasons so 
many authors have adopted a saltationist interpretation.” (Mayr, 1960, p. 351) 
 
Mayr (1960) himself seems to formulate the problem in population genetics 
terms: 
 
“The problem of the emergence of evolutionary novelties then consists in having 
to explain how a sufficient number of small gene mutations can be accumulated 
until the new structure has become sufficiently large to have selective value”  
 
But he immediately adds: “Or is there an explanation which avoids this 
troublesome threshold problem?” (p. 360). 
 
Mayr’s account is actually largely influenced by Darwin’s treatment of the 
question Mayr’s main process of the origin of novelty is change (or conversion) 
of function. He proposes two other processes: novelty as a pleiotropic by-product 
of a changing genotype, and novelty as a result of an intensification of function, 
but he states that change of function is “by far the main principle in the 
interpretation of the origin of new structures” (p. 360).  
 
The initiating conditions of a conversion of function are, according to Mayr, either 
a change in the environment, a change in behaviour, or a change in the structural 
environment, that is, the structural organisation of the organism Possibly Mayr’s 
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most original contribution is the stress on the role behavioural novelties or 
behavioural exploration in driving the change of morphological structures  
 
The functional-historical approach to novelty and concepts of function 
 
 Now that the approach has been presented, I will explain the use of the 
term functional-historical In a sense, the functional-historical approach as 
illustrated by Darwin, Bock and Mayr,  is adaptationist Bock and Von Wahlert 
make it clear 
 
“A definition of biological adaptation is inadequate unless it can be used as the 
foundation for an explanation of the mechanisms underlying the evolution of new 
adaptations and the adaptive origin of new major groups of organisms. These are 
not independent parts of evolutionary mechanisms; indeed, the solution of the 
latter question is completely dependent upon the solution of the former. The 
evolutionary principles for the emergence of novelties may be built upon the 
concept of adaptation advanced in this study by a synthesis of ideas such as 
those advanced by Mayr (1958, 1960, 1962, and 1963) and Bock (1959, 1963a) 
and with the concepts of population genetics such as those summarized by 
Lerner16 (1954, 1958).” (Bock & von Wahlert, 1965, p. 294)  
 
The resolution of the problem of novelty depends on adaptation However, 
because the functional-historical approach involves several concepts of function, 
it should not be equated to a naïve adaptationism stating that all the functions of 
the organism are the product of selection Regarding the concepts of function 
used in this approach, Bock and Von Wahlert’s changing definition of 
preadaptation is instructive  
 
“In an earlier paper, Bock (1959: 201) defined preadaptation as: "A structure is 
said to be preadapted for a new function if  its present form which enables it to 
discharge its original function also enables it to assume the new function 
whenever need for this function arises." While this definition is basically correct, 
it was formulated with a loose and rather erroneous concept of function so that it 
is necessary to redefine preadaptation within the framework of concepts 
                                                 
16 See chapter 3 
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developed in this paper. We would define preadaptation as follows: A feature is 
said to be preadapted when its present forms and functions (both utilized and 
non-utilized ones ) allow one of the faculties (either currently utilized or 
nonutilized) to acquire a new biological role and hence establish a new synergical 
relationship with the umwelt whenever the need (= appearance of the selection 
force) for this new adaptation (the faculty) should arise.” (Bock & von Wahlert, 
1965) 
 
Since Bock and Von Wahlert’s terminology is rather idiosyncratic, I will rely here 
on the terminology of Wouters (2003), who built on Bock and Von Wahlert’s 
account to distinguish four different concepts of function in biology17 Bock and 
Von Wahlert actually focus on two distinct concepts of function function as 
activity, function as biological role The distinction between function as activity 
and function as causal role is intended to distinguish between the functions that 
can be performed by a character or a set of characters and the functions that 
actually play a role in the survival or functional organisation of the organism For 
example rabbit legs can perform running, jumping, kicking, scratching  etc, these 
are their activities, and actually the activities of characters extend to all their 
physical and chemical properties A correlate of this concept of function is that it 
makes no sense to consider form completely separately Any form has functions 
in the sense of activities The actual biological roles of rabbit legs can be running 
to escape predators, or scratching to get rid of parasites All activities are not 
causal roles One of the points of Bock and Von Wahlert was to stress that tests 
of function in laboratories are not informative enough on the actual biological 
roles of the characters Bock and Von Wahlert focus primarily on morphological 
characters involved in locomotion or feeding but the idea can be extended to 
other characters such as organs like the lungs or the heart  
 
Related to the idea of conversion of function is the idea that characters can have 
a primary and secondary biological roles For example, in Darwin’s example of 
the barnacle ovigerous frena, the performance of respiration by the skin is not 
                                                 
17 My point here is to show the non-naïve use of functions employed by the functional-historical 
approach I will not engage directly with the philosophical literature on function  (Godfrey-Smith, 1994; 
Griffiths, 1994; Huneman, 2013; Nagel, 1977; A. Wouters, 2005; A. G. Wouters, 2003) 
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simply an activity but a secondary biological role It is hypothesised that this 
biological role progressively trumps the role of holding the eggs Another 
possibility is when an activity becomes a biological role The point here is to make 
clear that the concepts of functions used in the functional historical approach do 
not amount to a selectionist concept of function of the form the function of the 
character is that for which it or was selected  
 
The functional-historical approach and historical contingency 
 
 The approach is not only functional but also historical, first because there 
is an attention to the different functions adopted by characters through 
evolutionary time, but also because there is a place left for random events 
 
“Nor are all the functions, including all past and present ones, the only factors 
determining the form of a feature. It is not correct to assume that the form of a 
feature may be explained completely by correlating it with all past and present 
functions. An accidental component, one usually associated with the origin of the 
feature or with the major shifts in its evolution, is also involved. The basis for this 
accidental component stems largely from the chance factor in genetical changes 
such as mutations, chromosomal aberrations, and recombinations of all sorts. 
The accidental component forms the basis for the principle of multiple pathways 
of adaptation18 (Bock, 1959; Bock and Miller, 1959; Mayr, 1960 and 1962). 
Moreover, this accidental component is just as important in understanding the 
evolution of a single pathway of adaptive evolution.” (Bock & von Wahlert, 1965, 
p. 275) 
 
To the mutations evoked here can be added epigenetic events such as the one 
occurring in Bock’s hypothesis of the evolution of the avian basitemporal 
articulation The functional-historical approach involves contingency in both 
meanings distinguished by John Beatty unpredictability and dependence on 
initial conditions19  
 
                                                 
18 This principle will be covered again in the next chapter  
19 “a historically contingent sequence of events is one in which the prior states are necessary or strongly 
necessary (causal-dependence version), but insufficient (unpredictability version) to bring about the 
outcome.” (Beatty, 2006, p. 340)  
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The third phase  
 
 There has been a development of functional and evolutionary morphology 
prior to and then in parallel with evo-devo, from the 1950s until today Several 
evolutions are particularly significant 
 
1) Integration of criticism from anti-adaptationism, of cladistics and other 
methods to test hypothesis of evolution 
2) Constructional morphology and internal selection 
3) Integration of new methods and technologies in morphology 
4)  Specialisation into different fields  
5) Integration of different approaches and types of data, among which 
developmental data 
 
An important question of interpretation regards the degree of continuity between 
the approach of Mayr, and especially Bock and Von Wahlert, who focus on 
adaptation to the external environment and have no problem affiliating 
themselves to the Modern Synthesis and more recent developments in functional 
morphology illustrated by George Lauder (1981, 1986, 1990; Lauder & Liem, 
1989; Lauder & Thomason, 1995), David Wake (Lombard & Wake, 1976, 1977; 
Wake, 1982, 1991), Marvalee Wake (1992), Frieston Galis (1996) and many 
others. Walter Bock and Carl Gans20 are particularly representative of the 
continuity between the late Modern Synthesis era and the contemporary period, 
by their reliance on the concept of preadaptation or protoadaptiation and by their 
instrumental role in the constitution or an “Integrative biology” centred around 
functional morphology However, Marvalee Wake (1992) and Alan Love (2003, 
2006) for example, focusing on the more recent developments, have stressed the 
greater reflexivity about methods, the higher standards of hypothesis testing, the 
change of focus of some functional morphologists from the role of the external 
environment to the role of internal structural and functional constraints. I will 
address some of these questions.  
                                                 
20 See next chapter 
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Anti-adaptationism and exaptation  
 
 The locus classicus of the critique against adaptationism is Gould and 
Lewontin “Spandrel” paper (1979) However, I will focus on the Gould and Vrba’s 
article introducing the concept of exaptation which pursues the critique against 
adaptationism and is more related to the functional historical approach The 
concept of exaptation is elaborated against the concept of preadaptation. 
However, the ambiguity of their approach can be revealed by the following 
passage 
 
“Why has this conflation of historical genesis with current utility attracted so little 
attention heretofore? Every biologist surely recognizes that some useful 
characters did not arise by selection for their current roles; why have we not 
honored that knowledge with a name? Does our failure to do so simply 
underscore the unimportance of the subject? Or might this absent term, in 
Foucault's sense, reflect a conceptual structure that excluded it? And, finally, 
does the potential need for such a term at this time indicate that the conceptual 
structure itself may be altering?” (Gould & Vrba, 1982, p. 6) 
 
Now, preadaptation denotes exactly what Gould and Vrba refer to. The problem 
is that Gould and Vrba want to promote two different ideas: historical discontinuity 
and non-adaptation. And their concept of exaptation reflects this by denoting both 
cases where a non-adaptive or neutral character is co-opted for a certain function 
and cases where an adaptive trait is co-opted for a different function. In order to 
promote the conceptual innovation brought by the notion of exaptation, Gould 
and Vrba stress the unfortunate connotations of the term preadaptation (Gould & 
Vrba, 1982; Gould, 2002, p. 1231). However, the ideas put forward by Gould and 
Vrba are fully contained in the approach to novelty developed in the late Modern 
Synthesis era and analysed in the last chapter. First, it should be noted that the 
co-optation of originally non-adaptive characters was the original meaning of 
preadaptation when it was coined by Lucien Cuénot (see chapter 2). Thus, 
preadaptation was first coined to denote the exact same phenomena for which 
Gould and Vrba say a that a term is missing Second, this non-adaptive origin of 
novelty was accepted as one possible type of origin by Mayr (Mayr, 1960) and 
Bock and Von Wahlert (Bock & von Wahlert, 1965, p. 293). It is however true that 
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the idea of a co-optation of anon-adaptive trait is not contained in Bock and Von 
Wahlert’s concept of preadaptation.  
 
The near equivalence between the concepts of preadaptation and exaptation has 
already been noted (Casinos, 2017; Endler, 1986, p. 46; Grandcolas, 2015). 
Some have argued that the term ‘exaptation’ is plagued by nearly as many flaws 
as the term ‘preadaptation’ (Casinos, 2017; Cattani, 2008). Exaptation does not 
seem to have replaced preadaptation in biological literatures21 (Budd, 2006; 
Cattani, 2008), but it has had more influence in the philosophical literature 
(Dennett, 1998) and among anti-adaptationist biologists. Gould and Vrba’s stress 
on the discontinuity of their approach with previous ones, coupled with the 
success of the term ‘exaptation’, may have played a role in the neglect of the 
functional approach to novelty and the popularity of the idea that the problem of 
novelty was not addressed during the Modern Synthesis era.  
 
Gould and Vrba are right in pointing out that the term preadaptation contributes 
to perpetuating the conflation of two meanings of adaptation A) adaptation as 
the result of a process of transformation of a character, involving mutations and 
natural selection (selectionist adaptation) B) adaptation as a judgment regarding 
the fitness of a character for a certain function, regardless of whether this state is 
the result of a process of transformation under natural selection (engineering 
adaptation). Rather than favouring the replacement of preadaptation with 
exaptation, Futuyma presents the two concepts as complementary (Futuyma, 
2005, p.261).  This is actually what Gould and Vrba propose as well, except that 
they argue for the replacement of ‘preadaptation’ with ‘preaptation’ 
 
“…what we now incorrectly call "preadaptation" is merely a category of exaptation 
considered before the fact. If feathers evolved for thermoregulation, they become 
ex- aptations for flight once birds take off. If, however, with the hindsight of history, 
we choose to look at feathers while they still encase the running, dinosaurian 
ancestors of birds, then they are only potential exaptations for flight, or 
preaptations (that is, aptus-or fit-before their actual cooptation). The term 
                                                 
21 For example: “I do not see the need to replace the unambiguous term ‘preadaptation ’ with the term 
‘exaptation ’ (Gould & Vrba, 1982), and thus retain the older term, while recognising that it has no 
teleological implications.” (Budd, 2006, p. 618) 
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"preadaptation" should be dropped in favor of "preaptation." Preaptations are 
potential, but unrealized, exaptations; they resolve Mivart's major challenge to 
Darwin.” (Gould & Vrba, 1982, p. 11) 
 
However, Bock and Von Wahlert’s multiple concepts of function show that this 
confusion of the meanings of adaptation does not apply to them.  
 
Constructional morphology and internal selection 
 
 In the 1970s and 1980s there were several reactions to the explanation of 
the evolution of phenotypic characters through the functional relations of the 
organism to the environment and the external selection pressures acting on the 
latter A stress was put on the organism as a structural whole composed of 
interrelated parts and on the idea that this structural organisation itself, regardless 
of the changes and particularities of environment was the essential entity to focus 
on in order to understand evolutionary change For example, George Lauder 
distinguished between the equilibrium approach focusing on the influence of 
external selection pressures on morphological change22, and the transformational 
approach, for which “Historical patterns of structural change are analyzed as a 
consequence of intrinsic organizational properties of structural systems” (Lauder, 
1981, p. 431)  
However, it would be inaccurate to interpret this approach as a switch from a 
focus on function to a focus on form It is rather a switch from a focus on functional 
relations with the environment to internal functional relations between parts of the 
organism, and from external selection to internal selection Here is for example 
how a constructional morphologist expresses this position 
 
“Those constructional morphologists who, like myself, emphasize the 
bioconstruction primacy prior to the environment, join Gould and Lewontin (1979) 
in their attack against the “adaptationist program” However, in contrast to their 
criticisms, we do not argue the role of selection Their misconception of selection 
                                                 
22  “Three aspects of equilibrium analysis relate directly to the study of historical hypotheses in 
morphology: (1) the inference of historical selective forces to explain morphological change, (2) the use 
of morphological series as a reflection of the actual historical pattern of structural change, and (3) the 
explanation of adaptive radiations in terms of key innovations.” (Lauder, 1981, p. 431) 
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[.] follows from the traditional Darwinian view, that only special environmental 
conditions are capable of selection However, if you concede that the matter and 
energy consuming and converting part of the organismic machinery contributes 
to fitness as well as matter and energy acquisition organs, it must necessarily be 
exposed to selection as strongly More than that, it is the coherent unity of the 
organismic construction that determines how subsystems can respond to 
selective forces It sets the framework for possible morphological, physiological, 
and behavioural changes during the optimization and economization process [] 
driven by selection” (Vogel, 1991, p. 63) 
 
 The relative importance of environment-specific selection pressures and internal 
selection pressures depending on the structural organisation may depend on the 
type of character considered Regardless there is a continuity with the principles 
of the functional-historical approach This can be illustrated by the approach of 
Graham Budd who singles out the principles of “functional continuity”, 
“asymmetrical dependency23”, “redundancy” and “preadaptation” to study the 
evolution of the structural organisation of organisms (Budd, 2006)  
 
An important question regards the extension of the principle of conversion of 
function: what are the types of novelty that the principle can contribute to produce 
and what are the types that cannot be explained by it? Bill Wimsatt, referring to 
different body plans, for example, the exoskeleton of arthropods and the 
endoskeleton of chordates, states that “[t]his kind of change in functional 
organization runs so deep that there is no adaptive - even no meaningful - 
transition from one to the other” (2013, p. 36). He then concludes 
 
“This puts the contrast between role function and selection function in a new light. 
It is not just that people investigating role functions are not interested in a 
selectionist account of their origin. They could well be at a suitable distance. 
Rather, the problem is that there is no differential selectionist account moving 
                                                 
23  “In the terminology of this review, the unnecessary component is the least constrained, and by 
hypothesis will be the component of the system to evolve first once the system is in place, although the 
last to be emplaced into the system. In other words, the unnecessary component exercises a functional 
constraint on the necessary component, whereas the converse is not true. No matter how tightly 
integrated and interdependent a system might seem, it will still have many points of weakness – some 
of them very subtle – upon which selective pressures can act to cause change.” (Budd, 2006, p. 616) 
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from any form that is anywhere close to the form under consideration to the 
alternative modes of organization considered in a comparative morphological 
analysis.” (Wimsatt, 2013, p. 36) 
 
This question of the novelties for which a conversion of function is impossible 
should, in principle, be distinguished from the question of how many cases of 
novelties actually involve a conversion of function This second question relates 
on the one hand to the issue of testing hypotheses of character evolution and on 
the other hand to the issue of relative significance Regarding the issue of testing, 
all cases for which hypotheses of conversion of function can be formulated are 
not actual instances of conversion of function  
Ultimate and proximate causes  
 
The functional-historical approach does not fit with Mayr’s distinction of 
proximate and ultimate causes if this distinction is understood in the following 
way, expressed by George Lauder 
 
“Mayr has emphasized the distinction between functional biology, concerned 
primarily with understanding how organisms work and proximate causation, and 
evolutionary biology, committed particularly to studying historical pathways and 
ultimate causation. A major theme to emerge from a consideration of five areas 
of interplay discussed below is that clear areas of overlap exist between these 
two approaches that may provide new insights into organismal diversity and the 
mechanisms that have produced it. Research into the evolution of function 
increasingly exemplifies aspects of both "types" of biology.” (Lauder, 1990, p. 
320) 
 
It can be argued that if this is how Mayr’s position in his article on cause and 
effect in biology should be interpreted, then there is a contradiction between this 
theoretical position and Mayr’s own account of the emergence of evolutionary 
novelties because in the latter, Mayr himself implements a perspective that 
combines the two approaches of functional and evolutionary biology. 
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A double movement of specialisation and integration 
 
Another evolution of the functional-historical approach is a double 
movement of increased specialisation and of integration  In a review, Marvalee 
Wake notes the specialisation into functional morphology, biomechanics, 
ecomorphology, developmental morphology while evolutionary morphology or 
integrative biology refer to the reunion of these disciplines under a common 
project (Wake, 1992) Walter Bock and Carl Gans24 can be seen as figures of 
continuity since the former contributed to the development of ecomorphology  and 
the latter to the development of integrative biology (Adler, 2011)  
 
Evo-devo biologists and the functional approach 
 
 Some evo-devo practitioners focusing on developmental genetics rather 
than morphology can be said to adopt a functionalist framework For example, 
Sean B Carroll, when explaining the origin of novelties, refers to Darwin’s 
explanation and offers multifunctionality and redundancy as crucial explanatory 
factors because they create “the opportunity for the evolution of specialization 
through the division of labor” (Carroll, 2005, chapter 7) Carroll insists on the 
continuity between organs Rather than offering an alternative explanation to the 
functionalist framework, Carroll argues that evo-devo has offered new tools to 
support it 
 
“The erroneous notion of the anti-evolution camp has been that the intermediate 
stages in the evolution of structures must be useless – the old saw of “What use 
is half a leg or half an eye?” Following this preposterous “logic”, the conclusion is 
that structures must be forged perfectly in one instant – that evolution didn’t 
happen. This view clutches desperately at Darwin’s own explicit discussion of 
difficulties with the theory of natural selection in the Origin, yet it always fails to 
grasp or cite Darwin’s brilliant resolution of the matter. The crucial insight he had 
was that the same organ often performs wholly distinct functions, and that two 
distinct organs may also simultaneously contribute to the same function.” (Carroll, 
2005, p. 170) 
                                                 
24 More on Gans in chapter 2 
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However, few evo-devo biologists seem to endorse the functional-historical 
approach, and many instead subscribe to the opposition between the study of 
form and the study of function forcefully expressed by Ronald Amundson 
(Amundson, 2005) 
 
 
III – CAUSES OF THE NEGLECT OF THE FUNCTIONAL-HISTORICAL APPROACH 
 
The reduction to population genetics 
 
 The neglect of the functional-historical approach to evolutionary change 
and novelty partially comes from a conflation of the distinction between 
structuralism and functionalism and the distinction between the population 
genetic perspective and the organismal perspective (e.g. Amundson, 2005; 
Laubichler, 2007; Wagner, 2014; Walsh, 2013). It is true that the Modern 
Synthesis introduced the population genetic approach, but a functional approach 
to evolution and novelty was also perpetuated by some during the Modern 
Synthesis era. Consider this description by Denis Walsh: 
 
“The modern synthesis conception is grounded in a commitment to sub-
organismal mechanism. It locates the source of adaptive evolution in the actions 
of genes/replicators and proceeds by elucidating the activities of 
genes/replicators in the production of phenotypes, both novel and recurrent. 
Phenotypes vary in their contribution to organismal survival and reproduction 
according to the replicators that produce them. Consequently, some 
genes/replicators systematically leave more of their copies in future generations 
than others. In this way, populations change in their genetic/ replicator structure, 
and concomitantly they change in the phenotypic character of the organisms they 
comprise: hence the bias in form and function. The ultimate source of 
evolutionary novelties, on this view, is random mutation. Adaptive evolution 
proceeds by the gradual accretion (and recombination) of very small, lucky 
mutations.” (Walsh, 2013, p. 59) 
 
The problem with this characterisation of the Modern Synthesis approach to 
novelty is that it does not capture the actual level at which explanations of novelty 
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such as Mayr’s or Bock’s are situated. The usual attribution to Mayr, without 
qualifications25, of the gene-based approach described by Walsh reveals the 
neglect of the functional-historical approach. Admittedly, the latter is not a 
creation of the Modern Synthesis (Darwin introduced it) and it is not specific to 
the Modern Synthesis. Still, this approach has historically an important place in 
the Modern Synthesis, if only in its later phase. This also relates to problems with 
the historiography and definition of the Modern Synthesis, which will be 
addressed in the next two chapters, along with a historical analysis of the 
functional-historical approach.  
Objections to the functional definition 
 
 The recent theoretical literature on novelty has focused extensively on the 
problem of the proper definition of an evolutionary novelty. In that context, the 
functional definition of novelty, often attributed to Mayr (1960), has been criticised 
and rejected. Here is how Mayr formulates the definition 
 
“Our discussion will gain in precision if I state at the very beginning what I include 
in the category "evolutionary novelties." I include any newly arisen character, 
structural or otherwise, that differs more than quantitatively from the character 
that gave rise to it. Consequently, not every change of the phenotype qualifies, 
because change of size or of pigmentation would be a change of phenotype not 
necessarily qualifying as "emergence of an evolutionary novelty."  What particular 
changes of the phenotype, then, would qualify? Certainly any change that would 
permit an organism to perform a new function. Tentatively, one might restrict the 
designation "evolutionary novelty" to any newly acquired structure or property 
which permits the assumption of a new function. This working definition must 
remain tentative until it is determined how often it is impossible to decide whether 
or not a given function is truly "new." (Mayr, 1960, p. 351, emphasis added) 
 
 
Some defenders of the evo-devo approach to novelty have discarded the 
functional-historical approach to novelty altogether more on the basis of a critique 
of the functional definition of novelty than on the basis of a critique of the 
                                                 
 
 
 56 
functional-historical explanatory approach (Müller & Wagner, 1991). The critique 
of the definition has led to a neglect of the functional approach. Now, the latter is 
independent of the former. Since these criticisms of the functional definition are 
in, my opinion, valid and have been influential, I will review them, all the while 
stressing the independence of the functional-historical account from the 
functional definition.  
 
Restriction to key innovations.  
 
An efficient way to detect the appearance of a new function is to look for 
adaptive radiations. These diversifications following the colonization of new 
habitats are sometimes initiated by the appearance of a new function allowing 
the colonization. For example, the acquisition of avian flight linked to the 
emergence of wings led to the radiation of birds. According to Pigliucci (2008, p. 
888), defining novelty by the acquisition of a new function “links novelties directly 
to the ecology of the organism, imposing the stringent criterion that a novelty be 
connected to the adaptive radiation of a whole group”. But there is no one-to-one 
relation between novelty and adaptive radiation. “Novel features can appear 
without playing a role in adaptive radiations (ex  the transfer of jaw bones in the 
ear in early mammal history), and traits can play an important role in adaptive 
radiations while not being novelties in an interesting way” (Ibid.). One example of 
this latter case is the differentiation of teeth in mammals which played a crucial 
role in their evolutionary success but is only based on quantitative changes of 
shape (Hunter & Jernvall, 1995).  
In Mayr’s defence, he himself uses the example of the transfer of jaw bones 
into the ear in mammals to illustrate one of the processes of emergence of 
novelties. And Mayr does not mention adaptive radiation as a criterion in his 
article of 1960. Novelties do not always play a role in adaptive radiations, but 
neither do new functions. 
 
Displacement of the problem on function. 
 
The problem of distinguishing between quantitative and qualitative difference 
can be reformulated about function. This is shown by the ambiguity about the 
relation between novelties and adaptive radiations. Just as a new function was 
 57 
the criterion to distinguish qualitative from quantitative variation, adaptive 
radiations are a way to distinguish between the functions that are new and those 
that are not, that is, a function is new when it leads to an adaptive radiation. This 
is problematic as it leads back to the first objection: It restricts novelties to key 
innovations. This problem was acknowledged by Mayr himself: “This working 
definition must remain tentative until it is determined how often it is impossible to 
decide whether or not a given function is truly "new" (Mayr, 1960, p. 351). 
 
No distinction between morphological differences. 
 
 By including all traits associated with a new function, Mayr discards the 
intuitive distinction between quantitative and qualitative structural or 
morphological variation.  This is because, as stated earlier, a quantitative change 
can lead to a new function. For example, in finches of the Galapagos 
(Geopsizidae), a simple change of shape in the beak can be associated to the 
new function of cracking open big seeds, leading to new eating habits (in G. 
magnirostris) (Grant & Grant, 2006; Lack, 1947).  And the quantitative differences 
in beak size and shape in the different species of finches are produced by a 
quantitative change in the expression of a signalling protein. Now, it seems that 
this intuitive distinction between quantitative and qualitative structural change, 
however insufficient, should not be discarded but rather refined by a scientific 
definition of novelty26  
 
Circularity or infinite regress 
 
The objection of circularity appears when Mayr’s definition of novelty is 
confronted with the main principle that he proposes to explain the origin of 
novelty: the functional shift (e.g. Müller & Wagner, 1991, p. 231). According to 
this principle, the formation of a novel structure is caused by the assumption of a 
new function by an existing structure, leading to a new selection pressure that 
will guide the transformation of this structure. Thus there is a tension between 
Mayr’s definition of novelty and his explanation of novelty. On the one hand 
novelties are defined as traits allowing the realization of new functions, on the 
                                                 
26As noted earlier, this distinction is stressed by Mayr himself 
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other hand these very new functions are the starting point of the arising of 
novelties. To be fair to Mayr, the problem of circularity is not internal to his 
explanation of the arising of novelty. It comes from a literal interpretation of his 
definition of novelty, which he himself describes as a “working definition”.  
 
The principle of functional shift is not itself circular: new functions are primary to 
changes in the structures, they drive these changes through new selective 
pressures. It can then be asked: if the transformation into the novel structure is 
caused by a change of function of the initial structure, what caused the initial 
structure to appear? The mechanisms of functional shift seem to produce an 
infinite regress.  
 
 The neglect of the functional-historical approach is not universal  
 
The neglect of functional morphology and ecology is not shared by all evo-
devo biologists who focus on novelty (Breuker et al, 2006 Galis, 1996; Gilbert, 
2003; Hallgrímsson et al., 2012 D. B. Wake, 1982; M. H. Wake, 2015) nor by all 
philosophers of biology who focus on this topic (Brigandt, 2010 Brigandt & Love, 
2012 Love, 2003, 2005, 2006; Pigliucci, 2008) Alan Love, in particular, has 
repeatedly stressed the role of morphology in evo-devo and for the explanation 
of innovation and novelties He distinguished two roles for morphology 
 
“Therefore, morphology plays two essential roles in explaining the origin of  
qualitative variation at particular phylogenetic junctures without which the criteria 
of explanatory adequacy for innovation and novelty cannot be met. The first is 
the conceptualization and operational identification of the targets of explanation 
(complex morphological features) in the establishment of non-homology and 
phylogenetic juncture for the pattern component of explanations. The second is 
the elucidation of causal interactions at higher levels of organization.” (Love, 
2006, p. 327) 
 
While Love stresses the essential contribution of morphology, as a group of 
disciplines, to the explanation of the origin of novelties, I single out the functional 
historical approach as a tradition of explanation of the origin of novelty Actually, 
Love (2003) has also singled out the revival of functional and evolutionary 
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morphology from the 1950s A difference, however, is that Love (2003, 2006) 
defends rather strongly the idea of an exclusion of morphology from the Modern 
Synthesis, while I would argue that the case of Mayr and Bock and Von Wahlert, 
among others, undermines the idea, at least regarding the later phase of the 
Modern Synthesis This is partly due to differences in interpretation of the 
chronology and theoretical content of the Modern Synthesis, a subject that will 
be dealt with in chapters 2 and 3 This is also due to an overtly genetic 
interpretation of Mayr’s conception of novelty Love states that  
 
“Importantly, Mayr recognizes that the primary loci for discussions of innovation 
and novelty were the disciplines of comparative anatomy and paleontology but 
he ultimately reduces the project of explaining the emergence of evolutionary 
novelties to population genetics in sync with the Modern Synthesis theoretical 
framework.” (Love, 2003, p. 321) 
 
He refers to Mayr’s formulation of the problem 
 
“The problem of the emergence of evolutionary novelties then consists in having 
to explain how a sufficient number of small gene mutations can be accumulated 
until the new structure has become sufficiently large to have selective value” 
(Mayr, 1960, p. 357) 
 
But, as shown by his immediate next sentence “Or is there an explanation which 
avoids this troublesome threshold problem?” (Mayr, 1960, p. 357), and by the 
rest of his article, Mayr’s account does not ultimately reduce the problem of 
novelty to population genetics Mayr’s diverse views on novelty, and their 
potential contradictions, will be dealt with in more details in chapter 2 and 3  
 
Massimo Pigliucci (2008) has noted the limitation of the developmentally focused 
approaches to novelty (Müller & Wagner, 1991) and he has stressed the role of 
ecology They do not include ecology, turning the novelty problem into a purely 
developmental problem They stress too much the discontinuous nature of 
novelty, undermining the fact that nature often uses “tinkering” 
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“Evolutionary novelties are new traits or behaviors, or novel combinations of 
previously existing traits or behaviors, arising during the evolution of a lineage, 
and that perform a new function within the ecology of that lineage. [This] definition 
(1) makes explicit the fact that often novelties are not absolute discontinuities but 
can be built on previously existing parts, (2) indicates that they are a phenomenon 
that affects the evolution of certain lineages without implying that all derived 
characters are in fact novelties, and (3) requires some kind of ecological function 
to eventually be coupled with the novelty, although it does not imply a necessary 
link between novelties and adaptive radiations.” (Pigliucci, 2008) 
 
According to Pigliucci, the prospects of an explanation of evolutionary novelties 
by evo-devo are meagre, because evo-devo has been focused much more on 
development than on evolution and is concentrated on the molecular 
underpinnings of quantitative traits rather than on the underpinnings of the 
formation of complex new traits This trend is confirmed by recent quantitative 
analysis of research in the field (Diogo, 2016, 2018). 
 
 
IV – NOVELTY AND ADAPTATION 
 
 
 I will now come back to the distinction between novelty and adaptation to 
confront the view of some evo-devo practitioners with the view of the functional-
historical approach. Müller, Newman and Peterson repeatedly distinguished 
variation and innovation as distinct processes and novelty and adaptation as their 
respective outcome (Müller, 2010; Müller & Newman, 2005; Peterson & Müller, 
2013, 2016). Here is one of their schematic representation of the relation between 
the two processes. In this most recent version, the term adaptation replaces 
variation to designate the first process and the term adaptive trait replaces 
adaptation to designate its outcome, but the spirit of the conceptual distinction 
remains the same   
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Fig 2 Distinction between adaptation and innovation (redrawn after Peterson & Müller, 
2016) 
 
 
They explain the diagram in the following way: 
 
“i Adaptation. A preexisting element is the starting source for adaptive change. 
Natural selection acting on heritable variation determines the form of the 
phenotype. This works through continuous variation, with small changes in each 
generation resulting in an adaptive trait present in the population. ii Innovation. 
The initial source for innovation is the configuration of the developmental system, 
including both epigenetic and genetic factors. Epigenetic in this case refers to 
traits and processes above the gene level, such as environmental factors, tissue 
interactions, biomechanical forces, etc. A developmental property, such as 
cartilage induction by compression, determines the form that occurs from the 
developmental configuration. In the case of novelties, this form appears as 
discontinuous variation of the phenotype compared to previous generations. The 
resulting novelty, a new homologue, can undergo further adaptation.” (Peterson 
& Müller, 2016) 
 
It is important to acknowledge that this discontinuous view of evolution is not 
shared by all practitioners of evo-devo. I have stressed that the work of some 
evolutionary developmental biologists can be placed within the functional-
historical approach; in the same way some of them criticise the discontinuous 
view promoted by Müller, Newman an Peterson (Hall & Kerney, 2012; Minelli, 
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2015; Moczek, 2008; Shubin, Tabin, & Carroll, 2009). This is for example the 
case with Alessandro Minelli, who explicitly criticises the distinction between the 
process of innovation and the process of variation and states:  
 
“The better we know a process, the less we are able to identify its exact origins, 
these instead being determined by arbitrary choice. In science, and especially in 
biological disciplines with a strong historical dimension such as evolutionary 
biology and developmental biology, we should frame questions in terms of 
transitions rather than origins.” (Minelli, 2015) 
 
In order to understand how this distinction is applied to cases of novelties, I will 
focus on an example experimentally studied by Gerd Müller, the origin of the 
syndesmosis tibiofibularis in birds (Müller, 1990). A comparison with Walter 
Bock’s explanation of the basitemporal articulation in some birds presented 
earlier will illuminate similarities and differences in explanatory styles. 
    
Illustration: the origin of novelties in the avian hind limb skeleton 
 
 The syndesmosis tibiofibularis is a cartilaginous or bony crest that links the 
tibia and the fibula in birds’ legs. Müller’s work on this structure was inspired by 
the experimental work of Armand Hampé who placed a piece of mica between 
the tibia and the fibula of developing chicks. In birds, the distal part of the fibula 
is shortened compared to the tibia and it has no connection with the tarsal joint. 
The proximal part of the fibula is larger and contains an attachment point of the 
iliofibularis muscle. In Hampé’s developed chicken, the tibia and fibula were of 
equal length. Müller reproduced the experiment with the same result, he 
observed other anatomical changes beside the reduction of the fibula, in 
particular the absence of the syndesmoisi tibiofibularis. Müller and Streicher 
formulated the hypothesis that as the fibula was reduced during evolution of 
archosaur, dinosaur and birds, the increased mechanical pressures caused by 
the iliofibularis muscle on the fibula led to the formation of the syndesmosis 
tibiofibularis.  
 
“In the scenario outlined, three major, but morphologically unspecific, adaptive 
trends (improvement of archosaur gait, trend towards bipedality in dinosaurs, and 
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weight reduction in the evolution of flight) are canalized towards the bird-specific 
limb morphology by a set of functional and developmental factors (such as cell 
number of early rudiments, differential growth, fusion processes, mechanical 
stimulation of cartilage and bone formation, lability of early rudiments etc.). The 
syndesmosis tibiofibularis and the mechanisms of its formation are found to have 
played an important role in this process, allowing strong distal fibula reduction 
together with the maintenance of its proximal participation in the knee joint.” 
(Müller & Streicher, 1989, p. 336) 
 
Müller and Streicher relied on ontogenetic evidence and showed that the 
development of the syndesmosis tibiofibularis depends on a process of 
ossification caused by mechanical pressures (Müller & Streicher, 1989; Streicher 
& Müller, 1992). Gerd Müller (1990), relying on this example and other of similar 
nature, developed a “side-effect” theory of the origin of novelty  that he later 
summarised in the following way: 
 
“If selection acts on body proportions and skeletal proportions, the ensuing 
biomechanical changes and the reactive potential of skeletogenic tissues will 
automatically generate new elements. This effect is neither the direct result of a 
mutation or “new genes” for that specific character nor the result of selection “for” 
that character but rather a developmental by-product of general selection 
regimes, affecting growth rates for instance, that trigger a specific developmental 
response at certain threshold points of the affected developmental system. This 
response is “unforeseen” and the ensuing character could be called “neutral,” 
because it may exist for prolonged periods of time purely for developmental 
reasons without selective advantage.” (Müller, 2002, p. 59) 
Comparison of the types of explanations developed by Walter Bock and Gerd Müller 
 
Müller and Streicher’s explanation of the origin of the syndesmosis 
tibiofibularis is very close in spirit to Bock’s explanation of the origin of the avian 
basitemporal articulation Müller’s case is a pressure induced ossification of a 
tendon, Bock’s case is a pressure-induced formation of a diarthrosis between two 
bony processes In the two explanations there is a reliance on postulated 
adaptive trends based on data from comparative anatomy, functional 
morphology, behaviour and ecology.  In the two explanations, there is a 
combination of continuous modification of anatomical parts under different 
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selection pressures, and of a discontinuous change caused by the reactive 
properties of developing tissues.  
 
A first difference is that Müller and Streicher rely on multiple threads of ontological 
evidence, both descriptive and experimental, while Bock’s use of an epigenetic 
mechanism is not backed by direct evidence but on general principles of reactivity 
of developing tissues and on a reference to the work of Schmalhausen.  However, 
I do not see how this reliance on experiment could conflict with Bock’s approach; 
in fact, this is another level of evidence that could be added to Bock’s explanation 
Another difference, is the timescale of the evolutionary sequence considered. 
While Bock focuses on a novelty within birds and relies on the study of different 
extant birds, Müller and Streicher focus on transition between archosaur, 
dinosaurs and birds and rely on palaeontological data. Overall, one the one hand, 
the variety of sources of evidence and the quality of the evidence is greater in 
Müller and Streicher’ s work, on the other hand, while Bock is focused of a few 
characters and a reduced time scale, in contrast, the time scale and number of 
evolutionary events hypothesised by Müller and Streicher make their work more 
ambitious but also speculative. More importantly, the general styles of the two 
explanations are very similar. 
 
The comparison between Müller’s and Bock’s types of explanation seems 
relevant to issues regarding differences of epistemic values between scientists, 
or influence of disciplinary homes on the choice of criteria for an adequate 
explanation Surprisingly, there seems to be a contrast  between the claim from 
evo-devo practitioners, including Müller, that novelty is only studied by evo-devo 
and was outside of any research program, and the actual structures of Bock’s 
and Müller’s explanations of cases of novelty. Moreover, Müller and Streicher’s 
study answers the four research questions about novelty defined in section I of 
this chapter, but their investigation goes beyond these four questions27 The same 
                                                 
27 “1) What specific developmental mechanisms are responsible for a new derived character state that 
has been identified as an evolutionary novelty? 2) Did the developmental mechanisms that are 
responsible for the derived character state originate at the same time as this character state? 3) What 
were the exact developmental mechanisms responsible for the initial changes in the character state? 4) 
Are the observed genetic differences between these two developmental systems sufficient to account 
for the observed phenotypic differences?” (Laubichler, 2007) 
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can be said about the disciplines involved in their work28  They rely on 
developmental biology, systematics, comparative anatomy and palaeontology. 
But they also rely on functional morphology to infer adaptive trends29. They write: 
 
“In this scenario different adaptive demands are met by a variety of 
developmental mechanisms that in turn channel the further ability of the system 
to be modified. Depending on the availability of developmental mechanisms at 
specific stages of the evolutionary process entirely different pathways may be 
taken to meet similar adaptive problems.” (Müller & Streicher, 1989, p. 337) 
 
The explanation of the origin of the syndesmosis is embedded in a sequence that 
involved adaptive trends and these trends, such as the reduction of the fibula are 
used as one source of evidence for the hypothesis.  
  
Can the difference between Bock and Müller be seen as purely semantic? 
Conceiving the whole sequence of events as the origin of a novelty, or as a 
sequence of adaptation-novelty-adaptation makes little difference if, on one side, 
Müller and Peterson accept that the study of evolution prior to and after the 
emergence of the novelty is necessary to provide the context and the initiating 
conditions of this emergence and if on the other side Bock acknowledges that 
the emergence of the basitemporal articulation or of the syndesmosis are not 
simple cases of continuous adaptations Looking at the practices of explanation 
shows commonality of explanatory goals and strategies beyond the opposition of 
concepts.  
 
                                                 
28 “1) developmental biology, which provides insights into the proximate mechanisms of character 
development; 2) evolutionary genetics, which provides insights into the forces acting on the 
developmental genes; 3) systematics, which provides us with the comparative methods for testing the 
evolutionary assertions; 4) comparative anatomy, which helps us to coherently define the characters 
and the character states we seek to understand; and 5) paleontology, which provides us with 
information about the sequence of phenotypic transformations that led to the character” (Wagner, 
Chiu, & Laubichler, 2000, p. 829) 
29 Echoing Bock’s prescription “Study of the evolution of a structure must not cease with the 
establishment of correct sequences of the structural modifications. This is a necessary step, but it is as 
important or even more important to determine the ancestral structural form and the selection forces 
guiding the evolution of the structure. In discussions of the origin of a new structure, it is also necessary 
to know the "prehistory" of its several component parts.” (Bock, 1959, pp. 195–196) 
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However, I think there are conceptual problems in the formulation of the relation 
between novelty an adaptation adopted by Müller, Newman or Peterson  
 
 
V – NOVELTY, VARIATION, AND THE CREATIVITY OF NATURAL SELECTION 
 
 
There are at least three problems with the distinction between novelty and 
adaptation formulated by Müller and colleagues 
 
1) Their distinction presupposes a mechanism for the origin of novelty a 
novelty arises through discontinuous variation  
 
2) It associates natural selection to quantitative variation of existing 
characters30 and qualitative discontinuous variation with absence of 
selection or neutrality31. 
 
3) It confuses the problem of the generation of variation and the problem the 
generation of novelty  
 
                                                 
30 “Given the sensitivity of skeletogenesis to mechanical stimulation and its dependence on 
environmental conditions, it is legitimate to consider potential evolutionary roles of these 
interdependencies. One straightforward inference is that this kind of reactivity of the skeletogenic 
system provides a source of phenotypic plasticity. Natural selection would be able to operate on 
variations of size and shape of skeletal elements induced by environmental change. Such a role of an 
environment-dependent developmental mechanism is in line with the standard evolutionary theory and 
its emphasis on variation and selection.” (Müller, 2002, p. 58) 
31 “However, there is a second and possibly distinct evolutionary role of mechanosensitive 
skeletogenesis: the de novo formation of skeletal elements from responsive tissues. In this case, the 
starting point would be selection acting not on the new element itself (because it would not yet exist) 
but on other characteristics, such as size, shape, or proportions of body parts. Continuous selection on 
these parameters, for instance the relative size of limbs and their skeletal support, will alter the 
biomechanical conditions in the affected region and result in new pressure and tension loads in the 
involved tissues. If these tissues have a chondrogenic capacity, they will respond by producing cartilage 
matrix and begin cartilage cell differentiation at certain threshold levels of mechanical load. A new 
skeletal element will result. This new element could remain selectively neutral for long periods of time, 
its continuous existence merely depending on the maintenance of the same biomechanical conditions in 
every subsequent generation. But eventually it can become itself subject to selection and will thus be 
stabilized and integrated in the developmental-genetic machinery.” (Müller, 2002, p. 58) 
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Regarding 1), by modelling their idealised process of innovation on the cases of 
novelty that they study, Müller and colleagues do not leave room for continuous 
mechanisms of origination of novelty32 
 
Regarding 2), Müller seems to imply that quantitative variation is affected by 
natural selection while epigenetically induced new structures can remain neutral 
 
“This new element could remain selectively neutral for long periods of time, its 
continuous existence merely depending on the maintenance of the same 
biomechanical conditions in every subsequent generation. But eventually it can 
become itself subject to selection and will thus be stabilized and integrated in the 
developmental-genetic machinery.” (Müller, 2002, p. 58) 
 
However, this distinction does not seem warranted Quantitative variations can 
also be neutral, for example some allometric trends can be the product of drift 
rather than selection Furthermore, epigenetically formed new structures are 
likely to have an significant effect on the fitness of the organism  
 
I will address problem 3) at more length in the next two sections 
 
The generation of variation and the sorting of variation 
 
 An often made and valid distinction between the perspective of population 
genetics and the perspective of evo-devo is in terms of types of explanation. 
Population genetics and quantitative genetics offer statistical explanations of 
evolutionary change or stasis in terms of factors acting on gene frequencies or 
phenotypic values in populations. Evo-devo offers mechanistic explanations of 
                                                 
32 This is manifest in Müller’s recent endeavour to match types of novelties with mechanisms of origin  
 
Type of novelties Mechanisms 
Type I novelties (Bauplans)   epigenetic mechanisms (e.g. Newman & Müller, 
2000) 
Type II novelties (non homologous new traits) epigenetic mechanisms and phenotypic plasticity 
Type III novelties (homologous new traits) “variational paradigm” = genetic changes of the 
QTL (quantitative trait loci) type 
(after Müller, 2010) 
 68 
evolutionary change or stasis in terms of developmental mechanisms acting on 
phenotypes  
 
One problematic aspect of the distinction between variation and innovation as 
processes (Müller & Newman, 2005; Peterson & Müller, 2016) is that it suggests 
that population genetics can explain the process of quantitative variation leading 
to adaptation but not the process of qualitative variation producing novelty But 
population genetics cannot explain either of these processes, that is, the problem 
of the generation of variation is outside the scope of population genetics for 
quantitative variation as well as for qualitative variation Douglas Futuyma thus 
notes 
 
“Some evolutionary biologists, especially population geneticists, are inclined to 
dismiss [evo-devo] altogether. But that would be a great mistake, I believe, for 
the argument that evolutionary theory lacks but needs a theory of the origin of 
phenotypic variation is convincing—even obvious.” (Futuyma, 2015, p. 68) 
 
How phenotypic variations, quantitative and qualitative, are generated is a 
problem for developmental biology The mechanistic explanation of the 
generation of variation complements the statistical explanations of population 
genetics in both cases  
Two meanings of adaptations 
 
Müller and Peterson define adaptation in the following way 
  
“Adaptation. A preexisting element is the starting source for adaptive change. 
Natural selection acting on heritable variation determines the form of the 
phenotype. This works through continuous variation, with small changes in each 
generation resulting in an adaptive trait present in the population.” (Peterson & 
Müller, 2016) 
 
The validity of the argument about the active role of selection in producing 
adaptation and not novelty is partly contingent on the definition of adaptation 
adopted Two meanings of adaptations have to be distinguished (Lloyd, 2017) 
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_ The selected-product definition of adaptation Under this definition, any trait 
whose presence in a population is a result of a process of selection is an 
adaptation This type of adaptation can be illustrated by the classic case of the 
population of pepper moths composed of black and white individuals If initially 
the trees on which the moths rest are light-coloured, the white individuals are 
better hidden from predators and their frequency in the population is higher than 
that of the black individuals If the trees darken, the black moths will become fitter 
and their frequency will increase in the population Under this definition of 
adaptation, the pigmentation of the black moths is said to be an adaptation 
because it has been positively selected, even though the black variant was 
present at the beginning of the process  
 
_ The engineering definition of adaptation  Under this definition, an adaptation is 
the result of a process of change where new phenotypes are produced that 
constitute a better fit with the environment than phenotypes previously existing in 
the population  This can be illustrated by the progressive adaptation of Darwin’s 
finches to different ecological niches and in particular of their beak shape and 
size to specific feeding habits, such as cracking nuts in one case or picking 
insects in another The definition of Peterson and Müller cited earlier matches the 
engineering rather than the selected-product definition of adaptation since it 
implies of the occurrence of “small changes in each generation” (Peterson & 
Müller, 2016) which are selected and result in an adaptive phenotype that was 
not present at the beginning of the process   
 
We can relate this discussion to the debate about the creativity of natural 
selection (Endler, 1986; Forber, 2005; Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Neander, 1988, 
1995; Sober, 1995; Stegmann, 2010) Some authors argue that natural selection 
can only play a role in distribution explanations, that is, in cases of selected-
product adaptations, where the variants are present at the beginning of the 
process and natural selection has a role in changing the relative frequencies of 
the variants over time - their distribution in the population (Endler, 1986; Sober, 
1995) Others argue that natural selection has a positive role in cases of 
engineering adaptations, or more generally in origin explanations (where the trait 
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involved can be an engineering adaptation or a novelty) (Forber, 2005; Godfrey-
Smith, 2009; Neander, 1988, 1995)  
 
Thus, Müller and Peterson appear to be on the side of those who attribute a 
creative power to natural selection since they argue that natural selection can 
shape (engineering) adaptations by acting on continuous variations Does their 
argumentation match that of those who defend the creativity of selection? 
Actually, the latter do not argue that natural selection “determines the form of the 
phenotype” (Peterson & Müller, 2016), but rather that natural selection has a 
creative role by increasing the chances of the occurrence of the adaptive 
phenotype (eg Godfrey-Smith, 2009, pp 42-43) It increases these chances by 
contributing to raise the frequency of variants that have a closer access to this 
phenotype This reasoning applies regardless of whether the variation is 
continuous or discontinuous And it can in principle apply to the case of the 
basitemporal articulation or the syndesmosis tibiofibularis To schematise, by 
increasing the frequency of birds with smaller fibula thus decreasing support 
against the mechanical force exerted by the iliofibularis muscle, natural selection 
makes the origination of the syndesmosis more probable Natural selection is not 
more able to determine the “form” of an engineering adaptation than that of the 
syndesmosis, but it can increase the probability of their occurrence in the same 
way 
 
There are counterexamples to this positive role of natural selection I will use a 
hypothetical example here for the sake of simplicity33 Let us imagine a population 
of finches feeding on nuts in which the frequency of individuals with larger beaks 
more suited to cracking nuts increases under natural selection Let us further 
assume that  in this case the variants with smaller beaks have access to a 
mutation (or an epigenetic event) that determines the production of an even larger 
beak more adapted to cracking nuts The occurrence of this mutation, or 
epigenetic event, is much more probable in the offspring of variants with smaller 
beaks than it is in the offspring of variants with larger beaks Thus, by selecting 
against smaller beaks, natural selection makes the occurrence of the more 
                                                 
33 Godfrey-Smith (2009, p 50-52) provides other types of counterexamples  
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adapted beak less likely, it does not have a creative role as far as this phenotype 
is concerned However, the examples of the syndesmosis and of the 
basitemporal articulation do not belong to this type of cases In both examples, 
natural selection makes the occurrence of the new phenotype more probable  
 
To summarise, there is a contrast between the characterisation of the problem of 
novelty by some evo-devo practitioners and the actual explanatory practices of 
actual cases of novelty34 The functional-historical explanation of Walter Bock, 
affiliated with the Modern Synthesis35, is close in style to the explanation of the 
evo-devo practitioners Müller and Streicher However, the difference in definition 
of novelty is not purely semantic and innocuous as it confuses the distinction 
between the generation of variation and the sorting of variation with the distinction 
between the generation of adaptation and the generation of novelty  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Through the investigation of the characterisation of the problem of novelty 
in evo-devo and its characterisation within the functional-historical approach, 
several reasons of the existence of these distinct characterisations have been 
identified. Some evo-devo practitioners claim that they have introduced the origin 
of novelty as a new research problem in evolutionary biology This is justified in 
different ways depending on authors, either by distinguishing the problem of 
novelty from the problem of adaptation by defining variation and innovation as 
distinct processes or by relying on the epistemic concept of explanatory force 
Evo-devo characterisations of the problem of novelty are centred around 
identifying the developmental mechanism responsible for the production of the 
phenotypic character investigated, determining if the developmental mechanism 
originated at the same time as the phenotypic character, determining the type of 
                                                 
34 Admittedly more case studies are needed to generalise to be able  this statement Müller’s position 
may have hardened over the years, as suggested by this recent comment from Douglas Futuyma “Müller 
gives lip service to the complementarity of the [Modern Synthesis] and developmental mechanism, but 
in effect treats them as alternative explanations” (Futuyma, 2015, p. 58) 
35 This affiliation will be addressed in more details in the next chapter 
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developmental change that occurred when the phenotypic character originated 
The null hypothesis is that the change was genetic but research for changes at 
other organisational levels are undertaken Developmental biology alone is not 
sufficient for this endeavour and tackling these research questions requires the 
help of phylogenetic systematics, comparative anatomy, palaeontology and 
evolutionary genetics The role of the last discipline seems however minimal The 
role of disciplines like functional morphology, biomechanics, physiology or 
ecology in solving the problem of novelty is rarely denied but the dominant idea 
among theoreteticians of evo-devo seems to be that the developmental 
endeavour can be conducted separately  
 
The functional-historical approach to novelty can be compared to the evo-devo 
approach using the venerable form-function dichotomy This dichotomy can 
however be misleading because, while some evo-devo researchers or 
philosophers argue for a study of the evolution of form independently from 
function (Amundson, 2005; Raff, 1996), one the other hand the functional-
historical approach is not a study of function independently of form, instead it 
partly relies on the idea that the evolution of form and function should not be 
studied separately  
 
The functional-historical approach, illustrated by Darwin’s principle of conversion 
of functions, but not limited to it, is characterised by the use of different forms of 
functions, activities and biological roles, and by the attention to different types of 
contingency, unpredictability and dependence on past conditions, which entails 
that the characters of organisms and their transformations cannot be explained 
solely either by their current function, nor past function, nor even the series past 
and present functions  
 
The comparison of Bock’s explanation of the origin of the avian basitemporal 
articulation and Müller ‘s and Streicher’s explanation of the avian syndesmosis 
tibiofibularis revealed very similar explanatory strategies, regardless of the latter’s 
far richer use of descriptive and experimental ontological evidence. This 
prompted a stress on a distinction between theoretical positions and debates on 
one side and explanatory practices on the other. This might stem from a 
conceptual confusion. Müller (and Peterson and Newman) stress that natural 
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selection cannot explain the generation of novelty. But natural selection cannot 
explain the generation of variation either. The generation of variation, continuous 
or discontinuous, novel or not, is provided by developmental biology. This does 
not mean that an explanation of character change or of the emergence of a novel 
character in evolution is completely explained by developmental biology alone. 
This is demonstrated by Müller and Streicher‘s own explanation, which appeals 
to concepts from functional morphology and ecology as well as to developmental 
concepts.  
 
What conclusions can then be drawn from this confrontation between an evo-
devo and functional-historical characterization of the problem of novelty?  
 
First, the claims of proponents of evo-devo that novelty was neglected during the 
Modern Synthesis and that the Modern Synthesis did not have the conceptual 
and empirical tools to tackle novelty are undermined by the developments of the 
functional-historical approach to novelty However, this conclusion about the 
relation of the Modern Synthesis to novelty can only be preliminary since there is 
no strict identity between the functional-historical approach to novelty and the 
Modern Synthesis The functional-historical approach to novelty was championed 
and developed by architects and sympathisers of the Modern Synthesis like Ernst 
Mayr, Walter Bock, Gerd von Wahlert and others, but is only a part of the 
Synthesis More needs to be said about the history and content of the Modern 
Synthesis to fully assess its relation to the problem of novelty This will be 
addressed further in the next two chapters  
 
Second, the historical study of the functional-historical approach revealed 
continuities between approaches to novelty from the Modern Synthesis era and 
evo-devo approaches to novelty Some biologists and philosophers have 
presented the Modern Synthesis and evo-devo as two irreconcilable theoretical 
perspectives (Amundson, 2005; Laubichler, 2010; Müller, 2007), or as two 
scientific endeavours each concerned with one of two distinct and non-
overlapping sets of phenomena (Craig, 2014)  These views appear at odds with 
study of the evolution of the functional-historical approach between what I have 
called its second and its third phases, which revealed how developmental, 
morphological or phylogenetic considerations were already present and got 
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progressively refined and more tightly integrated into this approach Some 
scientific movements like transformation morphology or strands of constructional 
morphology and integrative biology, are representative of this complexification 
and enrichment of the functional-historical approach to novelty Importantly, as 
we have seen, some trends in evo-devo can also be included in this list And even 
among practitioners of evo-devo who forcibly separate their field from the Modern 
Synthesis and who define the problem of novelty as the exclusive task of evo-
devo, one can find a contrast between this proclaimed distance separating 
theoretical perspectives and the actual proximity of explanatory practices  
 
Third, the possibility of producing generalisations about the disciplines, models 
and sources of evidence needed for the explanation of all types of novelty is far 
from guaranteed. Some types of characters are more functionally integrated and 
constrained than others, some are under strong selection pressures and some 
not, some are submitted to extreme developmental constraints and other are less 
developmentally constrained. The question of the appropriate explanatory 
resources is partly contextual. This idea of types of characters or the related idea 
of types of model organisms is a key to understanding the diverse nature of the 
landscape of research on novelty  
 
Fourth, some of the uses that certain evo-devo practitioners and theoreticians 
make of the distinction between novelty and adaptation are conceptually flawed 
It is not only the generation of novelty that cannot be explained by population 
genetics but the generation of variation in general, quantitative as well as 
qualitative, non-novel as well as novel Furthermore, for some representatives of 
the functional-historical approach of the Modern Synthesis era, novelty is not so 
much neglected but rather consciously weaved together with adaptation, as 
illustrated by Mayr’s following statement 
 
“The problem of the emergence of evolutionary novelties then consists in having 
to explain how a sufficient number of small gene mutations can be accumulated 
until the new structure has become sufficiently large to have selective value. Or 
is there an explanation which avoids this troublesome threshold problem? This 
has been discussed by a number of authors, usually under the heading ‘the origin 
of adaptations’" (Mayr, 1960, p. 357) 
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This weaving is also made clear in the statement by Bock and Von Wahlert cited 
earlier36 This invites a broader reconsideration of the place of novelty in the 
conceptual and research landscape of the Modern Synthesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 “A definition of biological adaptation is inadequate unless it can be used as the foundation for an 
explanation of the mechanisms underlying the evolution of new adaptations and the adaptive origin of 
new major groups of organisms. These are not independent parts of evolutionary mechanisms; indeed, 
the solution of the latter question is completely dependent upon the solution of the former. The 
evolutionary principles for the emergence of novelties may be built upon the concept of adaptation 
advanced in this study by a synthesis of ideas such as those advanced by Mayr (1958, 1960, 1962, and 
1963) and Bock (1959, 1963a) and with the concepts of population genetics such as those summarized 
by Lerner(1954, 1958).” (Bock & von Wahlert, 1965, p. 294)  
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CHAPTER 2 – NOVELTY IN THE MODERN SYNTHESIS ERA Part 1 
NOVELTY IN THE CONCEPT AND RESEARCH SPACE OF THE 
MODERN SYNTHESIS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The history of research on evolutionary novelty has been the central 
subject of only a few historical works (Love, 2015, 2005, 2003).  This subject is 
however frequently addressed among other themes in publications centred on 
the history of evo-devo (Amundson, 2005; Hossfeld and Olsson, 2003; Laubichler 
and Maienschein, 2007; Love, 2015, 2009, 2007; Love and Raff, 2003; Olsson et 
al., 2010; Raff and Love, 2004).  Historical works dealing with how the problem 
of novelty was conceptualized and tackled during the Modern Synthesis period 
have focused more on the research and theories of “outsiders” than on research 
programs falling under the dominant framework.  
 
This historical literature dominantly concurs with and gives weight to the idea 
frequently found in the theoretical evo-devo and Extended Synthesis literature: 
namely, that the problem of novelty has been neglected by the Modern Synthesis. 
More precisely, as shown in chapter 1, two theses are recurrent:  A) The problem 
of the origin of novelties, among other problems, has been neglected during the 
Modern Synthesis era, and is neglected by the Modern Synthesis as a theoretical 
framework37 B) The theoretical and empirical tools necessary to solve the 
problem of the origin of novelty were not available during the Modern Synthesis 
                                                 
37 See for example: “Evolutionary innovations are outside the scope of any current research program. 
Through its contribution to the solution of that question, [evo-devo] genuinely expands the explanatory 
range of evolutionary theory” (Wagner et al., 2000, p.822); or: “ the majority of the new work 
concerns problems of evolution that had been sidelined in the MS and are now coming to the fore ever 
more strongly, such as the specific mechanisms responsible for major changes of organismal form, the 
role of plasticity and environmental factors, or the importance of epigenetic modes of inheritance.” 
(Müller and Pigliucci, 2010, emphasis added) 
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era, and they are not available to the Modern Synthesis as a theoretical 
framework38 
  
Because the major part of the historical research on novelty in the Modern 
Synthesis era has been done from the point of view of evo-devo, the attention 
has been directed at research that prefigured the framework of evo-devo A 
consequence of this focus is that research on novelty that did not include or 
emphasised developmental biology was relatively neglected Furthermore, the 
power of the historical narrative of a separation between evolution and 
development during the Modern Synthesis era (Amundson, 2005; Gilbert, 1994; 
Gilbert et al., 1996; Hamburger, 1990; Sapp, 2003) has prevented a thorough 
search for research associating the two by architects and biologists associated 
with the Modern Synthesis  
 
Clarifications on the Modern Synthesis  
 
A few words of clarification are needed about what is referred to here as the 
“Modern Synthesis”.  Regarding terminology, Betty Smocovitis (1996, p. 54; see 
also Reif et al., 2000) has drawn distinctions between the “evolutionary 
synthesis”, referring to the historical movement; the “synthetic theory”, referring 
to the theory produced as a result; and the “modern synthesis” referring to the 
original characterization by Huxley (1942) of what he saw as new developments 
in biology39 Despite the usefulness of these distinctions, the recent literature in 
biology and philosophy of biology has come to use the expression “Modern 
Synthesis” to refer both to the theoretical structure supposedly still dominant 
today, and to the historical movement that produced this structure in the middle 
of the 20th century. Because I engage primarily with this literature, and for the 
                                                 
38 See for example: “It has become possible to address phenomena of evolution that were untreatable 
by the MS, and to cast them as “how” questions, such as How did body plans originate? How did 
homoplasies arise? How did novelties evolve? How do organisms change phenotypes in response to 
different environments?” (Müller and Pigliucci, 2010, pp. 12–13, emphasis added) 
39 The use of the term “modern” was apparently not the import of Huxley alone. In a review of Mayr’s 
Systematics and the origin of species (1942), the ornithologist Alden H. Miller writes: “One element of 
style in writing proves annoying. It is the excessive use of the word "modern" Indeed, through repeated 
reference to the "modern worker," he creates an illusion of a caste of modernists arrogantly assigning to 
themselves a favored position in their science. Mayr would of course regret such a spurious impression.” 
(Miller, 1943, p. 290) 
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sake of convenience, I will conform to it and use “Modern Synthesis” to refer to 
the theoretical structure and “Modern Synthesis era” to refer to the historical 
period. 
 
Even though the details of the chronology of the Modern Synthesis era are still a 
matter of debate (Cain, 2009; Reif et al., 2000), this issue will not impair my 
investigation of research on novelty during that era, and will thus be left aside. 
For the sake of clarity, I will follow the chronology provided by Reif et al. (2000). 
They distinguish four phases 
 
“(1) Roots (1920 and before): Mendelian genetics, mutation theory, chromosome 
theory of inheritance etc. (2) Preparation (1920s and early 1930s): empirical and 
mathematical analysis of natural populations, biogeography of demes, 
populations and other low taxonomic units. (3) Formation = process of the 
Synthesis (early 1930 s to 1950): harmonization of population genetics, 
systematics, comparative morphology and paleontology, extrapolation of the five 
microevolutionary factors: mutation, recombination, selection, isolation and drift 
to macroevolution. (4) Reception (after 1950): application of the Synthetic Theory 
in modern research projects of population biology, ecology, systematics, 
biogeography, comparative morphology and paleontology.” (Reif et al., 2000, p. 
76) 
 
My focus will be restricted to the third and fourth phases. I will argue in this 
chapter that important theoretical and empirical advances and debates related to 
novelty occurred during the last phase, and that a neglect of this last phase has 
led to a reductive representation of research on novelty during the Modern 
Synthesis era. Therefore, I will not refer to this last phase as the “reception” phase 
but more neutrally as the “late Modern Synthesis”. Regarding the end of that late 
phase, it is usually placed between 1970 and 1980, a time when the first major 
attacks against the Modern Synthesis appeared (the neutral theory of evolution 
and punctuated equilibria). Since I will focus partly on George’s Ledyard 
Stebbins’ Flowering plants (1974), I will place the end of that period after 1974.  
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The theoretical content of the Modern Synthesis 
 
The question of the theoretical content of the Modern Synthesis is still a 
matter of debate to this day A notable pattern in the positions on this question is 
that authors who are sympathetic to the Modern Synthesis tend to describe it as 
difficult to reduce to a small number of theoretical claims, or as a fluctuating 
theoretical entity that has never been fully stable but has kept adjusting and 
integrating new elements (Futuyma, 2015; Mayr, 1992; Wray et al., 2014) On the 
contrary, authors who are positioned against the Modern Synthesis often have 
much less reservation about identifying and summarizing its content40 Since this 
is still a heated theoretical debate, there are reasons to interpret the two opposed 
attitudes as strategic Under this lens, the fluid conception of the Modern 
Synthesis appears as a strategic device that allows its defenders to evade 
criticisms and to more easily accommodate new concepts and findings41 
Conversely, the reduction of the Modern Synthesis to a limited number of dogmas 
appears as a way to clearly define the target in order to attack and overthrow it 
 
We are thus confronted with diverging views of the content of the Modern 
Synthesis and with an added layer of complexity brought by the ongoing state of 
scientific controversy and its constitutive social and strategic dimensions It is 
however reasonable to assume that historians of biology are less under the 
influence of these dimensions, that is, at least those historians who do not 
endorse a partisan conception of history Here again, there is no unanimous view, 
but many historians have expressed the difficulty to reduce the Modern Synthesis 
to a limited set of theses42, or to a single theory43 Some have argued that it is 
                                                 
40 Cain (2009) analyses this particular case, and other in the recent history of biology, such as the 
critique of GG Simpson by Gould in the 1970s, in terms of “ritual patricide” The ritual dimension refers 
to the social function of such theoretical attacks After the original act of patricide, the repetition of the 
attacks has a role in reinforcing the cohesion of the group (such as the Extended Synthesis group, or the 
defenders of punctuated Equilibrium group) This process is not exclusively taking place in minority, or 
non-dominant scientific groups Gould (Gould, 1982a) noted the same kind of ritualized attacks about 
the relation of the Modern Synthesis towards Richard Goldschmidt, and more generally of dominant 
scientific groups towards heretics 
41 See for example Stoltfuz (2017), for an analysis of this type 
42 “The evolutionary synthesis was a very complex process; its historical development cannot be 
encompassed accurately by any single thesis. The synthesis occurred on many levels. [. . .] [It] was more 
than a simple application of new concepts in genetics to other facets of evolutionary biology, as earlier 
accounts have suggested” (Provine 1980, p. 405). 
43  “It is very difficult to define the Modern Synthesis as a ‘theory’ . . . it is indeed questionable whether 
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better described as a “moving target” (Burian, 1988, p. 250; Smocovitis, 1996) I 
concur with these analyses It is however necessary and useful to address the 
dominant views on the Modern Synthesis in order to refine or criticise them.  
   
Are these considerations affecting the conditions of possibility of a historical study 
of research on novelty during the Modern Synthesis era? They would make this 
study difficult if the method employed was to establish the stable and coherent 
theoretical content of the Modern Synthesis and then deduce from it the approach 
of the Modern Synthesis to novelty. It is however possible and preferable to 
investigate research related to the problem of novelty in the Modern Synthesis 
era without a pre-established alleged content of the Modern Synthesis channeling 
investigation. The constraint that will be applied to this historical research will be 
less stringent and artificial I will focus less on the work of researchers obviously 
considered outsiders in the Modern Synthesis era and more on work unanimously 
considered as instrumental or related to the Modern Synthesis as a scientific 
movement. Thus, I will give particular attention to the work of Bernhard Rensch, 
Ernst Mayr and George Ledyard Stebbins and George Gaylord Simpson. I will 
also focus on several less prominent figures such as Isadore Michael Lerner, 
John Gordon Torrey, Walter Bock, Carl Gans and others, whose work was 
recognized and used by some of the more central figures Finally I will try to also 
focus on figures opposed or indifferent to the Modern Synthesis in order to clarify 
the theoretical oppositions or the differences in research focus.  
 
Outline of the chapter 
 
My goal in this chapter and the next is to provide elements for an 
intellectual history of research on evolutionary novelty, to study the concepts and 
methods produced to tackle this research problem and to show how these 
concepts and methods shaped the problem in return. My aim is not to produce a 
new general history of the Modern Synthesis, or of Evo-devo. However, I intend 
                                                 
the Modern Synthesis should be considered as one single theory” (Gayon 1990, p 3). Designations of 
the Modern Synthesis as a single theory are actually rare in the contemporary literature, even among 
those who are not sympathetic to it For example, Amundson (2005) uses the terms “approach”, 
“perspective”, “viewpoints” to qualify the Modern Synthesis Cf (2014) for a detailed analysis 
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to argue that a focus on research on novelty in the Modern Synthesis era can 
provide evidence to challenge some widely held views about the Synthesis. This 
will be addressed more directly in the next chapter where I will focus first on 
research relating development and evolution by Rensch (1947, 1959) and 
Stebbins (1974a), which relates to the historical narrative of an exclusion of 
development by the Modern Synthesis movement. Second, I will focus on 
controversies in the late Modern Synthesis era, which relates to the thesis of a 
late hardening of the Modern Synthesis (Gould, 2002; Smocovitis, 1999). 
 
The present chapter will be focused on the situation of novelty among concepts 
and research programs during the Modern Synthesis era. First, I will focus on the 
relation of novelty to mutationism and saltationism in order to assess Ernst Mayr’s 
claim that novelty was neglected during the Modern Synthesis because it was 
associated with these theories (Mayr, 1960, p. 350). Another reason for the 
apparent lack of explicit attention to the problem of novelty is the awkward 
position it holds in the conceptual space relatively to four major preoccupations 
of the Modern Synthesis: 1) the diversification of species, 2) the origin of higher 
taxa (genera, families, orders, etc), 3) the increase in complexity or levels of 
organization of organisms, 4) the adaptation of organisms to their environment 
The problem of novelty is conceptually distinct from these four other problems 
However, it entertains a close relation with each of them The process of 
speciation may act at least as a condition for the origin or the maintenance of 
novelties Higher taxa are defined by a series of diagnostic characters, thus 
inquiring about their origin involves explaining the evolutionary emergence of 
these characters The problem of the increase of complexity overlaps with the 
problem of the origin of novelties Certain types of novelties produce a change in 
complexity or level of organisation The increase in level of organisation can also 
be conceived as a subset of the category of adaptation Finally, the relation 
between novelty and adaptation is a complex and debated one that I have 
analysed in chapter 1Some trends in the Modern Synthesis weaved the two 
problems together In this chapter, I will focus on the different uses of the 
concepts of preadaptation which reveals different ways of relating adaptation and 
novelty coexisting within the Synthesis It is thus essential for a history of research 
on novelty in the Modern Synthesis era to focus in more detail on how these four 
 82 
problems were addressed and how they related to the problem of novelty I will 
focus in turn on speciation, complexity, higher taxa and adaptation44 
  
I – THE CONCEPT OF NOVELTY ASSOCIATED WITH MUTATIONISM 
 
 
The idea of a neglect of the problem of novelty is formulated as early as 
1960, by Ersnt Mayr himself, one of the architects of the Modern Synthesis, in 
the most influential theoretical paper on novelty of that era: 
 
“There are fashionable problems and there are neglected problems in any field 
of research.  The problem of the emergence of evolutionary novelties has 
undoubtedly been greatly neglected during the past two or three decades, in spite 
of its importance in the theory of evolution.”(Mayr, 1960, p. 350) 
 
Mayr explains the neglect of the problem of novelty since the 1930s by the 
association of the concept with mutationism 
 
“Indeed, most of the evolutionary literature of recent decades has been devoted 
to the description and documentation of the gradual nature of all kinds of 
evolutionary changes. Hence the emphasis on allometry, on clines (in space and 
time), on polygenic systems, on genetic and developmental homeostasis, and on 
other manifestations of gradual change and of factors favoring it. This period, 
somehow, did not provide quite the right intellectual climate for the question "How 
does an evolutionary novelty emerge?" This question seemed, to antimutationist 
ears, to demand a mutationist answer.  As a result, the problem of the emergence 
of evolutionary novelties has been almost completely neglected during the past 
two or three decades.” (Mayr, 1960, p. 350) 
 
Although mutationist and saltationist theories of novelty are not the central 
subject of this chapter, this remark by Mayr calls for some explanation 
Saltationism can be preliminary defined as a family of theories centred on the 
idea of evolution through jumps, that is the sudden origin of new characters, 
                                                 
44 As I just mentioned and as it will appear throughout the chapter, the frontiers between these 
concepts are porous, and their separate treatment in this chapter should not be read as a plea for strict 
separation but primarily as a matter of convenience  
 83 
species or types, as opposed to their gradual evolution over many generations 
Mutationism, as it is used here by Mayr, is arguably a form of saltationism 
attributing the evolutionary jumps to specific types of genetic mutations45 Mayr 
does not elaborate on why the concept of novelty is associated to mutationism, 
but two conceptual reasons can initially be offered first, the emergence of new 
characters was one of the phenomena that mutationists thought the gradualist 
and selectionist Darwinian theory could not explain Second, the mutationist 
explanation of novelty gives a clear identity to the phenomenon it is a single 
event clearly circumscribed in time and it has its own specific cause large 
mutations Meanwhile, in a gradualist and selectionist framework the causes that 
produce novelties, in short (small) mutations and selection, are not specific to the 
phenomenon since they also cause quantitative variation, and the origin of 
novelty is a less clearly temporally circumscribed process, threatened of being 
diluted in a continuum of change  
 
A clarification of saltationist and mutationist theories of novelty is important to 
understand Modern Synthesis research on the topic because they usually were 
the explicit opponents In several works that adopt the problem of the origin of 
novelties as a central topic (Mayr, 1960; Rensch, 1959; Schaeffer and Hecht, 
1965; Stebbins, 1974), what is at stake is generally to show that an explanation 
of novelty compatible with the Modern Synthesis is possible.  These 
presentations of the problem are structured around two couples microevolution 
and macroevolution, and mutationism, or saltationism, and gradualism. The 
distinction between microevolution and macroevolution is accepted and not 
questioned46, the goal is then to show how a gradualist explanation of the 
transition from one to the other is possible, as opposed to a saltationist 
explanation. These broad dichotomies are accurate but they can also exacerbate 
the oppositions and obscure the exact nature of the debates. Modern Synthesis 
dogma is sometimes wrongly represented as the rejection of all but infinitesimal 
mutations Three concepts are of particular importance homeotic mutations, 
macromutations and systemic mutations I will first clarify the positions of Modern 
Synthesis thinkers towards these three types of mutations and then show that the 
                                                 
45 For historical studies of these theories see for example Bowler (1992) and Levit et al (2008) 
46 Stebbins (1974b) for example writes about different points of view to reconcile. 
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centre of the debates is the question of the origin of higher taxonomical 
categories.  
 
Homeotic mutations, macromutations and systemic mutations 
 
The phenomenon of homeosis, the presence of a displaced character, 
appearing in an abnormal part of the organism, has been long known It was 
studied in details by William Bateson, who coined the term “homoeosis”47 that he 
defined as a type of  variation “which consists in the assumption by one member 
of a Meristic series, of the forms or characters proper to other members of the 
series” (Bateson, 1894, p. 84)48 The idea that homeotic mutants had a genetic 
determination was first offered by Calvin Bridges and Thomas Hunt Morgan in 
1915 when the first mutant in Drosophila was discovered49 (Gehring, 1998; Lewis, 
1994) This mutant had a duplicated thorax and was thus called “bithorax” It 
emerged spontaneously in the laboratory, and a lineage of bithorax was produced 
and conserved It would play a central role decades later in the beginning of new 
discoveries in developmental genetics (cf chapter 4) Other homeotic mutants 
were soon discovered; in The material basis of evolution, Richard Goldschmidt 
describes five known types of homeotic mutants in Drosophila (Goldschmidt, 
1940, pp. 326–328) The phenomenon of homeotic mutations was acknowledged 
by architects of the Modern Synthesis50 When they targeted the mutationist 
school, it was not the existence of homeotic mutations that was their focus 
                                                 
47 The orthography now in use is “homeosis”  
48 The link between Bateson’s concept of homoeosis and the genetic concept of homeosis is actually not 
straightforward. In the Materials for the study of variation, Bateson focused on discontinuous variations 
in nature as a key to understand evolution. He distinguished two kinds of discontinuous variations: 
“substantial variation”, affecting the substance of organisms and thus producing changes of size, 
proportions, colour, colour patterns etc.; and “meristic variations” affecting the parts composing the 
structure of organisms. Among meristic variations are, on the one hand,  the strict additions or deletions 
of parts, such as the reduction of the number of joints in the tarsus of the cockroach, or the increase in 
number of parts to the flower of the tulip; and on the other hand, cases of homoeosis. In this category, 
Bateson includes the replacement of one part by another along the anteroposterior axis, but also 
changes in bilateral asymmetry such as in the flat-fish where in some individuals, the characters 
normally present on one side are switched to the other side.  
49 Between Bateson’s work and the study of Drosophila mutants by geneticists, homeosis was studied 
by the Entwicklungsmechanik tradition (see Schmitt, 2004 for a historical account) 
50 Simpson for example, recognized the existence and interesting nature of homeotic mutants although 
he restrains their importance “Homoeotic mutants have special interest because (at full penetrance) 
they have spectacular phenotypic results, but their limitation by the system in which they occur is 
obvious. They do not produce new structures but only change the places where structures occur. 
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A second distinguishable concept, broader than homeotic mutations, is 
macromutation While homeotic mutations refer to the displacement or 
duplication of an existing character, macromutations include this phenomenon 
but they can also refer to the sudden creation of a new character or the sudden 
qualitative modification of an existing character The existence of macromutations 
was not denied by proponents of the Modern Synthesis (Dietrich, 1995, 2000; 
Futuyma, 2015) For example Fisher referred to large mutations to explain the 
discrete variation of colour patterns of the wings of butterflies A switch to a new 
colour pattern could be produced by a macromutation and then modified 
incrementally in later generations by allele substitution (Fisher, 1930) 
Furthermore, phenomena such as polyploidy and hybridization were recognized 
as potential causes of large phenotypic changes (Haldane, 1932, pp. 104–105; 
Stebbins, 1950)  
 
A third hypothetical phenomenon is described by Goldschmidt as “systemic 
mutations” Rather than involving a single gene or a small number of genes with 
large phenotypic effects, systematic mutations affects the patterns of 
organisation and interactions of genes on a chromosome. Thus, a systemic 
mutation can arise without the occurrence of a genetic mutation in the strict 
sense.  
 
“A repatterning of a chromosome may have exactly the same effect as an 
accumulation of mutations. And even more, a complete repatterning might 
produce a new chemical system which as such; i.e., as a unit, has a definite and 
completely divergent action upon development, an action which can be 
conceived of as surpassing the combined actions of numerous individual 
changes by establishing a completely new chemical system. Model: two different 
pictures produced with the same set of mosaic blocks, the new picture "emerging" 
only when all blocks are in their proper place.” (Goldschmidt, 1940, p. 203) 
 
As suggested by the analogy drawn in the last sentence, although the large 
phenotypic effects of systematic mutations appeared suddenly, the chromosomal 
repatterning itself could take many generations before becoming manifest in the 
                                                 
"(Simpson, 1953, p. 84) See Davis et al (2009) for an extended account of the reception of research on 
homeotic mutants by architects of the Modern Synthesis.  
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phenotype. This concept of systemic mutations is the product of the evolution of 
Goldschmidt’s views in physiological genetics From his studies of sex 
determination in the moth genus Lymantria and from the production of intersex 
specimens, Goldschmidt (1928) developed a view of genes as proteins acting as 
catalysts in networks of chemical reactions, especially during development. Thus, 
the nature of genes and quantity of genetic material genes would determine the 
nature and rate of the reactions and ultimately the phenotypic products And 
variations in quantities and rates caused by mutations would affect the 
phenotypic result The idea of systemic mutations originated in a departure from 
this initial view of genes Goldschmidt was influenced by experimental studies of 
Herman Muller and others on position effects, especially in Drosophila, showing 
phenotypic effects of gene rearrangements comparable to those of mutations 
(see Dobzhansky Theodosius, 1936 for a review) While these results questioned 
the classical view of genes as independent beads on a string,  Muller insisted that 
these rearrangements could not have effects of the magnitude of proper 
mutations Goldschmidt went further and made the chromosome, and not the 
gene, the proper unit of physiological genetics The arrangement of genes on a 
chromosome produces a chemical system and a series of changes in genetic 
positions could produce a repatterning of the whole system that Goldschmidt 
called a systemic mutation (Goldschmidt, 1940, 1938)  Of the three types of 
mutations reviewed here, systemic mutations were the only type that was nearly 
unanimously rejected by participants in the Modern Synthesis51 
 
To summarize, the possibility and existence of homeotic mutations as well as of 
mutations with large phenotypic effects were recognised by most Modern 
Synthesis biologists and were not points of contention in themselves Only 
systemic mutations were not accepted I now turn to the actual locus of debate 
regarding these mutations their role in macroevolution  
 
 
 
                                                 
51 See Dietrich (1995) for a review their reactions 
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The central debate against mutationism and saltationism the mode of origin of higher 
taxa 
 
The German geneticist Richard Goldschmidt and the German 
paleontologist Otto Schindewolf were the most prominent proponents of 
saltationist theories in the Modern Synthesis era and the main interlocutors of the 
Modern Synthesis architects.  When introduced, the saltationist school of the 
Modern Synthesis era is usually reduced to a handful of individuals. For example, 
Mayr (1963, p. 586) describes it as composed of a geneticist, Goldschmidt (1940, 
1948, 1952), a palaeontologist Schindewolf (1950), and of zoologists, Jeannel 
(1950), Cuénot (1951) and Cannon (1958) In another description (Schaeffer and 
Hecht, 1965), the morphologists Good (1956) and Russel (1962) are added The 
group of  biologists who sympathised with mutationist views surely extended 
beyond those few individuals, although it is quite difficult to estimate their 
number52. For the sake of brevity, I will limit my focus to Goldschmidt and 
Schindewolf. It is, however, not the object of this chapter to analyse in detail 
Goldschmidt’s and Schindewolf’s views on the origin of novelty53  
 
The main source of debate between Schindewolf and Goldschmidt on one side, 
and proponents of the Modern Synthesis on the other, was not the question of 
the existence of large mutations, but the question of their importance in 
macroevolution, more precisely their capacity to suddenly produce new species 
or new higher taxonomical categories54 This question occupies a particularly 
                                                 
52 This statement by the paleontologist Everett C. Olson, although not only about mutationists, is 
revealing regarding the difficulty of this estimate: ““There exists, as well, a generally silent group of 
students engaged in biological pursuits who tend to disagree with much of the current thought [the 
Modern Synthesis] but say and write little because they are not particularly interested, do not see that 
controversy over evolution is of any particular importance, or are so strongly in disagreement that it 
seems futile to undertake the monumental task of controverting the immense body of information and 
theory that exists in the formulation of modern thinking. It is, of course, difficult to judge the size and 
composition of this silent segment, but there is no doubt that the numbers are not inconsiderable. 
Wrong or right as such opinion may be, its existence is  important and cannot be ignored or eliminated 
as a force in the study of evolution.” (Olson, 1960, p. 523) 
53 A rather vast literature already exists on Goldschmidt’s synthesis of evolution and development (see 
Allen, 1974; Davis et al., 2009; Dietrich, 2000, 1995; Gould, 1982; Schmitt, 2000) and to a lesser extent 
on Schindewolf’s work (Eldredge, 1992; Grene, 1958; Laubichler and Niklas, 2009; Levit et al., 2008; Reif, 
1986) 
54 This judgement is determined by the object of our attention evolutionary novelty Schindewolf’s and 
especially Goldschmidt’s challenges are not limited to the origin of higher taxa For example, Michael 
Dietrich lists five different challenges posed by Goldschmidt “The responses of the neo-Darwinians 
addressed five major challenges presented by Goldschmidt. These challenges concerned (1) the validity 
of the theory of the gene; (2) the nature of mutation, and its role in evolution; (3) the origin of isolating 
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prominent place in the works of George Gaylord Simpson (1953, 1944) and 
Bernhard Rensch (1959, 1947). That this hypothesis is clearly distinct from the 
question of the existence of macromutations’ producing new characters or 
qualitative differences in characters, is expressed for example by Simpson, who 
offered an extensive critique  
 
“The issue is not, or certainly not only, whether large or small mutations are 
normally involved in evolutionary processes, as some discussants seem to think 
(e.g., Davis, 1949). It is rather whether a real or possible mutation, of any size, 
can give rise to a higher taxonomic category in one step and whether single 
mutations can occur and have occurred producing differences, genotypic and 
phenotypic, corresponding to those between families, orders, classes, etc.” 
(Simpson, 1953, pp. 98–99) 
 
Schindewolf’s concept of typogenesis and Goldschmid’s concept of hopeful 
monster both refer to this phenomenon of a sudden origin of a higher category 
Schindewolf developed a complex theory of macroevolution combining saltation 
and orthogenesis Typogenesis was the first phase of the evolution of types, 
which is an anatomical and morphological concept but can be related to higher 
taxonomical categories such as orders and classes The second and third phases 
are typostasis and typoloyse, the stasis and then senescence of the type 
Schindewolf called the entire cycle a typostrophe To explain the sudden origin 
of types, Schindewolf appealed to alterations of the early stages of ontogeny with 
large scale effects For example, for Schindewolf the fossil Archeopterix 
represents the exact point of transition from reptiles to birds It represents the 
sudden occurrence of a new type possessing several new characters making 
flight possible (Schindewolf, 1993) An essential characteristic of typogenesis is 
that it is a nested historical process in correspondence with the taxonomical ranks 
of the Linnean hierarchy That is to say, according to Schindewolf, the process of 
origin of types follows the descending hierarchy, the typogenesis of a class such 
as birds is an event that precedes typogeneses of smaller magnitude that 
suddenly produce orders within that class, and are themselves followed by 
typogeneses of even smaller magnitude 
                                                 
mechanisms necessary for species formation; (4) the concept of species and incipient species, as well as 
what Ernst Mayr calls population thinking; and (5) the tempo of evolution” (Dietrich, 1995) 
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Goldschmidt’ s hopeful monster is to be distinguished from the hypothesis of 
systemic mutations As Goldschmidt himself notes, the production of a hopeful 
monster can be conceived both on the basis of classical genetics via mutations 
of large effects or on the basis of Goldschmidt’s alternative conception of genetics 
via systemic mutations (e.g. Goldschmidt, 1940, p. 252) That is, the idea of 
hopeful monsters is not dependant on the validity of systemic mutations The 
magnitude of change implied in hopeful monsters, that is, in short, the number of 
new phenotypic characters involved and the amplitude of their divergence from 
the ancestral characters, is variable. Consider the following illustration given by 
Goldschmidt 
 
“A monstrosity appearing in a single genetic step might permit the occupation of 
a new environmental niche and thus produce a new type in one step. A Manx cat 
with a hereditary concrescence of the tail vertebrae, or a comparable mouse or 
rat mutant, is just a monster. But a mutant of Archaeopteryx producing the same 
monstrosity was a hopeful monster because the resulting fanlike arrangement of 
the tail feathers was a great improvement in the mechanics of flying.” 
(Goldschmidt, 1940, p. 391) 
 
This example seems to show that a hopeful monster can involve simply the 
sudden emergence of a single character, or a large change in a single character  
 
But, like Schindewolf, Goldschmidt holds the hierarchical view of the origin of 
higher taxa 
 
“The phyla existing today can be followed farthest back into remote geological 
time. Classes are a little younger, still younger are the orders, and so on until we 
come to the recent species which appear only in the latest geological epochs. 
Thus logic as well as historical fact tells us that the big categories existed first, 
and that in time they split in the form of the genealogical tree into lower and still 
lower categories” (Goldschmidt, 1952, p. 92) 
 
Thus, the logical taxonomic hierarchy is matched by the historical process 
Furthermore, these logical and historical dimensions are matched by the 
mechanistic dimensions of macromutations (or systemic mutations) Minor cases 
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of hopeful monsters can involve a qualitative change in a single character, but 
where high taxonomical categories are concerned, hopeful monster can involve 
a new body plan or many new characters55  
 
The opposition of Simpson56 to the views of Schindewolf and Goldschmidt about 
the origin of higher categories is at least threefold 
 
_ Simpson objected to the hierarchical nature of taxonomy reflecting the historical 
process. Characters defining higher taxa do not evolve simultaneously but 
successively, and in a contingent fashion according to a process called “mosaic 
evolution” (de Beer, 1954) or “heterobathmy” (Takhtajan, 1959) and that 
Goldschmidt ironically named the “’crazy-quilt’ method” (1952, p. 92)  
 
_ Simpson also objected to the mechanistic dimension of saltation He denied the 
possibility of hopeful monsters of larger magnitude, involving a new body plan or 
many new characters arising simultaneously (eg Simpson, 1953, p. 194) 
However, as stated earlier, he did not reject large mutations affecting a single 
character, as in Goldschmidt’ hypothetical examples of the Manx cat and 
Archaeopteryx Simpson himself uses the concept of “key mutations”, possibly of 
large effect57 These large mutations had the status of exceptions, not 
impossibilities, as Simpson insisted that “change by very small steps is the rule 
not only for metrical characters, as would be expected, but also frequently for 
qualitative characters and the appearance of new structures and tissues, which 
might be expected to originate by large mutations” (Simpson, 1953, p. 105, 
emphasis added).  
 
_ Additionally, like Dobzhansky and Sewall Wright, Simpson objected to 
Goldschmidt’s lack of consideration for population genetic processes (cf Davis 
                                                 
55 For example “it may then be assumed that major departures of the rank of higher categories are 
attained initially by single large mutational changes producing at once the essentials of the new type” 
(Goldschmidt, 1952, p. 94) 
56 Detailing the different reactions of Modern Synthesis participants would be beyond the scope of this 
chapter, thus I will here mainly take Simpson as an example 
57 Simpson’s use of these concepts and the relation of his theory to evolutionary novelty will be tackled 
in part IV of this chapter.  
 91 
et al., 2009; Dietrich, 2000, 1995) In his words  ‘‘the appearance of a mutant 
individual is not evolution’’ (Simpson, 1944, p. 53).  
 
Considering that this debate was mostly focused on the mode and rate of origin 
of higher taxonomical categories and that this phenomenon is closely related to 
the origin of evolutionary novelty, it appears to come into conflict with Ernst Mayr’s 
claim that novelty was neglected during the Modern Synthesis. If one of the main 
goals of at least some of the protagonists of the Modern Synthesis was to argue 
for the gradual origin of higher taxonomical categories through the action of 
natural selection combined with other factors, then the argument for a gradual 
origin of evolutionary novelties had to be part of the agenda. After having clarified 
the nature of the debate between the Modern Synthesis and saltationists, we now 
have to search the work of Modern Synthesis thinkers and practitioners 
themselves for other reasons of Mayr’s claim that novelty was neglected. 
Furthermore, if the focus on the origin of higher taxonomical categories was 
central, then we have to clarify the exact relation between this problem and the 
problem of the origin of novelty.  
 
 
II – NOVELTY, SPECIES AND SPECIATION  
 
Novelty and speciation  
 
In his article on the emergence of evolutionary novelties of 1960, Mayr notes 
the conceptual distinction between the origin of novelties and the origin of new 
taxa: 
 
“The origin of new taxa, from species to higher categories, will be considered as lying 
outside the scope of this discussion. Even though, admittedly, the origin of new higher 
categories is often correlated with the emergence of a  new structure or other 
character, the natures of the two problems are sufficiently different to necessitate 
separate treatment.” (Mayr, 1960, pp. 356–7). 
 
Regarding the difference between the origin of new species and the origin of 
novelties, Mayr does not go into more details in this article, but some of his other 
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writing can be used for clarification (1963, 1947, 1942).  According to Mayr, the 
process of origin of a new species, namely speciation, poses the problem of 
reproductive isolation within a population. It is a process of transformation of one 
population into two reproductively isolated populations. It does not necessarily 
imply the upcoming of novelties. However, the ambiguity of the relation between 
speciation and the origin of novelty is still stressed by George Gaylord Simpson 
in 1953, in one of the late classic texts of the Modern Synthesis, The major 
features of evolution: 
 
“Usages vary considerably, but most students understand by the word 
"speciation" one or both of two processes: (1) the origin of genetic isolation 
between two populations (or groups of populations), and (2) the origin of new 
characters and their distribution or differentiation among and within populations 
(a process that begins far below the level of genetic isolation and continues above 
it).” (Simpson, 1953, p. 380) 
 
Simpson goes on to give his own view of speciation, based on the first of the two 
processes, genetic (or reproductive) isolation, a view similar to Mayr’s and the 
dominant view of the late Modern Synthesis era 
 
“It now seems clearer to think of speciation as, literally, the origin of species and 
particularly the origin of genetical or horizontal species. On this basis, speciation 
is the process of differentiation within populations and of the rise of genetic 
isolation between populations formerly part of the same species. Subsequent 
divergence is not, strictly speaking, speciation but an aspect of phyletic evolution. 
Of course this frequently has its roots in differentiation within populations and 
hence is not absolutely distinct from speciation. This merely again exemplifies 
the fact that what we are analyzing is integral and that its elements do not have 
absolute distinctions.” (Simpson, 1953, p. 380) 
 
What Simpson is saying here is that the emergence of new characters occurs 
during phyletic evolution, that is during the phenotypic evolution of single species. 
This origin does not coincide with speciation, which is a process of splitting of two 
populations58, although his last sentence makes clear that the distinction is not 
                                                 
58 In The major features of evolution, Simpson argues for the replacement of the term “speciation” by 
the term “splitting” for more clarity. (Simpson, 1953, p. 380) 
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absolute and that incipient stages of new characters can occur during speciation. 
As suggested by Simpson’s quotes, the relation between the problem of the origin 
of new species and the problem of the origin of new characters has evolved 
during the period of elaboration of the Modern Synthesis. To frame the matter 
schematically, it can be said that previous to the Modern Synthesis era the two 
problems were more closely related than during that era or, to use pattern-
oriented terms, the concepts of diversity – the existence of a multiplicity of species 
– and of the concept of disparity – the phenotypic differences between species – 
were pulled apart during the Modern Synthesis And arguably more attention was 
given to the problem of speciation than to the problem of the origin of new 
characters 
 
The distinction of the two problems is dependent on the surge of interest for 
processes of speciation between the 1930s and the 1950s, illustrated for example 
by the important role played by the Society for the Study of Speciation (Cain, 
2009b; Milam, 2009), and on the development  of the biological concept of 
species and of theories of geographical and ecological speciation. A detailed 
history of the relation between the two problems from Darwin to the late Modern 
Synthesis era would require an independent chapter at least (see Wilkins, 2009; 
Zachos, 2016). I will focus here on the critique of Darwin’s conception of species 
and speciation and on the principles of experimental taxonomy  
The critique of Darwin and the biological species concept 
 
The elaboration of the biological concept of species was closely related to 
a critique of Darwin’s concept of species by its main proponents, Dobzhansky 
(1937, 1935) and Mayr (1959, 1942) Therefore, to explain the impact of the first 
trend on the relation between novelty and speciation, I will briefly review the 
motives and arguments of this critique of Darwin and how they connect to the 
relation between speciation and novelty Two questions are of particular interest 
here What are the differences between the morphological and biological species 
concept in relation to the conceptualisation of novelty? More precisely, how does 
a move towards the biological species concept further separate the problem of 
speciation and the problem of novelty? It should be noted here that the question 
of Darwin’s view of species is still a heated debate to this day (eg Mallet, 2010; 
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Stamos, 2013; Zachos, 2016) My point here is to present the view that Modern 
Synthesis thinkers had of Darwin’s conception of species This is not the place to 
attempt a detailed assessment of this view  
 
Darwin argued against the view of species as essences that was dominant in his 
time According to Darwin, variation within population of organisms produces new 
varieties that progressively turn into species. How then to explain the formation 
of species and the existence of morphological gaps between them? Darwin relied 
primarily on the “divergence of character” under the influence of natural selection 
(Darwin, 1859 chapter IV) In an area where many organisms are living, those 
that diverge to occupy specific ecological niches not accessed by the rest will 
suffer less competition Therefore natural selection will favour this divergence 
leading to the formation of new specialized varieties The morphological gaps 
between existing species comes from the extinction of the varieties that did not 
diverge and were outcompeted (see eg Kohn, 2009)  Thus, the main principle 
that drives the production of varieties as well as the production of species is 
continuous phenotypic change explained by the tendency of natural selection to 
favour divergence  
The biological species concept and allopatric speciation 
 
 It has been said that the confusion in contemporary scholarship on 
Darwin’s view of species is due to the fact that most scholars tend to recover their 
own views in Darwin’s work59 (Stamos, 2013) This problem fails to apply to 
Dobzhansky and especially to Mayr 
 
“Darwin failed to solve the problem indicated by the title of his work. Although 
he demonstrated the modification of species in the time dimension, he never 
seriously attempted a rigorous analysis of the problem of the multiplication of 
species, of the splitting of species into two I have examined the reasons for this 
failure [] and found that among them Darwin’s lack of understanding of the 
nature of species was foremost” (Mayr 1963, p 12). 
 
                                                 
59 Stamos insightfully compares his assessment to the one made by Albert Schweitzer about scholarship 
on Jesus at the beginning of the 20th century  
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Dobzhansky and Mayr objected both to Darwin’s definition of species and to his 
preferred explanation of their origin Darwin had focused on phenotypic 
divergence in the formation of species because this divergence is gradual and 
because gaps are caused by extinction of less fit intermediate varieties, Darwin 
did not see a difference of nature between varieties and species He had thus not 
fully perceived the singularity of species, grounded in the existence of isolating 
mechanisms  
 
Here is how Dobzhansky defined a species 
 
“a species is a group of individuals fully fertile inter se, but barred from 
interbreeding with other similar groups by its physiological properties (producing 
either incompatibility of parents, or sterility of the hybrids, or both)” (Dobzhansky, 
1935, p. 353) 
 
Mayr adopted the same definition which he called the “biological species 
definition” (Mayr, 1942, p. 119) What Dobzhansky (1937) called isolating 
mechanisms provided at the same time a way to define species as a category, a 
criterion to identify species taxa, and they were also an essential part in the 
explanation of the origin of species Regarding the identification of species, Mayr 
in particular insisted on problems with morphological criteria, such as sibling 
species, which are not differentiated phenotypically but do not interbreed (eg 
Mayr, 1942, p. 151), and polytypic species, single species with multiple 
phenotypically divergent but intergrading or potentially intergrading subspecies 
(Mayr, 1942, p. 111) Regarding the origin of species, the formation of isolating 
mechanisms was now considered the essential part of the process Mayr 
developed the theory of speciation through allopatry, the view that geographic 
isolation was necessary for the initial formation of genetic, physiological or 
ethological isolating mechanisms through divergence (Mayr, 1942, pp. 154–185)  
 
It is important to note that, even though the biological species concept and 
allopatric speciation arguably became progressively dominant, there was no 
consensus regarding the definition of species as a category, the identification of 
distinction between species taxa, and the processes of speciation Mayr himself 
recognised the limits of the biological species concept to provide diagnostic 
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criteria and its failure to apply to asexual organisms and freely hybridising 
organisms such as some plants (Mayr, 1942, pp. 121–122) The concept was 
criticised for example by Julian Huxley (1942) or C D Darlington, who argued 
that “[t]here are many kinds of species and many kinds of discontinuities between 
species” (in Huxley, 1940, p. 158)  However, the essential point here is that 
during the Modern Synthesis era, there was an increased focused on processes 
of speciation and that this process was, at least conceptually, decoupled from the 
process of gradual origin of new characters, and rather centred on the formation 
of isolating mechanisms  
 
The distinction between the problem of speciation and the problem of variation 
 
 Darwin was included among those who had neglected isolating 
mechanisms and the reality of species but he was not the only target Population 
geneticists focused mainly on genetic dynamics within populations and its models 
were mostly based on infinite populations. Experimental geneticists like Thomas 
Hunt Morgan, focused on the generation and transmission of genetic variations. 
The main question about evolution for Morgan was whether natural selection was 
a creative force acting on the direction of variation, or whether, as he thought, 
natural selection was just a negative force and mutations had the creative role 
(Allen, 1980; Beatty, 2016; Stoltzfus and Cable, 2014). Far from defending the 
reduction of evolution to the problem of the production and selection of variations, 
Dobzhansky, followed by Mayr and other students of speciation, insisted on the 
species and speciation as a different level of biological reality not captured by this 
production and selection of variations 
 
“Mutations and chromosomal changes are constantly arising at a finite rate, 
presumably in all organisms. But in nature we do not find a single greatly variable 
population of living beings which becomes more and more variable as time goes 
on; instead, the organic world is segregated into more than a million separate 
species, each of which possesses its own limited supply of variability which it 
does not share with the others [...] The origin of species [] constitutes a problem 
which is logically distinct from that of the origin of hereditary variation” 
(Dobzhansky, 1937, p. 119).  
 
 97 
Thus, the study of speciation reintroduced a focus on discontinuity in the 
biological world. Since the problem of the production of new characters was 
viewed as an extrapolation of the problem of the production and selection of 
variations, the distinction between the problem of speciation and the problem of 
variation was by extension a distinction between the problem of speciation and 
the problem of novelty.  
 
Experimental taxonomy in botany 
 
 A conceptual change thus occurred regarding species and speciation. 
Equally important, a change in research practices and interests occurred at the 
same time. This general change in practices and concepts has been called by 
some of its actors the “new systematics” (Huxley, 1940; Mayr, 1942, pp. 6–7) 
Following Cain (2009b, p. 628), the new systematics can be decomposed in three 
elements the rise of speciation studies, the development of experimental 
taxonomy, and the general move from a focus on objects to a focus on processes 
of evolution Here I will focus briefly on experimental taxonomy in botany60 
because it was more developed than in zoology (Cain, 2009), and because it had 
arguably a more interesting and ambiguous relationship to the problem of novelty.  
 
Jens Clausen, David Keck and William Hiesey, arguably the most important 
representatives of experimental taxonomy in botany, along with Ernest Babcock, 
defined their approach in the following way: 
 
“The threefold objective of the experimental taxonomy programme is an 
understanding of the various kinds and degrees of kinship between plants, of the 
relations between plants and their environment, and of the evolutionary 
processes that have produced the diversity between plants and their fitness to 
the environment.” (Clausen et al., 1948) 
 
Regarding the first objective, the experimental way of distinguishing between 
species associated with the biological species concept was seen as an 
                                                 
60 As noted by Hagen (1984, p. 250) several appellations have been used for the body of research 
referred to here synthetic taxonomy, genecology, genonomy, population systematics, biosystematics, 
and experimental taxonomy. I follow Hagen and others (e.g. Cain, 2009; Smocovitis, 2009) in using 
experimental taxonomy. 
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improvement on the museum-style method of recognition based on the 
morphology of specimens, although the two were combined rather than opposed 
(see Hagen, 1984) The criterion of breeding behaviour of the biological species 
concept offered a clear way to empirically test hypotheses in systematics In 
botany, it was especially interesting for what was called “critical” genera, that is, 
groups of related polyploid species difficult to classify. Hybridisation experiments 
between these species were the most reliable way to test hypotheses of 
phylogenetic relationships between these species. They were undertaken for 
example by Babcock and Stebbins on the genus Iris, by Clausen, Keck and 
Hiesey on Layia and Madia Furthermore, the discovery in 1937 (Blakeslee and 
Avery, 1937), that colchicine, an alkaloid produced by the roots of plants of the 
genus Colchicum, could induce polyploidy in plants led to its use by 
horticulturalists to produce new species, but also by taxonomists to test 
hypotheses regarding phylogeny and evolution of plant species.  
 
Two pathways through which polyploidy can produce a new species in nature 
were distinguished: autopolyploidy and allopolyploidy (Kihara and Ono, 1926) 
1) Autopolyploidy is polyploidy derived from individuals of a single species. There 
are two ways in which autopolyploidy can occur: the non-reduction of gametes 
during meiosis produces diploid gametes (2n). The fusion of these games can 
then produce tetraploid (4n) or triploid (3n) offsprings which can isolate from the 
original population and form new species either through asexual reproduction or 
by mating with each other. The second way in which autopolyploidy can occur is 
during somatic development a failure of sister chromatids to separate during 
mitosis can lead to tetraploidy (4n). It was found that it was the type of polyploidy 
occurring in mutants of the evening primrose discovered by Hugo de Vries 
(Gates, 1924). This was the main type of polyploidy produced artificially through 
treatment with colchicine (Eigsti and Dustin, 1955; Stebbins, 1951). 2) 
Allopolyploidy, or amphiploidy, occurs when the polyploid organisms are derived 
from to different species through hybridisation. The polyploidy event can occur 
during hybridisation, if a zygote is formed with unreduced gametes of individuals 
or different species, or after the hybridisation event, if there is a meiotic 
disturbance in the offspring of a hybrid.  
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Fig. 3: Three ways to produce polyploids with colchicine: A) Autotetraploids from the 
doubling of somatic chromosomes. B)  Amphiploids (or alloploids) by doubling of the 
chromosomes of a hybrid between two species. C) Amphiploids by hybridisation of 
autotetraploids of different species produced with colchicine (after Eigsti & Dustin, 1955, 
p. 278). 
  
Before detailed knowledge of polyploidy was acquired, this succession of 
hybridisation and polyploidy was hypothesised to explain the evolution of some 
plant taxa, for example the chrysanthemum family in which species had 
chromosome number that were multiple of nine (18, 36, 54, 72, 90) (Winge, 
1917). This evolutionary hypotheses scenario was later produced experimentally 
by Clausen and Goodspeed with tobacco species (Clausen and Goodspeed, 
1925). Other researchers used colchicine to experimentally produce 
hypothesized evolutionary events. It was applied in particular to study the origin 
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of crop species, many of which were known to be polyploids, for example to the 
origin of hexaploid wheats, of oats, of new world cottons and many others61. The 
relative frequency of different types of polyploidy in nature, and especially the 
frequency of the type of polyploidy produced experimentally, was however a 
debated matter (Harlan and deWet, 1975). 
 
Regarding the second objective of understanding the relations between plants 
and their environment, one of the major questions addressed was the distinction 
between genetically induced and environmentally induced variation. This 
question was studied through transplant experiments, either by transplanting a 
species into the environment of the related one and vice versa, a method used 
from the 1920s by Frederic Clements and Harvey Hall, or by transplanting plants 
from several different environments into a single controlled garden, a method 
perfected by the Swedish botanist Göte Turesson (see Hagen, 1984).  
 
Regarding the third objective, the study of evolutionary processes that produced 
diversity, part of the focus of transplant experiments was on forms and genetic 
underpinnings of adaptation to local environments, for example the adaptations 
to different soils or the conservation of ecotypic forms after transplantations 
There was also a great attention to the processes of polyploidy, hybridisation, 
apomixes and their combination in evolution George Leydard Stebbins, working 
in collaboration with Babcock on polyploidy and apoximis in Crepis (Stebbins and 
Babcock, 1939) or with Anderson on the role of hybridisation in evolution 
(Anderson and Stebbins, 1954), was at the forefront of research on what he called 
“cataclysmic evolution” in plants (Stebbins, 1951), that is abrupt speciation and 
possibly phenotypic change through polyploidy events Because of the intense 
research on such processes and their frequency in plants, evolutionary taxonomy 
in botany, much more than its zoological counterpart, was expanding beyond the 
domain of speciation and species level variations and towards the origin of higher 
taxa of lower ranks, especially genera The case of research on polyploidy and 
hybridisation also shows the interpenetration of the first and third objectives of 
experimental taxonomy. The same research was both contributing to taxonomic 
knowledge and to knowledge of evolutionary processes. 
                                                 
61 See for example Eigsti and Dustin (1955) for review and references.  
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To summarize the relation between novelty and species and speciation studies 
during the Modern Synthesis era, the increased interest in speciation and its 
genetic, geographical and ecological conditions conceptually separated 
speciation, centred on isolating mechanisms, from the process of genetic and 
phenotypic variation and by extension, of novelty The Modern Synthesis era saw 
the rise of experimental taxonomy, a multi-disciplinary and multi-purpose 
endeavour, which focused both on speciation and variation as processes but was 
mostly limited, at least in animal studies, to species-level and below species-level 
variations and adaptations, which were mostly quantitative and did not qualify as 
novelties However, experimental taxonomy in botany has a special status 
because it was more developed than in zoology and because the experimental 
study of polyploidy and hybridisation entered the realm of the origin of higher 
taxa, and, more indirectly, of the origin of novelty  
 
 
III – NOVELTY AND HIGHER TAXA 
 
Novelty and the origin of higher taxa 
 
 With experimental taxonomy in botany, there was, to a certain extent, a 
blur in the division between the study of speciation and species-level variations 
and the study of higher taxa and more large-scale variations. However, this 
division was commonly accepted, as shown in these disciplinary distinctions 
made by Simpson 
 
“The experimentalists are mainly concerned with evolutionary processes and 
events in subdivisions of species. The neontological systematists work for the 
most part around the level of species, on larger subdivisions of species, on 
species as a whole, or on closely related groups of species. The biological 
paleontologists and others who might be called historical biologists (representing 
a subscience that has no accepted name) are less concerned with species and 
more with groups from genera upward.” (Simpson, 1953, p. 338) 
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Regarding the relation between the origin of higher taxa (groups from genera 
upwards) and the origin of novelties, it is worth going back to the views expressed 
by Ernst Mayr. In his article on “The emergence of evolutionary novelties”, Mayr 
chooses to separate the two problems 
 
“The origin of new taxa, from species to higher categories, will be considered as 
lying outside the scope of this discussion. Even though, admittedly, the origin of 
new higher categories is often correlated with the emergence of a  new structure 
or other character, the natures of the two problems are sufficiently different to 
necessitate separate treatment.” (Mayr, 1960, pp. 356–7). 
 
Thus, there is enough difference between the origin of novelty and the origin of 
higher taxonomic categories to require a separate treatment, but there is 
nonetheless a correlation between them. However, a few years later, Mayr 
expresses a different judgment: 
 
“It is evident that the origin of a new type, the origin of new morphological and other 
biological characteristics, and the origin of the higher categories are three 
problems that cannot be separated from each other. Indeed, they are merely three 
different aspects of the same problem. Whatever contribution is made to one of the 
three problems is also a contribution to the other two.” (Mayr, 1963, p. 589). 
 
One way to explain the ambiguity is to argue that novelty and higher taxonomic 
categories are overlapping but non-identical problems. Some novelties are 
associated with the origin of higher taxonomic categories while others can be 
proper to a single species or a small number of species. Conversely the origin of 
a higher taxonomic category often implies a series of novelties, but it is a broader 
process that also requires speciation events.  
 
Precisely because the origin of a higher taxa, especially of taxa of high ranks 
(families, orders and above), usually involve the origin of several novelties, 
historical research focused on the evolutionary history of particular taxa often 
tackles the question of the origin of their diagnostic characters. Thus, research 
on novelty of the Modern Synthesis era is to be found in research focusing on the 
origin of higher taxa as well as on research more explicitly on some phenotypic 
character. Surveys of animal research on novelty in the Modern Synthesis era 
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have shown the sustained presence, if not abundance, of this research and 
revealed that this research falls within the disciplines of paleontology, morphology 
and comparative embryology. (Love, 2009, 2005; Love and Raff, 2003; Raff and 
Love, 2004). Rather than focusing on the same material, I will turn to the state of 
research on the origin of higher taxa in botany in order to provide a comparative 
view of the two domains. I will more precisely focus on the origin of angiosperms 
(and angiosperm novelties) since it was the most studied group. 
 
The origin of angiosperms 
 
 As noted by George Ledyard Stebbins (1974a, p 340), plants are superior 
to animals in terms of the possibilities of crossing between related species and 
even related genera and of subsequent genetic analysis. This partly explains the 
greater advancement of experimental taxonomy in botany than in zoology. At the 
same time, the fossil record, which allows tracking of evolutionary change, is 
much more abundant for animals than for plants, especially for angiosperms. This 
poor fossil record brings a disadvantage for the study of large-scale evolution. A 
look at research on the evolution of higher categories in plants is significant 
because it reveals a different power balance in this domain than in the domain of 
animal studies While the Modern Synthesis perspective had reached a 
dominating position in animal evolution at least from the 1950s, the situation in 
plant evolution was more contested, as illustrated by this statement from 
Stebbins  
 
“The reason that no botanist in the 1930s and 1940s did for botany what Simpson 
and Rensch did for zoology is perhaps that the only people who thought above 
the species level were the morphologists and the anatomists. They were 
dominated by people like Arber, Bower, and Bailey, who regarded adaptation and 
selection as teleology and were strongly opposed to truly Darwinian concepts. 
[…] Their hypotheses did not deal with the processes that produced change, but 
rather with the descriptive morphology of the types that were supposed to have 
been present. It was pure phylogeny, based upon supposed morphological 
homologies.” (Stebbins, 1980, pp. 150–151) 
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When Stebbins published his own book-length account of the origin and evolution 
of the angiosperms (Stebbins, 1974a), a review by the British botanist David 
Mabberley stated 
 
“[] cutting a swathe through the jungle of botanical conjecture and hypothesis, 
the author leaves a trail of battered and bruised theories. Among the injured are 
the ideas of Arber (and thus Goethe), Corner, Eames, Holttum, Melville, Sporne, 
van Steenis, Zimmermann.... Bews, Fedorov, Sattler and Takhtajan”.  
 
And later concluded 
 
“If Professor Stebbins is right in his genetic uniformitarianism, then this book will 
be seen, when sufficient evidence has been gathered, to be that of a prophet; if 
wrong it will be seen as yet another, almost colonial, imposition of temperate 
ideas on the tropical.” (Mabberley, 1976, p. 529) 
 
As expressed by Mabberley, a flurry of evolutionary hypotheses coexisted and 
the Modern Synthetic adaptationist and uniformiatarian view was not in a 
dominant position.  
 
Regarding angiosperm systematics, many different classifications still coexisted 
during the Modern Synthesis era One can distinguish between artificial 
classifications, based on a small selection of characters, such as the Linnean 
sexual system based on the number of stamens and pistils natural 
classifications, focused on overall similarity and based on numerous, mostly 
morphological, characters, such systems organized in a series of nested classes 
(eg genus, family, order etc) and allowing more predictions and generalisations 
than artificial systems and historical or phylogenetic classifications, whose 
purpose is to reconstitute the evolutionary history and relationships between taxa 
(Briggs and Walters, 2016; Constance, 1955; Singh, 2016)  
 
Many plant biologists doubted the possibility of phylogenetic taxonomies A 
minority considered that it should be the main goal of taxonomy (Constance, 
1955; Winsor, 1995) For example, this debate applied to taxonomy in general 
was the main subject of the discussions of the Taxonomic Principles committee 
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of the Association for the Study of Systematics in Relation to General Biology, 
which led to the publication in 1940 of the influential volume The new systematics 
As Winsor (1995, p. 227) notes 
 
“Most of the botanists asserted that taxonomy was a practical matter to be kept 
distinct from phylogenetic speculation, and most of the zoologists insisted that 
taxonomists must strive to represent evolution if they wished to be scientific”  
 
The reasons for the scepticism about the phylogenetic approach to taxonomy 
were multiple a) the different proposed phylogenetic systems relied on 
speculations to a large extent; b) the poverty of the fossil record meant that few 
transitional forms between extent plant taxa were found c) phylogenetic systems 
thus usually directly linked extant forms in transformation series, but the origin of 
extant forms from other extant forms was improbable in many cases; d) the 
uncertainty regarding the direction of evolutionary trends, that is, regarding which 
character is primitive and which is derived; e) the contradictions between 
phylogenetic series based on different types of evidence (different morphological 
characters, or embryological, biochemical, physiological evidence); f) the debates 
about different possible relations of homology between characters in different 
taxa g) the reduction of the utility of taxonomy by sacrificing its other goals to the 
single goal of establishing phylogenetic relations (after Constance, 1955, pp. 
412–413; see Garay, 1960; Davis and Heywood, 1963; Briggs and Walters, 
2016).  
 
The difficulties of the phylogenetic approach did not prevent plant biologists from 
both sides, defenders and opponents of phylogeny, to hypothesize many 
sequences of character transformation, or typological series A closer look at 
these character sequences shows that the simple opposition between natural and 
phylogenetic classifications is too coarse. For example, the influential 
classification of the German botanists Adolf Engler (1844-1930) and Karl Prantl 
(1849-1893) has been considered as the beginning of phylogenetic 
classifications (Singh, 2016), but it was composed of linear sequences of plant 
groups according to a principle of increasing complexity, which appears as a 
relatively naïve phylogenetic principle and has been refuted in many cases due 
to the importance of reduction in plant evolution (Singh, 2016, p. 313)  
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Here, a distinction should be made between phylogeny as an ideal and as a 
classification practice Botanists who doubted the phylogenetic ideal could still 
produce local evolutionary sequences as robust as botanists upholding this 
phylogenetic ideal. The German botanist Walter Zimmerman, although he was 
on the phylogenetic side, favoured “character phylogeny” 
(Merkmalsphylogenetik), the hypothesizing of evolutionary series of single 
characters, which he contrasted with “species phylogeny” (Sippenphylogenetik), 
the actual phylogeny of plant species or groups, the latter being much more 
difficult to investigate (Zimmermann, 1934). Zimmermann distinguished six 
processes responsible for plant morphological change through evolution 
(represented in figure 3 below) 1) overtopping, 2) planation, 3) fusion (a – in  leaf, 
and b- in stems), 4) reduction and 5) incurvation (Zimmermann, 1965, p. 76).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Examples of character phylogenies. Transformation of the leaf through 
overtopping, planation, fusion and reduction. Above: in Magnolia. Below: in conifers 
(After Zimmermann, 1965). 
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Fig. 5: processes of character transformation in vascular plants (After Zimmermann, 
1965). 
 
 
More generally, in a review of plant taxonomy, Davis and Heywood (1963, p 35-
37) list 29 generally accepted evolutionary trends, often based on morphological 
character series. Many other of these putative transformation series or “character 
phylogenies” were however, highly contested (Constance, 1955). Other plant 
morphologists, like Agnes Arber, were skeptical about the phylogenetic approach 
and preferred producing logical, non-evolutionary and non-directional 
morphological series. Arber established relations between characters from a 
developmental and dynamic perspective.  (Arber, 1950, 1937; Classen-Bockhoff, 
2001; Rutishauser and Isler, 2001; Vergara-Silva, 2003). Thus, while Stebbins is 
right in describing Arber as skeptical of natural selection, his description of her 
method as “pure phylogeny” (Stebbins, 1980, pp. 151, cited earlier) is misleading. 
In any case, most hypotheses of character evolution were also based on 
inferences from comparative morphology of extant angiosperm species rather 
than on inferences from the fossil record  
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Differences in emphasis 
 
 As suggested earlier, the origin of particular higher taxonomical categories 
is a problem that can be divided into several component research questions. An 
essential point for my investigation is to determine how much of the research on 
the origin of higher taxa was involving research on the origin of evolutionary 
novelties associated with these higher taxa. Some research on the origin of the 
angiosperms has an ecological and biogeographical focus with little reference to 
evolutionary novelties. For example, here is how the paleoecologist Daniel 
Axelrod divided the problem of the origin of the angiosperms 
 
“The problem has several facets, which may be viewed in terms of the following 
questions: (1) What were their ancestors? (2) What is their antiquity? (3) What 
was the general nature and area of the environment in which they originated? (4) 
Did they actually assume dominance with "bewildering suddenness" during the 
Cretaceous?” (Axelrod, 1952, p. 29) 
 
As stressed by Axelrod, there was little agreement on any of the four questions. 
For example, regarding the first question, there were debates between the 
hypotheses of a monophyletic origin and of a polyphyletic origin of the 
angiosperms; between the hypotheses of a similarity of the first angiosperms with 
some extant group or of their dissimilarity to any extant group; a prominent debate 
was about the growth habit of the ancestral angiosperms.  About the second 
question, the major debate was whether the angiosperms originated shortly 
before the first known fossils, dating from the early Cretaceous, or long before, in 
the Mesozoic.  
 
In order to assess research within the Modern Synthesis framework, a significant 
document to consider is the first volume of the publication derived from the 
Darwin centennial celebration at the university of Chicago (Tax, 1960). Of the 
twenty contributions, two are focused mainly on plant evolution, that of Axelrod 
on ‘The evolution of flowering plants”(Axelrod, 1960), which again adopts the 
same biogeographical and ecological perspective, and that of Stebbins, “The 
comparative evolution of genetic systems” (Stebbins, 1960), which focuses 
mainly, but not exclusively, on the evolution of alternation of generations in plants, 
concentrating on the genetic and chromosomal level and with a selectionist 
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outlook. This suggests that, for Modern Synthesis scientists, the question of the 
origin and evolution of angiosperms (and of plants more generally) was 
decoupled from the question of the origin of angiosperm novelties. It is certain 
that the latter was not dominant research subject. The case of Stebbins, however, 
forces us to nuance this diagnosis. In Variation and evolution in plants (1950 
chapter 13), Stebbins treated the question of large scale evolutionary trends in 
plant morphology. He later published a book-length account of the evolution of 
flowering plants combining the perspective of Axelrod and of G.G. Simpson with 
a focus on morphological and developmental evolution (Stebbins, 1974a). 
Stebbins’s approach will be covered in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
Stebbins (1980, pp. 150–151, cited earlier) makes a distinction between the 
Modern Synthesis approach, which was interested in “the processes that 
produced change” and the approach of morphologists like Agnes Arber, Irving 
Bailey and Frederick Bower, who were only interested in phylogeny and 
morphological homology. As I said, this dichotomy is confusing. There should be 
a distinction between the logical perspective of some comparative morphologists 
like Arber, focused on homologies and sceptic of the phylogenetic approach, and 
the perspective of the taxonomists and morphologists who pursued this 
phylogenetic approach. Regarding the latter, what was the relation between their 
work and the question of the origin of novelty? Even if Stebbins’ dichotomy is too 
coarse, it can be reframed to apply to both comparative morphologists like Arber, 
and phylogenetic taxonomists according to Stebbins, both were interested only 
in patterns (typological or phylogenetic), while only the Modern Synthesis 
perspective was concerned with processes of evolutionary change. I think that, 
again under this interpretation, Stebbins’s opposition between the pattern and the 
process perspectives is too strong. Walter Zimmermann is a case in point, as his 
work is both a contribution to phylogenetic systematics and a development of 
theories of character transformation grounded in processes at different levels the 
descriptive processes of morphological transformation described earlier are, in 
his framework,  grounded in genetic processes (mutations), in developmental 
physiology and in the action of natural selection (Zimmermann, 1965; Classen-
Bockhoff, 2001). More generally, research with phylogeny as a primary objective 
was often involved with processes of transformation on which to ground the 
phylogenetic patterns. The establishment of phylogenetic relationships is based 
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on different lines of evidence (fossil, morphological, anatomical, cytological, 
biochemical, developmental). Transformation series have to be established at 
these different levels, especially at level the morphological and developmental 
characters. These hypothesized transformations series have to be justified by 
formulating explanations which are involved with evolutionary processes. Thus, 
at least, some of the research primarily concerned with the phylogeny of the 
angiosperm pertains to the domain of research on the origin of angiosperm 
novelties. I will illustrate this in the next section with the example of the relation 
between the phylogeny of the angiosperm as a taxon and the origin and evolution 
of the angiosperm flower.   
 
The origin of the angiosperm flower 
 
 There was historically a strong association between the origin and 
evolution of the angiosperm taxon and the origin and evolution of the angiosperm 
flower because the use of floral characters in classification and phylogeny had 
been dominant for two centuries and was still dominant (Constance, 1955). 
Regarding the definition and origin of the flower, Foster and Gifford noted: 
 
“As angiosperms are commonly designated the flowering plants, it might be 
assumed that there is rather general agreement about the scientific concept of a 
flower. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and the literature on floral 
organography, ontogeny, and structure displays widely divergent viewpoints of 
the fundamental nature of the flower as well as on the interpretation of its 
component organs (sepals, petals, stamens, and carpels). One of the basic 
difficulties lies in our complete ignorance of the evolutionary history of the flower 
[…]; it becomes largely a matter of conjecture whether it is justifiable to draw 
comparisons between modern angiospermous flowers and the spore-producing 
structures of other tracheophytes [vascular land-plants]. If such comparisons are 
attempted, it is quite possible to reach either a very broad or a very restricted 
concept or definition of a flower.” (Foster and Gifford, 1974, p. 593) 
 
 
Although Foster and Gifford’s view is especially pessimistic, it reflects the 
multiplicity of competing theories regarding the homologies between flower 
organs and other plant organs and regarding the origin of the flower. 
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Three main groups of hypotheses regarding the origin and nature of the ancestral 
angiosperm flower were competing during the late Modern Synthesis era.  
 
_ The first group of hypotheses is grounded in the classical homology between 
flower organs and leaves, which goes back to Goethe. According to that 
homology, the flower is a determinate shoot with appendages, and the latter 
(sepals, petals, stamens, carpel) are modified leaves. The prominent modern 
formulation of this view is the strobilus theory of Arber and Parkin (1907). A 
strobilus or cone is a group of sporophylls (leaves bearing the organs that 
produce spores) borne terminally on a shoot. Strobili are found in several plant 
groups other than angiosperms. They can be unisexual (with only 
megasporophylls or microsporophylls) as in the Cycyads, or bisexual, as in the 
fossil group Bennettitales. Conifers possess compound unisexual strobili. Under 
that view the ancestral flower was derived from a bisexual cone and was “a 
radially symmetrical flower with an elongated axis bearing numerous, indefinite 
in number, separate, leaflike members arranged in regular spirals, or cycles, or 
pairs, depending upon the vegetative phyllotaxy” (Constance, 1955, p. 422). 
 
_ The second group of theories interpret the flower as derived not from a single 
bisexual axis but from the condensation of two unisexual cones, or by derivation 
from the compound cones of some gymnosperms. However, this second group 
also adopts the homology between the flower and a vegetative shoot, and 
between floral organs and leaves (e.g. Wettstein, 1908; Melville, 1960). 
  
_ The third group, in contrast, denied the view of the flower as a modified 
vegetative shoot. Different sources of evidence were used by different 
researchers such as phyllotaxy, and developmental evidence. For example, 
Satina and Blakeslee, who used chimera of the species Datura induced by 
colchicine treatment to study the fate of cells in development, relied on their 
developmental evidence to question the homology of all floral organs to leaves. 
Colchicine treatment of the seeds leads to the random polyploidy of some plant 
cells and because these polyploid cells are distinguishable, it allowed Satina, 
Blakeslee and Avery to trace cell lineages during the development of the plant. 
They used the technique to demonstrate the existence of three distinct germ 
layers in the shoot meristem (Satina et al., 1940). Satina and Blakeslee later 
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demonstrated that like leaves, sepals and petals originate from meristematic 
material of the central germ layer, whereas stamens and carpels originate from 
the innermost germ layer. They argued that this evidence weakened the claim of 
homology between leaves and all floral organs and thus the strobilus theory of 
flower origin. (Satina and Blakeslee, 1943, 1941). 
 
Thus, firstly, the example of research on the origin of the angiosperm flower 
shows that the frontier between phylogenetic research on the angiosperms and 
evolutionary research on the origin of angiosperm novelties was quite porous. 
The example of Satina and Blakeslee illustrates the bridge between 
developmental, evolutionary and phylogenetic research. Secondly, the 
multiplicity of different hypotheses shows the limitation of the evidence and the 
lack of a common theoretical framework. 
 
 
 
IV– NOVELTY, COMPLEXITY AND LEVELS OF ORGANISATION 
 
 
The position of the problem of novelty in the Modern Synthesis era can be 
approached from a different angle by referring to the frequently used distinction 
between increase in complexity, or in level of organization, and diversification.  
This broad distinction is related to several conceptual dichotomies important at 
the time: between general adaptation and special adaptation, grade and clade, 
anagenesis and cladogenesis. As Schaeffer and Hecht argue in their introduction 
to the proceedings of the Symposium on “The origin of higher levels of 
organization” (Schaeffer and Hecht, 1965), several key authors of the Modern 
Synthesis era (Simpson, Huxley, Schmalhausen, Rensch, Mayr) distinguish 
between the process that produces superior levels of organization and the one 
that leads to the diversification of species. There was however no clear 
unanimous understanding of the former process. This can be illustrated by the 
various meanings of the concepts of anagenesis and cladogenesis.   
 
The concepts of anagenesis and cladogenesis are particularly interesting 
because they had conflicting meanings that revealed disagreements or 
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ambiguities in the way Modern Synthesis scientists conceived evolution. The 
terms were first used together by Rensch in the first German edition of Evolution 
above the species level (Rensch, 1947). Here is how Rensch distinguishes the 
two distinct processes in the English translation of the second edition 
 
“Though it has rightly been argued that the ‘lower’ species may be ‘perfectly’ 
adapted to their special habitats, the existence of a ‘lower’ and a ‘higher’ has not 
been denied. There is no doubt that most of our Recent types of mammals are 
‘higher’ than their smaller Jurassic and Cretaceous ancestors, and that Recent 
insects represent a higher form of organization than their annelid ancestors. 
However, as a ‘higher’ level may be caused by increased complexity, improved 
rationalization, or greater versatility in reacting to environmental stimuli, the 
problem of progressive evolution, observed in so many phylogenetic branches, 
needs a consideration of its own. I have proposed referring to it as anagenesis, 
whereas the normal branching of lines of descent should be distinguished as 
kladogenesis.” (Rensch, 1959, p. 281) 
 
Rensch makes several important distinctions here. First, anagenesis is not 
identical to adaptation as a process less anagenetically advanced species can 
be as well adapted to their habitat as more advanced species62 Still, Rensch 
insists that anagenesis is the product of natural selection, and not of autonomous 
principles, as many who discussed the phenomenon argued, such as Lamarck 
or, more recently, Daqué and Beurlen. Thus, anagenesis is only one form of 
adaptation among others. Second, anagenesis includes increase in complexity 
but is not limited to it (the components of anagenesis will be discussed further 
below). Third, anagenesis and cladognesis should not be considered as 
alternative processes, the latter refers for Rensch to the diversification of life 
through phylogenetic branching. It includes both the splitting of lineages and their 
genetic and phenotypic change. Anagenesis should be considered as one form 
of change occurring during cladagenesis 
 
                                                 
62 Relatedly, there is no identity or necessary link between survival and spread on one side, and 
anagenesis on the other: “When we accept Charles Darwin’s statement (1859, chapter 11) that all 
‘recent species have proved their superiority over their extinct ancestors by their survival’, we should 
remember that this superiority does not necessarily mean a result of progressive evolution”. (Rensch, 
1959, p. 285) 
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“As at any phylogenetic level anagenesis is only one of several evolutionary 
possibilities, it is comprehensible that sometimes regressions will occur and that 
sometimes the anagenetic level will remain unaltered”. (Rensch, 1959, p. 300) 
 
Rensch distinguishes six types of anagenesis: (1) Increase in complexity. This 
process mainly resides in differentiation of parts. Differentiation is progressive 
when the specialisation of parts allows for improvements in the performed 
functions or for the assumption of new functions. Rensch insists on the principle 
of “the origin of new organs as a consequence of a strictly quantitative increase 
of certain tissues causing new growth gradients”, and cites as examples “the 
origin of parapodial appendages of polychaetes, the formation of wings in insects, 
the fins of primeval fishes, feathers and hairs, the neural groove, the optic cups, 
the semicircular ducts of the optic labyrinth, the basilar papilla of the internal ear, 
the neopallium of the vertebrate brain” (1959, pp. 289–290). However, this should 
not lead us to believe that Rensch includes in anagenesis any new morphological 
or physiological character all the examples used are related to the essential 
functions of locomotion, respiration, thermoregulation, perception and cognition. 
(2) Rationalisation of structures and functions. This is the improvement of 
efficiency by diminution of the number of parts or by centralisation. (3) The 
increase in complexity and rationalisation of nervous systems are treated 
separately but they can be seen as illustrations of the two previous processes. 
(4) The increase in plasticity of structures and functions. (5) “Improvement 
permitting further improvement”. Rensch here contrasts this process with 
adaptation leading to overspecialisation and possibly blind alleys, fatal when 
changes in environmental conditions occur. This further specifies the distinction 
of anagenesis with evolutionary novelty many new characters can be included 
in anagenesis but many others only increase specialisation. In the English edition 
of 1959, Rensch equates his idea with Simpson’s (1949) “progress in 
adaptatbility”  and Julian Huxley’s (1954) “nonrestrictive improvement”. (6) The 
increase of autonomy and independence from the environment.  
 
As I noted in part II of this chapter, Simpson favours a distinction between 
speciation or the splitting of lineages, and phenotypic evolution, which occurs 
within lineages and which he calls phyletic evolution he equates the first with 
cladogenesis and the second with anagenesis (Simpson, 1949, pp. 178–179). 
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The different conceptions that Rensch and Simpson have of anagenesis and 
cladogenesis are manifest in Simpson’s review of the first German edition of 
Rensch’s Evolution above the species level. What is of significance is that 
Simpson does not see this as simply a case of different meanings conventionally 
attributed to the same terms, but argues that the use Rensch makes of the terms 
reveals some inconsistency in his vision of evolution63. About Rensch’s version 
of cladogenesis, Simpson writes 
 
“Rensch moreover includes and emphasizes under "cladogenesis" the various 
phenomena involved in progressive specialization and, particularly, the origin of 
new organs and new basic structural types or ‘Bauplane’ Now, it would appear 
that this is not correctly conceived as an aspect of cladogenesis, 
‘Stammverzweigung,' unless the new organ or new basic type (and hence a new 
higher taxonomic category) appeared at the time of the branching, as a 
phenomenon of the branching itself and not as a progressive development within 
a continuous line of descent.” (Simpson, 1949, p. 179) 
 
Simpson then writes about anagenesis 
 
“In general, anagenesis is considered as progressive change in structures and 
groups already established as such (similar to what I have called "phyletic 
evolution"), and yet the distinction from progressive specialization or from 
progressive development of new groups is far from clear (to me, at least), and 
indeed Rensch has given nearly identical examples (e.g. rise of mammals and 
their basic structures from reptiles and theirs) for both cladogenesis and 
anagenesis.” (Simpson, 1949, p. 179) 
 
I think that the criticisms that Simpson formulates against Rensch are based on 
an ambiguity and a misunderstanding. The ambiguity is that of the concept of 
progressive evolution. The misunderstanding applies to Simpson’s belief that, like 
him, Rensch views cladogenesis and anagenesis as alternative processes, 
whereas, as noted earlier, for Rensch anagenesis is one form of cladogenesis. 
The two interpretation problems are manifest in the following diagram included 
                                                 
63 “In some respects, however, the concepts involved in Rensch's classification of these evolutionary 
aspects do not seem entirely clear and they may even be partly inconsistent with some of his main 
conclusions as to forces and processes in evolution.” (Simpson, 1949, p. 179) 
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by Simpson, even though he notes that the concepts are “analogous but not 
identical” (Simpson, 1949, p. 178) 
 
 
 
Fig 6 Comparisaon of Rensch’s and Simpson’s processes of evolution (after Simpson, 
1949, p. 179) 
 
Regarding anagenesis as progressive evolution, Simpson uses the concept in its 
temporal sense, as opposed to rapid or saltational evolution, and he assumes 
that Rensch does the same. Meanwhile, Rensch actually uses progressive 
evolution in its qualitative sense, as an increase in complexity or rationalisation 
or the other forms of anagenesis described earlier. Because of the 
misunderstanding and the ambiguity, here is the contradiction that Simpson 
perceives in Rensch’s framework on the one hand, he notes that Rensch, like 
himself, believes, contrary to Schindewolf and Goldschmidt, in the gradual 
formation of “groups”, that is, of higher taxa with characteristic structural plans. 
The phase of formation of groups is just as gradual as their phase of 
specialisation. On the other hand, Rensch assigns the formation of new organs 
and especially of new “Bauplane” (structural plans) to cladogenesis, suggesting 
that this formation coincides with branching and is thus sudden or even 
saltational.  
 
The misunderstanding between Simpson and Rensch can be interpreted as a 
difference of perspective. Simpson argues that Rensch has the perspective of a 
neozoologist while he himself has the perspective of a paleozoologist. I think that 
in this case, the following interpretation is more accurate Simpson conceives 
cladogenesis and anagenesis within the context of the problem of the tempo and 
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mode of evolution, whereas Rensch conceives cladogenesis as pertaining to this 
problem but anagenesis as pertaining to another one, the problem of qualitative 
progress in evolution64 
 
The case of anagenesis and cladogenesis can be related to the dual objective of 
evolutionary systematics in the Modern Synthesis era. Evolutionary systematics 
intends to classify taxa both according to phylogenetic relationships, in order to 
accurately represent phylogenetic history and according to level of organisation 
or morphological similarity. These levels of organisation are usually represented 
in ecological terms of niches or adaptive zones, with which morphological 
characteristics are associated. The combination of these two dimensions is for 
example defended by Mayr who opposes the cladistic school led by Hennig, 
which only considers the first dimension valid for systematics  
 
“Any theory of classification which pays no attention to the tremendous range of 
difference between shifts of phyletic lines into minor niches and into entirely new 
adaptive zones, is bound to produce classifications that are unbalanced and 
meaningless” (Mayr, 1974, pp. 105–106). 
 
The concepts of clade and grade, formalised by Julian Huxley (1959), each 
embody one of the dimensions While clades are groups based on phylogeny, 
more precisely monophyletic groups, grades are groups that share a level or 
organisation, for example based on mechanisms of feeding or locomotion A 
grade can thus be reached by different lineages through convergent or parallel 
evolution  
 
Thus, the primary research context in which the concept of grades was 
elaborated was the systematic classification of taxa. However, the problem of the 
transition between grades or levels of organisation was an important research 
topic during the Modern Synthesis era. This is illustrated for example by the 
Symposium entitled “The origin of higher levels of organisation” (Schaeffer and 
Hecht, 1965) which gathered biologists from different disciplines to study 
                                                 
64 Simpson’s meaning of anagenesis and cladogenesis will progressively become the dominant one. The 
distinction is still used today although there is again a polysemy of the terms and a debate regarding 
their usefulness (Allmon, 2017; Vaux et al., 2016). 
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separately the different factors playing a role in the origin of new grades. The 
selected factors were genetic mechanisms, morphogenesis, adaptive 
mechanisms, ecological factors, natural selection and experimentation (the 
overlap between the different factors was recognised). I will study some of these 
origin explanations in more detail in the next part of this chapter. The problem of 
transitions between grades or levels of organisation thus overlaps with the 
problem of the origin of novelties because the former often imply several 
morphological and physiological changes and these changes can include clear 
origin of novelties but also quantitative changes such as elongations of bones 
and muscles, loss of organs, changes of shapes65 
 
 
V – NOVELTY AND ADAPTATION 
 
Adaptive types and adaptive radiations 
 
 In the previous chapter, I examined the conceptual relations between 
novelty and adaptation and the arguments in favour of keeping these two 
problems separated Here, I will now examine in more detail how adaptation and 
novelty were weaved together during the Modern Synthesis era In a recent 
article, the paleobiologist Douglas Erwin (2015) summarizes the dominant 
position on novelty in the Modern Synthesis era with three claims: 
 
1) All the diversification events in the history of life are adaptive radiations.  
2) All the adaptive radiations are triggered by ecological opportunities.  
                                                 
65 Here is an example of the different types of transformations involved in the transitions between the 
three grades of sharks (cladodonts, hybodont and modern) “The transition from primitive placoderm to 
cladodont involved loss of the dermal armor, perhaps in relation to requirements for greater buoyancy, 
but retention of the cartilaginous (frequency calcified) endo-skeleton. The relatively large semicircular 
canals may have been carried over from the placoderm ancestry. The cladodont feeding mechanism, 
including the amphistylic jaw suspension (probably also a retained ancestral character), was obviously 
efficient for both the cladodont and the hybodont way of life. Possibly the reduced otic region, involving 
smaller semicircular canals, and surely the tribasal pectoral fins of the hybodont level, represent 
expressions of increased maneuverability. In modern sharks, the protrusible palatoquadrate, the 
calcified centra, and the fused pelvic plates were among the final refinements in feeding and 
locomotion.” (Schaeffer, 1965, p. 320) 
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3) The rate of morphological diversification between taxa is faster at the 
beginning of the history of a clade but slows down with the decrease of 
ecological opportunities.  
 
Adaptive radiations can be defined as the rapid diversification of a lineage into 
new species associated with the ecological and phenotypic divergence of these 
species and where this divergence corresponds to a process of adaptation to the 
different habitats involved The theory of adaptive radiations gained momentum 
in the later phase of the Modern Synthesis, through the impulsion of Lack (1947), 
Dobzhansky (1951) and especially Simpson (1953). It was at the time illustrated 
by a few empirically well studied cases, especially from island fauna, such as the 
Galapagos finches (Lack, 1947) and the Hawaii honeycreepers (Amadon, 1950). 
Douglas Erwin later argues that the progressive documentation of different 
adaptive radiations in the last decades has shown that they are actually not 
sufficient to produce the past and present diversity of life forms 
 
“The most striking observation [] is the absence of evolutionary novelty 
associated with classic adaptive radiations. Indeed, by their nature, adaptive 
radiations concern the adaptive exploitation of ecological opportunities via 
variation on existing adaptive themes, but not the formation of the themes 
themselves. While the fossil record documents adaptive radiations that 
encompass greater morphological diversity than Darwin’s finches, mockingbirds 
or Anolis lizards, including the spread of insects and angiosperms, and the 
Mesozoic radiation of mammals, the origins of morphological novelties often 
seem to involve a different process.”(Erwin, 2015, p. 933) 
 
The argument formulated by Erwin can be summarised in the following fashion: 
The Modern Synthesis represented evolution as a series of adaptive radiations. 
Now, it appears that adaptive radiations are not associated with evolutionary 
novelties, they are only associated with variations on existing adaptive themes. 
The process of production of novelty is situated outside of sequences of adaptive 
radiation and has not been covered by the Modern Synthesis. It is pertinent here 
to ask what Modern Synthesis thinkers and researchers would have thought of 
Erwin’s argument And what did Simpson and others have to say about what 
happened between adaptive radiations? I shall then focus on whether the 
formation of what Erwin calls “adaptive themes” was tackled by Modern Synthesis 
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researchers Was the question of the formation of adaptive themes left 
unaddressed? If not, what strategies were used to address this problem and what 
degree of importance was attributed to it? There are three possibilities here: 
1) MS biologists were focused only on adaptive radiations as episodes of 
diversification of species and specialisation in different directions from a 
generalist adaptive theme, and the formation of the adaptive themes 
themselves, and thus of evolutionary novelties, was left as an unexplained 
blind spot. 
2) MS biologists produced explanations of the transitions between adaptive 
themes but rejected the two-stage view of phenotypic evolution in favour 
of a continuous view: phenotypic changes, and thus novelties, occur as 
much during radiations as during transitions between adaptive themes. 
3) MS biologists produced explanations of the transition between adaptive 
themes and embraced, at least partly, the two-stage view of phenotypic 
evolution, locating essential phenotypic changes (and thus novelties) at 
these transitions  
 
It appears that whereas Simpson’s view is best described by proposition 2), other 
Modern Synthesis participants or sympathisers were closer to proposition 3) 
While fleshing out the whole theory of adaptive radiations is a task that would 
lead us away from evolutionary novelties, the concept of preadaptation is a 
cornerstone of the relationships between the Modern Synthesis’ adaptive view of 
evolution and evolutionary novelties It was used by Simpson to articulate his 
views, without having novelty as a direct explanatory target, but also by others, 
such as Ernst Mayr and functional morphologists, as a causal principle more 
directly targeted at explaining the origin of novelties I will thus briefly describe 
some concepts essential to Simpson’s view of adaptive radiations and then focus 
on the development of the concept of preadaptation and its varying relationship 
to novelty   
 
Adaptive types and adaptive zones 
 
 The concept of adaptive themes that Douglas Erwin describes as the 
starting points of adaptive radiations, which proceed via variation on these 
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themes, is not literally present in Simpson’s theory, but two of his essential 
concepts are related to it adaptive types and adaptive zones 
 
“Adaptive types may be defined in part and in some cases in geographic or 
physical environmental terms, but it is essential to remember that what we are 
talking about here is not a geographic, physical, or even in the broadest sense 
environmental zone but an adaptive zone, representing a characteristic reaction 
and mutual relationship between environment and organism, a way of life and not 
a place where life is led.” (Simpson, 1953, pp. 201–202) 
 
Three characteristics are essential to properly understand adaptive types and 
adaptive zones  
 
_ They are ecological concepts rather than morphological, anatomical or 
physiological they represent ways of life, not phenotypic structures In contrast, 
Erwin’s concept of adaptive themes is linked to evolutionary novelties and can be 
deemed close to the concept of Baupläne, types of structural organisation, which 
is a morphological and anatomical concept 
 
_ Due to convergent evolution towards similar adaptive types, the latter can but 
do not necessarily coincide with taxonomical units In that sense, Simpson’s 
adaptive types are very close to Huxley’s grades. On the one hand, Simpson 
states that major adaptive types correspond to taxonomical classes on the other 
hand, distantly related species can share an adaptive type while their close 
relatives belong to different types For example, the extinct tasmanian wolf 
(thylacine) is phylogenetically much more closely related to marsupials such as 
kangaroos than to canidae such as dogs, but its adaptive type is much more 
similar to that of dogs than that of kangaroos  
_ Adaptive type is a nested and relative concept  Simpson notes that even two 
birds born in the same nest have different adaptive types, although this level of 
difference is irrelevant in most research contexts More generally, adaptive zones 
can be repeatedly subdivided into subzones and for each case, several possible 
modes of subdivision are possible66 
                                                 
66 “For example, a major zone of rodentlike adaptation might, as one of numerous possible systems of 
subdivision, include zones one of which is squirrellike, in turn subdivided perhaps into arboreal and 
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Fig. 7: Major adaptive types in the vertebrates. Lines imply possible transitions but are 
not exhaustive (After Axelrod, 1960). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: Major adaptive types in flowering plants (After Axelrod, 1960). 
 
                                                 
terrestrial subzones, the latter into nonfossorial and fossorial or maybe noncommunal and communal, 
and so on down to a sub-subzone representing the particular and special adaptive type of one colony of 
Cynomys gunnisoni zuniensis (such as the one visible to me as I write these lines) or of one family or 
individual in that colony.” (Simpson, 1953, p. 202) 
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Adaptive radiation and phyletic evolution 
 
 To attribute to Simpson the idea that all diversity is the result of adaptive 
radiations may seem at odds with his insistence on the role of anagenesis or 
phyletic evolution67 As noted earlier, Simpson insisted on the distinction between 
splitting, or speciation, and phyletic evolution, stressing the fact that phenotypic 
evolution occurs mostly during the latter process The following text from Simpson 
may help to clarify the matter 
 
“The now existing major adaptive types of chordates do not owe their origin to 
early adaptive radiation in the phylum, which occurred but which involved lesser 
adaptive differences. The major types, corresponding to the classes in taxonomy, 
arose partly by radiation and partly by successive occupation of major zones: the 
Placodermi by succession from Agnatha, the Chondrichthyes and Osteichthyes 
probably as the most successful branches of a (poorly known) radiation in the 
Placodermi, the Amphibia by succession from Osteichthyes and the Reptilia by 
succession from Amphibia, the Aves and Mammalia, finally, as the most 
successful branches of a radiation in the Reptilia. The complexity of the process 
and the lack of definite distinction between radiation and succession is, however, 
shown by the fact that even when the relationship as between classes is 
successional the particular lineage that made the adaptive shift is one of many 
involved in lower-level radiation.” (Simpson, 1953, p. 225) 
 
Thus, first, contrary to what was suggested by Douglas Erwin, in Simpson’s 
framework adaptive radiations are not the only process producing phenotypic 
change, as change can be produced by the succession of different types 
However, Simpson recognises the lack of conceptual precision and clear 
delimitation between these processes It can be said that while an adaptive 
radiation at a lower taxonomic level, such as the radiation of finches on the 
Galapagos islands, can be clearly defined and delimited, an adaptive radiation at 
the level of a phylum or class is a much more complex, hard to track and loosely 
defined process Second, at least for high-level radiations stretching over ten 
million years or more, there is no inconsistency in the idea that phenotypic change 
occurs through phyletic evolution within an adaptive radiation (and not during the 
                                                 
67 See earlier, parts II and IV of this chapter  
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splitting events involved in the radiation) Third, While Simpson distinguishes 
between adaptive types and variations within adaptive types, he rejects the two-
staged view of phenotypic evolution suggested by Douglas Erwin Instead, as 
stated previously in section II of this chapter, Simpson favours a “mosaic” view of 
evolution. There is no inconsistency between the concept of adaptive type and 
the mosaic view since the former is a flexible and multi-level concept.  
 
Now that these clarifications on the theory of adaptive radiation have been given, 
I can turn to the concept of preadaptation. I will look first at its origin and then turn 
towards its different uses during the Modern Synthesis era.  
   
Preadaptation and novelty  
 
 The logic of what I have called the functional-historical approach to novelty 
and its origin in Darwin and Dohrn has been analysed in chapter 1 Here I will 
focus on the development of this approach in the Modern Synthesis era The 
interest of focusing on the concept of preadaptation is that it is put to divergent 
uses by different Modern Synthesis biologists, which makes clear the distinction 
between different research questions While George Gaylord Simpson makes 
use of it as an explanatory concept of the transitions between adaptive zones, 
some functional morphologists (eg Bock, von Wahlert, Gans) and zoologists 
(eg Mayr), include preadaptation in explanations of the origin of phenotypic 
novelties The neglect of these differences in research questions and in uses of 
preadaptation might explain some of the sweeping generalisations on novelty in 
the Modern Synthesis era Before moving to Modern Synthesis uses of 
preadaptation, I will focus on the creation and use of the concept by Lucien 
Cuénot  
 
Cuénot’s concept of preadaptation 
 
 The term “preadaptation” itself was coined by the French biologist Lucien 
Cuénot (1901) Cuénot was dissatisfied with the idea of the creative role of natural 
selection and insisted on the role of chance and nonadaptatation in the origin of 
functional characters, for example of defensive mechanisms in insects, which he 
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studied extensively. Cuénot hypothesized that in these cases initially non-
adaptive traits, such as the excretion of saliva during a stress reaction, can 
become defence mechanisms via random mutations, such as when a mutation 
adds a toxic compound to the saliva. Cuénot later gave the following general 
definition of preadaptation 
 
“I called preadaptive or prophetic characters, or shortly preadaptations, neutral 
or semi-useful characters that appear in one species and that are susceptible of 
becoming clear adaptations if that species moves into a new habitat or acquires 
new behaviours, these latter changes being made possible precisely by the 
existence of the preadaptations” (Cuénot, 1914, my translation)  
 
Another example given by Cuénot is the genus of cave-dwelling crustacea 
Niphargus, whose members lack eyes and pigment. Cuénot argued that the loss 
of eyes is not an adaptation to the cave habitat but that it preexisted the move to 
caves, giving as evidence the presence of some species of Niphargus in surface 
waters. The mechanism for the loss of eyes is thus unknown but Niphargus was 
preadapted for a move to caves. The related example of the blind cavefish was 
frequently used in early discussions of preadaptation (cf. Hubbs, 1938; Simpson, 
1953). Although Cuénot’s theoretical outlook was complex and evolving 
(Grimoult, 2001), he was associated with mutationism (e.g. Fisher and Stock, 
1915; Mayr, 1963). Furthermore, preadaptation was used by Goldschmit and 
Schindewolf to refer to the property of some hopeful monsters of being 
immediately adapted to a new environment68.  
 
Simpson’s use of preadaptation 
 
 By the middle of century, in The major features of evolution, Simpson 
notes that preadaptation has taken up a variety of different meanings. He writes 
                                                 
68 For example: “I need only quote Schindewolf (1936), the most progressive investigator known to me, 
who showed that the material presented by paleontology leads to exactly the same conclusions as 
derived in my writings, to which he refers. He elaborates the thesis that macroevolution on a higher 
level takes place in an explosive way within a short geological time, followed by a slower series of 
orthogenetic perfections, as exemplified in the oft-quoted evolutionary series. He realizes that the 
conception of preadaptation accounts completely for this type of evolution.” (Goldschmidt, 1940, p.395, 
emphasis added) 
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that Cuénot’s definition is the strictest one69 but it refers to only one of nine types 
of phenomena associated with the concept. For that reason, and because of the 
mutationist connotation associated with the concept, Simpson prefers coining the 
expression “prospective adaptations” to refer to this large class of phenomena  
 
“Prospective adaptation is not a quite distinct sort of adaptation or even a clear-
cut analytical category of adaptations. It is an aspect of adaptation in general or, 
if you prefer, a direction of looking at adaptation: it is the possession of 
characteristics making possible a change in adaptation and on which the new 
adaptation is built. Probably all organisms except the most extremely narrowly 
specialized, and perhaps even those, do have characteristics that would permit 
some adaptive change.” (Simpson, 1953, p. 189) 
 
The concept of prospective adaptation fits into Simpson’s view of evolution as 
changes in the interrelationships between organisms and environments. 
Evolution does not only consist in the progressive fine-tuning of organisms to their 
adaptive zone, it is also made of transitions between these adaptive zones, or of 
creation of new adaptive zones. These transitions are caused by an interplay of 
factors: some are physical, such as a climatic change or the migration of a 
population, some are behavioural or ecological, such as the adoption of a new 
feeding habit, some are genetic or mutational, such as the appearance of a new 
form of tooth. To make sense of changes of adaptive zone without physical 
changes of the environment, Simpson develops the concepts of “prospective 
functions” and “realized functions” attributed both to the organism and the 
environment, as shown in the diagram below:  
 
 
Fig 9 Diagram of the realisation of functions (after Simpson, 1953, p.185) 
                                                 
69 “A character nonadaptive or inadaptive in an ancestral group may be adaptive in a descendant group. 
This is preadaptation in the strictest sense of the word.” (Simpson, 1953, p. 192) 
 127 
 
The diagram could suggest a rather static picture, with organisms progressively 
filling pre-existing niches, or prospective functions, of the environment. But 
Simpson stresses the fluctuating nature of the relationship between organism and 
environment, that changes in realized functions lead to changes in the set of 
prospective functions70. Within this conceptual framework, prospective 
adaptations are traits that allow the transitions from prospective to realized 
functions.  
 
The two main conceptual divisions within Simpson’s list of prospective 
adaptations are the one between those that involve genetic changes and those 
that do not, and the one between those that were adaptive in the previous 
condition and those that were non-adaptive in the previous condition (Cuénot’s 
preadaptation). Among the prospective adaptations that do not involve genetic 
changes, Simpson includes:  
 
a) an adaptation that allows the transition from a broader to a narrower habit, 
such as the transition from a polyphagous to a monophagous species. 
b) An adaptation to an ecological niche that permits the transfer to another niche, 
for example plants with adaptations to desert soils are preadapted to the epiphytic 
condition (growing on the surface of other plants). 
c) An adaptation that assumes a new function, such as the broad digging foot of 
the platypus that is used for swimming  
Among the prospective adaptations that involve some genetic changes, Simpson 
includes: 
d) Mutations causing phenotypic variations in the direction of an existing adaptive 
trend. 
                                                 
70  “The extent of realization of functions tends constantly, although usually slowly, to change. 
Prospective functions have a certain short-range stability, but also tend to change; in fact, change in 
their realization normally changes their overall extent and nature” (Simpson, 1953, p. 185)  
Here are two illustrations of this process “When radiation does occur in a zone, it usually happens that 
this entails not merely an occupation but also a considerable expansion of the zone and changes in 
many of its features. Although the land carnivore zone of today has developed from that of the 
Paleocene, it is tremendously broader and so different that it does not even include any animals 
adaptively very similar to the earliest carnivores-the smaller bears are perhaps as nearly similar as any, 
and they are a late group, not a survival. Another rather frequent development, not sharply 
distinguished from the last, is spread from the occupied zone into others more or less different, as 
exemplified by the pinnipeds among carnivores.” (Simpson, 1953, pp. 349–350) 
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e) Mutations creating a new adaptive trend; Simpson uses the expression “key 
mutation” to describe the phenomenon and gives the example of the origin of 
claws in taeniodonts (an extinct early group of non-placental mammals) that, 
according to Bryan Patterson initiated the differentiation of stylinodontine 
taeniodonts In this case, "a single orthodox mutation resulting in the 
development of claws is believed to have been the starting point of the new 
adaptive shift represented by the Stylinodontinae" (Patterson, 1949). The 
acquisition of the claw is a key change because the digging behaviour associated 
with this character initiated a switch into a new adaptive zone.  
f) A trait that becomes adapted to a new environment by intensification, such as 
adaptations to extreme cold in the penguin Aptenodytes forsteri that are 
intensifications of traits found in its relatives. 
g) A trait that acquires a new function by intensification or continuation, for 
example incisors in the seal Leptonychotes weddelli are used to cut breathing 
holes in the ice and are larger than incisors found in close relatives. 
h) A “structure adaptive in one way in an ancestral group may be transformed to 
serve quite a different function in a descendant group”. The examples that 
Simpson gives for this category are the ones most likely to qualify as evolutionary 
novelties “transformation of the reptile walking limb to the bird flying wing or of 
the mammalian walking limb to the bat flying wing or the cetacean swimming 
paddle; transformation of reptilian jaw articulating bones to mammalian auditory 
ossicles; transformation of breathing lung to hydrostatic bladder in fishes and 
later incorporation of the bladder in the auditory apparatus; and many others” 
(Simpson, 1953, pp. 191–192). 
 
Thus, Simpson has a very inclusive and loose definition of prospective 
adaptations. His most questionable inclusion is that of simple favorable mutations 
(d). Furthermore, Simpson mixes cases where the focus is on a single character 
(c, e, g, h), and cases where the focus is on the adaptation of whole organisms 
to environments, which implies the involvement of several different characters (a, 
b, f). Some are cases of change of function of a character (c, e, g ,h), while others 
are cases of intensification of the same function (f). Finally, some cases arguably 
only involve quantitative morphological change (c, e, g), while others involve 
qualitative change (h). At the same time, Simpson’s concept is strongly 
determined by his framework of adaptive radiation. One of his main concerns is 
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whether preadaptations in the sense of Cuénot ever occur or whether they are 
adaptive all along. Whereas Darwin relied on his principle of conversion of 
function to defend gradualism, Simpson accepts that new characters are initially 
created by mutations and that these can be of large effect. He insists however 
that to be fixated these changes need to be adaptive “from the start” (p. 195). He 
allows exceptions to this rule, relying on Sewall Wright’s shifting balance theory 
to explain them, but insists that “the phase during which they are nonadaptive or 
inadaptive must usually if not always be very short in terms of geological time” 
(p.195). 
 
Key mutations, key innovations and ecological opportunities 
 
 Most importantly, as stated before, Simpson’s main concern is to show 
how preadaptations can explain the transition between, or creation of, adaptive 
zones. Some of these transitions may involve the origin of evolutionary novelties, 
the two main candidates being “key mutations” (e), and transformed structures 
(h), but some other transitions do not imply novelties Importantly, although he 
does not explicitly make this distinction, Simpson is more focused on the 
preadaptation of organisms to new habitats than in the preadaptation of 
phenotypic characters to new functions71 While Darwin devised the concept of 
conversion of function partly to explain how ecological evolution can drive 
morphological evolution and produce evolutionary novelties, Simpson does not 
have the latter as a direct explanatory target For Simpson, the central research 
question in relation to which the concept of preadaptation is developed is how 
do ecological opportunities, allowing to enter into new adaptive zones, occur? 
 
This focus on ecological opportunities allowing for switches into new adaptive 
zones was shared by several other researchers of the time. Close to Simpson’s 
key mutations was the concept of key innovation, introduced by Alden Miller and 
defined as "key adjustments in the morphological and physiological mechanism 
which are essential to the origin of new major groups"(Miller, 1949). With 
Simpson’s key mutation, there is a focus on the genetic nature of the change 
produced as well as its ecological consequence. In comparison, the concept of 
                                                 
71 This distinction is stressed by Mayr (1960, pp. 364–365). 
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key innovation does not imply a specific mechanism of origin. Furthermore, 
Simpson’s key mutations as well as his general concept of prospective adaptation 
is primarily focused on the access to new adaptive zones and not on the 
subsequent radiation. A character can be a prospective adaptation whether or 
not the switch to the new zone led to a bursting radiation. For example, the 
stylinodontine taeniodonts did not diversify into many species. Key innovations 
as defined by Miller had a similar meaning, the focus was on the characters 
deemed crucial in the formation of new taxonomic groups; whether the group was 
very successful in terms of number of species was not a determining factor.  
 
However, the meaning of the concept progressively changed towards the end of 
the Modern Synthesis era influenced by an increasing number of studies focusing 
on key characters hypothesised to have been instrumental in rapid adaptive 
radiations. A key innovation became not a character initiating the formation of a 
new group but a character initiating a radiation involving the rapid formation of 
many species (Alfaro, 2014; Galis, 2001). The most influential of these early 
studies of key innovations was the work of Karel Liem on the relation of the cichlid 
fish pharyngeal jaws to the explosive radiations of this fish in different lakes (Liem, 
1973).   
 
Even though the work of Liem is also focused on the genetic and developmental 
mechanisms of the origination of the cichlid specific pharyngeal jaw, the common 
main focus of Simpson’s work and of studies of key innovations is on the 
evolutionary effects of the chosen characters, whether ecological opportunity or 
evolutionary success, rather than on the causes and process of origin of new 
characters. I will now turn to another research program making use of the concept 
of preadaptation with a focus on origin rather than evolutionary fate. Simpson’s 
ecological framework and studies of key innovations are often referred to when 
picturing the Modern Synthesis’ approach to novelty. In contrast, the following 
research program centred on functional morphology has been neglected.  
 
The development of preadaptation by functional morphologists 
 
 Recent depictions of research on novelty in the Modern Synthesis tradition 
usually combine claims of the neglect of novelty and of the absence of theoretical 
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and empirical tools to tackle the problem, with a cursory presentation and 
dismissal of the ideas and research presented in Mayr’s 1960 paper “The 
emergence of evolutionary novelties” (eg Müller and Newman, 2005a, 2005b; 
Müller and Wagner, 1991) What is rarely noticed is that Mayr’s contribution is not 
a single and short-lived attempt at cobbling together hypotheses to tackle a 
neglected problem On the contrary, Mayr’s article coincides with the rise of a 
research program combining functional and evolutionary morphology and 
ecology, and refining and applying to case studies  the concepts presented by 
Mayr This program produced new conceptual and empirical developments of the 
idea of preadaptation. It can be situated within the framework of the ecological 
theory of adaptive radiations laid out by Simpson but it is not a simple application 
of Simpson’s ideas to case studies72  This development is original in its shift in 
emphasis compared to Simpson (Bock, 1959, p. 194) from the ecological 
opportunities offered by the prospective adaptations to the mechanisms of 
emergence of phenotypic novelty through the interactions between prospective 
adaptations and environment There is also a shift in the degree of generality, 
from the formulation of general mechanisms to the explanation of particular 
evolutionary sequences: 
 
“The major problem associated with the question of the adaptive origin of higher 
taxa lies, I believe, not with the known mechanisms of evolutionary change but 
with the description and analysis of the events involved in the origin and 
development of new groups. This facet of the problem has not received the 
attention it deserves from supporters of the synthetic theory of evolution; indeed, 
most analyses of the origin of new groups are very vague and weak in their 
discussion of the sequence of events involved.” (Bock, 1965, p. 274) 
 
                                                 
72 The representation that these researchers had of their relationship to the Modern Synthesis is well 
expressed in the reaction of two of them, Walter Bock and Gerd Von Wahlert, to a paper by Marjorie 
Grene comparing Simpson’s and Schindewolf’s theories “The basic ideas used by most morphologists 
today are in complete agreement the synthetic theory of evolution, if not based completely upon it. The 
synthetic theory is not founded upon the determination of ignoring structure, it is concerned with 
examining and understanding structure as structure as well as its genetical and development bases. It is, 
thus our belief that by accepting Schindewolf's position as typically representative for all morphologists, 
Grene was deceived about the true relationship between morphology and the synthetic theory and was 
unable to understand Simpson's inquiries into the genetical bases of structure and of 
macroevolutionary changes” (Bock and von Wahlert, 1963, p. 142) 
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The shift in emphasis is linked to differences in the biological disciplines of the 
researchers involved The concept of preadaptation is developed mainly by 
morphologists Most prominent among those who both developed the concept 
theoretically and used it in case studies were Walter Bock, Gerd von Wahlert and 
Carl Gans Bock and von Wahlert speak of a “current revival of morphology” that 
“is heralded by a flourish of studies in functional anatomy with the general result 
being a renewed focus of interest in the problem of organic form” (1965, p269 ) 
What characterizes this revived morphology is an integration of form, function 
and environment, although Bock and von Wahlert note that “the traditional 
considerations of pure morphological description and of the phylogenetic change 
of morphological form are not ignored” (Bock and von Wahlert, 1965, p. 269) The 
fact that this research program in morphology is placing itself fully under the 
framework of the Modern Synthesis is at odds with the repeated claim that 
morphology did not contribute to the Modern Synthesis (Coleman, 1980; Ghiselin, 
1980). This judgment may be caused by the restriction of the definition of 
morphology to a descriptive and comparative science and by the absence of 
focus on the late phase of the Synthesis (after 1950)73  
  
It is actually quite limiting to define these researchers as solely morphologists. 
This is especially true of Carl Gans (1923-2009), a herpetologist with a 
background in mechanical engineering, who made contributions in the fields 
systematics, functional and evolutionary morphology, biomechanics and 
physiology and was a pioneer of integrative biology (Gans, 1974; Adler, 2011) 
Walter Bock (born in 1933) is an ornithologist, close to Ernst Mayr, who combined 
from early on empirical work in avian functional and evolutionary morphology and 
systematics, and theoretical work in evolutionary biology Gerd von Wahlert 
(1925-2016) was an ichthyologist and general biologist, less influential than Gans 
and Bock partly because he mostly published in German. 
 
                                                 
73 “How much, if anything, morphology contributed to the modern synthesis is partly a matter of how 
one defines that term. In the strict sense, morphology is a purely formal discipline and had very little to 
contribute. Morphology may also be considered a kind of data, and when it becomes functional a better 
case can be made for its role in evolutionary studies. Be that as it may, the incorporation of morphology 
into the synthesis was a later development.” (Ghiselin, 2006) 
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For the sake of brevity, I will concentrate on the work of these few individuals, 
although they were not the only ones to apply a functional approach to the study 
of evolutionary novelties in that period74 For example, there were related 
developments of the approach of functional morphology in invertebrate 
paleontology, such as the method of “paradigms” aimed at inferring the functions 
of fossil characters from their structures and thus their ways of life (Rudwick, 
1964) This research program was primarily focused on functional analysis 
independently of evolutionary considerations, but it was also applied to trace the 
evolution of echinoderms or brachiopods (Nichols, 1967; Rudwick, 1970)75 This 
functional approach in paleontology was first advocated by Stephen Jay Gould 
(Gould, 1970) before his later turn against adaptationism (Gould and Lewontin, 
1979; see Rudwick, 2017, 2018) Although I will not provide an extensive review 
here, I will give a few other examples of the use of functional morphology to infer 
the evolution of higher taxa and new characters These studies did not all use the 
concepts of preadaptation and functional shift in their explanations but manifest 
a common trend in methods and theoretical commitments the origin of the heat-
sensing pit organ of pit vipers (Dullemeijer, 1959) the evolution of the head in a 
teleost fish (Liem, 1967) of tail autotomy in salamanders (Wake and Dresner, 
1967) the origin of the mammalian lower jaw (Crompton and Parkyn, 1963) of 
the jaw of bolyerine snakes (Frazzetta, 1975, 1970) the origin of the coelom 
(Gutmann, 1966; see Gudo, 2002) of wings and flight in insects (Flower, 1964; 
Wigglesworth, 1973, 1963);  of the insect ovipositor (Scudder, 1964, 1961); of the 
protrusile tongue in salamanders (Lombard and Wake, 1977, 1976 see 
Griesemer, 2013) the evolution of characters in arthropods, such as those 
associated with locomotion (Manton, 1972, 1977) the evolution of some mollusks 
(Yonge, 1969) of some crustacea (Fryer, 1968) of ceratopsian dinosaurs 
(Ostrom, 1966)  
   
How is the concept of preadaptation developed by these functional morphologists 
different from Simpson ‘s concept? How does it apply to the explanation of the 
                                                 
74 There are many other important figures in this movement in functional morphology in the late 
Modern Synthesis era. My choice here is informed by the use of the concept of preadaptation and by 
space restrictions. Particularly important on the theoretical front are Pieter Dullemeijer (Dullemeijer, 
1980, 1959) and Wolfgang Gutmann (Gutmann, 1966; see Gudo, 2002). 
75 See Rudwick (2018, 2017) for a historical account of this research program 
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origin of novelties? Bock is critical of the looseness and confusion in Simpson’s 
use of preadaptation (Bock, 1959, p. 201) While Simpson does not make any 
direct reference to Darwin’s conversion of functions or Dohrn’s succession of 
function, in his own formulation of preadaptation, Bock makes this filiation explicit: 
 
“The definition of preadaptation that I shall adopt is close to Dohrn's original one 
and to the one implied by most authors. A structure is said to be preadapted for 
a new function if its present form which enables it to discharge its original function 
also enables it to assume the new function whenever need for this function 
arises.” (Bock, 1959, p201) 
 
As it was shown in chapter 1 with Bock’s study of the origin of the avian medial 
brace, the concept of preadaptation is used by these researchers as a guiding 
principle in the understanding and explanation of the origin of evolutionary 
novelties. However, their range of explanatory strategies and concepts was rich 
and should not be reduced to the preadaptation. Several critiques of Modern 
Synthesis approaches to novelty (Bonner, 1982, pp. 282–283; Gould and Vrba, 
1982; Müller and Wagner, 1991) have focused on problems with the concept of 
preadaptation, its complex origins, polysemy and teleological connotations, and 
have neglected the contributions of this research program in functional 
morphology by not focusing on the detail of their explanations.  
 
The articulation of selection and contingency 
 
 Two essential elements of these functional explanations of the origin of 
novelties are the action of selection pressures and the role of historical 
contingency. The evolution of new structures is conceived as the interaction of 
adaptive and non-adaptive factors. At least four important features of these 
explanations should be stressed: 
   
a) The role of epigenetic mechanisms in the emergence of novelties.  
b) The multiplicity of historical events and selection pressures leading to 
transitions in morphology and ecology.  
c) The multiplicity of evolutionary pathways to adaptations.  
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d) The role of behaviour and behavioural explorations and innovations in the 
origin of novelties 
 
I will address each in turn.  
 
a) Epigenetic mechanisms 
 
 The role of epigenetic mechanisms has been illustrated by Bock’s example 
of the avian basitemporal articulation. Bock will later call the epigenetic 
mechanisms he appealed to in the example of the avian medial brace “somatic 
adjustments” and he will stress their essential role in the emergence of novelties 
(Bock, 1979, p. 26) The progressive genetic assimilation of the process is a 
possibility but not a central part of the explanation76. More generally, the 
explanations of the origin of novelties within this tradition of functional morphology 
rarely involve a genetic component. These explanations involve units (tissues, 
morphological characters, behaviours etc. …) and causes (selection pressures, 
mechanical forces, tissue interactions etc. …) pertaining to higher levels of reality. 
The explicit endorsement of the Modern Synthesis perspective by Bock and Van 
Wahlert and more generally the compatibility of the research program with the 
Modern Synthesis comes from a commitment to the role of natural selection and 
the rejection of orthogenesis, saltationism and Lamarckism rather than from a 
use of population genetic explanations or a commitment to random genetic 
mutations of small effect as the sole pertinent causal unit of change.  
 
A few explanations explicitly refer to epigenetic mechanisms. Other explanations 
are best described as agnostic regarding the genetic and epigenetic mechanisms 
involved in the evolutionary change. This is for example the case with Gans’s 
explanation of the origin of the snake jaw (Gans, 1961). Gans distinguishes three 
research questions: “(i) What was the change that established the selective 
                                                 
76 This is not developed by Bock in his early papers. Bock later clearly stated that genetic assimilation 
was, according to him’ not a necessary part of the process “Sometimes these phenotypic changes do 
acquire a direct genetic basis as shown over a century ago by Baldwin (1896), and discussed ever since 
by evolutionists as the Baldwin Effect. But I suspect that more frequently phenotypic changes resulting 
from physiological adaptation never, or only very slowly acquire a direct genetic basis. For example, 
many groups of birds possess an articulation between the medial process of the mandible and the base 
of the brain case (Bock 1960) or, between the mandibular ramus and the ectethmoid plate as in the 
Australian honey-eaters (Passeriformes: Meliphagidae; Bock & Morioka 1970).” (Bock, 2002, p69) 
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advantage for a fundamentally different feeding mechanism snakes? (Or 
possibly: What change was possible because a different feeding apparatus 
arose?); (ii) How did such a mechanism evolve?; (iii) What ophidian modifications 
may be viewed as secondary reflections of the functional and structural shift?” 
(Gans, 1961, p. 217). Regarding the mechanism, Gans locates the crucial 
process in the liberation of the mandible through the suppression of the 
mandibular symphysis. The entities involved are bones, nerves and muscles as 
well as feeding behaviours, and the explanation focuses on the functional and 
mechanical conditions of the phenotypic shift.  
 
b) Multiple historical events 
 
 The historical dimension is essential to explanations involving 
preadaptation. The concept implies that the formation of a character is not 
explained by its current function(s) and involved a historical shift. The historical 
dimension is essential and becomes in general more complex when the focus is 
transferred form the origin of a single novelty to the origin of a higher taxon. As 
noted earlier, Bock (1965, p. 274) stated that the weakness of the Modern 
Synthetic treatment of the origin of taxa is not in the evolutionary mechanisms 
proposed but on the details of the historical events for each particular taxon. The 
origin of some new taxon cannot be explained by single shift between adaptive 
zones, but involve a complex history possibly involving multiple changes in 
ecological conditions. This is illustrated by Bock’s hypothesis on the origin of 
diagnostic characters of birds through a series of functional shifts (climbing, 
leaping between trees, parachuting, gliding, active flight) involving multiple 
successive or simultaneous selection pressures rather than a single switch 
between two broad adaptive zones (Bock, 1965)77 
 
                                                 
77 “The avian tibiotarsus and tarsometatarsus and the reversed pubis evolved in connection with 
bipedal locomotion; the reversal of the hallux with arboreal life; feathers, warm-bloodedness, and 
perfection of sight and hearing with a later stage in arboreal life; the wing and flight feathers, balance, 
and the beginnings of the rigid trunk with the stages of leaping, parachuting, and gliding. The enlarged 
sternum and its keel, flight muscles, the final fusion of the synsacrum and other parts of the skeleton, 
loss of teeth and many other features appeared only in a late gliding stage, or after active flight was 
achieved.” (Bock, 1965, p. 178) 
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c) The multiplicity of evolutionary pathways 
 
 Another form of contingency playing a role in the functional-historical 
approach is the existence of multiple evolutionary pathways (Bock, 1959; Bock 
and Miller, 1959; Bock and von Wahlert, 1965). This is stressed for example by 
Bock in the example of the medial brace: 
 
“There are several ways to counteract strong forces on the quadrate hinge. In some 
families, the condyles of the quadrate hinge are completely adequate to withstand 
the disrupting forces; in others, the jaw muscles and ligaments inserting on the 
mandible may be sufficient to protect the quadrate hinge. A discussion of these other 
methods of preventing the disarticulation of the mandible would lead us too far from 
the central problems of this paper, hence I shall quite arbitrarily accept the 
development of the medial brace as the only adaptive response to the selection force 
for additional support of the mandible.” (Bock, 1959, p. 196) 
 
d) The role of ecology and behavior 
 
 The rise of the research program in functional morphology was related to 
a surging interest in behaviour and in the relation between behaviour and 
evolution (Corning, 2013), illustrated for example by the 1958 volume edited by 
G.G. Simpson and Anne Roe entitled Behavior and evolution While some, like 
Romer or Colbert, focused on the complex physiological and morphological 
underpinnings of behaviour and on the dependence of the latter on the two 
former, Mayr insisted, after Konrad Lorenz, that behaviours often precede the 
evolution of the correlated morphological structures (Mayr, 1958). Mayr 
developed the idea in his article on evolutionary novelties78, later defining 
behaviour as the “pacemaker” in evolution (Mayr, 1976, p. 106, see also 1974). 
 
This approach is shared by Bock, Von Wahlert, Gans and others (Bartholomew, 
1964; Bock, 1959; Gans, 1963; Wahlert, 1965). Wahlert for example argues that 
 
                                                 
78  “It is now quite evident that every habit and behavior has some structural basis but that the 
evolutionary changes that result from adaptive shifts are often initiated by a change in behavior, to be 
followed secondarily by a change in structure (Mayr, 1958). It is very often the new habit which sets up 
the selection pressure that shifts the mean of the curve of structural variation.” (Mayr, 1960, p. 371) 
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“The actual evolutionary effect of […] environmental factors is in part determined 
by the organisms exposed to them. A population of hares may be threatened by 
wolves invading their habitat. The hares may cope with this danger by trying to 
outrun the wolves; this would establish a selection force favoring and resulting in 
an increase of speed. Or the hares may try to out-maneuver the wolves or to 
escape by rushing into holes; either method would induce the operation of a quite 
different selection force, although the ecological factor remains the same.” 
(Wahlert, 1965, p. 296) 
 
A note on Baldwin effect, stabilizing selection and genetic assimilation 
  
 The dominant contemporary view regarding the relation of the Modern 
Synthesis to behaviour seems to be that the latter was neglected and that its role 
in evolution was considered minor. This view may stem from a limited focus on 
the “Baldwin effect”79 A focus on the research program that I just described 
should refute that appreciation, at least for a part of the late Modern Synthesis. 
Furthermore, the Badwin effect itself was not rejected (Simpson, 1953, p. 183; 
see Corning, 2013). There is a close relation between this research program and 
the concepts of Baldwin effect, Schmallhausen’s stabilizing selection and 
Waddington’s genetic assimilation I will not cover these concepts in detail for 
lack of space, and because they were less directly applied to the problem of the 
origin of novelties. The Baldwin effect in particular, is more focused on genetic 
stabilization than on novelty and change80 It is focused on the physiological or 
behavioural initiation of new traits followed by natural selection for their genetic 
determination. Examples of the Baldwin effect studied during the Modern 
Synthesis era are new bird songs, the new preferences for different food sources 
and plants (e.g. Simpson, 1953).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 For example “The irony is that the great palaeontologist, George Gaylord Simpson (1953) who coined 
the term [“Baldwin effect”] did so in order to disparage it. He and many others who forged the new 
synthesis did not think that behaviour played an important role in evolution. This became the standard 
line of neo-Darwinists.” (Bateson, 2004) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The weaving together of novelty and adaptation in the functional-historical 
approach prompted me to embark on a reassessment of the place of novelty in 
the Modern Synthesis era A guiding principle was that one should not conclude 
that novelty was not addressed or neglected from the fact that it was not clearly 
singled out and isolated as an independent problem 
 
Two main general conclusions emerge at the end of this chapter 
_ First, for all the research themes covered (species and speciation, higher taxa, 
levels of organisation  and adaptation) there are some research programs which 
address, more or less directly, the problem of the origin of novelties 
_ Second, one cannot summarise in a simple, straightforward way the position of 
the Modern Synthesis on the problem of novelty, either in terms of whether it was 
neglected or not, or in terms of the Synthesis’ explanation of novelty There are 
multiple answers regarding both aspects 
 
To support the first conclusion, one can refer to experimental taxonomy in botany, 
to the close connection between research on the origin of the angiosperm and 
research on the origin of the flower, to the overlap between the question of the 
origin of new grades and the question of the origin of novelty, and finally to the 
use of the concept of preadaptation by functional morphologists in the 
explanation of the origin of novelty 
 
To support the second conclusion, one can rely on several contrasts first, the 
rise of speciation studies and of the biological species concept separated the 
process of the origin of new character and the process of speciation, however 
some experimental plant taxonomists, especially by focusing on hybridization and 
polyploidy, combined the study of speciation and the study of novelty Second, 
among botanists focusing on the origin of the angiosperm, some do adopt an 
ecological and biogeographical focus with little interest for angiosperm novelties, 
others consider the problems or the origin of angiosperm taxa and angiosperm 
novelty as inseparable and this distinction does not coincide with the one 
between Modern Synthesis proponents and opponents Finally, while G G 
Simpson adopts and ecological standpoint, and is interested not in how novelties 
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originate, but rather in how novelties, among other factors, can allow organisms 
to seize ecological opportunities and switch between adaptive zones, some 
functional morphologists, who claim their allegiance to the Modern Synthesis, 
focus on the problem of the origin of novelty within the theoretical framework of 
the Synthesis  
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CHAPTER 3 – NOVELTY IN THE MODERN SYNTHESIS ERA Part 2: 
THE PLACE OF DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROVERSIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last chapter, I focused on concepts and research programs central to 
the Modern Synthesis which are closely, and sometimes ambiguously, related to 
the problems of evolutionary novelty. In this chapter, I will address more directly 
debates regarding the historical representations of the Modern Synthesis and 
focus on elements in the history of research on novelty that can directly contribute 
to these debates. More precisely I will focus on three dominant representations 
of the Modern Synthesis: 1) It is centred on population genetics; 2) It did not 
integrate development in its framework; 3) It arrived at a consensual theoretical 
framework and this consensus hardened in the late phase.  
 
The population genetics view of the Modern Synthesis 
 
 The Modern Synthesis is nearly unanimously associated with 
reconciliation of the Mendelian particulate theory of heredity with Darwin’s theory 
of gradual evolutionary change under natural selection thanks to the elaboration 
of population genetics led by Ronald Fisher, John Haldane and Sewall Wright 
(Gayon, 1998; Provine, 1978, 2001). The debate regards the relation of the 
Modern Synthesis to population genetics: should it be interpreted as the 
application of the principles and results of populations genetics to other biological 
disciplines, or should it be interpreted as a synthesis of contributions from 
different disciplines, population genetics being only one of them?  
 
The major part of the literature calling for an Extended Synthesis or an evo-devo 
synthesis adopts the first interpretation of the Modern Synthesis (Amundson, 
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2005; Craig, 2014; Laland et al., 2014; Laubichler, 2010, p. 201; Müller & 
Newman, 2005; Müller & Pigliucci, 2010, pp. 13–14; Stoltzfus, 2017) The 
competing interpretation is defended for example by Stephen Jay Gould (2002, 
pp. 532–541) or Ernst Mayr (1980). This second interpretation denies that the 
Modern Synthesis can be viewed as an alignment on genetics, or as Stephen Jay 
Gould phrases it, “a whipping of older disciplines into line” (Gould, 2002, p. 532) 
According to this alternative view, the naturalist disciplines were constitutive in 
the formation of the synthesis and not secondary Gould sees Theodosuis 
Dobzhansky as the one who initiated the synthesis by reinstating the diversity of 
species as the central problem of evolutionary theory Mayr expressed this view 
very strikingly81: 
 
“Actually, nothing in the supposedly evolutionary writings of T.H. Morgan, R.A. 
Fisher, and J.B.S. Haldane explained the multiplication of species, the origin of 
higher taxa, and the origin of evolutionary novelties. Their interpretation 
concerned the gene level in a single gene pool.” (Mayr and Provine, 1980, p. 11) 
 
Many of the materials presented in the last chapter can be used as evidence in 
favour of this second interpretation. 
 
The exclusion of development from the Modern Synthesis 
 
 Few historical works about research on novelty have focused on 
continuities between the Modern Synthesis and contemporary eras Historical 
works on evo-devo, both by scientists and by professional historians have 
emphasised the continuity between their contemporary problems and methods 
and old research traditions in experimental embryology (Entwicklungsmechanik), 
comparative embryology and comparative morphology (Amundson, 2005, 2007; 
Gilbert, Opitz, & Raff, 1996; Laubichler & Maienschein, 2007; Love & Raff, 2003; 
R. Raff, 1996; R. A. Raff & Love, 2004) This continuity is rather presented as a 
resurrection since these old research traditions were excluded by the rise of 
                                                 
81 Ironically, very similar statements can be found in some of the recent writings of proponents of an 
Extended Synthesis with the only difference that the name of Mayr himself (and maybe those of other 
architects of the Modern Synthesis) would be added to the list.  
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classical genetics and of the Modern Synthesis (Allen, 1980, 1986; Amundson, 
2005; Gilbert, Opitz, & Raff, 1996; Hamburger, 1980) The history of the mutual 
exclusion of evolution and development at the beginning of the 20th century and 
during the Modern Synthesis era has been investigated by many Some of the 
historical works on individuals who tried to build bridges between evolution and 
development have corroborated the thesis of the mutual exclusion because these 
individuals were outsiders (Burian, Gayon, & Zallen, 1991; Dietrich, 1995, 2003; 
Gilbert, 1994; Peterson, 2011) A minority of authors have argued for a revision 
or tempering of the mutual exclusion thesis (Davis, Dietrich, & Jacobs, 2009; 
Love, 2009) Others have focused on the exclusion of other disciplines from the 
Synthesis (morphology, macroevolutionary theory), implying or explicitly arguing 
that development should not be singled out as the sole excluded dimension 
(Coleman, 1980; Ghiselin, 1980; Gould, 2002; Love, 2003, 2005, 2006) 
 
In narrations of the mutual exclusion of evolutionary biology and embryology 
during the Modern Synthesis era, a considerably stronger emphasis has been 
put on the rejection of embryology by architects of the Modern Synthesis than on 
the rejection of evolutionary concerns by embryologists. The model of the relation 
between development and evolution that was the most influential among 
developmental biologists at the beginning of the 20th century was Haeckel’s 
recapitulation theory. Haeckel had argued that the evolutionary history of living 
beings was inscribed in the individual organism’s development so that the stages 
of development of an organism from a certain species corresponded to the stages 
of the evolutionary history leading to that species. According to Hamburger 
(1980), developmental biologists considered it an important endeavor to refute 
the recapitulation theory well into the 1930s (De Beer, 1951; Smit, 1962). This 
refutation was driven by the growing body of experimental studies in embryology 
With the rejection of the recapitulation theory came a decrease in the interest in 
the link between development and evolution Hamburger’s thesis is that the 
distance of the embryologists from the concerns of the Modern Synthesis came 
not from a stagnation of their discipline but on the contrary from different 
advances of a mechanical and experimental perspective in embryology (see also 
Maienschein, 2007)  
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Even the most virulent proponents of the idea of an exclusion of development 
during the Modern Synthesis era have recognized points of contact (eg 
Amundson, 2005, pp. 189–197).  Ronald Amundson singled out the work of 
Sewall Wright, Oxford morphologists (Edwin Goodrich, Julian Huxley and Gavin 
de Beer82), Conrad Waddington, Ivan Schmallhausen and Richard Goldschmidt. 
The roles of Goldschmidt83, Schmallhausen84 and Waddington85 have especially 
attracted the attention of scholars. Alan Love focused on lesser known figures, 
comparative embryologist Norman John Berrill, morphologist D.Dwight Davies 
and palaeontologist William K. Gregory (Love, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007). In the 
domain of plant biology, much fewer historical works have focused on the relation 
between the Modern Synthesis and developmental biology The studies of 
historical traditions related to contemporary plant evo-devo concentrate on 
figures with no or very little relation to the Modern Synthesis, such as British 
                                                 
82 On Oxford morphologists, see also Waisbren (1988) Among them, Gavin de Beer has attracted the 
most attention He is credited in particular for developing the study of heterochrony (Brigandt, 2006; De 
Beer, 1951) 
83 Richard Goldschmidt was more clearly marginalized because he was characterized as a mutationist, 
although his work on physiological genetics was unanimously respected (Cf this chapter, I2) and cited 
references).  
84 On Schmalhausen and his relation to the Synthesis,, see for example Gilbert (1994),  Levit et al. 
(2006), Olson et al. (2010) 
85 See for example Gilbert (1994), Peterson (2011). The relation between Waddington and the architects 
of the Modern Synthesis was complex. The position of Waddington as an outsider has been more 
emphasized than his influence on evolutionary biology on some of the central figures of the Modern 
Synthesis, and more generally on the evolutionary biology of this era  For example, Peterson (2011) 
insists on the disagreements between Waddington and Mayr He focuses on a specific incident of 
particular interest for  the subject of this chapter prior to the 1959 Darwin centennial conference in 
Chicago, papers were circulated among the participants Waddington was particularly interested in 
Mayr’s paper, which was to become the influential “The emergence of evolutionary novelties” (Mayr, 
1960) In his commentary of Mayr’s paper, Waddington wrote “the major argument in favour of 
[saltation in] evolution is nowadays in embryology and that this requires rather special discussion” 
(Waddington to Mayr, 22 June 1959, cited by Peterson, 2011, p315). As noted by Peterson, Mayr did 
not reply to Waddington’s comments Peterson goes on to write “But it is clear from earlier 
correspondence that Mayr regarded much of European embryology as “riddled with metaphysical 
concepts” (Mayr to Waddington, 20 July 1959, CHW-UEL, MS 3035.3). Mayr’s feelings may have 
extended to Waddington’s philosophy as well, especially considering some of the misgivings expressed 
above.” (Peterson, 2011, p. 315) However, Peterson does not mention the influence of Waddington on 
the idea of the homeostasis of the genotype, adopted by Mayr and others, and on Mayr’s theory of 
genetic revolutions The latter explicitly stated the influence of Waddington on his theorizing (eg Mayr, 
1963, Chapter 19) Peterson also insists on the way Waddington was sidelined by the 1959 centennial 
conference It is true, that Waddington was not a member of the panel entitled “the evolution of life” 
where the state of evolutionary theory was discussed However, one of the 16 themes discussed clearly 
referred to concepts developed by Waddington “6. The relations of developmental (epigenetic) and 
physiological processes to selection and evolution are proving to be very important: e.g., stabilization 
(canalization) of developmental processes, partial simulation of Lamarckian evolution by genetic 
assimilation and other evolutionary "feedback" mechanisms. The role of pedomorphism and 
recapitulation in evolution.” (Tax and Callender, 1960, p. 108) 
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botanist Agnes Arber (Classen-Bockhoff, 2001; Vergara-Silva, 2003) and figures 
in the German tradition such as Goethe and 20th century plant morphologists 
Wilhelm Troll and Walter Zimmerman (Classen-Bockhoff, 2001; Kaplan, 2001; 
Vergara-Silva, 2003) 
 
One can find sources even closer to the “centre” of the Modern Synthesis that 
can question, or at least nuance, the accepted history of a mutual exclusion of 
developmental and evolutionary biology during the Modern Synthesis era. 
Indeed, a close study of the interplay between development and evolution can be 
found in the works of two authors that are considered as “architects” of the 
Modern Synthesis (Mayr and Provine, 1980). These works are Bernhard 
Rensch’s Evolution above the species level (1959) and Stebbins’ Flowering 
plants (1974). Both of these works are partly based on the original research of 
the authors, but they are mostly synthetic works that rely on a wide range of 
sources and thus give an overview of research trends of the period and not only 
of isolated, marginal research.  
 
The consensual view of the Modern Synthesis 
 
 The literature that is critical of the Modern Synthesis framework often 
summarises it in a small set of tenets: the centrality of population genetics, 
gradualism, externalism (natural selection determines the direction of evolution), 
gene centrism and extrapolation of microevolution to macroevolution (e.g. 
Amundson, 2005; Laland et al., 2015; Müller & Pigliucci, 2010). This view that the 
Modern Synthesis can be defined as an unambiguous and consensual theoretical 
framework appears shared by some historians who have stressed the spirit of 
consensus that existed between architects of the Synthesis, especially in the late 
phase. For example, focusing specifically on the 1959 Darwin centenary 
celebration at the university of Chicago, Betty Smocovitis writes: 
 
“By the late 1950s, the group including Wright, Dobzhansky, Mayr, Stebbins, 
Simpson, and, of course, Huxley had worked out many of their differences and 
had carved out well-defined locations for themselves in evolutionary studies; little 
was left to spontaneous disagreement.” (Smocovitis, 1999, p. 298) 
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In the same spirit but with a more critical tone, Stephen Jay Gould has argued for 
a “hardening” of the Synthesis in the late phase, relying as evidence on the 1959 
conference and on evolutions in the works of Dobzhansky, Simpson and Mayr 
(Gould, 1983, 2002). 
 
Other historians have stressed the importance of the social dimension for the 
analysis of the Modern Synthesis (Cain, 2009; Hull, 2008). For example, David 
Hull noted that:  
 
“Scientists are much more interested in the content of science than anything that 
might count as the social structure of science, but social structure does make a 
difference. The founders of the synthetic theory of evolution were not really all 
that much in agreement with each other about the fundamentals of the synthetic 
theory of evolution - in fact, synthetic theory was not very synthetic - but they 
agreed to mute their disagreements. They did not go after each other in print.” 
(Hull, 2008) 
 
The importance of the social dimension should prompt us to be wary of claims of 
unity and consensus by the actors of the Synthesis and look more closely at 
implicit dissensions and inconsistencies between scientists and even between 
parts of the work of each scientist. For example, it would be hasty to deduce too 
much about the content and status of the Synthesis from a celebration such as 
the one in Chicago in 1959. Other historians have insisted clearly on the pluralism 
on the Modern Synthesis86 (Beatty, 1992; Provine, 1992). A few historians have 
focused on controversies within the late Synthesis (Beatty, 1987; Gayon, 1998; 
Rao & Nanjundiah, 2011). 
 
How is the question of controversies within the Modern Synthesis related to the 
history of research on novelty? The reductive, gene-centric and consensual, view 
of the Modern Synthesis has served and continues to serve several purposes in 
the context of theoretical controversies in biology. In the case of evolutionary 
novelty, this view has favoured the oversight of different approaches to the 
                                                 
86 "There were about as many different versions of the evolutionary synthesis as there were major 
evolutionary biologists associated with it" (Provine, 1992, p. 169). "We cannot let the 'constriction' and 
'hardening' of the synthesis blind us to the diversity of possible evolutionary agents being discussed in 
the fifties, sixties and seventies and to the incredible room still left for controversy about these actual 
modes of evolution" (Beatty, 1992, p. 188).  
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problem of novelty pursued during the Modern Synthesis. It has also favoured 
the partial misinterpretation of certain approaches. For example, the solution of 
the problem of novelty in terms of functional shift, illustrated by Mayr, Bock and 
others87, should not be interpreted in terms of gene-centred gradualism, but 
rather in an organism-centred perspective integrating ecology, ethology and 
functional morphology88 Asking whether there existed coexisting or competing 
perspectives within the Modern Synthesis can thus help us with the interpretation 
of concepts and theories that were devised during this period to address the 
problem of novelty.  
 
Outline of the chapter  
 
In the first section, I will address the question of the relation between 
development and evolution by focusing on how this relation is conceived, and 
articulated to the problem of novelty, by Bernard Rensch and George Ledyard 
Stebbins.  
 
In the second section, I will address the question of consensus and controversies 
in the Modern Synthesis by focusing on some debates of the late phase. I will try 
to show how I. Michael Lerner’s theory of heterozygosis-based homeostasis and 
especially Mayr’s theory of genetic revolutions controversially affect the problem 
of novelty.  
 
 
I – RESEARCH RELATING DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION WITHIN THE 
MODERN SYNTHESIS 
 
Bernhard Rensch’s Evolution above the species level 
 
There are several reasons why Bernhard Rensch (1900-1990) is a 
particularly important figure in this history of research on novelty in the Modern 
Synthesis era and in the history of the relation between development and 
                                                 
87 See chapter 2, part V. 
88 On the different framings of the problem of novelty depending on different theoretical assumptions, 
cf. Chapter 1. 
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evolution First, in many historical accounts, Bernhard Rensch is included among 
the “architects” of the Modern Synthesis (eg Futuyma, 2015; Levit et al., 2008b; 
Mayr and Provine, 1998; Reif et al., 2000) Second, his major work, Evolution 
above the species level, which appeared in German in 1947, and in a second 
edition in 1954 that was translated in English in 1959, contains  significant 
chapters on the problem of the origin of novelties (1959, pp. 126–239 and 266–
280) and another one on the different types of alterations of ontogeny during 
evolution (1959, pp. 239–266)89 Third, although Rensch was not primarily an 
embryologist himself, his work uses a wide array of research in experimental and 
comparative embryology to offer a synthetic treatment of the different possible 
alterations of development during evolution and their respective potential effects 
on the production of novelties And fourth, despite his status, the work of Rensch 
has been much less studied by historians or philosophers of biology than the work 
of other architects90  
 
There has been a recent movement among historians towards a restitution of the 
international nature of the Synthesis, with a special focus on German and 
Russian contributors For example, Levit et al (Levit, Simunek, & Hossfeld, 2008) 
and Reif et al (Reif, Junker, & Hossfeld, 2000) credit Erwin Baur (1875–1933), 
Walter Zimmermann (1892–1980), Nikolai V. Timofeev-Ressovsky (1900–1981) 
and Gerhard Heberer (1901–1973) along with Bernhard Rensch for the shaping 
of the Modern Synthesis in Germany However, it seems that, at the time of the 
Modern Synthesis, among these German biologists only Bernhard Rensch was 
considered as an architect by other architects based in Anglo-Saxon countries 
For example, in the foreword to the 1959 English edition of Evolution above the 
species level, Theodosius Dobzhansky writes  
 
“Together with an attempt by Huxley (1942) which fell rather short of synthesis, 
we have had the works of Mayr (1942) stemming from zoological and of Stebbins 
(1950) stemming from botanical systematics and genetics, of Simpson (1944, 
                                                 
89 These chapters have been expanded in the 1959 English edition, but there was no significant change 
in content, in particular in Rensch’s view of the relation between evolution and development. I will rely 
on the 1959 English edition.  
90 The literature on Rensch focuses more on his general philosophy than on his biological work and 
contribution to the Modern Synthesis (Delisle, 2008, 2009; Levit et al., 2008b)  
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further developed in 1953) from paleontology, of Schmalhausen (1946 in 
Russian, 1949 in English) from comparative morphology, of Darlington (1939) 
and White (1945, 1954) from cytology and genetics, and of Rensch (the two 
German editions in 1947 and 1954) from systematics, comparative morphology 
and paleontology” (Rensch, 1959, p. v)  
 
A decade earlier, in his review of the first German edition of Rensch’s major book, 
Simpson91 presented Rensch as “one of the great authorities on speciation in a 
narrow sense, on what he calls ‘intraspecific evolution’”, and he noted that his 
work on speciation is “known to all students of evolution” (Simpson, 1949, p. 178). 
92 In The major features of evolution (1953), Simpson refers to Rensch’s work on 
20 different occasions, mainly to the first German edition of Evolution above the 
species level In another review of the first German edition in the Quarterly review 
of biology, the geneticist Bentley Glass places Rensch’s book at the level of the 
landmarks of the Modern Synthesis by Huxley, Mayr and Simpson, which were 
unknown to Rensch when he wrote it Concerning the section on the different 
forms of alteration of ontogeny during evolution, Glass notes the proximity 
between Rensch’s work and  Gavin de Beer’s Embryos and ancestors, which was 
also unknown to Rensch (Glass, 1949)  
 
Thus, the central status of Rensch during the Synthesis is not the product of a 
retrospective historical effort Rensch was included in the canon of the Synthesis 
very early on, his work was known and acknowledged by other architects of the 
Synthesis He was for example one of the 20 contributors to the volume that 
emerged from from the 1959 Darwin centennial conference in Chicago. More 
specifically, Rensch’s study of the relation of the different types of evolutionary 
modifications of developmental processes has not gone ignored or neglected 
                                                 
91  In the preface to The major features of evolution (1953), Simpson also includes Rensch’s book in his 
list of synthetic works of major importance “A number of important summarizing and reviewing 
volumes in the new spirit of evolutionary theory have also appeared in the last ten years, outstanding 
among them those by Huxley (1942), Mayr (1942), Heberer (1943),  Rensch (1947), Schmalhausen 
( 1949), Stebbins (1950), Carter (1951), and Dobzhansky (1951).” (Simpson, 1953, p. x) 
92 Mayr for example acknowledged Rensch’s influence on him “Rensch cited from the literature and 
from his own research numerous examples of natural populations that were on the borderline between 
subspecific and specific rank, and he pointed out that all of these crucial populations were 
geographically isolated. My own work’, Mayr concluded, ‘was a continuation of the work of Rensch” 
(Mayr, 1976, p. 118).”  
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For example, Mayr explicitly praises this part of Rensch’s work in his Animal 
Species and evolution 
 
“Rensch [] has given the best modern discussion of the manifestations of 
evolution at the various stages of the ontogenetic cycle. He describes the 
manifold ways in which evolution can affect development and considers critically 
the various evolutionary theories based on ontogenetic phenomena.” (Mayr, 
1963, p. 607) 
 
His specific analyses of the origin of new organs and new structures have also 
been praised, if not fully endorsed by other architects of the Modern Synthesis 
Here is for example what Simpson wrote in The major features of evolution 
 
“Rensch (1947) has treated the origin of new organs and new "structural plans," 
an essential aspect of the origin of high categories, under "cladogenesis" or 
phyletic branching. (His discussion of the subject is perhaps the best in print, but 
seems to me weakened by this approach93.)” (Simpson, 1953, pp. 354–355) 
 
Alterations of ontogeny and evolution 
 
 In his study of developmental alterations during evolution, one of the main 
goals of Rensch is to show that these alterations do not reveal a directionality 
brought about by the properties of developmental systems Rensch seeks to 
evaluate the degree of validity of the “Biogenetic rule”, Ernst Heackel’s idea that 
ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny; and the degree of validity of “Van Baer’s rule”, 
Karl Ernst Van Baer’s first law stating that the more general characters of a 
taxonomic group arise earlier in development than the more specialised 
characters (characters common to the phylum will occur before those common to 
the class, order, family etc.). In his study of the different types of alterations of 
ontogeny during evolution, Rensch reuses the typology developed by Nikolai 
Sewertzoff (1931; Levit, Hossfeld, & Olsson, 2004; Olsson, Levit, & Hossfeld, 
2010), modifying some of Sewertzoff’s definitions94: archallaxis refers to the 
                                                 
93 See Chapter 2, part IV for an analysis of Rensch’s and Simpson’s conflicting views on anagenesis and 
cladogenesis.  
94 For a summary of Sewertzoff’s original definitions, see Olsson et al. (2010). 
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changes in early stages of ontogeny; deviations are changes in the middle and 
late stages of ontogeny; anabolia are additions of ontogenetic stages; 
abbreviations are suppressions of ontogenetic stages, caenogenesis refers to 
changes in ontogenetic stages that do not result in changes in the adult. Each 
process can occur at the level of the developing organism or at the level of an 
organ, thus, for example, Rensch distinguishes organ archallaxis and total 
archallaxis (p.242). He presents his approach in the following way:  
 
“We shall consider some examples typical of each of the categories mentioned 
and try to determine the regularity of these phylogenetic phenomena in the 
course of ontogeny. We shall also determine which of these alterations is most 
frequently met with and which of them is most likely to initiate the evolution of 
new organs, new structures and new types of organization.” (Rensch, 1959, p. 
241) 
 
Throughout his analysis, Rensch demonstrates a clear conscience of and affinity 
for the idea that evolution occurs through the modifications of developmental 
systems According to Rensch, the study of these modifications with the tools of 
experimental and comparative embryology is key to explaining each singular 
case of the arising of a new structural pattern or a new phenotypic character 
Rensch stresses however that very few general laws or rules can be extracted 
from the study of developmental alterations One of Rensch’s main conclusions 
is that because many types of alterations of development can lead to the same 
type of new character, developmental biology does not provide explanatory laws 
of evolutionary change This does not mean that developmental biology provides 
no explanation of evolutionary change at all, only that developmental 
explanations cannot be generalised to high taxonomical levels (Rensch, 1959, 
pp. 265–266) In that regard, Rensch’s approach is similar to Gavin de Beer’s 
approach in Embryos and ancestors (De Beer, 1951) 
 
Regarding the methods of investigation of ontogenetic changes, Rensch relies 
on a combination of comparative and experimental embryology: 
 
“In most transpecific alterations an adequate analysis of the genetic background 
is impossible, because hybrids of species and genera usually are inviable or 
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infertile. Thus, we must rely on comparative studies of ontogenetic development. 
Transplantations and explantation experiments, however, provide sound clues 
towards the proper evaluation of the potencies, affinities, and induction effects of 
single cells and organ buds, from which one may draw some conclusions 
regarding the genetic causes of archallactic alterations.” (Rensch, 1959, p. 242) 
 
Like others before him (De Beer, 1930; Schindewolf, 1936), Rensch refers to a 
flurry of cases from descriptive and comparative embryology to illustrate several 
developmental phenomena such as proterogenesis (also called paedomorphosis 
or neoteny), “the shift of juvenile characters towards adult stages” (p.260), which 
undermines the theory of recapitulation. More importantly, he takes a large part 
of his evidence from experimental embryologists, especially from work on 
xenoplastic transplantations. He relies in particular on the works of Leopold von 
Ubisch (1923, 1933) and Fritz Baltzer (1950a, 1950b), both former students of 
Theodor Boveri, like Hans Spemann, but who, more than Spemann, were 
interested in the relations of genetics to development (Gehring, 1998, p. 87; 
Sander, 1994). Rensch also relies on early experimental work of Johannes 
Holtfreter (1934). The latter, a student of Hans Spemann, was “the world’s 
foremost experimental embryologist in the decades between 1930 and 1960” 
(Gerhart, 1998, p. 3). He was a central figure in the transfer of Spemann’s study 
of embryonic induction and of the organizer from the level of tissues to the cellular 
and biochemical level (Gerhart, 1998; Hamburger, 1988; Holtfreter, 1991; 
Steinberg & Gilbert, 2004). However, the majority of works that Rensch relies on 
pertain to what was already called in the mid-century “classical experimental 
embryology” (Oppenheimer, 1955). 
 
For example, against Von Baer’s first law, Rensch relies on the experimental work 
of Leopold Von Ubisch on sea urchins to show that phenotypic differences 
between closely related species can be caused by archallaxis. Ubisch 
transplanted the four micromeres of Parechinus miliaris taken at the sixteen-cell 
stage, into half of a blastula of Echynocyamus pusillus. These micromeres 
normally develop into skeletal spicules after several cell divisions. After 
transplantation, they develop into spicules characteristic of the donor species 
Parechinus. Rensch introduces the example by stating that in echinoderms, “the 
development of many specific and generic traits has been found to occur at early 
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phases of ontogeny” (1959, p. 243). Rensch’s interpretation of this case as an 
example of archallaxis is questionable. For Rensch, the experiment 
demonstrates the early determination of the skeletal identity of the micromeres 
and thus a change in early development between related species. An important 
point is that this interpretation of the experiment in terms of developmental 
evolution is Rensch’s own import. In contrast, the research questions pursued by 
Von Ubisch were related to the mechanisms and types of induction involved in 
the formation of the skeletal spicules. There was for example a debate on the 
relative influence of nuclear and cytoplasmic factors (Horstadius, 1939; Ubisch, 
1939). Rensch also provides clearer examples of archallaxis between closely 
related species without important differences in the adult phenotype, such as the 
related species of worms Tubifex rivulorum and pachydrilus lineatus, studied by 
Andreas Penners, which differ in their type of cleavage and in most later stages 
of development (Penners, 1922, 1930). 
   
Is transspecific evolution directed? 
  
 Rensch concludes his investigation of ontogenetic alterations in evolution 
by the following judgment:  
 
“Reviewing the various types of ontogenetic alterations arising in the course of 
phylogeny, we have to state that the primary undirected evolution, initiated by 
random mutation, is quite obvious also in the transspecifc differentiation of 
ontogenetic development, as in many groups of animals almost any possible 
alteration of ontogeny can develop, provided that it remains biologically tolerable 
[…]. This means that once more there is no reason to assume special 
autonomous factors of evolution causing a certain direction of ontogenetic 
alterations, and that mutations and selection provide sufficient explanations of 
the phenomena in question.” (Rensch, 1959, pp. 263–264) 
 
Rensch’s verdict could be misinterpreted as claiming that genetic mutations are 
the only pertinent level of analysis to explain evolutionary change and that 
developmental mechanisms do not contribute to this explanation. But to properly 
understand Rensch’s position, it is important to be aware of the contrast class 
against which it is formulated. Rensch argues against two central ideas: 
recapitulation theory and Von Baer’s first law on the one hand, and orthogenesis 
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on the other. Regarding the former, Rensch argues against the validity of these 
universal laws linking development and evolution, this does not mean that he 
argues against the relevance of developmental mechanisms to explain particular 
cases of evolutionary change. Regarding the latter, it is important to distinguish 
it from the contemporary concepts of physical, developmental or phylogenetic 
constraints. One problem of interpretation is that orthogenesis was popular in the 
first part of the twentieth century and more than twenty different versions were in 
existence (Levit, Meister, & Hossfeld, 2008; Levit & Olsson, 2006). However, from 
Rensch’s own review of orthogenetic theories (Rensch, 1959, pp. 57–59), it is 
clear that it is against a strong version that he argues, orthogenesis understood 
as an “autonomous evolutionary factor” determining the directionality of evolution 
over large scale trends  
 
Against orthogenesis, Rensch’s argumentation is twofold: on the one end Rensch 
stresses the opportunism in evolution: cases where there is a clear absence of 
directionality; on the other hand, Rensch recognises the existence of trends that 
show directionality, he focuses on rules of allometry, the correlated changes in 
parts of organisms and seeks to explain them in developmental and selectionist 
terms rather than in orthogenetic terms. 
 
Rensch’s verdict on ontogenetic alterations can be seen as an illustration of 
opportunism. Rensch also relies on examples in which all the possible states of 
a trait have evolved. Thus, in the case of hibernation in butterflies, only four 
possibilities can be realized: either hibernation as an egg, as a caterpillar, a pupa 
or as an adult. All of these four possibilities are realized in different species. 
Rensch also uses morphological examples such as the many shapes of 
Gastropoda shells or antelope horns. These examples are primarily directed 
against orthogenesis, but in some cases, Rensch also clearly states that they 
show the limitation of the action of selection:  
 
“Of course, these horns serve an important purpose as a weapon and as a means 
of species recognition, but there can hardly be any selective force necessitating 
the appearance of the particular characteristics of the surface, of bending and 
twisting etc.” (p. 60).  
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Allometry and the factors of transspecific alterations 
 
 Related to his focus on allometry and directional trends, Rensch develops 
many concepts and hypotheses that contribute to an integrated and holistic view 
of organisms and their evolution.  
 
“Do random mutations and natural selection add one character to the other, or is 
a certain state of harmonious animal construction being maintained throughout 
the stages of transformation? Numerous facts suggest that the latter assumption 
is true” (Rensch, 1959, p. 127) 
 
Among Rensch’s integrative concepts and hypotheses95, one that directly relates 
to the origin of evolutionary novelties is the principle of “compensation of body 
material96” (Rensch, 1959, p. 181). This is a developmental hypothesis to explain 
negative allometry by the existence of a competition for developmental material. 
Rensch refers to early experiments of amputations and regenerations conducted 
for example by Edmund Wilson or Hans Prizbram (see Laubichler & Maienschein, 
2007) but notes that:  
 
“most of these experiments were made on single animals, or at best on a few, no 
statistical tests of the results were made, and other possible causes, such as 
traumatic, hormonal, and nervous stimuli, did not receive sufficient attention in 
the experiments”(Rensch, 1959, p. 181) 
 
Thus, Rensch asked one of his students, Hubert Wilbert, to conduct such 
experiment on a large scale using the stick insect (Carausius morosus) (Wilbert, 
1953). Wilbert conducted ablations of one hind leg on larvae and measured the 
                                                 
95 Also stressed by Rensch, but with a less direct relation to the problem of novelty, are the mutual 
induction of tissues and the general effects of hormones such as prolactin and thyroxin during 
development 
96 The principle of material compensation has been originally formulated by Goethe and then by 
Goeffroy Saint-Hilaire who named it “loi de balancement” (balancing law) It was acknowledged by 
Darwin, although he remained more neutral than Rensch on the role of natural selection in the 
principle "For I hardly see any way of distinguishing between the effects, on the one hand, of a part 
being largely developed through natural selection and another and adjoining part being reduced by this 
same process or by disuse, and, on the other hand, the actual withdrawal of nutriment from one part 
owing to the excess of growth in another and adjoining part" (Darwin, 1859, p. 147). For contemporary 
studies of material compensation see for example Klingenberg and Nijhout (1998).  
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correlated effects of their regeneration on the growth of other organs 
(contralateral leg and ovaries), controlling for other causes. He found significant 
effects on the growth of the correlated organs, which Rensch interprets as 
material compensation. Rensch also refers to similar experiments and 
interpretation by Tschumi (1954) on amphibians. He concludes: 
 
“The above examples prove that processes of material compensation do occur, 
and hence we should account for this fact and its consequences in phylogeny, 
though we must not forget that all evaluation of phyletic transformation and its 
causes is based on extrapolation, and this should be done with care.” (Rensch, 
1959, p. 183) 
 
Rensch indeed applies the principle to some evolutionary changes. In particular, 
it play an essential role in Rensch’s explanation of the evolution of vestigial 
organs To the question of why vestigial organs continue to be present over long 
periods of time in many cases, such as the vestigial hind limbs of whales, Rensch 
answers  
 
“The hereditary character is still preserved and hind limbs would develop if 
increased growth of other parts of the body did not cause a retardation in their 
development by way of material compensation Selection directly affects the hind 
limbs only slightly if at all, because otherwise they would completely disappear” 
(Rensch, 1959, p. 225) 
 
Relying on the developmental work of Sewertzoff (1931) and Maran (1927) 
among others, Rensch further notes that in some reptiles (such as lizards 
Chalcides ocellatus and Ophimorus tridactylus with vestigial limbs), whales, and 
insects (such as species of the beetle Poecilus with reduced wings), the distal 
parts (phalanges, distal wing veins) are the first to be reduced Because these 
parts differentiate last in development, they are the first to be affect by the lack of 
material used by other increased organs 
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George Ledyard Stebbins’s Flowering plants 
 
 The focus on Rensch and Stebbins is intended to provide evidence and 
analysis of research on the problem of evolutionary novelty involving 
developmental resources inside the Modern Synthesis circle. Flowering plants, 
published by Stebbins in 1974, is a late work and could arguably be placed after 
the Modern Synthesis era. Using this book to illustrate Modern synthesis 
research on novelty would not be pertinent if it was the product of a late change 
in Stebbins’s methods and research interests. It is however not the case. 
Flowering plants is the expansion and update on subjects that were already 
treated in chapter 13 of Variation and evolution in plants, published in 1950. There 
are at least three reasons to focus on the former rather than the latter: it is more 
extensive and Stebbins’s methods and theories are presented in more details; it 
engages with the evolutionary, systematic and developmental literatures of the 
late Modern Synthesis era; finally, it has been much less studied by historians 
and philosophers of biology.  
 
The importance of the study of comparative and experimental embryology for the study of 
plant macroevolution  
 
 As it was stressed in the last chapter, the origin, evolution and systematics 
of the angiosperms attracted a lot of attention before and during the Modern 
Synthesis era. How does Stebbins relate to the numerous existing theories 
regarding evolutionary trends in the angiosperms? And how different is his 
approach? 
 
“One of my major objectives is to find out to what extent both phylogeny itself and 
the methods of gaining new information about evolutionary history will be 
modified if botanists shift their major emphasis away from traditional taxonomy 
and idealistic morphology, and towards population and developmental genetics, 
comparative developmental physiology, and an ecological viewpoint that places 
primary emphasis upon interactions between populations and their environment.” 
(Stebbins, 1974a, pp. viii–ix) 
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According to Stebbins himself, the two main originalities of his approach are his 
application of Simpson’s theory of adaptive radiations to flowering plants and his 
use of experimental and comparative embryology and developmental genetics to 
understand evolutionary trends97 As shown in the last chapter, the adaptationist 
approach was actually rare among botanists studying large scale plant evolution. 
Regarding the importance of embryology to understand plant evolution and 
systematics, Stebbins was not alone in relying on comparative embryological 
data to establish phylogenetic patterns (Constance, 1955; Davis, 1967). More 
importantly, Stebbins stressed the importance of development to understand the 
evolutionary process and developed concepts of developmental availability, 
constraint and irreversibility98 
 
“The bridge between gene action as understood by developmental geneticists 
and an understanding of the genetic basis of morphological trends that is needed 
by the evolutionist must be provided by studies of morphogenesis. The basic 
postulate for such studies, as mentioned above, is that morphological 
characteristics are determined by complex sequences of gene actions that are 
controlled by many genes, acting upon the cells of developing tissues. On the 
basis of this postulate, evidence must be sought that will permit evolutionists to 
decide what kinds of changes are accomplished with relative ease, what changes 
are more difficult from the point of view of gene action, what changes can be 
reversed with relative ease, and which ones are intrinsically irreversible or nearly 
so. “ (p.102, emphasis added) 
                                                 
97 During the discussions at the Darwin centennial conference in Chicago, Stebbins already stated the 
importance of a knowledge of the details of development to understand the origin of evolutionary 
novelties“When we find out how those forty-six strings of DNA effected all the differentiation of cells, 
tissues, and organs, all the forward steps and feedbacks, eventually ending in this beautiful form we all 
admire, then we shall be better able to argue about the selective basis of adaptations, the emergence of 
novelties, or any other type of change.” (Tax and Callender, 1960, p. 143) 
98 An illustration of the role that Stebbins attributes to development can be found in the criticism that 
he formulates against Walter Zimmerman’s approach to plant evolution (described in the last chapter): 
“The concepts of overtopping (‘Uebergipfelung’), webbing, and anastomosis of vascular strands are […] 
useful for describing the ways in which adult structures became modified. They do not however, even 
begin to analyze the causal factors involved, or to associate these changes with modified gene action 
that could be the result of new mutations and gene recombinations. A first step in the direction of such 
an analysis would be to describe and compare carefully the developmental patterns that give rise to 
each of the different kinds of adult structures, in terms of the distribution and activity of meristematic 
regions, cell division as compared to cell enlargement, polarized growth of both cells and tissues, and 
the times and methods of procambial cell differentiation. Such descriptive studies should be followed by 
altering development experimentally through changing the balance of growth substances” (Stebbins, 
1974a, pp. 144–145) (Webbing and anastomosis, the formation of connections between branching 
structures, belong to Zimmerman’s category of fusions). 
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Transfer of function, ecology and development 
 
 The combination of Stebbins’s ecological and adaptive framework, and of 
his focus on the role of development in plant evolution can be illustrated by his 
treatment of the concept of transfer of function. Within his adaptive framework, 
Stebbins makes use of the concept that Darwin called conversion of function and 
Mayr functional shift, and which he calls “transfer of function” (p.64) or 
“transference of function” (p.79). Stebbins applies the concept to explain shifts 
from one pollinator to another: the transitions is made possible by a stage of 
“double function” in which two different vectors are pollinating the flower. Stebbins 
also uses the concept to speculatively explain some evolutionary trends in which 
organs originally having a function of protection of the developing ovule adopt a 
function of dispersal of the mature seeds and the function of protection is adopted 
by another organ. Stebbins identifies evolutionary trends that he interprets as 
serial repetition of this same pattern, and thus calls the phenomenon “cycles of 
transference of function” (p.83; see Stebbins, 1970). 
 
In botany, the concept of transference of function was actually introduced by 
E.J.H. Corner (Corner, 1958; see Baum & Donoghue, 2002) who defined it in the 
following way: “a property which occurs in an organ, tissue, or cell-layer in one 
case may occur in other parts of the body in other cases. The property is the 
same, but its site of development has shifted” (Corner, 1958, p. 33). After a survey 
of examples, Corner later summarises his central idea: 
 
“It is considered that many evolutionary changes in plants, including the division 
of labour and neoteny, result from restricting the site of development of 
a hereditary property or by moving it to another part of the plant-body.” (Corner, 
1958, p. 40) 
 
Stebbins refers to Corner and notes that several of the latter’s examples pertain 
to the same category as his own examples. However, Stebbins argues that 
Corner confuses the matter by including within the category of transference of 
function phenomena of different natures. This is illustrated by Corner’s example 
of the transition from apacarpous ovary to the syncarpous ovary. In flower with 
multiple separated carpels (apocarpous), each carpel contains an ovary; in the 
syncarpous condition, the carpels are fused and enclose a single ovary with 
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different ovules and placentas (points of attachment of ovules). For Corner, this 
transition involves an intercalary growth, and there is a transference of function 
between the two types of ovaries99 Here is how Stebbins analyses Corner’s 
example: 
 
“Apart from the problems that this interpretation raises regarding homologies, this 
example is inappropriate because it does not involve transference of function at 
all, according to the ecological meaning in which the concept was originally used 
by Darwin, as well as by Dohrn, Mayr, and many others, including myself. It 
illustrates, rather, a reorganization of the developmental pattern, so that ovules 
that retain their original function acquire a new position of origin. The position at 
which ovules appear is not a property or characteristic of the carpel or the ovary, 
but of the developmental pattern that produces it. If we are to understand better 
the complex interrelations between structures, function, and development that 
exist in higher plants, we must define our concepts more clearly than Corner has 
done.” (Stebbins, 1974a, p. 84) 
 
Stebbins accuses Corner of conflating two different uses of the term function, an 
ecological use and a developmental use. Indeed, in the example of the 
syncarpous ovary, Corner is saying that the function of producing the ovary with 
all its morphological component parts (placentas, ovules, vascular supply etc.) is 
“transferred to the new intercalation” (Corner, 1958, p. 35). To employ a term now 
in use, but that is not used by Stebbins, Corner confuses a complex form of 
heterotopy, the development of a morphological character in a new location, 
which is a developmental concept, with a transfer of function (such as protection 
of ovule and dispersal of seeds) which belongs to ecology. 
 
This does not mean that there is no interplay between developmental processes 
and ecological processes and that the two dimensions should be separate. This 
can be stressed by coming back to Bock’s example of the avian medial brace. 
                                                 
99 Here is Corner’s own formulation: “The syncarpous ovary has always been a problem, now beset with 
many artificial theories. In essence it is an intercalary growth at the base of the free or apocarpous 
carpel-primordia, which thus become elevated on the new "ovary-box". This seems a new feature, but it 
is merely concerted internodal growth. However, the point is that most of the properties of the 
apocarpous ovary become transferred to the new intercalation, namely the placentas with the ovules, 
the vascular supply, the postfertilization development of the carpel-wall and the method of 
dehiscence.” (Corner, 1958, p. 35) 
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The development of the basitemporal articulation is a developmental process 
explained by Bock in terms of epigenetic mechanisms, however this 
developmental process fits into the explanation of the evolution of the medial 
brace which involves factors belonging to ecology, ethology and functional 
morphology. Similarly, in Darwin’s hypothesis that a conversion of function can 
be initiated when two structures perform the same function, this redundancy of 
structures can be the product of a duplication fully explained in developmental 
terms. This reminder should help us understand Stebbins’s position. He is not 
claiming that the study of developmental processes and the study of ecological 
evolution should be separate, he is stating that the two levels of analysis should 
not be conflated. Corner conflated the production of organs by developmental 
processes and the performance of functions by these organs.  
 
The example of the syncarpous ovary, however, poses the question of the 
relative explanatory weights of developmental processes and ecological 
processes in general and in the case of plant character evolution in particular. In 
several of their zoological examples, Darwin, Mayr or Bock attribute an important 
explanatory weight to ecological and functional factors. For example, in Darwin’s 
case of the transition from the ovigerous frena to branchiae in barnacles, no major 
developmental shift needs to be postulated. Bock’s avian medial brace is an 
intermediate example since the formation of the basitemporal articulation is a 
significant developmental shift, but ecological factors are instrumental in the 
larger transformation. In the case of the transition from the apocarpous ovaries 
to the syncarpous ovary, the explanatory weight seems to be attributed fully to 
the properties of developmental processes. Stebbins makes the epistemological 
comment that the study of transfer of function in an ecological sense is much 
more difficult in plants than in animals because of the greater difficulty to 
recognize selection pressures (in particular selection pressures on the structure 
of plant reproductive organs and seed), and because of the greater plasticity of 
plants. Furthermore, although he does not state it explicitly in this case, Stebbins’ 
analysis of Corner example show that the former recognises the important 
explanatory weight of developmental processes in plant character 
transformations. This point will be further illustrated in the next section.  
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Stebbins’s use of developmental biology to study plant novelties 
 
 As noted earlier, in Flowering plants, Stebbins argues for the essential role 
of the study of morphogenetic processes to understand changes in plant form 
(e.g. Stebbins, 1974a, p. 104). Stebbins stresses the importance of the study of 
developmental genetics and singles out regulatory genes in the determination 
and change of morphological characters: 
 
“genes that determine morphological characters most probably code either for 
regulators or control systems that affect the action of other genes, or for structural 
proteins that can function properly only in conjunction with other proteins that are 
coded by different genes” (Stebbins, 1974a, p. 104) 
 
Stebbins conducted research on developmental genetics in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In particular he did cytogenetic studies on the development of stomatal 
complexes (pores on leaves and stems serving for gas exchange) (Stebbins, 
1956; Stebbins and Khush, 1961; Stebbins and Shah, 1960), and developmental 
genetic studies of the effect of mutations in barley (Gupta and Stebbins, 1969; 
Stebbins and Yagil, 1966, 1966; Wijewantha and Stebbins, 1964; Zeiger and 
Stebbins, 1972).  
 
The fact that significant morphological differences in plants can be caused by a 
limited number or even single genetic mutations has been recognised from very 
early on (Gottlieb, 1984). The relations between single genetic mutations and 
large morphological and architectural differences both within species and 
between species of plants, as well as morphological abnormalities, has been 
widely studied during the 20th century, as reviewed for example by Gottlieb 
(1984). However, there were few studies of the developmental mechanisms at 
different levels involved between the genetic factors and the anatomical and 
morphological characters (Meyerowitz, Smyth, & Bowman, 1989). In that regards, 
some of the developmental work of Stebbins, especially his work with Ezra Yagil 
on the hooded barley, is pioneering. Stebbins and Yagil focused of the genetic 
and epigenetic causes of the morphological differences between the awned 
barley and the hooded barley. In the latter, two additional florets are growing on 
the lemma of the main floret.  
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Fig.10: Differences between awned and hooded barley showing differences in axis of 
polarization of the florets. (after Stebbins & Yagil, 1966) 
 
Stebbins and Yagil show that the morphological difference is linked to the 
mutation of a single gene. The cascade of epigenetic effects starts with an 
increase of cell proliferation in the distal part of the lemma and a prolonged 
meristematic state. This is correlated with a change in the direction cell of 
proliferation. This leads to the formation of a meristematic “cushion”, similar to 
the primordia of normal florets, from which the inverted floret develops. To 
summarise, Stebbins and Yagil interpret this morphological change in terms of 
change of cell division patterns caused by a single gene.  
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Regarding the role of developmental processes in understanding morphological 
change and evolutionary trends, Stebbins stresses the importance of other 
related processes at the cellular level:  
 
_ The influence of meristematic capital on the number of parts in a floral whorl, a 
process experimentally studied for example by Torrey using indole acid to 
increase cell proliferation (Torrey, 1955, 1957). 
_ The role of intercalary meristems and their control by growth substance such 
as auxin:  
 
“The development, intensification, and redistribution within the plant of intercalary 
meristems form some of the most important kinds of developmental changes, 
with respect to both the differentiation of angiosperms from other groups of seed 
plants and the differentiation of the various groups of angiosperms from one 
another.” (Stebbins, 1974a, p. 110) 
 
The role of intercalary meristem in morphological change and evolution of plant 
novelties is illustrated for example by the transition from apocarpy to syncarpy.  
 
Developmental data of different kinds play a crucial role in Stebbins’s formulation 
of his own hypothesis regarding the origin and evolution of the angiosperm as a 
taxon, and the origin and evolutionary trends of the flower. It would be beyond 
the scope of this chapter to analyse in details Stebbins’ own position. As we saw 
in the last chapter (section III), Stebbins is probably less original than he claims 
in his plea for the study of development in order to understand plant 
macroevolution. He is more original, at the time, with his attempt to apply the 
framework of adaptive radiations to plant macroevolution. However, his 
conception of development and of its role in plant evolution is outstandingly 
integrative, from developmental genetics to epigenetic mechanisms at different 
levels.  
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II – CONTROVERSIES WITHIN THE MODERN SYNTHESIS AND THEIR RELATION 
TO THE PROBLEM OF NOVELTY 
 
 
  I will develop three arguments in this section: 
 
1) I will argue against the consensual conception of the Modern Synthesis by 
focusing on controversies that occurred in the later phase of the Synthesis: 
the classical-balance controversy, the beanbag-interaction controversy 
and more generally an opposition between atomism and holism. Despite 
existing studies on these controversies (Beatty, 1987; Crow, 2009; Rao 
and Nanjundiah, 2011), they are usually not taken into account by 
defenders of the consensual and gene-centred views of the Modern 
Synthesis. 
2) Even though these controversies have been studied, the link between 
them and the problem of novelty has not been explored in detail. Lerner’s 
concept of genetic homeostasis and especially Mayr’s concept of genetic 
revolutions have a direct bearing on the question of the tempo and mode 
of occurrence of phenotypic novelties. While the dominant view held that 
phenotypic change occurred gradually through phyletic evolution, the 
concept of genetic revolutions opens the door to a theory of rapid 
production of phenotypic novelty during speciation, even though this 
theory was not fully developed by Mayr or others   
3) While open controversies represent explicit dissent, there is also an 
implicit pluralism in the corpus of the later phase of the Modern Synthesis 
that has not been an object of close focus. The pluralism of the Modern 
Synthesis has been stressed by several historians (Beatty, 1992; Cain, 
2009; Dietrich, 1995; Provine, 1988); their focus, however, was often 
centred on the early phase The interpretation of the later phase has been 
dominated by Gould’s idea of a hardening of the synthesis (Gould, 2002; 
Smocovitis, 1999) The theory of genetic revolutions is an example of this 
pluralism, it is implicit because its controversial potential has not been fully 
explored by Mayr or other Modern Synthesis proponents. Gould’s thesis 
(strengthened adaptationism, extrapolationism and individualism 
regarding the level of selection) is based on textual evidence that can 
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hardly be contested. But if one embraces the opposite approach and 
focuses on what is dissonant with that hardening, a more pluralistic and 
potentially incoherent picture emerges. Here I will focus primarily on 
genetic revolutions, the functional theory of the origin of novelties and 
group selectionist overtones in Mayr and Dobzhansky.  
 
The many faces of the opposition between geneticists and naturalists  
 
In order to oppose the gene-centred view of the Synthesis, Mayr mobilised 
a distinction between geneticists and naturalists:  
 
“As Laudan100 stresses, no victory of one paradigm over another was involved, 
as in Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, but rather an exchange of the most 
viable components of the previously competing research traditions. For this 
reason to state that the synthesis was merely an acceptance by the naturalists of 
the of the newer findings of genetics ignores the numerous concepts that 
geneticists took over from the naturalists: population thinking, the 
multidimensionality of the polytypic species, the biological species concept (with 
the species defined as a reproductively and ecologically autonomous entity), the 
role of behaviour and change of function in the origin of evolutionary novelties, 
and so on.”(Mayr and Provine, 1980, p. 40, emphasis added) 
 
The relationship presented here is one of complementarity and mutual 
enlightenment between geneticists and naturalists. The picture it offers appears 
in line with the consensual view of the Modern Synthesis. However, as with 
several other dichotomies developed by Mayr (Beatty, 1994; Witteveen, 2016), 
the one between geneticists and naturalists has gone through different meanings 
and uses over the years. Despite the reductive nature of this dichotomy, it can be 
a point of entry to restore controversies within the Modern Synthesis  
 
The distinction between geneticists and naturalists has mostly been developed 
by Ernst Mayr (eg Mayr, 1992, 1982, 1959; Mayr and Provine, 1998) both as an 
interpretative key to structure the history of biology in the 19th and 20th centuries 
and as a strategic tool to counter the supremacy of genetics in the Modern 
                                                 
100 Laudan (1977) 
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Synthesis101 However, the use of this opposition is not limited to Mayr. It was in 
particular adopted as a strategic tool by other biologists such as Dobzhansky 
(Dobzhansky, 1980) (cf. Beatty, 1990; Gould, 2002; Milam, 2010; Smocovitis, 
1996), and it has been used as an interpretative key by other historians (e.g. 
Bowler, 1992, p. 217). It was closely related to, and sometimes conflated with an 
opposition between reductionism and holism or organicism in biology (Milam, 
2010) The study of this distinction may be a good path to move beyond the 
unified view of the Modern Synthesis stated earlier and recover some of the 
controversies taking place within it  
 
A crucial angle from which to analyse the opposition between geneticists and 
naturalists is the strategic or social angle and I will describe three strategic 
reasons for the development of the opposition by Mayr and others. But although 
it is necessary to have the strategic dimension in mind, it is also manifest that 
several topics of research cannot be understood with a purely genetic-centred 
reading of the Synthesis. To the ones cited by Mayr (population thinking, polytypic 
species, biological species concept, functional approach to novelties), we can 
add the ones that we analysed in the last chapter: speciation, the origin of higher 
taxa and the increase in complexity 
 
One can find at least three contexts in which the distinction between geneticists 
and naturalists was deployed as a conceptual and strategic tool in controversies 
within the Modern Synthesis   
 
                                                 
101 Mayr has theorised and defended in several places (1963, 1982b) his use of simplifying dichotomies 
or categorical statement in science and history of science. In the preface to The growth of biological 
thought, he attributed it a strategic role in bringing out the truth, using an analogy with Hegel’s 
dialectics: “I agree with Passmore (1965) that histories should even be polemical. Such histories will 
arouse contradiction and they will challenge the reader to come up with a refutation. By a dialectical 
process, this will speed up a synthesis of perspective.” (Mayr,1982b, p. 9). This should of course grant 
caution about unreflectingly reusing Mayr’s historical dichotomies. However, two remarks can be 
offered in defence of this use: firstly, the dichotomy has been used by other historians. Secondly, Mayr’s 
sweeping statements are usually criticised for reducing or hiding debates and controversies rather than 
for artificially creating them (eg Witteveen, 2015, 2016). Thus, it is very probable that controversies 
within the Modern Synthesis were more complex and more numerous than the one described by Mayr’s 
dichotomy. Now, this is not a major problem for my argument, considering that the goal in this section 
is to move away from the reductive unified view of the Synthesis and restore controversies and 
oppositions.  
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_ A conflict for power and recognition against the domination of genetics, already 
visible for example in Systematics and the origin of species (1942) 
_ A controversy between two distinct views of genetics (“classical” and “newer”, 
or “atomistic” and “holistic” genetics, in Mayr’s words) that developed from the 
1950s 
_ A historiographic fight against an account of the Synthesis centred on 
population genetics, especially formulated by William Provine, from the 1970s 
(Provine, 1978, 2001)102  
 
The second controversy appears not to fit within the general category of 
oppositions between geneticists and naturalists Although, as indicated by its 
name, it was primarily a debate internal to population and evolutionary genetics, 
it involved Dobzhansky and Mayr as some of its main protagonists and they partly 
sided with the holistic school of genetics because it fitted their naturalists’ 
concerns Thus, it still has its place within the category Here I will principally 
focus on this second context for several reasons. First, it developed in the later 
phase of the Modern Synthesis, at a period that dominant historical accounts 
describe as the reaching of a consensus or the hardening of the Synthesis, this 
controversy thus provides evidence to question or at least nuance these 
dominant accounts. Second, this controversy is related to the formulation of 
Mayr’s theory of genetic revolutions, a theory that has a direct bearing on how 
the problem of novelty was tackled during the Modern Synthesis era  
 
A fourth context should be mentioned in relation to the opposition between 
geneticists and naturalists, the fight against the rise and domination of molecular 
biology in the 1960s Here a different opposition was elaborated, mainly by 
Dobzhansky, Mayr and Simpson (Dobzhansky, 1964; Mayr, 1961; Simpson, 
1964), between reductionist molecular biology and anti-reductionist organism-
centred, museum and field based biology This opposition is closely related to the 
                                                 
102 For example, in a letter to George Gaylord Simpson, Mayr wrote, “as far as the conference on the 
‘Synthesis’ is concerned—confidentially—I want to counteract the present historiography which gives 
just about all the credit to the geneticists. They shall have all the credit they deserve, but not more.” 
Mayr to Simpson, 27 Aug 1973, GSP, Series I: Correspondence, Folder Ernst Mayr #3. On this 
historiographic conflict and more generally on Mayr’s central role in stimulating the production of 
historical accounts of the Modern Synthesis, see (Cain, 2009; Haffer, 2007; Smocovitis 2007). 
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one between geneticists and naturalists103 I will however not focus on this 
controversy because molecular biology is not usually considered as an integral 
part of the Modern Synthesis, thus focusing on this fight does not exactly shine a 
light on controversies internal to the Modern Synthesis Furthermore, this 
opposition has received several historical and philosophical accounts  (Beatty, 
1990, 1994; Milam, 2010)  
 
The idea of different forms of oppositions between geneticists and naturalists 
during the Modern Synthesis apparently stands in conflict with the view of the 
Modern Synthesis as a reconciliation of these two groups Indeed, as noted for 
example by Bowler (1992, p. 216), the opposition between the geneticists and 
naturalists was focused up until the 1930s on the importance of natural selection 
itself in evolution. For example, in their comprehensive survey of animal variation, 
Robson and Richards (1936) give a large place to non-adaptive variation and 
favour Lamarckism over selectionism for adaptive characters This is opposition 
fades as the naturalists progressively accept selectionism during the 1930s and 
1940s However, right as this reconciliation and synthesis spirit in evolutionary 
biology is celebrated, a tension arises regarding the respective contributions of 
the different groups or disciplines. This is expressed by Mayr at the very 
beginning of Systematics and the origin of species (1942):  
 
“There was a tendency among laboratory workers to think rather contemptuously 
of the museum man, who spent his time counting hairs or drawing bristles, and 
whose final aim seemed to be merely the correct naming of his specimens. A 
welcome improvement in the mutual understanding between geneticists and 
systematists has occurred in recent years, largely owing to the efforts of 
such men as Rensch and Kinsey among the taxonomists, Timofeeff-Ressovsky 
and Dobzhansky among the geneticists, and Huxley and Diver among the 
general biologists. It was realized by these workers that only some of the 
problems of the origin of species can be solved by the geneticist, while other 
                                                 
103 Milam has recently stressed the proximity and even the blending of the two oppositions “in 1959 
Mayr was more interested in defending evolution against the influence of geneticists than he was in 
defending the broader community of organismic biologists against molecular biology. This would slowly 
change, although these two defensive lines can be difficult to tease apart because they were engaged in 
the same battle to maintain the position of museum- and field-based biology in a rapidly changing 
world” (Milam, 2010, p. 289)   
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aspects are more accessible to such branches of biology as ecology and 
biogeography, paleontology, and taxonomy. A satisfactory understanding of 
intricate evolutionary phenomena can be attained only through the cooperation 
of all these disciplines, and systematics is willing and able to contribute its share.” 
(Mayr, 1942, p. 3, emphasis added) 
 
This tension, while never eliminated, will take a new turn in the 1950s and 1960s 
Since this new turn has its origin in a series of controversies within genetics, it 
may be misleading to define it as another episode of the confrontation between 
geneticists and naturalists In this case, the arguments of the naturalists were 
renewed and fuelled by new developments coming from different branches of 
genetics itself Thus, if one had to characterise the episodes and ideas that will 
be the subject of the next section with one opposition, the one between atomism 
and holism would be better suited, although, as it will hopefully become clear, no 
single opposition would be sufficient  
 
Different forms of holism in the late Modern Synthesis 
 
 “Classical” and “newer” populations genetics 
 
 In The genetic basis of evolutionary change, Richard Lewontin refers to 
the classical-balance controversy in evolutionary genetics and brilliantly analyses 
its inception and evolution between the 1950s and the 1970s. But as noted by 
Joel Felsenstein (1975), Lewontin weaves together different themes that could 
be better interpreted as different controversies: the classical-balance, beanbag-
interaction and selection-neutrality questions. Here, my focus will be on the two 
first controversies, because the selection-neutrality unfolded only from the mid-
1960s and has attracted more recent attention than the first two, the neutral 
theory of evolution being considered as the first or one of the first attacks against 
the Modern Synthesis (e.g. Dietrich, 1994; Stoltzfus, 2012). Mayr distinguished 
the “classical population genetics” of Fisher, Wright and Haldane and the “newer 
population genetics”  As representative of this new trend, he listed Dobzhansky's 
“balance theory,” Isadore Michael Lerner's “genetic homeostasis,” and Kenneth 
Mather's work on quantitative inheritance (“genetic inertia”). Mayr later 
designated Lerner as the leader of the holists The following quote is revelatory 
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of how this opposition relates to the relationships between geneticists and 
naturalists 
 
“Every naturalist, I suppose, has a feeling that a purely reductionist approach fails 
to explain the holistic aspects of organisms and of evolution. Some geneticists, 
in the 1940s and 1950s, came to the same conclusion, even though by a very 
different route. Dobzhansky had sympathies in this direction, but even more so 
his students Wallace, Brncic, and Vetukhiv. K. Mather's experiments led to similar 
conclusions, but M. Lerner became the leader of this school of holistic thinking 
(Lerner 1954). I felt that he had demonstrated convincingly the importance of 
nonadditive genes and of the genetic homeostastis of the genotype as a whole. 
In Cold Spring Harbor it was Bruce Wallace's work with irradiated populations 
that opened my eyes to the existence of a remarkable cohesion of the genotype.” 
(Mayr, 1992, p. 14) 
 
Partly like Lewontin, Mayr seems to include several debates into his dichotomy 
between classical and newer population genetics  
 
The classical-balance controversy 
 
 Under the classical view of genetics, natural selection favours the allele 
with the highest fitness at each genetic locus, thus, the effect of selection is a 
progressive elimination of less fit alleles Because there is usually no absolute 
dominance at a genetic locus, selection will favour homozygotes with the fittest 
allele over heterozygotes Thus, the frequency of homozygotes with the optimal 
allele for each locus will increase and the population will tend towards 
homozygosis at all loci There cannot be a total elimination of genetic diversity, 
but this diversity is “either neutral, or transient, or morbid” (Dobzhansky, 1955, p. 
3) Under the balance view, the notion of the allele with the highest fitness, the 
optimal allele, is questioned This is partly due to the variability of environments 
which leads to any allele being more beneficial in some conditions but less in 
others Thus, homozygotes will be generally less fit than heterozygotes because 
of their overspecialisation Because of the superior fitness of heterozygotes, a  
population will contain and maintain a high degree of variability at most loci 
 
 172 
The main proponents of this debate were Herman Jospeh Muller, who defended 
the classical view, and Theodosius Dobzhansky who defended the balance view 
The reasons for which the debate did not resolve easily are multiple the difficulty 
of collecting and assessing evidence (e.g. high heterosigosity in Drosophila was 
mostly based on chromosomal inversions rather than on alleles at gene loci), the 
social implications of the debate, especially its relation to eugenics, the strong 
personalities of the protagonists Here is not the place to go over these reasons 
in detail104, it is sufficient for my purpose to note that this controversy was not 
superficial and involved deep theoretical issues such as the mode of action and 
the levels of selection. This will be further addressed later in this section. 
 
Isadore Michael Lerner  heterozygosity and homeostasis 
 
 In his presentation and defence of the balance view, Dobzhansky makes 
several references to Isadore Michael Lerner For example, Dobzhansky refers 
to the mechanism of “obligate heterozygosity” as contributing to the balance view. 
Lerner defines obligate heterozygosity as the requirement of a certain amount of 
heterozygosis to allow the normal development of organisms (Lerner, 1954, p. 
6) Lerner is important for my investigation because of his influence in the later 
phase of the Modern Synthesis, as attested for example by Mayr, and because 
he appears to be the missing link between Conrad Waddington and Ivan 
Schmallhausen’s developmental perspective on one side, and Mayr and 
Dobzhansky’s organismic and holistic perspective on the other side. Lerner was 
a Russian geneticist who had emigrated to Vancouver in 1927 and then spent his 
career at Berkeley working on poultry breeding and later on species competition 
His work Genetic homeostasis, published in 1954, draws a link between the 
classical-balance controversy and genetic and evolutionary concepts with holistic 
connotations such as the coadaptation of the genome, developmental 
canalisation and genetic inertia or homeostasis  
 
In a series of publications, Conrad Waddington developed the idea of 
developmental canalisation (Waddington, 1942, 1948) Considering that 
                                                 
104 For an analysis of these reasons, especially of the social implications of the controversy, see Beatty 
(1987)  
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environmental stresses or genetic mutations can disrupt developmental 
pathways and have deleterious effects on the phenotypic outcome of 
development, Waddington suggested that natural selection favoured genetic 
combinations that limited the possibilities of disruption of developmental 
reactions To explain this developmental canalisation, Waddington referred to 
feedback mechanisms and other cybernetic concepts but he did not provide a 
genetic theory of developmental canalisation Lerner refers to Waddington’s 
definition of canalisation, asserts its importance in evolution and provides a 
potential, albeit speculative105, genetic mechanism for it, based on 
heterozygosity. Lerner distinguishes an additive version of the mechanism, where 
heterozygosity at certain specific loci is needed for canalisation, and a non-
additive version, where canalisation does not depend on heterozygosity at 
specific loci but on a certain overall rate of heterozygosity at the level of the of 
the group of genes involved in a developmental reaction, or at the genome level 
Lerner provides the following abstract and simplified model of the non-additive 
version 
 
                                                 
105 “mere designation of a phenomenon by the term 'buffering of development' does not imply real 
understanding of the process; this must await the time when the physiology of gene action and of 
normal ontogeny is reduced to precise physico-chemical terms. In Landauer's (1952) words, ‘It is 
important that we should not deceive ourselves. Our knowledge concerning the hereditary forces 
governing normal embryonic development is practically nil.' Only when such great voids have been filled 
can generalizations of the type attempted here rest on a sound foundation.” (Lerner, 1954, p. 114) 
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Fig. 11: “Non-specific control of buffering by heterozygous gene pairs. 
Roman numerals represent stages of development between which the products 
of gene pairs Aa, Bb and Cc enter into play. The arrows represent developmental 
paths taken by each genotype. At the extreme right the range of normal 
phenotypic expression is indicated.” (Lerner, 1954, p. 67) 
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Lerner notes that there is no conclusive evidence for either version of the 
mechanism and that the reality is probably a combination of the two versions 106  
 
While the concept of developmental homeostasis107 applies to the individual level, 
Lerner also develops the concept of genetic homeostasis, which is a population 
level concept and which he defines as “the tendency of a Mendelian population 
as a whole to retain its genetic composition arrived at by previous evolutionary 
history” (Lerner, 1954, p. 81). The main source of evidence for this phenomenon 
is found in examples of the tendency of a population under artificial selection for 
an extreme phenotype to return to its initial condition after the artificial selection 
has stopped To explain this phenomenon, Lerner appeals to two mechanisms 
involving heterozygosity 
 
“It is suggested here that heterozygosity has a dual function in the life of 
Mendelian populations. On the one hand, it provides a mechanism for 
maintaining genetic reserves and potential plasticity, and on the other it permits 
a large proportion of individuals to exhibit combinations of phenotypic properties 
near the optimum. Underlying both processes is the superior buffering ability of 
heterozygotes as compared with homozygotes.” (Lerner, 1954, p. 108) 
 
Lerner explains genetic homeostasis as either a by-product of developmental 
canalisation based on obligate heterozygocity at the individual level, or as a 
consequence of the greater adaptability to different environments of a highly 
heterozygote population. In short, the selection for an extreme phenotype tend to 
increase homozygocity and thus decrease overall canalisation and fitness. 
Natural selection thus acts towards a return to the more heterozygous state. To 
illustrate Lerner’s ideas, one can refer for example to the work of Carl Huether on 
the species linanthus androsaceus (Huether, 1969, 1968) . The flowers of this 
species, and of the whole Polemoniaceae family, are mostly pentamerous (five 
petals) however a very small percentage of plants have flowers with more or less 
                                                 
106 “On the one hand, the usual lethality of deletions, and the specificity of genes acting on biosynthetic 
pathways of lower organisms, predispose one to view the first model with favour. On the other hand, 
the complete overlapping of phenotypes for polygenic traits when their genotypes are different 
supports the second one. It is most likely that both types of gene action occur.” (Lerner, 1954, p. 68) 
107 Lerner uses the concepts of canalization, homeostasis and buffering alternatively and without 
significant changes in meaning Even in contemporary developmental biology, these terms are generally 
synonymous (Hall, 2005; Hallgrímsson et al., 2002)  
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petals. To show that this condition was not produced by developmental accidents 
in a genetically homogenous population but by the presence of genetic variability 
that is mostly canalised, Huether selected for increased and decreased numbers 
of petals over five generations and successfully obtained lines with a high level 
of plants with more than five petals, and, to a lesser extent, lines with a high level 
of plant with less than five petals. Huether refers to Waddington’s concept of 
canalisation but not directly to Lerner, and he offers two possible interpretations 
of the combination of stable phenotype and high genetic variability in the natural 
state, assuming their adaptive significance either 1) canalisation is a superior 
way to maintain the stable phenotype, or 2) the genetic variability has an adaptive 
value In the first hypothesis, which could be called “non-lernerian”, canalisation 
is adaptive but not based of variability or heterozygosity, these are by-products 
of canalisation, they are not adaptive but are not selected against because of 
canalisation In the second “lernerian” hypothesis, the heterozygosity is adaptive, 
either because it is the basis of canalisation or for another reason Stebbins 
(Stebbins, 1974a, pp. 20–21) goes further than Huether and favours the second 
hypothesis, directly citing Lerner   
 
The evolutionary developmental biologist Brian K Hall has recently devoted an 
article to Lerner’s book (Hall, 2005) Hall introduces Lerner’s propositions and 
gives attention to Conrad Waddington’s positive review108 But Hall’s main interest 
is in understanding why Lerner’s work has gone out of fashion, how could it “not 
have forged a synthesis of mechanisms uniting genes, individual organisms, 
populations, environment and selection, or have founded an integrative and 
holistic biology?” (Hall, 2005, p. 192) Hall is focused on the absence of 
contemporary legacy of Lerner and thus does not evoke the importance of his 
influence in the later phase of the Modern Synthesis109 
                                                 
108 For example ‘‘It is refreshing to find a population geneticist who realizes that he cannot avoid 
talking embryology and who does his best to do so in a sophisticated rather than an elementary 
fashion’’ (Waddington, 1955: p 52) 
109 Several factors can explain why the influence of Lerner’s theories declined over the years only few 
cases of heterozygote superiority were experimentally observed in the few decades after the 
publication of Lerner’s book. Other mechanisms were shown to be more plausible in explaining the 
presence of heterozygosis in populations such as frequency-dependent selection and linkage 
disequilibrium. Explanations of developmental canalisation developed around the robust architecture of 
gene regulatory networks or the pervasiveness of gene duplications but not around the effects of 
heterozygosity. Some of these topics will be addressed in the next chapters.  
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The beanbag-interaction controversy 
 
 I now turn to a second controversy that had a strong impact in the later 
phase of the Modern Synthesis the confrontation between an atomistic view and 
an integrative view of the action of genes While the classicalbalance controversy 
was concerned with the quantity and the role of variability (and heterozygosity) in 
populations, this controversy focuses on the relation between genes in a 
genotype during the development of organisms and more generally their whole 
life cycle In short, the opposition was between an atomistic view, according to 
which genes could be studied as independent units, and an integrative or holistic 
view, according to which the interaction between genes is so important that it 
cannot be neglected During the 1950s, geneticists pertaining to what Mayr had 
termed the “newer” school started questioning the ability of the models of 
classical population genetics to adequately represent the behaviour of genes 
Such criticism is expressed for example by Lerner in Genetic homeostasis, as 
illustrated by the following statement  
 
“In any case, if the basis of the ideas suggested here is an acceptable one, it 
follows that the two-dimensional specifications (time and gene frequency) of 
evolutionary processes used in the early studies of population genetics, 
necessary as they were to carry us to our present understanding of evolution, will 
have to be replaced eventually by much more complex multidimensional ones. 
Even the first crude stages of quantification of the combinatorial properties of 
genotypes may be beyond our capacity for statistical manipulation. This fact was 
undoubtedly realized by the pioneers of population genetics, who as a first 
approximation confined themselves to the simpler forms of analysis.” (Lerner, 
1954, p. 120) 
 
What Lerner, Dobzhansky, Wallace and others argued was not that Fisher, 
Haldane, Wright and other “classical” population geneticists had a naïve atomistic 
view of the genome, but rather than the simplifying assumptions that they 
adopted, with models involved one or two gene loci and no interaction with other 
genes, were useful but limited to represent the behaviour of genotypes composed 
of a high number of interacting genes  
A full review of the works, concepts and experiments of the “newer” population 
genetics is not possible here I will then briefly focus on those most pertinent to 
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the present subject The concepts of genetic background and genetic 
environment refer to the genes with which a specific gene will interact; the genetic 
background usually refers to the individual level, the individual genotype in which 
the gene is integrated while the genetic environment refer to the gene pool of the 
population The action of a gene and its fitness is not an absolute value but a 
variable that depends on genetic background and environment Here again, the 
criticism addressed to classical population genetics is on the value of simplified 
models, as illustrated by this recognition from Bruce Wallace and collaborators 
 
“Wright (1931), it is true, has pointed out that the behaviour of a gene in a 
population depends upon its reaction-and the reactions of every one of its alleles-
to the entire array of genotypes in which it is found. Since a complete analysis of 
a complex a system is an obviously impossible experimental or mathematical 
task, simplifying assumptions must be introduced into the calculations. Until 
critical experiments have been made, it should be remembered that these 
mathematical models are working hypotheses awaiting confirmation.” (Wallace 
et al., 1953, p. 273) 
 
The concept of coadapted gene complexes, genotype or gene pool proceeds 
from this differential effect and fitness of genetic interactions This is for example 
illustrated by the adaptive interpretation of chromosomal inversions in Drosophila 
Chromosomal inversions, if they are heterozygous, prevent the recombination of 
genetic material between the chromosome on which it is found and its 
homologous Dobzhansky, among others, has observed experimental and 
natural populations of Drosophila pseudoobscura with chromosomal inversions 
(e.g. Dobzhansky, 1950) Heterozygotes offspring for some inversions from 
parents of the same populations had a superior fitness than homozygotes, while 
heterozygotes from parents of different populations had a lower fitness than 
homozygotes Dobzhansky hypothesized that the chromosomal segments 
corresponding to the inversions were coadapted gene complexes and that 
inversions allowed their conservation by preventing recombination  
The controversial nature of the distinction between atomistic and integrative 
genetics, was amplified, if not created by Ernst Mayr, especially with his 1959 
article entitled “Where are we?”(Mayr, 1959) Mayr had been introduced to the 
concepts of to the “newer” population genetics by Bruce Wallace  and James C. 
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King in 1950 (Provine, 2004), and had found a resonance between them and his 
naturalist’s preoccupations, as noted earlier Mayr, in 1959 and later, presented 
the matter not as a problem regarding the powers and limits of populations 
genetic models, but as the opposition of two conceptions of genetics and of the 
genotype 
 
“For the last 60 years, but one could also say all the way back to Darwin (1859 
p. 11, 146; 1868 II:319-335), two traditions of viewing the genotype can be 
distinguished. According to the atomistic ("beanbag") view each gene is 
independent not only in its actions, but also in the effects of selection on it. 
Evolutionary stasis of the phenotype, for instance, is explained by the stabilizing 
selection acting on individual genes. According to the holistic (integrative) view, 
genes perform as teams and large numbers of other genes form the "genetic 
milieu" (Chetverikov, 1926) of any given gene.” (Mayr, 1982a) 
 
Because of these different formulations of the problem, the beanbagintegrative 
controversy is less clearly defined than the classicalbalance controversy, and 
the latter can arguably be considered as one aspect of the former  
 
Holism, species and levels of selection 
 
 A last aspect of the holism of the late Modern Synthesis is worth 
mentioning, although it is a complex issue that cannot be covered in detail here 
“naïve group selectionism” (Wilson and Wilson, 2007) It can be defined as the 
belief in adaptations at levels other than the individual organism, especially 
populations and species, without a clear understanding or formulation of the 
evolutionary mechanisms necessary to produce these high-level adaptations110 
Naïve group selectionism was the most obvious in the works of some ecologists, 
as illustrated by this statement from the 1949 textbook Principles of animal 
ecology 
 
“The probability of survival of individual living things, or of populations, increases 
with the degree with which they harmoniously adjust themselves to each other 
                                                 
110 This naïve group selectionism is to be distinguished from later developments of multilevel selection 
theory   
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and to their environment. This principle is basic to the concept of the balance of 
nature, orders the subject matter of ecology and evolution, underlies organismic 
and developmental biology, and is the foundation for all sociology.” (Allee et al., 
1949, p. 729) 
 
 Some of the claims and formulations of proponents of the holistic and balance 
views of genetics, especially of Dobzhansky and Mayr, also prompt the question 
of their adhesion to the idea of population-level or species-level selection and 
adaptation An illustration of these group selectionist overtones can be found in 
Dobzhansky’s and Mayr’s conception of isolating mechanisms as adaptations at 
the level of the species: 
 
“[i]solating mechanisms appear to be ad hoc contrivances that prevent the 
exchange of genes between nascent species, rather than incongruities 
originating in accidental changes in the gene functions” (Dobzhansky, 1951, p. 
208). 
 
“The reproductive isolation of a species is a protective device against the 
breaking up of its well-integrated, co-adapted gene system. Through organizing 
diversity into species, a system has been created that permits genetic 
diversification and the accumulation of favorable genes and gene combinations 
without any danger of destruction of the basic gene complex.” (Mayr 1963, p.423) 
 
Mallet (2010) has argued that the example of isolating mechanisms and others 
demonstrate that Mayr and Dozhansky endorsed a form of naïve group 
selectionism While there are definitely  ambiguities in the formulations used by 
these authors, Mallet is in some cases too prompt to jump from overtones to 
active endorsement of group selectionism For example, Mallet  speaks of 
“Dobzhansky's group selectionist reinforcement hypothesis” Now, 
reinforcement, as formulated by Dobzhansky (1937) only involves individual 
selection It was viewed as the second stage of allopatric or peripatric speciation 
(e.g. Lewontin, 1974, p. 161), when two populations initially isolated come into 
contact again there can be a reinforcement of incipient isolating mechanisms 
between the two populations if the hybrids produced have a lower fitness than 
the non-hybrids. Reinforcement itself cannot warrant Dobzhansky’s adhesion to 
group selectionism  
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Mayr’s genetic revolutions  
 
 Here is where this investigation on controversies within the Modern 
Synthesis rejoins the problem of novelty most closely the theory of genetic 
revolutions, developed by Ernst Mayr as the counterpart to genetic homeostasis, 
to provide a new mechanism for speciation but also for rapid production of 
evolutionary novelties This theoretical development can be seen as the 
combination of his peripatric theory of speciation with the concepts of the “newer 
genetics” described earlier Provine has already stressed that genetic revolutions 
constituted a change in Mayr’s conception of speciation and isolating 
mechanisms (Provine, 2004) However, he has not analyzed Mayr’s proposal of 
genetic revolutions as a mechanism for the production of evolutionary novelties 
I will briefly explain how genetic revolutions constitute a change in Mayr’s thinking 
and then focus on their relation to the origin of novelty  
 
Relying on his observations of island birds in New Guinea and on the work of 
Sewall Wright (1931, 1932), Mayr developed in Systematics and the origin of 
species a theory of speciation by rapid evolution of small peripherally isolated 
populations. Mayr noted the repeated observation of the phenotypic difference 
between large mainland populations of a species and peripherally isolated 
populations of the same species, the latter often being more phenotypically 
uniform. Mayr argued that it was probably due to the “founder principle”: the 
reduced genetic variability, due to their small number, of the first individuals who 
founded these isolated populations. Additionally, he relied on Wright’s genetic 
models showing higher rates of gene loss and drift, and generally more rapid 
evolution, in small populations. Mayr later called this theory “peripatric speciation” 
(Mayr, 1954). 
 
Genetic homeostasis and genetic revolutions 
 
 The concept of genetic revolution was introduced in a 1954 article entitled 
“Change of genetic environment and evolution”. Mayr begins the article by 
referring to the problem of the difference between two types of variation within 
species ecotypic variations, between contiguous populations forming an 
interbreeding series, and what he called, after Schindewolf, “typostrophic” 
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variations that characterise some peripherally isolated populations On the one 
hand, ecotypic variations are clinal, that is, they merge into one another, they are 
dependent on local environments and are of a limited range. Following 
Goldschmidt (1940), Mayr argues that this type of variation cannot lead to 
speciation. On the other hand, the type of variation sometimes found in peripheral 
isolates is “so different from that of contiguous populations that we may be 
dealing with something entirely new” (Mayr, 1954, p. 160). Thus, Mayr insists, 
more so than in 1942, on the morphological and ecological novelties found in 
peripheral populations and provocatively reuses a saltationist term to describe 
the phenomenon. 
 
Contrary to his work of 1942, where he insisted on the role of drift and on the 
founder principle to explain speciation and phenotypic difference of peripheral 
isolates, Mayr now argues that neither drift nor environmental differences are 
sufficient to explain the phenomenon (Mayr 1954, p. 158). Instead Mayr proposes 
the mechanism of genetic revolutions as the main explanatory factor  This 
mechanism is grounded on concepts from the new school of populations genetics 
recently assimilated by Mayr and described earlier, especially coadapted genetic 
system, genetic environment and genetic homeostasis The limited nature of 
ecotypic variations between populations that interbreed is explained by the 
presence of gene flow between these populations which prevent the rapid spread 
of favourable mutations, and by genetic homeostasis explained by the 
interactions and coadaptation of genes The problem of variation is thus 
formulated in terms of the conditions that can allow a breakage or loosening of 
the genetic homeostasis Why then are peripherally isolated founder populations 
providing these conditions? The key idea is that these conditions lead to a change 
in genetic environment for any of the genes of the founders The founders switch 
from a large mainland population to a small number of individuals greatly reduces 
genetic variability, and this will, according to Mayr, increase homozygosity and 
expose alleles to negative selection Moreover, because, according to the holistic 
view, each gene’s action and fitness value depends on the rest of the genes in 
the genotype and the gene pool, the overall change in genetic composition of the 
population will instantly change the action and fitness value of each gene  
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As noted by Provine (2004), the model provided by Mayr does not come with a 
lot of details and quantification in terms of population genetics Mayr insisted that 
the genetic revolution was a theory of rapid evolutionary change under natural 
selection and was irritated when it was described as a theory of genetic drift111 It 
seems hard to deny however that Mayr gives an important role to drift in his 
theory For example, Mayr talks of the selective pressures of the new 
environments of the isolates as playing a role, but then states 
 
“The amazingly great differences among populations of adjacent islands, eg 
Tanysiptera carolinae (Numfor) and riedelii (Biak), indicate that the accidents of 
gene assortment during the “genetic revolution” of the isolated population may 
be more important than the “directive” force of the similar environment of adjacent 
islands” (Mayr, 1954, p 170) 
 
Genetic revolutions and evolutionary novelties 
 
 The dominant view regarding phenotypic evolution during the Modern 
Synthesis era, expressed for example by George Gaylord Simpson112, was that it 
occurred mostly during phyletic evolution and not during speciation. With genetic 
revolutions, Mayr goes against this view by joining speciation and phenotypic 
novelty  
 
“It seems to me that many puzzling phenomena, particularly those that concern 
paleontlogists, are elucidated by a consideration of these [peripherally isolated] 
populations This concerns primarily the phenomena of unequal (and particularly very 
rapid) evolutionary rates, breaks in evolutionary sequences and apparent saltations, and 
finally the origin of new ‘types’” (Mayr, 1954, p 175) 
 
Contrary to macromutations, systemic mutations or “mutational avalanches”, 
which would not be able to spread in a large population with gene-flow and 
                                                 
111 In a 1961 letter to Phil Sheppard, Mayr wrote: “Frankly, I am a little tired of having my 1954 paper 
cited as ‘a theory of genetic drift’ when the major objective of the paper was to prove that the genetic 
changes in peripherally isolated populations were due to selection and not due to drift”. Mayr to P. M. 
Sheppard, July 19, 1961, Ernst Mayr Papers HUGFP 74.7, box 8, folder 781, General Correspondence, 
1952–1987, HU. Cited by Milam (2010) 
112 See chapter 2, II.1) 
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contrary to ecological changes affecting selection pressures, which are too slow 
to explain “quantum evolution”, Mayr states that 
 
“The genetic reorganization of peripherally isolated populations, on the other 
hand, does permit evolutionary changes that are many times more rapid than the 
changes within populations that are part of a continuous system. Here then is a 
mechanism that would permit the rapid emergence of macroevolutionary 
novelties without any conflict with the observed facts of genetics" (Mayr, 1954, 
p176, emphasis added) 
 
The importance of genetic revolutions 
 
How much can be deduced about Mayr’s thinking and about tensions 
during the Modern Synthesis era from the theory of genetic revolutions depends 
on the status of this theory in Mayr’s views on evolution and on its impact If 
genetic revolutions were only one speculative idea among many others without 
specific importance for Mayr and without impact on the scientific community, then 
grounding a historical argument on it would not be warranted There is enough 
evidence to the contrary Mayr recognized the speculative nature of the theory 
(1982), but he retrospectively considered it to be his most important scientific 
contribution in several places (e g Haffer, 2007; Provine, 2005) For example, 
Provine (2005) writes “When, over the course of a 2-day interview, I asked Mayr 
to tell me his most important contribution to evolutionary biology during his life, 
he replied without hesitation, ‘genetic revolutions’” Thus, considering the multiple 
works in which Mayr developed his theory of genetic revolutions and the high 
value he attributed to this theory, it is perplexing that contemporary authors cite 
him as the most, or one of the most, prominent representative of the view of 
evolution as a gradual shift in allele frequencies113 
                                                 
113 Soltfuz (2017) directly attributes to Mayr, Dobzhansky and Simpson the definition of evolution as 
“shifting gene frequencies” It is true that the expression originated in Dobzhansy’s Genetics and the 
origin of species (Dobzhansky, 1937).  But it is especially controversial to attribute this view to Mayr 
considering his repeated efforts to counter the population genetic-centred view of the Modern 
Synthesis and his attachment to his own theory of genetic revolutions that is far from classical 
population genetic models and that was later criticised by numerous populations geneticists (eg Barton 
and Charlesworth, 1984) Here is one citation of Mayr stating his position on shifting gene frequencies 
“The reductionist definition that evolution is a change of gene frequencies is meaningless. Evolution is a 
matter of phenotypes, structures, developmental pathways, functions, populations, and inter- acting 
ecosystems. The non-reductionist tradition in evolutionary biology is old, beginning with Darwin's 
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And the theory, although initially without notable effects, had an important, if 
belated, influence on palaeontologists (Eldredge, 1971; Eldredge and Gould, 
1972) and spurred population genetic studies of speciation (Charlesworth and 
Rouhani, 1988; H L Carson and Templeton, 1984; Lande, 1980; N H Barton and 
Charlesworth, 1984)  Although Mayr attempted to clearly distinguish genetic 
revolutions from a theory of rapid evolutionary change via genetic drift in the 1954 
article and later, the fact that many population geneticists interpreted it as a theory 
of genetic drift (eg Barton and Charlesworth, 1984; Crow, 2009) says more 
about the lack of precise genetic content of the theory as formulated by Mayr than 
about the distractedness of these geneticists. Thus, Mayr’s genetic revolutions 
should not be considered as a mature theory, but as an influential speculation 
that opened up new lines of research, maybe similar, in smaller proportions, to 
the way Goldschmidt’s systemic mutations spurred controversy and progress 
during the earlier phase of the Modern Synthesis (Dietrich, 1995)  
 
Genetic revolutions, drift and saltations 
 
There is actually a proximity between Mayr’s genetic revolutions and 
Goldschmidt’s systemic mutations. What distinguished the former from the latter 
is not their relation to the possibility of rapid phenotypic changes at the individual 
level, but rather, according to Mayr, his own insistence that this type of phenotypic 
change could not be understood without integrating population dynamics Mayr 
vigorously insisted that genetic revolutions were a population process One of the 
many uses of his distinction between typological and population thinking (cf 
Witteveen, 2016) may have been to conjure this dangerous closeness of genetic 
revolutions to saltationist theories Mayr’s proximity to Goldschmidt is particularly 
striking since they both insisted on their rejection of the classical conception of 
genetics, characterized by the former as “beanbag genetics” (eg Mayr, 1982a) 
and by the latter as the “string of beads” conception of genetics (eg Goldschmidt, 
1940, p. 247), and they both defended a holistic view of the genome Although 
                                                 
repeated references to the "mysterious laws of correlation," continuing with Chetverikov's concept of 
the genetic milieu, with Lerner's of genetic homeostasis, and my own of the cohesion of the phenotype. 
“ (Mayr, 1982a) 
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admittedly, Goldschmidt’s views became less holistic in the later phase of his 
career since he moved away from systemic mutations and focused more and 
more on homeotic mutations. Moreover, the ultimate barrier supposedly setting 
Mayr apart from saltationists and condemning Goldschmidt, namely population 
thinking or lack thereof, is weakened if we consider Goldschimdt’s late dialogue 
with Sewall Wright and his attempt at integrating his theory with population 
genetics (Davis et al., 2009; Dietrich, 1995)  
 
The tension between preadaptation and genetic revolutions 
 
 The case of Mayr is particularly interesting because there is a potential 
tension between Mayr’s theory of genetic revolutions and his functional shift 
account of the origin of morphological novelties This tension primarily lies 
between the gradual nature of the origin of novelties through functional shifts and 
the possibly abrupt nature of phenotypic change during genetic revolutions. Mayr 
insists that his theory of genetic revolutions is still gradualist because it is a 
population process. However, this type of gradualism (sudden phenotypic change 
at the level of individuals but gradual change at the population level), is different 
from the one that is pictured in Mayr’s functional shift account of novelty. In the 
latter, sudden change at the individual level is not strictly excluded but is deemed 
less probable than incremental change. The second possible tension is relative 
to the role attributed to selection in the two processes. On the one hand, the 
theory of preadaptation if based on the action of successive or simultaneous 
selection pressures without a role for genetic drift, on the other hand genetic 
revolutions have been interpreted as involving drift in an important way This 
second tension is however more ambiguous since Mayr himself insisted, without 
much justification, that genetic revolutions did not involve drift. 
 
Mayr recognises the difference between his theory of genetic revolutions and the 
theory of functional shift in terms of explaining the origin of novelties Thus, his 
position regarding the origin of novelties appears pluralist 
 
“It is evident that too great a stability of the phenotype would be a handicap in a 
newly arising situation where there is a premium on the development of a new 
structure. A peripherally isolated population, or any other population in which the 
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stabilizing mechanisms are temporarily weakened, may occasionally be in an 
especially favorable situation with respect to the emergence of evolutionary 
novelties. However, in view of the change of function and other mechanisms 
discussed above, the origin of evolutionary novelties is by no means limited to 
such peripherally isolated populations.” (Mayr, 1960, p 377, emphasis added) 
 
However, at the same time Mayr tries to show how the two phenomena can act 
together 
 
“A shift in function exposes the fully formed "preadapted" structure to the new 
selection pressure. This, in most cases, explains how an incipient structure could 
be favored by natural selection before reaching a size and elaboration where it 
would be advantageous in a new role. Mutation pressure, as such, plays a 
negligible role in the emergence of evolutionary novelties, except possibly on the 
cellular level. Yet the structure of the gene complex is important: too great a 
genetic and developmental homeostasis will result in too stabilized a phenotype 
and will tend to prevent a response to new selection pressures. Any population 
phenomenon that would tend to counteract excessive stability of the phenotype 
may favor evolutionary changes.” (Mayr, 1960, p 378) 
 
The ambiguous relation between genetic revolutions and functional shift again 
shows the speculative nature of Mayr’s theories, especially of the former This 
partly explains the virulence of the reaction of some population geneticists 
against genetic revolutions  
 
A hardening of the Synthesis? 
 
The idea of a hardening of the synthesis has been mostly defended by 
Gould and by other historians to a lesser extent The hardened view of the 
Synthesis has been adopted by a large part of the literature promoting an 
Extended Synthesis or the framework of evo-devo against the Modern Synthesis 
framework. Gould grounds his interpretation on evolutions in some of the works 
of Ernst Mayr, George Gaylord Simpson and Theodosius Dobzhansky, and on 
an analysis of the Darwin 1959 centennial conferences in Chicago and 
Philadelphia (eg Gould, 2002, pp. 518–585). For the evolution of Dobzhansky’s 
ideas, Gould compares the first and last editions of Genetics and the origin of 
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species (1937, 1951); for Simpson, he compares Tempo and mode in evolution 
(1944) to The major features of evolution (1953); for Mayr, Gould compares 
Systematics and the origin of species (1942) to Animal species and evolution 
(1963).  
 
Gould’s main idea is that, at least for these three authors, there was a transition 
from the recognition of selection as one factor of evolution among others, to the 
dogma of an all-encompassing power of selection to shape evolution Gould also 
argued that the hardening expanded to the other two “legs” of Darwin’s tripod, 
namely the question of the level(s) at which selection operates  and the question 
of the relation between microevolution and macroevolution Regarding the latter, 
Gould notes a stronger dogmatism concerning the power of microevolutionary 
proecces to explain macroevolution Regarding the levels of selection, Gould 
identifies a move during the 1960s towards a dogmatic defense of organismic 
selection as the only valid level, although this move was not led by Dobzhansky, 
Simpson or Mayr.  
 
Several reasons for the hardening of the Synthesis have been offered by its 
proponents. Gould considers first the empirical reason: the transition towards a 
stronger defence of adaptationism was grounded on the accumulation of 
empirical observations of natural selection in action. He recognises that the case 
of Dobzhansky gives support to this interpretation114, but argues that it cannot be 
a sufficient one or even the main one. Smocovitis offered a political reason: 
adaptationism coincided much more with the post-World War II values of 
progress and rationality than genetic drift, associated with stochasticity (cf. 
Smocovitis, 1992, p. 40). Gould favours a sociological interpretation based on the 
dynamics of scientific communities. The close proximity, geographical, 
institutional and affective, of Dobzhansky, Simpson and Mayr (the “New York 
Mafia” (Gould, 2002, p. 543)), all revolving around Columbia University, 
contributed to the convergence of their views. In addition, the hierarchical nature 
                                                 
114 In the first paper of his series Genetics of natural populations, Dobzhansky attributed inversion 
patterns in the third chromosome of Drosophila pseudoobscura to random fluctuations; he then 
discovered that these fluctuations followed regular and repeatable patterns. The bold title of paper XVII 
in the series gives a clear idea of Dobzhansky’s change of mind: “Proof of operation of natural selection 
in wild populations of Drosophila pseudoobscura” (Dobzhansky and Levene, 1948). 
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of their scientific community, where few lead and many follow, allowed for the 
spread and acceptance of these views. 
  
Gould’s hardening thesis, especially regarding George Gaylord Simpson, has 
already been analysed and criticised from a sociological point of view by Cain 
(2009). Interestingly, the explanation of the hardening of the Synthesis that Gould 
favours appears similar to Cain’s interpretation of Gould’s own criticism of 
Simpson Cain stresses the influence of social factors, especially of the building 
of the new paleobiological community, on Gould criticism of Simpson. He argues 
that as this new scientific community was forming in the 1970s, the critique of 
Simpson evolved into a “ritual patricide” that played a role in tying the community 
together and asserting its identity115 It is not my purpose here to venture into an 
overall reassessment of Gould’s arguments, mostly because I have not 
approached here the breadth of sources and experiences on which Gould relies, 
and secondly because it would move us away from the subject of the chapter 
However, it may be fruitful to take stock of the examination of the debates 
between geneticists and naturalists, atomists and holists and of Mayr’s theory of 
genetic revolution, and to confront some of Gould’s claims in the light of it 
To clarify the argumentative line that I would like to pursue against Gould’s idea 
of a hardening of Mayr’s position, I will first distinguish it from other possible lines 
of criticism that I will not engage in. Firstly, one could extend Cain’s sociological 
interpretation to Gould’s analysis of Mayr’s evolution towards adaptationism. 
Mayr was not a paleontologist like Gould and Simpson, so the idea of a ritual 
patricide does not exactly apply to his case; he was however one of the dominant 
figures of the Modern Synthesis, from which Gould was trying to break, thus what 
Cain argued about Simpson could be applied to Mayr to a lesser extent. 
Secondly, Gould’s view of a hardening of Mayr’s adaptationism between the two 
books could be disputed by questioning the interpretation that Gould gives of 
some citations of Mayr116, or by confronting different citations to the ones that he 
                                                 
115 Cain then generalizes his analysis: “In the 1970s, such narratives helped rebels in paleobiology and 
macroevolution identify what they were breaking away from, just as it later did for the ‘‘evo-devo’’ 
programme and ‘‘four-dimensional’’ biology. Giving the idea of synthesis a good kicking frequently 
operated as a ritualised form of departure” (Cain, 2009b) Cain’s analysis also finds a parallel in Michael 
Dietrich’s (1995) analysis of the constructive role or Richard Goldschmidt on the Modern Synthesis   
116 For example, Gould uses as an illustration of Mayr’s adaptationist overconfidence his claim that the 
search for homologous genes between distant taxa and even between closely related species, is vain 
(Mayr, 1963, p. 609). Gould writes “In modern hindsight, this claim provides a particularly compelling 
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chooses117 It is nevertheless hard to contest Gould’s overall diagnosis of Mayr’s 
hardened adaptationism.  
 
The point I would like to stress is different from the two previously mentioned and 
it still stands even if we admit the greater adaptationism of the later Mayr. Despite 
the pervasive adaptationism, many new developments in Mayr’s thinking 
contribute to build a broader, more pluralistic and maybe more contradictory 
theoretical picture than the one presented by the earlier Mayr. The holistic view 
of the genome, the theory of genetic revolutions, the view of species as natural 
entities (with possibly adaptations at the level of the species), the functional 
theory of the origin of novelty, among others, contribute to a widening rather than 
a hardening. Interestingly Gould indirectly recognizes this widening, or even the 
potential incoherence of Mayr’s theories, but he does not draw conclusions from 
this fact. I will give three examples of this pattern. The first involves peripatric 
speciation and genetic revolutions, the second involves the origin of evolutionary 
novelties and the third involves selection at the level of the species.  
 
                                                 
example of how hardened adaptationism can suppress interesting questions—for such homologues 
have now been found in abundance. Their discovery ranks as one of the most important events in 
modern evolutionary science” (Gould, 2002, p. 539) But what Gould does not say is that this belief was 
shared beyond the core circle of the Modern Synthesis It was even shared by Gavin de Beer, one of the 
most prominent proponents of a synthesis between evolution and development, as late as 1971 "It is 
now clear that the pride with which it was assumed that the inheritance of homologous structures from 
a common ancestor explained homology was misplaced; for such inheritance cannot be ascribed to 
identity of genes. The attempt to find 'homologous' genes, except in closely related species, has been 
given up as hopeless. What mechanism can it be that results in the production of homologous organs, 
the same `patterns,' in spite of their not being controlled by the same genes? I asked that question in 
1938, and it has not yet been answered” (De Beer, 1971, p. 16) 
117 For example, Gould stresses that in Systematics and the origin of species, Mayr uses the category of 
“nonadaptation” Gould writes: “within this important category of nonadaptation, Mayr includes many 
prominent phenomena that he would later ascribe to selection.” (Gould, 2002, p. 534). However, by 
“nonadaptation”, Mayr essentially refers to characters that he considers as neutral and not 
maladaptive, such as “combinations of color patterns, spots, and bands, as well as extra bristles and 
wing veins” (Mayr, 1942, p. 86) Mayr later writes in Animal species and evolution “If a given subspecies 
of ladybird beetles has more spots on the elytra than another subspecies, it does not necessarily mean 
that the extra spots are essential for survival in the range of that subspecies. It merely means that the 
genotype that has evolved in this area as the result of selection develops additional spots on the elytra 
When studying geographic variation in the voice of birds, in the plume of birds of paradise, or in the 
color patterns of parrot and pigeons, one must never ignore the possibility that some of the phenotype 
is merely the incidental by-product Yet close analysis often reveals unsuspected adaptive qualities even 
in minute details of the phenotype” (1963, p. 311). Claiming, as Gould does, that Mayr now ascribes to 
selection what he then considered as nonadaptive is a shortcut as Mayr is rather postulating a 
correlation between these traits that he still construes as nonadaptive and other traits that are 
adaptive.  
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Regarding the first example, genetic revolutions, here is the analysis given by 
Gould 
 
“In the mid 1990's, Mayr himself (in lift, and personal communications […]), while 
continuing to explicate and defend his favored themes of 1963, denies any 
substantial change between the volumes of 1942 and 1963 on questions of 
adaptation. This difference between current memory and textual record, 
previously discussed as a general principle (see p. 521), provides a fascinating 
illustration of how scholars can slowly and unconsciously imbibe a shifting 
professional consensus, thus imposing a subjective and personal impression of 
stability upon a virtual transmogrification. I find this unconscious alteration all the 
more ironic in Mayr's case because his first category of major change in ideas 
about speciation—his intellectual move from the dumbbell to the peripatric 
model—so strongly encourages a widened space for nonadaptationist themes 
(for many evolutionists have interpreted his notions of genetic revolutions and 
founder effects in small peripheral isolates as a powerful antidote to the classical 
panadaptationist model of Fisherian panmixia in large populations). Yet Mayr 
never translated the implications of these changes in his own ideas about 
speciation into doubts about adaptation in his chapters on variation and change 
within populations.” (Gould, 2002, pp. 536–537, emphasis added) 
 
In this citation, it seems that Gould is himself giving ammunition to his potential 
contradictors Indeed, Gould is saying on the one hand that Mayr did not 
recognise the hardening of his adaptationism between 1942 and 1963, and on 
the other hand he is stressing that the theory of genetic revolutions, present in 
1963 but not in 1942, allows for clearly nonadaptive elaborations.  If we follow 
Gould’s advice and do not rely on Mayr’s late interpretation of his own work but 
rather focus on the details of the texts, then we are forced to recognise that a 
potential conflict exists between different parts of Mayr’s book of 1963 This 
motivates a questioning of Gould’s interpretation why give priority, or even 
exclusive attention, to the increased adaptationism while other new and 
potentially contradictory themes arise in Mayr’s version of the late Modern 
Synthesis?  
 
The second example is Mayr’s theory of the origin of evolutionary novelties 
through functional shift Here is Gould’s analysis  
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“Major subjects, the origin of evolutionary novelty for example, now reside 
exclusively within an adaptationist framework by purely functional definition: "We 
may begin by defining evolutionary novelty as any newly acquired structure or 
property that permits the performance of a new function, which, in turn, will open 
a new adaptive zone" (p. 602).” (Gould, 2002, p. 539)  
 
Gould is making a case for Mayr’s pervasive adaptationism, thus he cannot be 
criticized for enumerating the different illustrations of this framework The problem 
is that by writing that the origin of novelty “now reside[s]” within the adaptationist 
framework, Gould suggest that between 1942 and 1963, Mayr moved from a non-
adaptationist or non-strictly adaptationist, theory of novelty, to an adaptationist 
one Now it is more accurate to say that Mayr did not develop a theory of the 
origin of novelties in his book of 1942118 The theory summarized in Animal 
Species and evolution, and elaborated elsewhere Mayr (1960) and others119, is 
best seen as an addition to Mayr’s views on evolution, thus widening his scope.  
 
The third example is the group selectionist overtones present in Mayr’ 
development of population thinking and of his concept of species. The third part 
of Gould’s thesis of the hardening of the Synthesis is its increasing dogmatism 
on the question of the levels of selections, with the insistence on the individual 
organism being the sole valid level. Gould recognizes that this part of the 
hardening comes relatively later and not from the figures of the Synthesis who 
are his main focus (Dobzhansky, Simpson and Mayr) but especially from George 
Williams (1966) Gould even acknowledges that Mayr’s view of levels of selection 
does not fit this hardened picture: 
                                                 
118 In Systematics and the origin of species, Mayr mentions the possible formation of aberrant 
characters in small founder populations. He attributes this phenomenon to a founder effect and an 
increased rate of evolution in small populations. The scope of aberrant characters is not exactly 
determined. It refers mostly to extreme forms of existing characters (such as a very elongated beak in a 
bird) rather than to novel characters. Regarding the phenomena of macroevolution, Mayr only offers a 
“very cursory survey” (Mayr, 1942, p. 291) as it is not the main subject of the book. In the conclusion of 
this survey, he clearly states his conviction of an extrapolation of the principles of microevolution to 
macroevolution: “In conclusion we may say that all the available evidence indicates that the origin of 
the higher categories is a process which is nothing but an extrapolation of speciation. All the processes 
and phenomena of macroevolution and of the origin of the higher categories can be traced back to 
intraspecific variation, even though the first steps of such processes are usually very minute.” (Mayr, 
1942, p. 298) 
119 See chapters 1 and 2 
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“In rereading Mayr's 1963 book with the hindsight of thirty years, however, I was 
struck by the number of passages and arguments that either speak loosely about 
explicit advantages to groups and populations (rather than fortuitous beneficial 
effects arising as side consequences of selection on organisms), or seem to state 
an explicit claim for selection at the population level.” (Gould, 2002, p. 546) 
 
However, Gould does not draw consequences against his hardening thesis from 
this fact. Gould’s indifference seems all the more unjustified that these group 
selectionist ideas blossomed in the later phase of the Modern Synthesis (Borrello, 
2009; Mallet, 2010). Gould could have argued that this trend fits well into his 
narrative of increased adaptationism but he should have admitted simultaneously 
that it downplays his general thesis of a hardening of the Synthesis on all fronts  
 
In conclusion, the many theories developed by Mayr and others between the 
1940s and the 1960s and collected in Animal species and evolution form a more 
pluralistic picture than expected, a picture that might not be fully coherent, and 
that definitely cannot be fully reduced to the supposedly polished and hardened 
core of adaptationism. The controversies of the late Modern Synthesis 
(classical/balance, beanbag/interaction, genetic revolutions) raise the question of 
the place of population genetics in the Modern Synthesis (e.g. Gould, 2002; 
Lewontin, 1980). Gould insists on the ignorance of Modern Synthesis architects 
on this matter and on their trust in population geneticists120 He further argues that 
this attitude demonstrates the existence of a shared culture among evolutionists 
of the time and that it is conducive to a phase of normal science, accumulating 
illustrations of the accepted principles but leaving aside ambiguous cases and 
puzzles (Gould, 2002, p. 520). According to Gould, this contributed to a state of 
orthodoxy in the 50s and 60s. The controversies underlined in this section invite 
to at least nuance Gould’s judgment there was no consensus in population 
                                                 
120 For example: “But if Dobzhansky could integrate the Mendelian experimental world with natural 
history, what about the supposed centerpiece of mathematical population genetics? Here, by his own 
repeated, almost gleeful, admission, Dobzhansky remained a near dunce. He did not study, nor could he 
even understand, the details of this literature. Of his long and fruitful collaboration with Sewall Wright, 
Dobzhansky simply said that he had followed the principle of "father knows best"—that is, he bypassed 
Wright's mathematical manipulations and accepted his English explanations on faith. In fact, of all the 
great second-phase synthesists only G. G. Simpson possessed sufficient mathematical background to 
read and understand these papers.” (Gould, 2002, p. 520) 
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genetics and there was no blind following of population geneticists by other 
biologists, as clearly illustrated by Mayr121 
 
Mayr’s theory of genetic revolutions particularly stands out in the context of a 
history of research on novelty. Although it is a speculative effort, it is grounded 
on genetic and developmental concepts (genetic environment, developmental 
canalisation, genetic homeostasis etc.) that were widely studied, albeit 
controversial, in the late Modern Synthesis. It is conceived as a mechanism for 
the sudden “typostrophic” changes stressed by palaeontologists such as 
Schindewolf.  It potentially clashes with other contemporary theoretical 
developments on the problem of novelty, even with Mayr’s own other theories. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The confusion regarding the position of Modern Synthesis participants on 
novelty partly stems from a neglect of the contrast class, that is, of the theories 
they were opposed to and tried to refute (saltationism, lamarckism, orthogenesis) 
As noted by William Provine, The Modern Synthesis was a movement of 
constriction,  ‘‘a vast cut-down of variables considered important in the 
evolutionary process’’ (Provine, 1992, p. 176). The context of the constriction 
should be kept in mind and assuming that this constriction applies to any possible 
variable that is not selection is running a strong risk of anachronism. Rensch and 
Mayr can be taken as examples here The position of the Modern Synthesis on 
novelty is often summarised by opponents in the terms of the extrapolation thesis 
the factors of microevolution (natural selection, mutation, migration and drift) are 
sufficient to explain macroevolution Applied more precisely to novelty, it means 
that new characters appear through the accumulation of microevolutionary 
events (eg Amundson, 2005; Bonner, 1982, pp. 279–280; Stoltzfus, 2017) 
Indeed, in Evolution above the species level, Rensch defends the thesis that 
                                                 
121 The question of the lack of mastery of theoretical population genetics during the Modern Synthesis 
era can be related to the problem of “epistemic dependence” (Hardwig, 1985). This is of course no 
specific to research in evolutionary biology during the Modern Synthesis era and has arguably become 
more pervasive with the increase in specialisation and interdisciplinary in science over the last few 
decades.  
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natural selection and mutations are sufficient to explain macroevolution including 
the emergence of novelties However, when one looks more closely at Rensch’s 
work as it was done in this chapter, it becomes clear that Rensch develops many 
hypotheses regarding the origin of novelties  material compensation, the action 
of hormones, heterochronies etc These theories are all formulated at levels of 
organisation above the genes Thus, it would not be accurate to summarise 
Rensch’s view of novelty as the action of natural selection on mutations When 
Rensch asserts that natural selection and mutations are sufficient to explain 
macroevolutionary phenomena, what he rejects as unnecessary are not 
developmental processes but orthogenesis as an internal directional force This 
judgment can be applied to several approaches to novelty covered in this chapter 
and the last, to Stebbins’s approach to angiosperm novelties and well as to the 
work of Walter Bock or some of Ernst Mayr’s.  
 
Overall, the materials presented in this chapter and in the previous one 
undermine the three dominant theses about the Modern Synthesis described in 
the introduction that it was mainly focused on the gene level and was an 
adaptation of biological disciplines to population genetics that development was 
excluded from it that it evolved towards a hardened consensus  
 
Weighting against the first thesis are several research programs, such as the 
functional morphologists’ approach to novelty or some of Rensch’s research, 
which, despite not referring to the genetic level or population genetics – or not 
attributing a central place to them - are clearly either identifying with the Modern 
Synthesis or integrated in its canon Second is Mayr’s evolving but persisting 
distinction between geneticists and naturalists and his resistance against the 
geneticist reading of the Synthesis 
 
Against the thesis of the exclusion of development from the Synthesis, the work 
of Rensch on material compensation, of Stebbins on the developmental genetics 
of barley, and of Lerner on homeostasis, constitute not only an abstract 
recognition of the role of development in evolution but active empirical and 
theoretical research on this role by architects or influential figures in the 
Synthesis  
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Finally, the thesis of a hardening of the Synthesis is undermined by the vivacity 
of controversies between classical and new population genetics and by the 
multiplication of potentially conflicting concepts and theory, as illustrated by Mayr 
simultaneous defense of preadaptation and genetic revolutions  
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CHAPTER 4 – NOVELTY AND HOMOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The relation between homology and novelty has been addressed partially 
several times in previous chapters (see especially chapter 1, part I and chapter 
2, part III) and the importance of and understanding of homology for the study of 
novelty should have clearly emerged. The overview of research on the origin of 
angiosperm and of the flower in the Modern Synthesis era in particular has shown 
that an important part of the debate centred on which were the correct relations 
of homology between floral organs and organs in other plant taxa. On these 
different hypotheses of homology depend the formulations of scenarios of the 
origin of the flower. The development of cladistic methods, the reliance on 
molecular phylogenies, and advances in pant developmental genetics have had 
a significant impact on the problem of the origin of the flower.  
 
Another problem that has emerged relates to the establishment of homologies at 
different levels of organisation and to the determination of relationships between 
homologies at different levels of organisation. In the last chapter was evoked the 
difficulty to establish generalisations regarding the relationships between 
developmental processes and morphological characters, the same 
morphological characters in closely related species can develop from different 
tissues or be induced at different times. For example, homologous bones can 
originate from cartilage in one species and from a connective tissue in another 
species (De Beer, 1971; Rensch, 1959). At the genetic level, the discovery of 
developmental control genes shared across very distantly related species and 
involved in body axis, segmentation and other pattern formations in all of these 
species (McGinnis, Garber, Wirz, Kuroiwa, & Gehring, 1984; Quiring, Walldorf, 
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Kloter, & Gehring, 1994; see Gehring, 1998; Morange, 2000, 2011; Rheinberger 
& Müller-Wille, 2018, chap.8) has raised hopes for a general theory of the 
developmental genetic basis of homology. However, the importance of 
developmental system drift has cast doubt on the possibility for such a theory 
(Haag & True, 2001, 2018).  
 
An influential group of evo-devo researchers base their definition of novelty on 
the concept of homology The definition of morphological novelty as “a structure 
that is neither homologous to any structure in the ancestral species nor 
homonomous122 to any other structure of the same organism” (1991, p. 243), 
developed by Gerd Müller and Günter Wagner, has been widely adopted in the 
field This definition is grounded on a developmental concept of homology (Müller 
& Wagner, 1996; Wagner, 1989a, 1989b). This concept has been developed by 
Müller and Wagner in recent years (Müller, 2003; Wagner, 2007, 2014, 2015b); 
Wagner especially has offered it as a general solution to the problems of 
homology and novelty.  The establishment of relations of homology plays a 
central part in cladistics Now, Müller, Wagner and their followers on one side, 
and phylogenetic systematists on the other, do not share the same concept of 
homology   
 
Several problems emerge when weaving these different threads together: 
 
_ Although, as stated in chapter 1, phylogenetic systematics has an essential role 
for research on novelty both as a preamble and as a means of testing theories, 
the concept of non-homology as it is developed by Wagner and Müller is not used 
in systematics and potentially conflicts with the concepts of homology used in this 
discipline. 
_  Wagner’s recent theory of the developmental basis of homology and novelty 
relies on a wealth of animal examples at different levels of organisation. Wagner 
also applies his theories to the example of the origin of the flower. This poses the 
question of the generalisation of theories of novelty across taxonomic kingdoms. 
                                                 
122 Homonomous parts in the same organism, are parts that have similar forms and that constitute 
series, such as leg pairs in centipedes or fingers in primates. 
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It also raises the question of the contribution of developmental genetics to the 
problem of the origin of the flower.  
 
I will address these different questions in turn. Section I briefly introduces the 
history of the concept of homology and its recent development in systematics. 
Section II will focus on the relation between the phylogenetic concept of 
homology and the biological concept of homology and their respective relation to 
the concept of novelty. Section III will analyse further Wagner’s recent alteration 
of his biological concept of homology. In section IV, I will focus on the origin of 
the angiosperm flower and on questions raised by the application of Wagner’s 
theory to this example. In section V, I will reflect on this example to address the 
concept of type and the question of generalization in research on novelty.  
 
 
I – THE CONCEPT OF HOMOLOGY, ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS  
 
 
The concept of homology has its roots in the work of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 
and the French school of comparative anatomy. It was first clearly defined by 
Richard Owen in the context of species fixism and opposed to the concept of 
analogy in order to clarify the fluctuating terminology of the time (Amundson, 
2005; Panchen, 1994; Schmitt, 2004) He defined a “homologue” as “ same organ 
in different animals under every variety of form and function,” as opposed to an 
“analogue” which was “a part or organ in one animal which has the same function 
as another part or organ in a different animal” (Owen 1843, p. 379, 374; see also 
Owen 1848, p. 7). Owen relied on the unity of plan between all of vertebrates. He 
established a bone per bone correspondence between the skeletons of all groups 
of vertebrates and devised an abstract “vertebrate archetype” (Owen, 1849) 
whose parts could be related to the corresponding parts in any vertebrate. The 
concept of homology was refined by Owen to include three types: 
 
a)   “Special homology”: a relation of homology between corresponding parts 
in different species”. 
b) “General homology”: The homology between a part in a species and its 
corresponding part in the archetype.  
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c)  “Serial homology”: homology between corresponding parts inside an 
organism. 
These concepts were integrated into the theory of evolution. The archetype 
became the common ancestor and the first two types of homology were explained 
by a common genealogy. Edwin Ray Lankester, a disciple of Darwin, was the first 
to give a definition of homology in the context of the theory of evolution:  
 
“Without doubt the majority of evolutionists would agree that by asserting an 
organ A in an animal 𝝰 to be homologous with an organ B in an animal 𝝱, they 
mean that in some common ancestor 𝝴 the organs A and B were represented by 
an organ C, and that 𝝰 and 𝝱 have inherited their organs A and B from 𝝴” 
(Lankester 1870, p. 36). 
 
Lankester also invented the term “homoplasy”. It was distinguished from the 
concept of analogy in that analogy was a similarity of function regardless of the 
morphology of the organs, while homoplasy also included a morphological 
similarity.  
 
These evolutionary concepts of homology and homoplasy are still in use in 
contemporary evolutionary biology and systematics, and is also applied in 
molecular biology (Brigandt, 2003). The logic of concepts of homology at the 
genetic level is very similar to the one at the morphological an anatomical level 
(Freudenstein, 2005): 
 
_ Different alleles of the same genes can be considered different character states 
of the same character.  
_ Orthology can be equated to special homology. Orthologs are the same gene 
in different species inherited from a common ancestor. These genes can have 
undergone different changes.  
_ Paralogy can be equated to serial homology. The relation is established 
between genes that are the result of a gene duplication. 
 
The cladistic school in systematics, starting with the work of Willi Hennig (Hennig, 
1966) has vindicated the establishment of phylogenetic relationships, in the strict 
sense of relationships of common ancestry between taxa, as the main goal of 
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systematics, as opposed to evolutionary taxonomists who combined several 
goals (see chapter 2, part IV) (Hennig, 1975; Mayr, 1974), and pheneticists who 
vindicated overall similarity (Sneath & Sokal, 1973; Sokal, 1963)123 
Establishment of relationships of homology between characters is central to the 
cladistic method. Cladists use hypothesised patterns of identity and 
transformation series (Brower, 2014; Carine & Scotland, 1999; Grant & Kluge, 
2004) between homologous characters in different taxa to infer phylogenetic 
relationships between these taxa, represented in cladograms. For a given set of 
species (or higher taxa), they distinguish between the ancestral state of a 
character  (plesiomorphy) and the derived state of the character (apomorphy). 
Ancestral states shared by some taxa are symplesiomorphies and derived states 
shared by some taxa, and only those taxa, are synapomorphies.  
 
 
II – CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF HOMOLOGY AND THEIR ROLE IN RESEARCH 
ON NOVELTY 
 
 
Is a novelty identical to an apomorphy? 
 
 The definitions of evolutionary novelties from phylogenetic systematics 
usually equate novelty to any character used to build cladograms. For example: 
“the list of identified novelties is endless, virtually equalling the diagnostic 
characters of all successful higher taxa” (Cracraft, 1990, p.21). Other authors do 
not restrict novelties to attributes of higher taxa: “Evolutionary Novelty. An 
inherited change from a previously existing character state, the novelty is the 
transformational homolog of the preexisting character state” (Wiley & Lieberman, 
2011, p.13). “All homologs begin their existence as evolutionary novelties.” (Ibid., 
p.14). Novelties are identified with apomorphies, that is, derived characters 
(knowing of course that a derived character in one cladogram can be a primitive 
character in another cladogram). This view is expressed by phylogeneticists (e.g. 
Cracraft, 1989 ; Wiley & Liebermann, 2011), but also by evolutionary biologists 
(e.g. Futuyma, 1986) and by evolutionary developmental biologists (e.g. Arthur, 
                                                 
123 See Hull (1988) for a philosophical and historical account of the debates.  
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2000)124 This shared view on what novelties are would suggest that there is no 
problem regarding the definition of novelties and that the only remaining problems 
lay in the explanation of some cases of novelty. But this view is not shared among 
all biologists, and even if it was, it would leave open the question of how 
apomorphies are identified and individuated.  
 
Let us first assess the pertinence of the identification of novelty and apomorphy 
by reviewing the different possible relations between ancestral and derived 
characters in phylogenetics If we look at Mammalia for example, following Müller 
and Wagner (1991), six different forms of relation between primitive and derived 
characters can be found (Müller & Wagner, 1991, p. 238):  loss of trait; change 
of shape; differentiation of repeated elements; new elements; change of context; 
combination of plesiomorph elements. The same types of changes can be found 
at the level of molecular characters (genes used in molecular phylogenies), 
except for the absence of change of shape and with the addition of the process 
of acquisition of a foreign element through lateral gene transfer (Freudenstein, 
2005) 125 
 
It appears that the outcomes of these different processes do not satisfy to the 
same degree the idea of a qualitative difference essential to the intuitive concept 
of novelty 
 
_ A loss of trait is not a novel structure in itself. It can only bring a new trait 
indirectly if it is associated with a transformation of its structural environment. 
_The status of the change of shape may be more complex to assess. In this case, 
we are still left with the intuitive difference between quantitative and qualitative 
change. Some changes of shape may appear only quantitative, like the beaks of 
the Galapagos finches (Abzhanov, Protas, Grant, Grant, & Tabin, 2004), other 
cases may be more ambiguous. For example, pronotums126 of treehoppers in the 
family Membracidae have complex difference in shape not easily analysed in 
quantitative terms (Moczek, 2008).  
                                                 
124 “Novelties and apomorphies are essentially the same.” (Arthur, 2000, p. 811) 
125 However, this similarity of processes between molecular and morphological characters does not 
imply a necessary correlation of the processes at both levels (cf. Freudenstein, 2005). 
126 Superior part of the prothorax in insects 
 203 
_The differentiation of repeated elements is comparable at the morphological 
level to a change of shape.  
_New element is the type that would intuitively qualify more straightforwardly as 
novelty. Among many examples are feathers (Prum, 1999), the turtle shell 
(Burke, 1989; Gilbert, Loredo, Brukman, & Burke, 2001; Kuratani, Kuraku, & 
Nagashima, 2011), the lantern of fireflies (Moczek, 2008). 
_ The change of context should be understood as morphological context, and not 
a change in ecological context or functional context What is implied here is 
primarily changes in topology, even though these changes can be accompanied 
by functional changes A classic example is the transformation of the articular 
and quadrate jaw bones of amniote ancestors into the malleus and incus ear 
bones of mammals (Crompton & Parkyn, 1963; Mayr, 1960; Rensch, 1959).  
_ The same can be said of the combination of plesiomorph elements. One 
example is the formation of the gynostemium in orchids by the fusion of style and 
stamens (Rudall & Bateman, 2002), or the transition from the apopetalous to the 
sympetalous carpel with enclosed ovule (Armbruster, Debevec, & Willson, 2002). 
 
For Müller and Wagner, as well as for many others, especially for some 
practitioners of evo-devo, the extension of apomorphy is in fact broader than the 
extension of novelty Müller and Wagner offer a definition that entails a more 
restrictive extension of the concept of novelty:  
 
“A morphological novelty is a structure that is neither homologous to any structure 
in the ancestral species nor homonomous to any other structure of the same 
organism” (Müller & Wagner, 1991, p. 243) 
 
According to the authors, the advantages of this alternative definition are the 
following: 
 
“The main properties of the definition are that it is independent from descriptive 
or mechanistic qualifiers, that it excludes merely quantitative or negative traits, 
and that it allows distinction between meristic variation and true novelties” (Müller 
& Wagner, 1991, p. 252) 
 
 204 
The absence of descriptive and mechanistic qualifiers means that the definition 
remains neutral regarding the developmental nature of novelties and the 
processes at their origin. The distinction of meristic variation and novelty is 
expressed by the exclusion of homonomy. Homonomous traits correspond to 
serial homologs as defined by Richard Owen, that is, corresponding parts in the 
same organism, for example leg pairs in centipedes or hairs in mammals. The 
definition avoids considering a new leg pair or new hairs as real novelties.  
 
As the authors acknowledge, this definition is dependent on the concept of 
homology. To make this definition operational, the conditions under which a trait 
has no homolog must be established. 
 
Phylogenetic homology and biological homology  
 
Müller and Wagner (1991) acknowledge the inadequacy of the view of homology 
used in systematics for their definition of novelty: 
 
“In systematics, any discernable (sic) structural difference may be homologized. 
In evolutionary biology it is more useful to restrict the homology concept to 
anatomical units. This excludes merely quantitative variation, changes of 
proportion, and topological relationships among body parts.” (Müller & Wagner, 
1991, p. 244) 
 
Taxonomic characters are the attributes of organisms that are used in 
systematics to establish relations of homology and provide evidence of 
phylogenetic relationships What Müller and Wagner (1991, cf. also Wagner, 
1989) propose is to discard the “quantitative variation, changes of proportion, and 
topological relationships among body parts”, which are the basis of distinctions 
between character states, and to retain only character identity   
 
Wagner  (2014, p. 76) recently stressed again the distinction between his concept 
of homology and the one used in phylogenetics but argues for a relation of 
complementarity. Wagner’s position could be interpreted as non-committal 
compared to, on one side, those who argue for a relationship of mutual 
dependence of the two concepts (Brigandt, 2007; Winther, 2009), and, on the 
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other side, those who argue for their incompatibility (Cracraft, 2005; Scholtz, 
2005). 
 
“The conceptual irrelevance of the distinction between characters and character 
states is true for systematics because of its pragmatic needs, and not because 
body parts with different character states do not exist. Anatomical, variational, 
and developmental evidence shows that they do exist and that the distinction is 
necessary to understand the pattern of biological diversity and disparity at the 
phenotypic level.“ (Wagner, 2014, p. 76) 
 
This clear distinction of character and character state transfers the problem again 
to the notion of character as anatomical unit Is there an agreement on how 
anatomical units are individuated?  
. 
  
III – GUNTER WAGNER’S DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO HOMOLOGY AND 
NOVELTY 
 
 
The biological concept of homology 
 
Günter Wagner relies on a biological concept of homology based on 
development mechanisms Traits are homologous if they are produced by the 
same set of relatively autonomous developmental processes, or the same 
“character identity network” (Wagner, 2007, 2014), to use the concept he has 
developed in recent years Thus a new homolog arises when a new independent 
character identity network arises Now this developmental independence can 
arise a long time after the appearance of the new character  
 
Wagner’s theoretical elaborations on the developmental underpinnings of 
morphological characters and on the arising of novel characters span nearly thirty 
years from his formulation of the concept of biological homology (Wagner, 1989a, 
1989b) to his recent theory of character identity networks (Wagner, 2007, 2014). 
The central principles of his more recent theory are already present in his early 
conception of biological homology.  
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An important problem is defining what makes traits the same and what makes 
traits in related species sufficiently different to not be homologs. The concept of 
biological homology developed by Wagner is an attempt to ground homology in 
its developmental underpinnings in order to answer the problem  
 
“A biological homology concept is associated with a large number of empirical 
questions, most of them falling into the range between experimental embryology 
and comparative anatomy. How are ontogenetic networks of well-established 
homologs organized? How common are hierarchical and cyclical network 
structures? What is the pattern of interspecific variation of ontogenetic networks? 
How conservative are generative rules in comparison to character variation? All 
of these questions suggest that a successful research program on the biological 
basis of homology should consider the evolution of morphological characters at 
two levels: 1) the level of character modification within a given framework of 
developmental constraints and 2) the level of the evolutionary modifications of 
constraints.” (Wagner, 1989b, p. 1169, emphasis added)” 
 
Wagner’s conception of homology and of evolutionary novelty is based on a 
sharp distinction between characters and character states. There are 
constraining developmental mechanisms producing and defining anatomical 
units or characters, and variation within these developmental frameworks is of a 
different nature than variation altering the framework itself or producing a new 
one. Wagner originally developed the notion of epigenetic trap (1989a, 1989b) to 
describe the developmental mechanisms that make evolutionary conservation 
more likely for some traits than for others, and those mechanisms that make 
anatomical units develop in a quasi-autonomous way. The hierarchical networks 
refer to cases where the development of some embryonic trait is dependent on 
the previous development of another embryonic trait. The more the functional 
traits are dependent on the formation of a previous trait, the more likely it is to be 
conserved through time. Cyclical networks refer to the mutual inductive relations 
between parts of a developing organ. This feedback mechanism makes the 
development of certain organs nearly independent of external inductive signals 
and explains how the phenomenon of ectopic organs is possible. The vertebrate 
eye and the fin-hook of Blenniids are examples of organs whose development 
relies on a cyclical network. The development of the vertebrate eye is 
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characterised by a cycle of epigenetic interactions between the lens and the 
retina. The induction of new developmental stages is not triggered by external 
elements but by the parts of the eye themselves (McAvoy, 1980). 
 
“Character identity networks”: the developmental solution to the problem of homology 
 
Wagner (Wagner, 2007, 2014, 2015a) recently proposed a new 
formulation of his theory of character development, conservation and change: it 
is a three-stage model of character formation with at its centre the concept of 
Character identity network (ChIN), which is the developmental basis of homology.  
This formulation can be seen as a refined version of the definition of homology 
by Van Valen (1982) as continuity of information. Van Valen’s definition has been 
undermined by numerous cases of different developmental origins of 
homologous characters.  
 
According to Wagner, the idea of continuity of information can be saved with a 
more fine-grained view of the development of character, which allows one to 
distinguish between variable and highly conserved stages. In the development of 
characters, Wagner distinguishes between the inductive signals, the character 
identity networks and the realizer genes. The variation of inductive signals and 
realizer genes is much less constrained than the variation of character identity 
networks. Examples of homologous characters forming from different precursors 
show the variability of the inductive signals but not of the gene networks 
determining the identity of the characters themselves. As Wagner writes: 
“inductive signals are not instructive (i.e., do not contain information about the 
final product), but are only permissive (i.e., they trigger a process intrinsic to the 
cells themselves)” (2014, p. 93).  
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Fig 12 Wagner’s three-stage model of character development (redrawn after Wagner, 
2014, p. 97) 
 
 
The existence of a distinction between character identity genes and realizer 
genes, that is, genes governing the development of the details of the character, 
has been revealed by knockdown experiments. One significant example is the 
knockdown of the Ubx gene in the beetle Tribolium (Tomoyasu, Wheeler, & 
Denell, 2005). In Drosophila, which has wings at the forewings positions and 
haltere at the hindwings positions, the knockdown of Ubx leads to the formation 
of wings rather than halteres at the hindwings position. Thus, Ubx could either 
determine the formation of halteres or the hindwing identity. Tribolium has elytra 
at the forewings positions and wings at the hindwings positions. The knockdown 
of Ubx leads to the formation of elytra at the hindwings positions. This shows that 
Ubx determines hindwing identity and not a specific character state such as wing 
or haltere. When Ubx is knocked down, the forewing identity is expressed at the 
hindwing position127  
                                                 
127 A similar idea is presented by Jean Deutsch (2005) “Hox genes have a critical role in differentiating 
serial homologues, whatever the precise morphology of these appendages could be. The present data 
lead us to adjust our point of view on Hox genes’ function. It is common to say that the Hox genes 
determine the identity of body parts. What does identity mean? From our own human perspective, 
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ChINs and Kernels 
 
What makes ChINs specific is their high degree of conservation That 
property relates ChINs to the concept of kernel developed by Eric Davidson and 
Douglas Erwin. Kernels are highly conserved gene regulatory networks typically 
found in the patterning of body plans and the control of segment numbers in 
animals. Furthermore, the mode of origin of kernels and ChINs is also similar: 
 
“Critically, these kernels would have formed through the same processes of 
evolution as affect the other components, but once formed I they would have 
become refractory to subsequent change” (Davidson & Erwin, 2006, p. 761c) 
 
The main difference between the two concepts is that kernels are defined by their 
formation in early metazoan evolution and their conservation across phyla or at 
the phylum level. On the contrary ChINs underpin a broader range of characters 
ancient as well as recently evolved.  
 
Novelty From the overcoming of developmental constraints to the creation of new 
homologues 
 
 The question of the mode of origin of ChINs invites us to look back and 
consider the conceptual change in Günter Wagner’s theorisation of the evolution 
of novelty. There has been a significant change between Wagner’s original 
formulation of the problem of novelty (Müller & Wagner, 1991; Wagner, 2000, 
2001; Wagner, Chiu, & Laubichler, 2000) and his more recent formulation 
(Wagner, 2014) In chapter 1, I provided an analysis of the characterisation of the 
problem of novelty based on different articles dating from the turn of the century. 
                                                 
most of us thought that it meant a precise morphology for a group of cells expressing a given Hox 
selector. Genetic analysis reveals the genome’s point of view, that of the organism itself in its evolution. 
It now appears that the precise morphology of an organ or a segment does not matter, what matters for 
the Hox genes is relative morphology. In other words, identity, determined by Hox genes, means no 
more than difference between a certain body part and its neighbours along the AP axis. We can thus 
view the Hox genetic programme as a metaprogramme, versatile enough to accommodate changes in 
the underlying genetic programmes specifying the precise morphology of individual parts. In summary, 
the Hox genes do not make the difference between the three thoracic segments, after all. They might 
just ensure that they are (and maybe have to be) different from one another”(Deutsch, 2005) 
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The focus was on the developmental mechanisms responsible of the origin of a 
new morphological character. Attention was given:  
_ To the possible difference between the original developmental mechanism 
responsible for the origin of the trait and the mechanism responsible of the 
development of the trait in extant species; 
_ To identification of the type and degree of variation in developmental 
mechanism at the time of the origin of the character, that is, the measure of the 
developmental constraint that had been overcome. 
 
Even though other mechanisms were considered, the assumption was that the 
origin was caused by a change in gene regulatory networks.  
 
With the concept of the ChIN, the main focus is not directed at the origin of a 
morphological structure but at its acquisition of quasi-independence:  
 
‘‘The origin of a morphological novelty is the evolutionary process through which 
a novel character identity arises. In other words, an evolutionary novelty 
originates when part of the body acquires individuality and quasi-independence’’ 
(Wagner, 2014, p. 125) 
 
The original emergence of the structure is not the main explanandum anymore 
New ChIN do not appear in an abrupt way. Wagner admits that new ChINs are 
often absent in the incipient stages of evolutionary novelties. He acknowledges 
the role of Gerd Müller’s side-effect hypothesis for the origin of novelties (Müller, 
1990) that states that the origin of morphological novelties is found not primarily 
in genetic changes but at higher levels in the reactions of cell populations to 
changes in mechanical pressures.  
 
Thus, a new set of research question emerges: 
 
“_ How does the appropriate set of target genes come under the control of the 
gene regulatory network of the cell or the cell population? 
_ How is the expression of target genes linked to those signals that ensure 
differential expression within the appropriate spatial and temporal context? 
_ How does the gene regulatory network acquire the quasi-autonomy that is 
characteristic of individualized body parts and cell types?” (Wagner, 2014, p. 174) 
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The concept of ChIN is still related to the concepts of constraints and evolvability 
since the acquisition of a ChINs involves the acquisition of evolutionary 
independence that may enable further evolution. However, compared to the 
formulation of the problem of novelty analysed in chapter 1, there is more 
attention to developmental stability and adaptive consideration. The emergence 
of a ChIN may be favoured by selection because it brings developmental 
robustness to the new trait. ChIN may also have the adaptive role of preventing 
the expression of genes in spatial and temporal contexts where they would be 
harmful.  
 
This dimension of ChINs is illustrated by Günter Wagner’s comments on Müller’s 
example of the origin of the syndesmoisis tibiofibularis presented in chapter 1 
(section IV), and on Müller’s organisational concept of homology, partly 
elaborated from a generalisation of this example128 Wagner himself distinguishes 
the epigenetic view of Müller from his own “more genetic view” (GP Wagner, 
2014, p172) 
 
“However, from the perspective of this book, Newman and Müller’s (2005) 
perspective is incomplete because it does not explain the eventual 
developmental/genetic individualization of the new structure. There are at least 
two different hypotheses for the individuation of these structures: 
_ Selection pressure to make the development of the new structure more reliable, 
less dependent of the mechanical pressure. It would be a case of selection for 
developmental robustness.  
_ The structure is selected to assume a specific shape, which would increase its 
functional performance. This could lead to character-specific developmental 
program.” (Wagner, 2014, p. 173) 
 
 
                                                 
128 “Homologues are autonomized elements of the morphological phenotype that are maintained in 
evolution due to their organizational roles in heritable, genetic, developmental, and structural 
assemblies.” (Müller, 2003). Wagner thus considers Müller’s position and his as complementary:“As 
such, the organizational homology concept is not concerned with explained how characters can be 
developmentally individualized and, thus, is complementary rather than competing with the ideas 
developed in this book.” (Wagner, 2014, p77) 
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The problem of the phylogenetic junctures at which novelties occur 
 
 Considering the late arising of ChIN, how should this affect the idea of a 
precise phylogenetic juncture for the appearance of a novelty? It seems that we 
should adopt a more encompassing view of novelty and accept that the process 
of origination can be spread out over long geological time. The example of the 
perianth in angiosperms illustrates how the process of origination of a novelty can 
have different stages and be spread out over long stretches of geological time 
(Endress, 2001, 2008; Specht & Bartlett, 2009; Warner, Rudall, & Frohlich, 2009) 
The differences in the approaches of Müller and Wagner indicate that while Müller 
would be focused on the emergence of the morphological characteristics of the 
perianth, Wagner is explicitly focused on the emergence of the ChIN for the whole 
flower, attributing distinct identities to sepals and petals  
 
As both researchers advocate, their views are not competing but complementary 
views on the evolution of homology and the origin of novelty It thus appears that 
integration of approaches and explanations is the right path to follow These 
ambiguities, or more accurately, these differences in focus and emphasis should 
be viewed as explanations of different aspects of the problem of novelty, or even, 
in certain cases like the perianth, explanations of different phases in the origin of 
a novelty Now, this integrative approach seems only possible if the concept of 
the phylogenetic juncture at which novelty occurs is relaxed Several cases are 
possible here  
 
a) All aspects or phases of the origin of a novelty can be located at the same 
phylogenetic juncture  
b) Different aspects or phases can be located at precise but distinct 
phylogenetic junctures 
c) The phylogenetic junctures of only some, but not all, phases or the origin 
of a novelty can be located; 
d) No precise phylogenetic juncture can be located for any of the phases of 
the origin of a novelty. 
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IV- HOMOLOGY AND NOVELTY IN PLANTS 
 
 
Before addressing recent development in research on the origin and evolution 
of the angiosperm flower and addressing Günter Wagner’s application of his 
theory to this case, I will undertake a rapid review of differences between plants 
and animals that can potentially affect the problem of novelty and the 
generalisation of theories of novelty  
 
Differences between plants and animals relevant to the problem of novelty 
 
Independent origins of plant and animal development 
 
A common origin to plant and animal developments would give support to 
the transposition of theories from animal to plants The data gathered by whole-
genome sequencing and by developmental genetics point to independent origins 
of development in plants and in animals (Meyerowitz, 2002)129 This means that 
we cannot rely on a relation of homology to transpose theories of novelty from 
animals to plants. That we cannot rely on common descent does not mean that 
there cannot be convergence between plant and animal development  
 
These two distinct emergences of development make possible a real comparative 
study of development that does not rely on common descent (Meyerowitz, 2002; 
Vervoort, 2014).130 Plant and animal developments share important features, 
particularly in pattern formation, a fundamental mechanism in development 
(Meyerowitz, 2002).  Regarding spatial pattern formation, homeotic genes acting 
in a similar manner can be found in animals and in plants.  In animals, this role is 
in large part fulfilled by the HOX genes group whereas in plants it is the MADS-
                                                 
129 “Although the logic underlying many developmental processes is similar, the molecules that carry 
out the logical plan are unrelated, or represent novel arrangements of ancient protein domains.” 
(Meyerowitz, 2002, p. 1485) 
130 An important question however is how far reaching are the implications of this matter of origin. How 
informative is the fact of independent origins? This fact has to be confronted with the complexity of the 
phenomena of homology. The discovery of independent origins can be tempered by the phenomenon of 
deep homology (Shubin, Tabin, & Carroll, 2009). 
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box gene family that plays this role. The distinction between homology and 
homoplasy, or common descent and convergence, is actually not straightforward 
because of the phenomenon of deep homology Plants and animals evolved 
development independently but they inherited the same genetic toolkit from their 
unicellular ancestor 
 
Plasticity, modularity and open development 
 
The important level of developmental modularity and plasticity in plants entails 
a high level of tolerance to genetic mutations and recombinations. Thus the level 
of deleterious mutations and recombinations is in principle lower in plants than in 
animals.  
 
Because most plants are not mobile and are thus highly dependent on the 
environment, environmentally induced variation is more frequent in plants than in 
animal. Evolution through phenotypic plasticity and genetic accommodation 
should then be more frequent in plants than in animals. Plants have an open 
system of development in which apical meristems continually produce new 
organs. There is a potential of genetic mosaicity when plant parts endure 
mutations. Because of the iterative production of sexual organs and of vegetative 
reproduction, the mutations have a higher probability of being transmitted than in 
animals.  
 
Events of homeosis are probably more frequent in plants than in animals, 
because of the greater modularity of plant development (Baum & Donoghue, 
2002). Some of these can lead to monogenic speciation. The evidence for single-
step mutations that engender temporal or mechanical changes in reproductive 
organs is overwhelming, particularly in flowering plants Outstanding example 
simple one-step mutations that alter the number, position, symmetry and fusion 
of floral parts and even the sexuality of flowers Because such features are used 
in taxonomy to characterize plants, this could lead to the sudden apparition of 
taxa at the genus level or above  
 
 
 
 215 
Hybridisation and polyploidy 
 
The hybridisation and polyploidy in plant was already intensely studied 
during the Modern Synthesis (see chapter 2) However, Stebbins and other 
Modern Synthesis botanists only attributed a limited evolutionary potential to 
polyploidy (Soltis, Visger, & Soltis, 2014) Hybridization, both between 
subspecies and between species, is more frequent in plants than in animals. 
Production of extreme or novel characters by hybridization (Rieseberg, Archer, & 
Wayne, 2001; Yakimowski & Rieseberg, 2014) 
 
General consequences for novelties in plants 
 
This shows a variety of causes, mechanisms and paces and frequencies. 
The problem resides in weighing the respective importance of these phenomena. 
Some can be relatively well traced such as the number of polyploidy events in a 
lineage; others are still obscure such as the consequences of hybridization 
events for evolutionary rate and occurrence of novelties. Salient differences with 
animal novelties have however emerged.  
 
_ Events of homeosis are probably more frequent in plants than in animals, 
because of the greater modularity of plant development (Baum & Donoghue, 
2002). Some of these can lead to monogenic speciation. The evidence for single-
step mutations that engender temporal or mechanical changes in reproductive 
organs is overwhelming, particularly in flowering plants Outstanding example 
simple one-step mutations that alter the number, position, symmetry and fusion 
of floral parts and even the sexuality of flowers Because such features are used 
in taxonomy to characterize plants, this could lead to the sudden apparition of 
taxa at the genus level or above This can occur though the production of 
apetalous fertile flowers; a change in the number of flowers in an inflorescence; 
a change in floral symmetry that can cause a potential alteration of the mode of 
pollination and thus a mechanical reproductive isolation; a change in temporal 
barriers to sexual reproduction, for example day-sensitiveday-neutral; a change 
in mechanical barriers flower that do not open and therefore are self-pollinated. 
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_ A related fact is that he concept of “hopeful monster” is defended by more plant 
biologists than animal biologists (Bateman & DiMichele, 2002; Günter Theissen, 
2006, 2009) 
 
_ Homoploid hybrid speciation and allopolyploid speciation are much more 
common in plants than in animals (Abbott et al., 2013). Because they imply 
drastic genetic recombination and chromosomal changes, their probability or 
engendering drastic and rapid phenotypic novelties is much greater than that of 
small mutations and recombination through normal sexual reproduction.  
 
The origin of the angiosperm flower 
 
The origin of the angiosperm flower is still today considered as a very 
complex problem and there are maybe as many competing theories in the 
contemporary literature as there were in the Modern Synthesis era (Bateman, 
Hilton, & Rudall, 2006; David A. Baum & Hileman, 2006; Frohlich, 2003; Frohlich 
& Parker, 2000; Specht & Bartlett, 2009; Guenter Theissen & Melzer, 2007). 
However the speculative range of these theories has been narrowed a lot. Three 
main sources of evidence have given support to the strobilus theory of the origin 
of the flower and the homology of flower organs with leaves: 
 
_ The advancement of phylogenetics systematics partly based on molecular 
phylogenies (Endress & Doyle, 2009; Judd, Campbell, Kellogg, Stevens, & 
Donoghue, 1999) 
_ The discoveries of fossils (Donoghue, Doyle, Gauthier, Kluge, & Rowe, 1989) 
_ Advances in plant developmental genetics (Causier, Schwarz-Sommer, & 
Davies, 2010; Coen & Meyerowitz, 1991; Jaramillo & Kramer, 2007; Kramer & 
Jaramillo, 2005; Meyerowitz, Smyth, & Bowman, 1989; Rosin & Kramer, 2009) 
 
 
The ABC model of floral organ identity was developed through the study of 
genetic mutants with homeotic organ conversions. I was discovered that the 
identities of the different floral organs in Arabidopsis and Antirrhinum are 
determined by the interaction of transcription factors produced by different 
classes of MADS-box genes a type of homeobox containing genes that are 
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involved in the developmental regulation of many plant organs. The expression 
of the gene controlling the production of the A-function transcription factor leads 
to the formation of sepals, expression of A-function and B-function produces 
petal, B-function and C-function produce stamens and C-function alone produces 
carpels. It was then discovered that the proteins of the A,B and C classes do not 
regulate organ identities alone but have to form dimers with another class of 
transcription factor proteins, called class E, in other to initiate organ formation 
(Theissen & Saedler, 2001).  
 
The support of developmental genetics to the strobilus theory 
 
 
 If the strobilus theory of the origin of the flower is accepted, there are four 
main problems in the origin of the flower: 
1) The transition from separate unisexual sporangiae to the bisexual 
condition. 
2) The evolution of determination (limited growth) of the floral axis and the 
compression of the organs. 
3)  The origin of the perianth (the non-reproductive organs of the flower). 
4) The differentiation of the perianth into petals and sepals. 
 
An example of explanation of the four transitions is provided by Baum and 
Hileman (2006) 
 
1) The evolution of the bisexual axis is conceived as an homeotic conversion 
of microsprophylls into megasporophylls in the ancestral male cone. This 
is explained by competition of the C-class and B-class transcription factors 
for their dimerization with E-class transcription factors. If there is an excess 
of C-class, a threshold can be reached when there is not enough E-class 
left for the dimerization necessary to initiate the male identity and a female 
cone develops. 
 
2) The switch to determinacy is explained by the negative regulation by C-
class transcription factor of the gene WUSCHEL responsible for the 
maintenance of the indeterminacy of the apical meristem. 
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3) The formation of the perianth, that is, non-reproductive organs, of the 
flower is explained by the sterilisation of stamens. The postulated scenario 
is that the co-regulation of WUSCHEL and C-class genes caused an 
spatial extension of the expression of B-class genes which allowed for the 
formation of petals.  
 
4) The progression towards clear differentiation of the perianth into petals 
and sepals is explained by the increased dependence of B-class genes 
with co-regulators.  
 
 
Character identity networks and the ABCE model of flower development 
 
 Is the sharp distinction between character and character state also justified 
in plants? Do we find in plant evolution the differential conservation of gene 
networks determining organ identity and realiser genes? Some of best case 
studies available to settle these questions are the flower organs of Arabidopsis 
thaliana (Brassicaceae) and Antirrhinum majus (Plantaginaceae) because their 
genetic and developmental underpinnings are widely studied. Günter Wagner 
interprets this example as an illustration of his theory of Character Identity 
Networks.  
 
_ Wagner is interesting because he develops a general theory of novelty, mostly 
based on animal examples, but he also uses the example of the flower and 
applies his theory to the plant kingdom  
 
“What is unique about flowers is how the deployment of the various parts 
became developmentally integrated into the flower. The developmental 
integration of the flower is implemented through the dependence on the 
expression and function of flower meristem genes (the E-class genes) of the 
organ identity genes (see above). This integration evolved through a derived 
dependency of the function of the organ identity transcription factors on  protein-
protein interactions with the flower meristem regulators. The notion of a 
developmental type, the angiosperm flower, can be grounded in the obligatory 
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cooperativity among these transcription factor proteins.” (Wagner, 2014, pp. 414–
415) 
 
That is why Wagner is interested in the angiosperm flower, because it is one of 
the best known examples of the developmental control of organ identity. The 
advancement of research on novelty in plants is recognised by Günter Wagner: 
 
“The motivation is that research on character identity and character origination is 
much more advanced in plant biology than in any of the zoological model systems 
of which I am aware. [] In contrast, much of the zoological literature focuses on 
other aspects of developmental evolution, such as the controversy regarding the 
relative importance of cis-regulatory and trans-regulatory evolutionary changes, 
the causes of organ loss (e.g., the loss of pelvic structures in freshwater 
stickleback populations), or the modifications of certain quantitative or meristic 
characters like the numbers and kinds of bristles in different parts of the insect 
larva or imago. Overall, the problem of organ identity origination has received 
much less attention in zoological devo-evo than in botany” (Wagner, 2014, p. 
385) 
 
From fading border to ABCE developmental programs, ecological explanation versus 
developmental explanation 
 
The case of the evolutionary transition from flowers with a fuzzy morphology 
to the well-defined flower of core eudicots can illustrate the existence of different 
possible causes of robustness in developmental processes.  The fading borders 
model interprets the gradual transition in floral morphology observed in basal 
angiosperms, magnoliids, and basal eudicots as reflecting a gradient in 
expression levels of floral organ identity genes across the developing floral 
meristem, where weak expression at the margin of the range of activity of a given 
gene overlaps with the expression of another regulator in adjacent organs 
(Chanderbali, Berger, Howarth, Soltis, & Soltis, 2016; Soltis, Chanderbali, Kim, 
Buzgo, & Soltis, 2007) . Gradually fading influence toward the periphery of 
broadly expressed organ identity functions, of B function in particular, imparts 
some features of one set of organs onto adjacent floral organs. 
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Ecological and selective factors 
 
The gradual transition towards well-defined organs and the floral quartet as it 
is found in Arabidopsis is linked to the co-evolution of plants and their pollinators. 
The increased specialisation of plant-pollinator relations requires increased 
stability of phenotypic trait of the flower to properly attract the pollinator and be 
pollinated. Under this hypothesis, the flower structure would be kept constant by 
stabilizing selection. (Armbruster, 2016; Fenster, Armbruster, Wilson, Dudash, & 
Thomson, 2004).  
 
Role of the developmental architecture (obligate heterodimerization) 
 
Günter Wagner favours a hypothesis based on developmental properties:  
 
“The flexibility of the gymnosperm system results from the many possible 
interactions among transcription factor proteins, many of which are probably 
functionally redundant. By comparison, the rigidity of the angiosperm flower 
Bauplan results from the obligatory interaction among a number of transcription 
factors, all of which need to be co-expressed or reproductive organ development. 
This is unlikely to occur spontaneously outside of the flower context, as it would 
require multiple simultaneous changes. To my knowledge, this is the first 
example for which we have a mechanistically plausible explanation for the origin 
of a developmental type, the angiosperm flower. The integration of the 
developmental type results from the obligatory formation of a multimeric 
transcription factor complex, which necessitates the co-expression of multiple 
transcription factor genes with little or no functional redundancy. This situation 
arose from an ancestral situation in which numerous protein-protein interactions 
were possible and with many means for functional compensation. The derived 
canalized state was  to a loss of possible physical protein-protein interactions 
among transcription factors, which made the activation of target genes dependent 
on a strictly determined set of factors” (Wagner, 2014, p. 405) 
 
According to Wagner, the integration of the angiosperm flower resulted from the 
developmental genetic architecture.  B- and C-class genes require the floral 
context to exert their role in the flower organ development. The phenotypic 
integration of the flower is a consequence of the molecular interaction of the floral 
organ transcription factors (B and C) and the floral meristem transcription factors 
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(E).  B and C have to form tetrameric transcription factor complexes with E to be 
able to regulate organ development.  This is not a necessary configuration. E-
genes could only intervene to trigger the activation of B and C without being 
needed in the regulation of the target of B and C.  
 
What is the relation between the two explanations? Are we faced with competing 
or complementary explanations?  
 
a) Among the researchers studying the phenomenon experimentally, the 
alternative is framed as either selective advantage or the 
heterodimerization or genetic drift. 
 
b) Wagner is less interested in what caused heterodimerization to be 
introduced and diffused in the first place (selection or drift), but more about 
what caused it to be conserved over a long evolutionary period. Here the 
alternative is between: 
 
The example of the evolution of the flower raises several questions: 
 
1) What the cause of the existence of this flower “Bauplan” or “type”?  
 
Wagner seems to draw an opposition in this case between the 
developmental explanation and the selective explanation. How can we 
articulate selection and developmental bias?  
 
2) Is it representative of all the angiosperms? If not, how far can we 
extrapolate? 
 
3) Is it representative of other plant characters?  
 
a. In terms of evolutionary trend (towards integrated ChINs). 
Can this observation of an evolutionary tendency towards more integrated 
and constraining developmental architecture be generalised? 
 
b. In terms of developmental underpinning of traits 
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Homeosis, heterotopy and quasi-autonomous parts 
 
The existence of heterotopic phenotypes, for example Eupomatia 
bennettii, which has stamens as the outermost whorl, does not contradict 
Wagner’s theory of organ identity and of quasi autonomous parts. On the contrary 
the ABCE model of character identity in the flower, as an example of ChIN, can 
predict the occurrence of such phenotype with the shift of expression domains of 
the regulatory genes.  But the pervasiveness of these heterotopic phenotypes 
(Baum & Donoghue, 2002; Rutishauser, Grob, & Pfeifer, 2008; Sattler, 1988, 
2012)favors the hypothesis of the selection pressure on pollination rather the 
hypothesis of developmental constraints. They tend to show that it is a case 
where actual divergent variants have lower fitness rather than a case where 
divergent variants are made improbable by developmental constraints. 
 
Fuzzy morphology 
 
The existence of plants with more fuzzy morphologies is challenging 
Wagner’s model more frontally. Rutishauser et al. (2008) talk of plant organ 
identity crisis. This questions the special status of ChINs (their high 
conservation). Considering open development and the need for plants to react to 
environment The stability of the flower might be an exception due to the 
necessity of the attraction of specific pollinators  
 
 
V- PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF GENERALISATIONS IN EVO-DEVO 
 
 
I want to argue here firstly that Wagner engages in different forms of 
typological thinking and that, despite classical objections, this method is perfectly 
justified in evo-devo. Secondly, I want to argue that a problem with Wagner 
comes not from the opposition between typological and population thinking, but 
from a tension between what Jenner (2008) has called the idiographic and 
nomothetic goals of evo-devo. In favouring the search for generalisations across 
higher taxa, especially the presence of ChINs across higher taxa, Wagner is not 
sensitive enough to diversity inside these higher taxa.  
 223 
 
Wagner (2014) concludes his analysis of the case of the flower this way: 
 
“The tetrameric transcription factor complexes are, at least in this case, the very 
locus and root of the macroscopic integration of the developmental type, in this 
case the flower. This is a fundamental insight that raises hope for all of biology in 
that we may be close to a deep understanding of the vexing patterns and 
concepts of comparative anatomy, with names like body plan, developmental 
type, and homology, which have eluded experimental analysis and mechanistic 
understanding for centuries.” (Wagner, 2014, p. 398) 
 
Wagner defines his type of reasoning as “homology thinking” (2014, p. 425) and 
not typological thinking because he focuses on examples of characters that are 
inherited from a common ancestor such as the tetrapod limb or the flower, and 
intends to uncover their developmental underpinnings to explain their 
evolutionary stability and what he calls their “variational properties”. Wagner does 
not hesitate to describe the flower as “a developmental type” because it is 
grounded in a shared evolutionary history of the angiosperms. But his approach 
goes beyond homology thinking when he develops the concept of character 
identity network and goes on to demonstrate that character identity networks with 
similar properties can be found across very distant taxa that did not inherit these 
similar networks from a common ancestor.  The pervasiveness of character 
identity networks is not the product of homology, but is nonetheless a 
developmental regularity.  
 
Jenner (2008) distinguishes between developmental type conceived as individual 
and developmental type conceived as class. In this framework, the flower 
developmental regulatory network is a developmental type of the individual form 
because it is supposed to have been inherited from a common ancestor. Thus 
each instance of this developmental mechanism is homologous with other 
instances. On the other hand, character identity networks are a developmental 
type of the class form, because they are found in many remotely related taxa and 
their widespread existence cannot be explained by common ancestry alone. 
Wagner does not talk of the category of character identity networks as a 
developmental type because it would be falling into typological thinking without 
any justifying ground (while homology justifies it in individual cases).  
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Nevertheless, it may be argued that his work is guided by an ambition of 
generalisation beyond individual developmental types. One of the main goals of 
his work is to show the pervasiveness of character identity networks and the 
reality of his three-stage model of development. 
 
Typology versus population thinking 
 
Is Wagner indulging in typological thinking? Is it the object of my analysis?  
Before I address my reservations regarding Wagner’s approach, I want to 
distinguish my position from the common accusations against typological thinking 
that can be applied to practitioners of evo-devo like Wagner (see Witteveen, 
2018, for a review). I am going to review the classical arguments against 
typological thinking to show that Wagner does not fall in these traps.  
 
I will adopt the definition given by Tim Lewens: 
 
“The typological thinker believes there is some limited number of stable ‘types’ or 
‘forms’, which explain the observed patterns of diversity in the biological world.” 
(Lewens, 2009, p. 355) 
 
Here are a few examples of use of typological concepts in evo-devo: 
 
“Diversity is not merely an inconvenience. It has also been regarded as a sort of 
epiphenomenon, the frills and digressions surrounding the real elements of 
development. To developmental biologists, there is a mechanistic universality in 
developmental processes despite any diversity of ultimate outcome.” (Raff, 1996, 
p. 22) 
 
“If there is any typological concept that is alive and well, then it is the concept of 
an angiosperm flower.1 As we will see in the following sections, there are good 
reasons why the concept of “flower type” is a meaningful biological term. Flowers 
are developmentally tightly integrated and the extensive variation among extant 
angiosperms can be understood within the confines of a “flower Bauplan” or 
“flower developmental type.” (Wagner, 2014, p. 386) 
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“the different architectures of these wings [in bats, birds and pterosaurs] reflect 
different develop- mental modifications of a common tetrapod forelimb design” 
(Carroll, 2005, p.190) 
 
The four arguments against typological thinking  
 
Tiw Lewens (2009) has recently distinguished four arguments against 
typology:  
 
a) Typological Thinking is committed to a platonic metaphysics. 
 
b) Typological Thinking is antievolutionary. 
 
c) Typologists are committed to the “Natural State” model131 
 
d) Typological Thinking is incompatible with the causes of population 
genetics 
 
Following Lewens, it is possible to adopt a nominalist understanding of 
developmental type. Such a view allows us to reject all four objections against 
typological thinking, especially the last one.  The existence of developmental 
types is not incompatible with the concepts of population genetics. Natural 
selection can be the cause of their existence but is not the only possible one.  
 
Nomothetic and idiographic approaches in evo-devo 
 
There is thus no compelling reason to reject typological thinking in evo-
devo. However, a problem might arise if the focus on developmental types 
favours generalisations over breath of the taxa studied. This can be best 
understood I the terms used by Jenner (2008) to define the goals of evo-devo: 
 
“Evo-devo is an ambitious young discipline with both idiographic and nomothetic 
                                                 
131 For the natural state model, the cause of deviation and the cause of stability are distinct  
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goals. Idiographically, evo-devo aims to document the unique effects of changes 
in evolutionary developmental mechanisms on the origin of novelties and the 
evolution of body plans. Nomothetically, evo-devo attempts to establish the 
general effects of evolutionary developmental mechanisms on determining the 
overall direction of phenotypic evolution.” (Jenner, 2008, p. 114) 
 
The idiographic and nomothetic tasks are complementary, the idiographic studies 
serve as evidence for generalisations. But there can be a tension between the 
two tasks, precisely because supplementary idiographic data can weaken 
preliminary generalisations. Günter Wagner’s recent project developed in his 
2014 book is arguably more nomothetically than ideographically oriented. In his 
demonstration of the pervasiveness of character identity networks, Wagner has 
looked for characters of plants that best illustrate the concept of ChIN. The 
question of how representative is the flower’s ChIN of other plant characters’ 
developmental underpinnings should not be separated of the search for ChIN 
across higher taxa because the evolutionary significance of ChINs is partly 
dependent on this question.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In chapter 1, after presenting and comparing the evo-devo and the functional-
historical characterisations of the problem of novelty, I focused on two case 
studies, Walter Bock’s research on the origin of the avian basitemporal 
articulation and Gerd Müller’s research on  the origin of the syndesmosis 
tibiofibularis, pertaining respectively to the functional-historical approach and to 
the evo-devo approach I showed the existence of a dissonance between the 
great difference in expressed theoretical commitments and conceptual definitions 
on one side, and the proximity in the explanatory practices and the evidential 
sources used on the other side A similar type of comparison can now be 
undertaken between Stebbins’ research on plant novelties and Wagner’s 
research on the origin and evolution of the flower  
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As explained I chapter 3 (pp.158-161), Stebbins criticised Corner for conflating 
two conceptions of function in his definition and his examples of transference of 
function: proper cases of transference of function, according to Stebbins, involve 
the evolutionary transfer of the performance of an ecological function (such as 
protection of the embryo or dispersal) from one character to another other cases 
involve what Stebbins calls a “reorganisation of the developmental pattern” 
(1974a, p.84), such as in the example of the transition from apocarpy to syncarpy. 
Interestingly, a related distinction has been recently developed by Baum and 
Donogue in their update of the theory of transference of function informed by 
developmental genetics (Baum and Donoghue, 2002). The first type of 
transference of function they identify, “non-homologous transference of function” 
refers to cases where the two structures involved (the one performing the function 
in the ancestral species and the other structure performing the same function in 
the descendant species) do not share, either totally or partially, developmental 
genetic programs This is illustrated by the (hypothetical) example of the 
transference of the function of dispersal from fruit hairs to fruit wings The second 
type, “homologous transference of function”, refers to cases where the two 
structures share some developmental genetic programs.132 
 
Stebbins, like Baum and Donoghue, distinguished the two dimensions of 
ecological processes and developmental processes but attributed evolutionary 
significance to both of them his attention to the latter is illustrated by his 
insistence on the role of intercalary meristems in morphological change. Günter 
Wagner operates the same distinction. In the case study that Wagner focuses 
on, the evolution of the flower, there is a potential competition between a 
developmental process, the evolution of obligate transcription factor interaction, 
and an ecological process, the co-evolution of plant hosts and pollinators leading 
to specialisation. There is, however, no major distinction in terms of conceptual 
                                                 
132 It should be noted that Baum and Donoghue adopt different concepts of homology and non-
homology than Günter Wagner For Wagner, if a character’s development is dependent on a new ChIN 
and if this new ChIN allows for the independent evolution of this character, then this character is non-
homologous For Baum and Donoghue, if a new structure shares some of its developmental genetic 
programs with a pre-existing structure, then this new structure is homologous to the pre-existing one 
While Wagner focuses on the developmental and evolutionary autonomy of the ChIN to determine 
homology and non-homology, Baum and Donoghue focus on the genetic content of the ChIN  
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framework between Stebbins and Wagner both recognise and distinguish 
ecological and developmental factors in plant evolution. This comparison of 
Stebbins and Wagner is at odds with oppositions between Modern Synthesis and 
evo-devo as distinct and potentially irreconcilable theoretical frameworks. Or, 
more accurately, Stebbins’ approach to plant evolution, at least as it is presented 
in his Flowering plants, does not match the alleged Modern Synthesis approach 
as described and criticised by some evo-devo proponents.  
 
However, two important differences lie in the richness of the developmental data 
and concepts available to Wagner compared to those available to Stebbins and 
in the levels of analysis of development that each adopts. Although Stebbins uses 
the concept of regulatory genes and stresses their importance in evolution, in 
Flowering plants, this concept only has a programmatic status. When discussing 
the importance of developmental processes in evolution, Stebbins discusses the 
notion of meristematic capital and the role of intercalary meristems, thus adopting 
the levels of analysis of cells and tissues rather than the genetic and molecular 
levels Other important evolutions distinguish the perspective of evo-devo from 
that of Stebbins, in particular the use of phylogenetics and the comparative 
methods to test hypotheses of adaptive radiations or morphological evolution. But 
however important, these conceptual and empirical evolutions do not amount to 
a transition from an omission of development to an integration of it.  
 
Two central takeaway messages of chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis were that 1) 
the Modern Synthesis is indeed a moving target and the reductive view of its 
scope and dogmas offered by some evo-devo scientists and historians does not 
fully resist scrutiny; and 2) at least some scientists associated with the Modern 
Synthesis, such as Bock Rensch, Lerner and especially Stebbins, were sensitive 
to the role of development in evolution and participated in elaborating conceptual 
and empirical tools to study it. One important question that should now be 
addressed is: in what ways do these findings matter beyond historical accuracy? 
In chapter 1, I already attempted to show how reductive historical views of the 
Modern Synthesis were used to back the advocacy of a separation of research 
programs, especially of the study of novelty on one side and of adaptation on the 
other, and how this separation could be counterproductive. The history of 
research on novelty by Modern Synthesis scientists can also be related to 
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contemporary calls for (Breuker et al, 2006 Brigandt and Love, 2012 
Hallgrímsson et al, 2012) and practice of (eg Budd, 2006 Galis, 1996 Niklas, 
2000 DB Wake, 2009) a functional evo-devo The dominance of a structuralist 
perspective in evo-devo, focusing on changes in form without a concern for 
functional questions, is an uncontroversial fact (Brigandt and Love, 2012, p. 423). 
Criticisms of this bias and attempts at integrating structural and functional 
considerations in evo-devo have recently been formulated. This thesis can be 
viewed as a historical and philosophical contribution to this project by providing 
elements of an history of functional approaches to novelty and by showing 
continuities as well as evolutions between research projects of the Modern 
Synthesis era and some contemporary projects in constructional, evolutionary 
and functional morphology as well as evo-devo. As such, it stands as a 
counterpoint to historical accounts stressing the opposition between the structural 
and the functional perspectives (e.g. Amundson, 2005).  
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GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 I will summarise the insights and findings of each chapter, stressing the 
conclusions that can be drawn from my research.  
 
Chapter 1  
 
In this chapter I focused on two different characterisations of the problem of 
novelty, one from a gene-centred evo-devo perspective and another from a 
functional-historical perspective  
 
Some evo-devo practitioners claim that they have introduced the origin of novelty 
as a new research problem in evolutionary biology This is justified in different 
ways depending on authors, either by distinguishing the problem of novelty from 
the problem of adaptation by defining variation and innovation as distinct 
processes or by relying on the epistemic concept of explanatory force Evo-devo 
characterisations of the problem of novelty are centred around identifying the 
developmental mechanism responsible for the production of the phenotypic 
character investigated, determining whether the developmental mechanism 
originated at the same time as the phenotypic character, and determining the 
type of developmental change that occurred when the phenotypic character 
originated For the majority of evo-devo researchers, the null hypothesis is that 
the change was genetic, but research for changes at other organisational levels 
is undertaken Developmental biology alone is not sufficient for this endeavour 
and tackling these research questions requires the help of phylogenetic 
systematics, comparative anatomy, palaeontology and evolutionary genetics 
The role of the last discipline seems however minimal, only present as a set of 
boundary conditions The role of disciplines like functional morphology, 
biomechanics, physiology or ecology in solving the problem of novelty is rarely 
denied but the dominant idea seems to be that the developmental endeavour can 
be conducted separately  
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The functional-historical approach to novelty can be compared to the evo-devo 
approach using the respectable form-function dichotomy The latter can however 
be misleading because, while some evo-devo researchers or philosophers argue 
for a study of the evolution of form independently from function (Amundson, 2005; 
Raff, 1996), on the other hand the functional-historical approach is not a study of 
function independently of form, and instead partly relies on the idea that the 
evolution of form and function should not be studied separately  
  
The functional-historical approach, illustrated by Darwin’s principle of conversion 
of functions, but not limited to it, is characterised by the use of different types of 
functions, activities and biological roles, and by the attention to different types of 
contingency, unpredictability and dependence on past conditions, which entails 
that the characters of organisms and their transformations cannot be explained 
solely either by their current function, nor past function, nor even the series past 
and present functions  
  
An important question emerging from the choice of considering and investigating 
the functional-historical perspective as an encompassing  set of approaches on 
the evolution of organisms is that of the relation between the perspective of 
ecomorphology, oriented towards the relation of the organism to the specificities 
of its environment, and the perspective of constructional morphology, oriented 
towards the structural and functional organisation of living beings Although some 
forms of structuralism focused on the idea of laws of structures and of their 
transformations (Webster & Goodwin, 1982) are incompatible with the functional-
historical approach, I argued that common functional and historical principles and 
the relation between internal and external selection justify considering 
constructional morphology and ecomorphology as parts of a common functional-
historical perspective This contributes to nuancing the idea of a rupture between 
the Modern Synthesis and post Modern Synthesis periods   
 
A related question is that of a classification of types of characters and the 
appropriate approach to their study While both internal and external selection 
are pertinent for the study of characters involved in locomotion or feeding for 
example, external selection seems more relevant for characters such as those 
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involved in mating display, while internal selection is more relevant for general 
skeletal construction and performance of internal organs This consideration can 
also be applied to the relations between developmental constraints and functional 
constraints Developmental constraints arguably exist to the variation of most 
characters For some types of characters, considerations of functional constraints 
and functional continuity are essential to the investigation of the evolution of the 
characters and more explanatory (for example, the shape that a heart can adopt 
is drastically limited by functional constraints) Other characters are much less 
functionally constrained, and little developmentally constrained, such as helmets 
on the pronotum of treehoppers, of which widely different forms are known in 
different species, and which often have a function of camouflage (Moczek, 2008) 
Yet other characters are both functionally and developmentally constrained such 
and limbs and digits (Smith et al., 1985)  
 
Causes for the neglect of the functional were found in the conflation of the 
functional approach and the populational genetic approach. This conflation can 
be found for example in Amundson (2005). It is true that the Modern Synthesis 
introduced the population genetic approach, but a functional approach to 
evolution and novelty was also perpetuated by some during the Modern 
Synthesis era. An important factor was also the development of the concept of 
exaptation by Gould and Vrba, which was conceived as a critique of 
preadaptation. I argued, after others, that the exaptation did not bring a significant 
conceptual input compared to preadaptation. Furthermore, by conflating a 
defence of historical contingency and non-adaptation, Gould and Vrba wrongly 
assimilated the functional-historical approach to naïve adaptationism. 
 
The comparison of Bock’s explanation of the origin of the avian basitemporal 
articulation and Müller ‘s and Streicher’s explanation of the avian syndesmosis 
tibiofibularis revealed very similar explanatory strategies, regardless of the latter’s 
far richer use of descriptive and experimental ontological evidence. This 
prompted a stress on a distinction between theoretical positions and debates one 
side and explanatory practices. However, this judgment about the proximity 
between the functional-historical approach of Bock and the epigenetic evo-devo 
approach of Müller should not be too quickly generalised. Because the epigenetic 
approach of Müller includes considerations of functional morphology, it is 
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naturally closer to the functional-historical approach than genetic approaches to 
evo-devo.  
 
I finally argued that, despite its limited effect on explanatory style, at least in the 
case study considered, the distinction between innovation and variation in terms 
of different process was conceptually unhelpful because it narrowed down a priori 
the possible processes of the origin of novelty, it attributed unjustified distinct 
properties to continuous and discontinuous variation, and confused the problem 
of the generation of variation with the problem of the generation of novelty.  
 
The weaving together of novelty and adaptation by the functional-historical 
approach, especially by Modern Synthesis representatives  of the approach, 
prompted a more general appraisal of the situation of the problem of novelty in 
the Modern Synthesis era.  
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 I undertook a historical investigation of the relation of different research 
programs and different concepts elaborated during the Modern Synthesis era to 
the problem of novelty. I was not guided by the search for precursors of evo-devo, 
nor more generally by a focus on development. Rather, inspired by the close 
relationship between novelty and adaptation and using a hermeneutic approach, 
I isolated five concepts potentially related to novelty.  
  
There is a close relationship between novelty and mutationism and saltationism 
since these theories were formulated as explanations of novelty and provided a 
distinction between novelty and variation in terms of nature and process of origin. 
Beyond this association, two important distinctions were stressed regarding the 
relation of Modern Synthesis participants to mutationism: the distinction between 
different types of macromutations and the distinction between the problem of the 
occurrence of macromutations and the problem of their importance in evolution, 
particularly for the problem of the origin of higher taxa. The distinction between 
homeotic mutations, macromutations and systemic mutations has made clear 
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that only the latter received widespread scepticism while homeotic mutations 
were acknowledged by Modern Synthesis biologists. The central debate, 
especially with Richard Goldschmidt and Otto Schindewolf, concerned the tempo 
and mode of the origin of higher taxa, between the Modern Synthesis “mosaic” 
view and the saltationists’ taxonomic view of their evolution.  
 
The development of speciation studies was marked by a conceptual distinction 
between speciation as reproductive isolation of populations and phenotypic 
change. There was then a conceptual movement of disconnection between 
speciation and the formation of new characters, whereas those processes were 
associated in Darwin’s view, at least according to Dobzhansky’s and Mayr’s 
interpretation.  The development of experimental taxonomy was a related 
illustration of this increased focus on speciation and intraspecific processes. 
However, experimental taxonomy in plants was specific in its degree of technical 
and experimental advancement. The strong focus on polyploidy and 
hybridisation, the recognition of its importance in evolution, associated with 
experimental techniques to induce polyploidy such as colchicine treatment 
allowed for attempt at experimentally testing hypotheses of plant evolution and 
experimentally producing novelties in plants.  
 
The research problem of origin of higher taxa in plants was addressed from 
several different perspectives, some more closely related to the problem of 
novelty (e.g. character series) than others (e.g. biogeography). The Modern 
Synthesis perspective on macroevolution was probably more rejected or ignored 
by botanists than it was by animal paelontologists. The research goals of 
establishing taxonomic relations and explaining morphological evolution were 
often weaved together as illustrated by some of the research on the origin of the 
angiosperm flower.  
 
The concepts of anagenesis, grades and levels of organisation reveal a focus on 
different notions of progress in evolution. They also reveal numerous ambiguities. 
The concept of an agenesis is particularly revealing. For Rensch, it refers to 
different types of improvement in structural organisation and complexity which he 
distinguishes from the concept of adaptation. For Simpson, anagenesis refers to 
progressive phenotypic evolution in a temporal rather than qualitative sense. A 
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focus on the concept of preadaptation showed that it was put to different uses in 
different contexts. Simpson uses it with a focus on ecology. Some functional 
morphologists put it to use, among other explanatory concepts, in explanations 
of morphological novelties.  
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 In chapter 3, I confronted dominant views of the Modern Synthesis 
regarding the exclusion of development by showing Bernhard Rensch’s and 
George Stebbins’s attention to and involvement in developmental approaches to 
evolutionary novelty.  I confronted the view of a consensual and hardening late 
Modern Synthesis by recovering debates related to Mayr’s theory of genetic 
revolution and focusing on I. Michael Lerner as a missing link between Mayr and 
Dobzhansky on one side , and Waddington and Schmalhausen on the other.  
 
The confusion regarding the position of (some) Modern Synthesis architects on 
novelty partly stems from a lack of attention to the contrast class. The main 
theories that were opposed to the Modern Synthesis views were saltationism, 
Lamarckism and orthogenesis Although all three of these theories had many 
versions, prudence should be applied when extending the rejection of these 
theories by the Modern Synthesis to the idea of a rejection of any position that 
undermines selection.  Rensch and Mayr can be taken as examples here The 
position of the Modern Synthesis on novelty is often summarised by opponents 
in the terms of the extrapolation thesis the factors of microevolution (natural 
selection, mutation, migration and drift) are sufficient to explain macroevolution 
Applied more precisely to novelty, it means that new characters appear through 
the accumulation of microevolutionary events (eg Amundson, 2005; Bonner, 
1982, pp. 279–280; Stoltzfus, 2017) Indeed, in Evolution above the species level, 
Rensch defends the thesis that natural selection and mutations are sufficient to 
explain macroevolution, including the emergence of novelties However, a closer 
look at Rensch’s work shows that he develops many hypotheses regarding the 
origin of novelties  material compensation, the action of hormones, 
heterochronies etc These theories are all formulated at levels of organisation 
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above the genes Thus, it would not be accurate to summarise Rensch’s view of 
novelty as the action of natural selection on mutations This judgment can be 
applied to several approaches to novelty covered in this chapter and in chapter 
2, to Stebbins’s approach to angiosperm novelties and well as to the work of 
Walter Bock or parts of Ernst Mayr’s.  
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 Chapter 4 first clarified the distinction between different concepts of 
homology, in particular the biological concept of homology as it is promoted by 
Günter Wagner and the phylogenetic concept of homology. Phylogenetic 
systematics uses a practice-based and pragmatic concept of homology based on 
contextual distinction between character and character states. Günter Wagner, 
in contrast, promotes a distinction of character and character states that carves 
nature at its joint, this is made possible by the developmental mechanism of 
character identity networks.  
 
Wagner considers the angiosperm flower as an illustrious example where a 
character identity network is channeling evolutionary change. Indeed, research 
on the genetics of flower development has allowed the production of an elegant 
and refined model involving the regulation of organ identities by obligate 
association and correlated expression of transcription factors. This model has 
allowed the formulation of hypotheses on the origin of the angiosperm flower in 
developmental genetic terms via processes of homeotic conversion, thresholds 
of expression of transcription factor genes and progressive co-dependence 
between transcription factors. Despite this progress, multiple hypotheses are still 
competing and they still face problems of access to evidence that may never be 
solved.  Wagner unapologetically uses the concept of type and, as the 
mechanism of obligate heterodimerisation suggests, the concept of type points 
to real mechanisms in nature.  However, the flower is not representative of the 
great plasticity of plants and Wagner’s focus may be interpreted as a bias towards 
types.  
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The integration of scientific disciplines to tackle research problems is a flourishing 
area of study in philosophy of science More specifically, regarding the origin of 
novelties, it has already been stressed that different types of novelties can require 
different types of integration for their explanation (Brigandt and Love, 2012, p 
424) Connecting together materials presented in this thesis allows us to flesh out 
and expand on this programmatic insight From the different case studies 
analysed in this thesis (Bock, Müller, Rensch, Stebbins, Wagner), it can be 
concluded that different types of organisms and of characters studied involve 
different types and degrees of integration More precisely, the relationship 
between consideration of function and consideration of form is partly dependent 
on the type of organism or the type of character considered. The structural evo-
devo approach has demonstrated its success for the study of theevolution of the 
flower; a synthesis centred on functional and evolutionary morphology may have 
more explanatory force for skeletal novelties in vertebrates or novelties in plant 
vascular systems. Furthermore, just as the elaboration of a structuralist evo-devo 
has benefited from historical perspectives on its conceptual and empirical roots, 
the historical and philosophical perspectives on functional approaches to novelty 
presented in this thesis should hopefully serve as materials for the elaboration of 
a functional evo-devo.  
 
 
 
  
 238 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Abbott, R., Albach, D., Ansell, S., Arntzen, J. W., Baird, S. J. E., Bierne, N., … 
Zinner, D. (2013). Hybridization and speciation. Journal of Evolutionary 
Biology, 26(2), 229–246.  
Abouheif, E. (1997). Developmental genetics and homology: a hierarchical 
approach. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 12(10), 405–408. 
Adler, K. (2011). Carl Gans (1923 – 2009) and the Integrative Biology of 
Reptiles. Russian Journal of Herpetology, 17(1), 78–80. 
Alfaro, M. E. (2014). Key Evolutionary Innovations. In The Princeton Guide to 
Evolution (pp. 592–598). Princeton University Press. Retrieved from  
Allee, W. C., Park, O., Emerson, A. E., Park, T., & Schmidt, K. P. (1949). 
Principles of animal ecology. Philadelphia: WB Saunders. 
Allen, G. E. (1974). Opposition to the Mendelian-chromosome theory: The 
physiological and developmental genetics of Richard Goldschmidt. 
Journal of the History of Biology, 7(1), 49–92.  
Allen, G. E. (1980). The evolutionary synthesis: Morgan and natural selection 
revisited. In E. Mayr & W. B. Provine (Eds.), The Evolutionary Synthesis: 
Perspectives on the Unification of Biology. (pp. 356– 382). Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Allen, G. E. (1986). TH Morgan and the split between embryology and genetics, 
1910-1935. A History of Embryology, 113–146. 
Allmon, W. D. (2017). Species, lineages, splitting, and divergence: why we still 
need ‘anagenesis’ and ‘cladogenesis’. Biological Journal of the Linnean 
Society, 120(2), 474–479.  
Amadon, D. (1950). The Hawaiian honeycreepers (Aves, Drepaniidae). Bulletin 
of the AMNH, 95,(article 4). 
Amundson, R. (1989). 12 The Trials and Tribulations of Selectionist 
Explanations. Issues in Evolutionary Epistemology: Contemporary 
Engagements between Analytic and Continental Thought, 413. 
Amundson, R. (1994). Two concepts of constraint: Adaptationism and the 
challenge from developmental biology. Philosophy of Science, 556–578. 
 239 
Amundson, R. (2005). The changing role of the embryo in evolutionary thought: 
roots of evo-devo. Cambridge University Press. 
Amundson, R. (2007). Development and Evolution. In S. Sahotra & A. Plutynski 
(Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Biology (pp. 248–268). 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  
Anderson, E., & Stebbins, G. L. (1954). Hybridization as an Evolutionary 
Stimulus. Evolution, 8(4), 378–388. 
Arber, A. (1937). The interpretation of the flower: a study of some aspects of 
morphological thought. Biological Reviews, 12(2), 157–184.  
Arber, A. (1950). The natural philosophy of plant form. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Arber, E. A., & Parkin, J. (1907). On the origin of angiosperms. Botanical 
Journal of the Linnean Society, 38(263), 29–80. 
Armbruster, W. S. (2016). Plant–Pollinator Interactions and Flower 
Diversification A2  - Kliman, Richard M. In Encyclopedia of Evolutionary 
Biology (pp. 297–300). Oxford: Academic Press.  
Armbruster, W. S., Debevec, E. M., & Willson, M. F. (2002). Evolution of 
syncarpy in angiosperms: theoretical and phylogenetic analyses of the 
effects of carpel fusion on offspring quantity and quality. Journal of 
Evolutionary Biology, 15(4), 657–672. 
Arthur, W. (2000). Intraspecific variation in developmental characters: the origin 
of evolutionary novelties. American Zoologist, 40(5), 811–818. 
Arthur, W. (2001). Developmental drive: an important determinant of the 
direction of phenotypic evolution. Evolution & Development, 3(4), 271–
278.  
Axelrod, D. I. (1952). A Theory of Angiosperm Evolution. Evolution, 6(1), 29–60.  
Axelrod, D. J. (1960). The evolution of flowering plants. In Sol Tax (Ed.), 
Evolution after Darwin (Vol. 1, pp. 227–305). 
Baltzer, F. (1950a). Chimaren und merogone bei Amphibien. Rev. Suisse Zool, 
57(Suppl 1), 93–114. 
Baltzer, F. von. (1950b). Entwicklungsphysiologische Betrachtungen über 
Probleme der Homologie und Evolution. Rev. Suisse Zool, 57, 451. 
Bartholomew, G. A. (1964). The roles of physiology and behaviour in the 
maintenance of homeostasis in the desert environment. In Symposia of 
the Society for Experimental Biology (Vol. 18, p. 7). 
 240 
Barton, N. H., & Charlesworth, B. (1984). Genetic Revolutions, Founder Effects, 
and Speciation. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 15(1), 133–
164.  
Bateman, R. M., & DiMichele, W. A. (2002). Generating and filtering major 
phenotypic novelties: neoGoldschmidtian saltation revisited. Systematics 
association special volume, 65, 109–159. 
Bateman, R. M., Hilton, J., & Rudall, P. J. (2006). Morphological and molecular 
phylogenetic context of the angiosperms: contrasting the ‘top-down’and 
‘bottom-up’approaches used to infer the likely characteristics of the first 
flowers. Journal of Experimental Botany, 57(13), 3471–3503. 
Bateson, W. (1894). Materials for the study of variation treated with especial 
regard to discontinuity in the origin of species. London, New York, 
Macmillan and co. 
Baum, D A., & Donoghue, M. J. (2002). Transference of function, heterotopy  
and the evolution of plant development. In Cronk, Q. C., Bateman, R. M., 
& Hawkins, J. A. (Eds.), Developmental Genetics and Plant Evolution 
Taylor and Francis: London, 52–69. 
Baum, D A., & Hileman, L. C. (2006). A developmental genetic model for the 
origin of the flower. Annual Plant Reviews, Flowering and Its 
Manipulation, 20, 3–27. 
Beatty, J. (1987). Weighing the risks: Stalemate in the classical/balance 
controversy. Journal of the History of Biology, 20(3), 289–319.  
Beatty, J. (1990). Evolutionary anti-reductionism: Historical reflections. Biology 
and Philosophy, 5(2), 199–210.  
Beatty, J. (1992). Julian Huxley and the evolutionary synthesis. In C. K. Waters 
& A. Van Helden (Eds.), Julian Huxley, biologist and statesman of 
science: proceedings of a conference held at Rice University, 25-27 
September 1987. Texas A&M University Press. 
Beatty, J. (1994). The proximate/ultimate distinction in the multiple careers of 
Ernst Mayr. Biology and Philosophy, 9(3), 333–356. 
Beatty, J. (1995). The evolutionary contingency thesis. Concepts, Theories, and 
Rationality in the Biological Sciences, 45–81. 
Beatty, J. (1997). Why Do Biologists Argue like They Do? Philosophy of 
Science, 64, S432–S443. 
 241 
Beatty, J. (2006). Replaying Life’s Tape. The Journal of Philosophy, 103(7), 
336–362. 
Beatty, J. (2016). The Creativity of Natural Selection? Part I: Darwin, 
Darwinism, and the Mutationists. Journal of the History of Biology, 49(4), 
659–684.  
Bedau, M. A. (1992). Measurement of evolutionary activity. In Artificial Life II 
(pp. 431–461). Addison-Wesley. 
Behe, M. J. (1996). Darwin’s black box: The biochemical challenge to evolution. 
Simon and Schuster. 
Blakeslee, A. F., & Avery, A. G. (1937). Methods of inducing doubling of 
chromosomes in plants: by treatment with colchicine. Journal of Heredity, 
28(12), 393–411. 
Bock, W J. (1959). Preadaptation and multiple evolutionary pathways. 
Evolution, 194–211. 
Bock, W J. (1965a). The role of adaptive mechanisms in the origin of higher 
levels of organization. Systematic Biology, 14(4), 272–287. 
Bock, W J. (1965b). The Role of Adaptive Mechanisms in the Origin of Higher 
Levels of Organization. Systematic Biology, 14(4), 272–287. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/sysbio/14.4.272 
Bock, W J. (1979). The synthetic explanation of macroevolutionary change–a 
reductionist approach. Bull. Carnegie Mus. Nat. Hist, 13, 20–69. 
Bock, W J. (1981). Functional-adaptive analysis in evolutionary classification. 
American Zoologist, 21(1), 5–20. 
Bock, W J., & von Wahlert, G. (1963). Two Evolutionary Theories--A 
Discussion. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 14(54), 
140–146. 
Bock, W J., & von Wahlert, G. (1965). Adaptation and the form-function 
complex. Evolution, 269–299. 
Bock, W J, & Miller, W. D. (1959). The scansorial foot of the woodpeckers, with 
comments on the evolution of perching and climbing feet in birds. 
American Museum novitates ; no. 1931.  
Bonner, J. T. (Ed.). (1982). Evolution and development: report of the Dahlem 
Workshopon Evolution and Development, Berlin 1981, May 10-15. Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag. 
 242 
Borrello, M. E. (2009). Shifting Balance and Balancing Selection: A Group 
Selectionist’s Interpretation of Wright and Dobzhansky. Transactions of 
the American Philosophical Society, 99(1), 323–344. 
Bowler, P. J. (1992). The eclipse of Darwinism: Anti-Darwinian evolution 
theories in the decades around 1900. JHU Press. 
Breuker, C. J., Debat, V., & Klingenberg, C. P. (2006). Functional evo-devo. 
Trends in ecology & evolution, 21(9), 488-492. 
Brigandt, I. (2003). Homology in comparative, molecular, and evolutionary 
developmental biology: the radiation of a concept. Journal of 
Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 
299(1), 9–17. 
Brigandt, I. (2006). Homology and heterochrony: the evolutionary embryologist 
Gavin Rylands de beer (1899–1972). Journal of Experimental Zoology 
Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 306B(4), 317–328.  
Brigandt, I. (2007). Typology now: homology and developmental constraints 
explain evolvability. Biology & Philosophy, 22(5), 709–725.  
Brigandt, I. (2010). Beyond reduction and pluralism: Toward an epistemology of  
explanatory integration in biology. Erkenntnis, 73(3), 295-311. 
Brigandt, I. (2015). From developmental constraint to evolvability: how concepts 
figure in explanation and disciplinary identity. In Conceptual Change in 
Biology (pp. 305–325). Springer.  
Brigandt, I., & Love, A. C. (2012). Conceptualizing evolutionary novelty: moving 
beyond definitional debates. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: 
Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 318(6), 417–427. 
Briggs, D., & Walters, S. M. (2016). Plant Variation and Evolution. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Brower, A. V. Z. (2014). Transformational and taxic homology revisited. 
Cladistics,  
Cladistics, 31(2), 197-201. 
Brown, R. L. (2014). Identifying Behavioral Novelty. Biological Theory, 1–14. 
Budd, G. E. (2006). On the origin and evolution of major morphological 
characters. Biological Reviews, 81(4), 609–628. 
Burian, R., Gayon, J., & Zallen, D. (1991). Boris Ephrussi and the synthesis of 
genetics and embryology. A Conceptual History of Modern Embryology, 
207–227. 
 243 
Burian, R. M. (1988). Challenges to the evolutionary synthesis. In Evolutionary 
biology (pp. 247–269). Springer.  
Burke, A. C. (1989). Development of the turtle carapace: implications for the 
evolution of a novel bauplan. Journal of Morphology, 199(3), 363–378. 
Caianiello, S. (2015). Succession of functions, from Darwin to Dohrn. History 
and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 36(3), 335–345.  
Cain, J. (2009a). Rethinking the Synthesis Period in Evolutionary Studies. 
Journal of the History of Biology, 42(4), 621–648.  
Cain, J. (2009b). ‘Ritual Patricide: Why Stephen Jay Gould Assassinated 
George Gaylord Simpson. The Paleobiological Revolution: Essays on the 
Growth of Modern Paleontology, 346–363. 
Canguilhem, G., & Delaporte, F. (1994). A vital rationalist (Vol. 6). New York: 
Zone Books. 
Carine, M. A., & Scotland, R. W. (1999). Taxic and transformational homology: 
different ways of seeing. Cladistics, 15(2), 121–129. 
Carroll, S. B. (2005). Endless forms most beautiful: The new science of evo 
devo and the making of the animal kingdom. WW Norton & Company. 
Carroll, S. B. (2008). Evo-devo and an expanding evolutionary synthesis: a 
genetic theory of morphological evolution. Cell, 134(1), 25–36. 
Carson, H. L., & Templeton, A. R. (1984). Genetic Revolutions in Relation to  
Speciation Phenomena: The Founding of New Populations Annual 
review of ecology and systematics, 15(1), 97-132. 
 Cartwright, N. (2007). Are RCTs the Gold Standard? BioSocieties, 2(1), 11–20.  
Cartwright, N., & Munro, E. (2010). The limitations of randomized controlled 
trials in predicting effectiveness. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical 
Practice, 16(2), 260–266.  
Casinos, A. (2017). From Cuénot’s préadaptation to Gould and Vrba’s 
exaptation: a review. Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 121(2), 
239–247.  
Cattani, G. (2008). Reply to Dew’s (2007) commentary:“Pre-adaptation, 
exaptation and technology speciation: a comment on Cattani (2006)”. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 17(3), 585–596. 
Causier, B., Schwarz-Sommer, Z., & Davies, B. (2010). Floral organ identity: 20 
years of ABCs. Seminars in Cell & Developmental Biology, 21(1), 73–79.  
 244 
Chan, Y. F., Marks, M. E., Jones, F. C., Villarreal, G., Shapiro, M. D., Brady, S. 
D., … Schmutz, J. (2010). Adaptive evolution of pelvic reduction in 
sticklebacks by recurrent deletion of a Pitx1 enhancer. Science, 
327(5963), 302–305. 
Chanderbali, A. S., Berger, B. A., Howarth, D. G., Soltis, P. S., & Soltis, D. E. 
(2016). Evolving Ideas on the Origin and Evolution of Flowers: New 
Perspectives in the Genomic Era. Genetics, 202(4), 1255–1265. 
Charlesworth, B., & Rouhani, S. (1988). The Probability of Peak Shifts in a 
Founder Population. II. An Additive Polygenic Trait. Evolution, 42(6), 
1129–1145. https://doi.org/10.2307/2408998 
Cheverud, J. M. (1984). Quantitative genetics and developmental constraints on 
evolution by selection. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 110(2), 155–171. 
Classen-Bockhoff, R. (2001). Plant Morphology: The Historic Concepts of 
Wilhelm Troll, Walter Zimmermann and Agnes Arber. Annals of Botany, 
88(6), 1153–1172.  
Clausen, J., Keck, D. D., Hiesey, W. M., & Grun, P. (1948). Experimental 
taxonomy. Experimental taxonomy.  
Clausen, R. E., & Goodspeed, T. H. (1925). Interspecific hybridization in 
Nicotiana. II. A tetraploid glutinosa-tabacum hybrid, an experimental 
verification of Winge’s hypothesis. Genetics, 10(3), 278–284. 
Coen, E. S., & Meyerowitz, E. M. (1991). The war of the whorls: genetic 
interactions controlling flower development. Nature, 353(6339), 31–37. 
Coleman, W. (1980). Morphology in the evolutionary synthesis. In E. Mayr & W. 
B. Provine (Eds.), The evolutionary synthesis: perspectives on the 
unification of biology (pp. 174–180). Harvard University Press.  
Constance, L. (1955). The systematics of the angiosperms. In A century of 
progress in the natural sciences 1853-1953. San Francisco: California 
academy of science. 
Corner, E. J. H. (1958). Transference of function. Journal of the Linnean Society 
of London, Zoology, 44(295), 33–40. 
Corning, P. A. (2013). Evolution ‘on purpose’: how behaviour has shaped the 
evolutionary process. Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 112(2), 
242–260.  
Cracraft, J. (1981). The use of functional and adaptive criteria in phylogenetic 
systematics. American Zoologist, 21(1), 21–36. 
 245 
Cracraft, J. (2005). Phylogeny and evo-devo: Characters, homology, and the 
historical analysis of the evolution of development. Zoology, 108(4), 345–
356.  
Craig, L. R. (2014). Neo-Darwinism and Evo-Devo: An Argument for Theoretical 
Pluralism in Evolutionary Biology. Perspectives on Science, 23(3), 243–
279.  
Crompton, A. W., & Parkyn, D. G. (1963). On the lower jaw of diarth rogn athus 
and the origin of the mammalian lower jaw. Proceedings of the 
Zoological Society of London, 140(4), 697–749.  
Crow, J. F. (2009). Mayr, mathematics and the study of evolution. Journal of 
Biology, 8, 13. 
Cuénot, L. (1901). L’évolution des théories transformistes. Rev. Gén. Sc. Pures 
Appl, 12, 264–269. 
Cuénot, L. (1914). Théorie de la préadaptation. Scientia, 16, 60–73. 
Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species by means of natural selection. 
London: John Murray. 
Darwin, C. (1872). On the origin of species by means of natural selection. (6th 
ed.). London: John Murray. 
Davidson, E. H., & Erwin, D. H. (2006). Gene Regulatory Networks and the 
Evolution of Animal Body Plans. Science, 311(5762), 796–800.  
Davis, G. K., Dietrich, M. R., & Jacobs, D. K. (2009). Homeotic Mutants and the 
Assimilation of Developmental Genetics into the Evolutionary Synthesis, 
1915-1952. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 99(1), 
133–154. 
Davis, G. L. (1967). Systematic embryology of the angiosperms. John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Davis, P. H., & Heywood, V. H. (1963). Principles of angiosperm taxonomy. 
Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd. 
De Beer, G. R. (1930). Embryology and evolution. Oxford Clarendon Press 
De Beer, G. R. (1951). Embryos and ancestors. (2nd ed) Oxford Clarendon 
Press 
De Beer, G. R. (1954). Archeopterix and evolution. Adv. Sci, (11), 160–170. 
De Beer, G R (1971). Homology: An Unsolved Problem. Oxford University 
Press. 
 246 
De Ricqlès, A., & Padian, K. (2009). Quelques apports à la théorie de 
l’Évolution, de la « Synthèse orthodoxe » à la « Super synthèse évo-
dévo » 1970–2009 : un point de vue. Comptes Rendus Palevol, 8(2–3), 
341–364.  
Delisle, R. G. (2008). Expanding the Framework of the Holism/Reductionism 
Debate in Neo-Darwinism: The Case of Theodosius Dobzhansky and 
Bernhard Rensch. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 30(2), 
207–226. 
Delisle, R. G. (2009). The Uncertain Foundation of Neo-Darwinism: 
Metaphysical and Epistemological Pluralism in the Evolutionary 
Synthesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C, 40(2), 
119–132. 
Dembski, W. A. (1998). The design inference: Eliminating chance through small 
probabilities. Cambridge University Press. 
Dennett, D. C. (1998). Preston on Exaptation: Herons, Apples, and Eggs. The 
Journal of Philosophy, 95(11), 576–580.  
Deutsch, J. (2005). Hox and wings. BioEssays, 27(7), 673–675.  
Dietrich, M. R. (1994). The origins of the neutral theory of molecular evolution. 
Journal of the History of Biology, 27(1), 21–59.  
Dietrich, M. R. (1995). Richard Goldschmidt’s “heresies” and the evolutionary 
synthesis. Journal of the History of Biology, 28(3), 431–461. 
Dietrich, M. R. (2000). From hopeful monsters to homeotic effects: Richard 
Goldschmidt’s integration of development, evolution, and genetics. 
American Zoologist, 40(5), 738–747. 
Dietrich, M. R. (2003). Richard Goldschmidt: hopeful monsters and other 
‘heresies’. Nature Reviews Genetics, 4(1), 68–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nrg979 
Diogo, R. (2016). Where is the Evo in Evo-Devo (evolutionary developmental 
biology)? Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and 
Developmental Evolution, 326(1), 9–18.  
Diogo, R. (2018). Where is, in 2017, the evo in evo-devo (evolutionary 
developmental biology)? Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: 
Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 330(1), 15–22.  
 247 
Dobzhansky, T. (1950). Genetics of natural populations. XIX. Origin of heterosis 
through natural selection in populations of Drosophila pseudoobscura. 
Genetics, 35(3), 288–302. 
Dobzhansky, T. (1955). A review of some fundamental concepts and problems 
of population genetics. Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative 
Biology, 20, 1–15. 
Dobzhansky, T. (1935). A critique of the species concept in biology. Philosophy 
of Science, 2(3), 344–355. 
Dobzhansky T. (1936). Position effects on genes. Biological Reviews, 11(3), 
364–384.  
Dobzhansky, T. (1937). Genetics and the origin of species. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Dobzhansky, T. (1951). Genetics and the Origin of Species (Third edition). 
Columbia university press. 
Dobzhansky, T. (1964). Biology, Molecular and Organismic. American 
Zoologist, 4(4), 443–452. 
Dobzhansky, T. (1980). Morgan and His School in the 1930s. In E. Mayr & W. 
B. Provine (Eds.), The Evolutionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the 
Unification of Biology (pp. 445–452). Harvard University Press. 
Dobzhansky, Theodosius, & Levene, H. (1948). Genetics of Natural 
Populations. Xvii. Proof of Operation of Natural Selection in Wild 
Populations of Drosophila Pseudoobscura. Genetics, 33(6), 537–547. 
Dohrn, A. (1875). Der Ursprung der Wirbelthiere und das Princip des 
Functionswechsels: Genealogische Skizzen. W. Engelmann. 
Dohrn, A., & Ghiselin, M. T. (1994). The Origin of Vertebrates and the Principle 
of Succession of Functions: Genealogical Sketches by Anton Dohrn 
1875. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 16(1), 3–96. 
Donoghue, M. J., Doyle, Gauthier, Kluge, & Rowe. (1989). The Importance of 
Fossils in Phylogeny Reconstruction. Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics, 20(1), 431–460.  
Dullemeijer, P. (1959). A comparative functional-anatomical study of the heads 
of some Viperidae. Morph. Jb., 9, 881–985. 
Dullemeijer, P. (1980). Functional morphology and evolutionary biology. Acta 
Biotheoretica, 29(3–4), 151–250.  
Dupré, J. (2001). Human nature and the limits of science. Clarendon Press. 
 248 
Eigsti, O. J., & Dustin, P. (1955). Colchicine - in agriculture, medicine, biology 
and chemistry. (Vol. 50). Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press. 
Eldredge, N. (1971). The Allopatric Model and Phylogeny in Paleozoic 
Invertebrates. Evolution, 25(1), 156–167.  
Eldredge, N. (1992). Marjorie Grene, ‘tTwo Evolutionary Theories’ and modern 
evolutionary theory. Synthese, 92(1), 135–149.  
Eldredge, N., & Cracraft, J. (1980). Phylogenetic patterns and the evolutionary 
process. Method and theory in comparative biology. New York.: 
Columbia Univ. Press. 
Eldredge, N., & Gould, Stephen Jay. (1972). Punctuated equilibria: an 
alternative to  
phyletic gradualism. in T. J. M. Schopf (ed.), Models in Paleobiology, 
Freeman, Cooper, San Francisco, pp. 82-115. 
Endler, J. A. (1986). Natural selection in the wild. Princeton University Press. 
Endress, P. K. (2001). Origins of flower morphology. Journal of Experimental 
Zoology, 291(2), 105–115.  
Endress, P. K. (2008). Perianth Biology in the Basal Grade of Extant 
Angiosperms. International Journal of Plant Sciences, 169(7), 844–862.  
Endress, P. K., & Doyle, J. A. (2009). Reconstructing the ancestral angiosperm 
flower and its initial specializations. American Journal of Botany, 96(1), 
22–66. 
Erwin, D. H. (2015). Novelty and Innovation in the History of Life. Current 
Biology, 25(19), R930–R940. 
Felsenstein, J. (1975). The Genetic Basis of Evolutionary Change. Evolution, 
29(3), 587–590.  
Fenster, C. B., Armbruster, W. S., Wilson, P., Dudash, M. R., & Thomson, J. D. 
(2004). Pollination Syndromes and Floral Specialization. Annual Review 
of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics, 35, 375–403. 
Fisher, R. A. (1930). The genetical theory of natural selection. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Fisher, R. A., & Stock, C. S. (1915). Cuenot on preadaptation: A criticism. The 
Eugenics Review, 7(1), 46–61. 
Flower, J. W. (1964). On the origin of flight in insects. Journal of Insect 
Physiology, 10(1), 81–88.  
 249 
Fodor, J. (2007, October 18). Why Pigs Don’t Have Wings. London Review of 
Books, pp. 19–22. 
Forber, P. (2005). On the explanatory roles of natural selection. Biology and 
Philosophy, 20(2–3), 329–342. 
Foster, A. S., & Gifford, E. M. (1974). Comparative morphology of vascular 
plants. 
Frazzetta, T. H. (1970). From Hopeful Monsters to Bolyerine Snakes? The 
American Naturalist, 104(935), 55–72.  
Frazzetta, Thomas H. (1975). Complex adaptations in evolving populations. 
Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates. 
Freudenstein, J. V. (2005). Characters, states and homology. Systematic 
Biology, 54(6), 965–973. 
Frohlich, M. W. (2003). An evolutionary scenario for the origin of flowers. Nature 
Reviews Genetics, 4(7), 559. 
Frohlich, M. W., & Parker, D. S. (2000). The mostly male theory of flower 
evolutionary origins: from genes to fossils. Systematic Botany, 25(2), 
155–170. 
Fryer, G. (1968). Evolution and adaptive radiation in the chydoridae (crustacea: 
cladocera): a study in comparative functional morphology and ecology. 
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 254(795), 221–384.  
Futuyma, D. J. (2015). Can modern evolutionary theory explain 
macroevolution? In Macroevolution (pp. 29–85). Springer.  
Galis, F. (1996). The application of functional morphology to evolutionary 
studies. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 11(3), 124–129. 
Galis, F. (2001). Key Innovations and Radiations. In G P. Wagner (Ed.), The 
Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology (pp. 581–605). San Diego: 
Academic Press.  
Gans, C. (1963). Functional analysis in a single adaptive radiation. In 
Proceedings of the XVI International Congress of Zoology (Vol. 3, pp. 
278–282). 
Gans, Carl. (1961). The Feeding Mechanism of Snakes and Its Possible 
Evolution. American Zoologist, 1(2), 217–227. 
Gans, Carl. (1974). Biomechanics: an approach to vertebrate biology. Lippincott 
Williams & Wilkins. 
 250 
Garay, L. A. (1960). On the origin of orchidaceae. Botanical Museum Leaflets, 
Harvard University, 19(3), 57–96. 
Gates, R. R. (1924). Polyploidy. Journal of Experimental Biology, 1(2), 153–
182. 
Gayon, J. (1990). Critics and criticisms of the modern synthesis: the viewpoint 
of a philosopher. Evolutionary Biology, 24, 1–49. 
Gayon, J. (1998). Darwinism’s struggle for survival: heredity and the hypothesis 
of natural selection. Cambridge University Press. 
Gehring, W. J. (1998). Master control genes in development and evolution: The 
homeobox story. Yale University Press. 
Gerhart, J. (1998). Johannes Holtfreter: January 9, 1901–November 13, 1992. 
Biographical Memoirs National Academy of Sciences (US), 73, 209–228. 
Ghiselin, M. T. (1980). The failure of morphology to assimilate Darwinism. In E. 
Mayr & W. B. Provine (Eds.), The evolutionary synthesis: perspectives 
on the unification of biology (pp. 180–193). Harvard University Press.  
Ghiselin, M. T. (2003). Carl Gegenbaur versus Anton Dohrn. Theory in 
Biosciences, 122(2), 142–147.  
Ghiselin, M. T. (2006). The failure of morphology to contribute to the modern 
synthesis. Theory in Biosciences, 124(3–4), 309–316.  
Gilbert, S. F. (1994). Dobzhansky, Waddington and Schmalhausen: Embryology 
and the modern synthesis. The Evolution of Theodosius Dobzhansky: 
Essays on His Life and Thought in Russia and America, 143–154. 
Gilbert, S. F. (2003). Evo-Devo, Devo-Evo, and Devgen-Popgen. Biology and 
Philosophy, 18(2), 347–352.  
Gilbert, S. F., Loredo, G. A., Brukman, A., & Burke, A. C. (2001). 
Morphogenesis of the turtle shell: the development of a novel structure in 
tetrapod evolution. Evolution & Development, 3(2), 47–58. 
Gilbert, S. F., Opitz, J. M., & Raff, R. A. (1996). Resynthesizing evolutionary 
and developmental biology. Developmental Biology, 173(2), 357–372. 
Glass, B. (1949). [Review of Review of Neuere Probleme der 
Abstammungslehre: Die Transpezifische Evolution, by B. Rensch]. The 
Quarterly Review of Biology, 24(3), 232–235. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (1994). A Modern History Theory of Functions. Noûs, 28(3), 
344–362.  
 251 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009). Darwinian populations and natural selection. Oxford 
University Press. 
Goldschmidt, R. (1940). The material basis of evolution. Yale University Press. 
Goldschmidt, R. B. (1928). The gene. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 3(3), 
307–324. 
Goldschmidt, R. B. (1938). Physiological genetics. McGraw-Hill.  
Goldschmidt, R. B. (1952). Evolution as viewed by one geneticist. American 
Scientist, 40(1), 84–135. 
Gottlieb, L. D. (1984). Genetics and Morphological Evolution in Plants. The 
American Naturalist, 123(5), 681–709. 
Gould, S. J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1979). The spandrels of San Marco and the 
Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme. Proc. 
R. Soc. Lond. B, 205(1161), 581–598.  
Gould, S J. (1987). Is a new and general theory of evolution emerging? In Self-
Organizing Systems (pp. 113–130). Springer.  
Gould, S J. (1970). Evolutionary paleontology and the science of form. Earth-
Science Reviews, 6(2), 77–119. 
Gould, S J. (1982a). The uses of heresy: An introduction to Richard 
Goldschmidt’s The material basis of evolution. The Material Basis of 
Evolution, XIII–XLII. 
Gould, S J. (1982b). The uses of heresy: An introduction to Richard 
Goldschmidt’s The material basis of evolution. The Material Basis of 
Evolution. 
Gould, S J. (1983). The hardening of the modern synthesis. In R. M. Burian & 
M. Grene (Eds.), Dimensions of Darwinism: Themes and counter themes 
in 20th century evolutionary theory. 
Gould, S J. (2000). Wonderful life: the Burgess Shale and the nature of history. 
Random House. 
Gould, S J. (2002). The structure of evolutionary theory. Harvard University 
Press. 
Gould, S J., & Vrba, E. S. (1982). Exaptation-a missing term in the science of 
form. Paleobiology, 4–15. 
Grandcolas, P. (2015). Adaptation. In T. Heams, P. Huneman, G. Lecointre, & 
M. Silberstein (Eds.), Handbook of Evolutionary Thinking in the Sciences 
(pp. 77–93). Springer Netherlands.  
 252 
Grant, P. R., & Grant, B. R. (2006). Evolution of Character Displacement in 
Darwin9s Finches. Science, 313(5784), 224–226.  
Grant, T., & Kluge, A. G. (2004). Transformation Series as an Ideographic 
Character Concept. Cladistics, 20(1), 23–31.  
Grene, M. (1958). Two Evolutionary Theories (I). The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 9(34), 110–127. 
Griesemer, J.R. (2013). Integration of approaches in David Wake’s model-taxon   
research platform for evolutionary morphology. Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44: 525–536. 
Griffiths, P. E. (1994). Cladistic Classification and Functional Explanation. 
Philosophy of Science, 61(2), 206–227. 
Griffiths, P. E. (1996). The Historical Turn in the Study of Adaptation. The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47(4), 511–532. 
Grimoult, C. (2001). L’evolution théorique d’un évolutioniste: Lucien Cuénot. 
Ludus Vitalis, vol. IX, n° 16, 2001, p. 3-25 
Gudo, M. (2002). The development of the critical theory of evolution: The 
scientific career of Wolfgang F. Gutmann. Theory in Biosciences, 121(1), 
101–137.  
Gupta, V., & Stebbins, G. L. (1969). Peroxidase activity in hooded and awned 
barley at successive stages of development. Biochemical Genetics, 3(1), 
15–24.  
Gutmann, W. F. (1966). Funktionsmorphologische Beitrage zur ‘Gastraea-
Coelomtheorie’. Senckenbergiana Biologica, 47, 225–250. 
Haag, E. S., & True, J. R. (2001). Perspective:from mutants to mechanisms? 
assessing the candidate gene paradigm in evolutionary biology. 
Evolution, 55(6), 1077–1084. 
Haag, E. S., & True, J. R. (2018). Developmental System Drift. In Evolutionary 
Developmental Biology (pp. 1–12). Springer, Cham.  
Haffer, J. (2007). Ornithology, Evolution, and Philosophy: The Life and Science 
of Ernst Mayr 1904-2005. Springer Science & Business Media. 
Hagen, J. B. (1984). Experimentalists and naturalists in twentieth-century 
botany: Experimental taxonomy, 1920–1950. Journal of the History of 
Biology, 17(2), 249–270 
Haldane, J. B. S. (1932). The causes of evolution. 
 253 
Hall, B. K. (1994). Homology: The Hierarchial Basis of Comparative Biology. 
Access Online via Elsevier. 
Hall, B. K. (1999). Evolutionary developmental biology. Springer. 
Hall, B. K. (2000). Guest Editorial: Evo-devo or devo-evo — does it matter? 
Evolution & Development, 2(4), 177–178.  
Hall, B. K. (2003). Descent with modification: the unity underlying homology and 
homoplasy as seen through an analysis of development and evolution. 
Biological Reviews, 78(3), 409–433. 
Hall, B. K. (2005). Fifty years later: I. Michael Lerner’s Genetic Homeostasis 
(1954)—a valiant attempt to integrate genes, organisms and 
environment. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and 
Developmental Evolution, 304B(3), 187–197. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/jez.b.21052 
Hall, B. K., & Kerney, R. (2012). Levels of biological organization and the origin 
of novelty. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and 
Developmental Evolution, 318(6), 428–437. 
HallgrÍmsson, B., Jamniczky, H. A., Young, N. M., Rolian, C., Schmidt-ott, U., & 
Marcucio, R. S. (2012). The generation of variation and the 
developmental basis for evolutionary novelty. Journal of Experimental 
Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 318(6), 501–
517. 
Hallgrímsson, B., Willmore Katherine, & Hall Brian K. (2002). Canalization, 
developmental stability, and morphological integration in primate limbs. 
American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 119(35), 131–158.  
Hamburger, V. (1980). Embryology and the Modern Synthesis in Evolutionary 
Theory. In E. Mayr & W. B. Provine (Eds.), The evolutionary synthesis: 
perspectives on the unification of biology. Harvard University Press.  
Hamburger, V. (1988). The heritage of experimental embryology: Hans 
Spemann and the organizer (Vol. 199). Oxford University Press on 
Demand. 
Hamburger, V. (1990). Embryology and the Modern Synthesis in Evolutionary 
Theory. In Neuroembryology (pp. 334–349). Birkhäuser, Boston, MA.  
Hardwig, J. (1985). Epistemic Dependence. The Journal of Philosophy, 82(7), 
335–349. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026523 
 254 
Harlan, J. R., & deWet, J. M. J. (1975). On Ö. Winge and a Prayer: The origins 
of polyploidy. The Botanical Review, 41(4), 361–390.  
Hennig, W. (1966). Phylogenetic systematics. University of Illinois Press. 
Hennig, W. (1975). ‘ Cladistic Analysis or Cladistic Classification?’: A Reply to 
Ernst Mayr. Systematic Zoology, 244–256. 
Hohenlohe, P. A., Bassham, S., Etter, P. D., Stiffler, N., Johnson, E. A., & 
Cresko, W. A. (2010). Population Genomics of Parallel Adaptation in 
Threespine Stickleback using Sequenced RAD Tags. PLoS Genet, 6(2), 
e1000862.  
Holtfreter, J. (1934). Formative Reize in der Embryonalentwicklung der 
Amphibien, dargestellt an Explantationsversuchen. Gustav Fischer. 
Holtfreter, J. (1991). Reminiscences on the life and work of Johannes Holtfreter. 
In A conceptual history of modern embryology (pp. 109–127). Springer. 
Horstadius, S. (1939). The mechanics of sea urchin development, studied by 
operative methods. Biological Reviews, 14(2), 132–179. 
Hossfeld, U., & Olsson, L. (2003). The road from Haeckel: The Jena tradition in 
evolutionary morphology and the origins of “Evo-Devo”. Biology and 
Philosophy, 18(2), 285–307. 
Hubbs, C. L. (1938). Fishes from the caves of Yucatan. Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, (Pub. No. 491), 261–295. 
Huether, C. A. (1968). Exposure of natural genetic variability underlying the 
pentamerous corolla constancy in Linanthus androsaceus ssp. 
androsaceus. Genetics, 60(1), 123–146. 
Huether, Carl A. (1969). Constancy of the pentamerous corolla phenotype in 
natural populations of linanthus. Evolution, 23(4), 572–588.  
Hull, D. L. (1988). Science as a process: an evolutionary account of the social 
and conceptual development of science. University of Chicago Press. 
Hull, D. L. (2008). Leon Croizat: a radical biogeographer. In M. R. Dietrich & O. 
Harman (Eds.), Rebels, Mavericks, and Heretics In Biology (pp. 194–
212). New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 
Huneman, P. (2013). Weak realism in the etiological theory of functions. In 
Functions: selection and mechanisms (pp. 105–130). Springer. 
Huneman, P. (2014). A Pluralist Framework to Address Challenges to the 
Modern Synthesis in Evolutionary Theory. Biological Theory, 9(2), 163–
177.  
 255 
Hunter, J. P., & Jernvall, J. (1995). The hypocone as a key innovation in 
mammalian evolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 92(23), 10718–10722. 
Huxley, J. (Ed.). (1940). The new systematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Huxley, J. (1942). Evolution. The Modern Synthesis. Evolution. The Modern 
Synthesis. 
Huxley, J. (1954). The evolutionary process. In J. Huxley, A. C. Hardy, & E. B. 
Ford (Eds.), Evolution as a Process (pp. 9–33). London: George Allen 
and Unwin. 
Huxley, J. S. (1959). Clades and grades. Function and Taxonomic Importance 
(Ed. AJ Cain), 21–22. 
Jaramillo, M. A., & Kramer, E. M. (2007). The Role of Developmental Genetics 
in Understanding Homology and Morphological Evolution in Plants. 
International Journal of Plant Sciences, 168(1), 61–72.  
Jenner, R. A. (2008). Evo-devo’s identity: from model organisms to 
developmental types. Evolving Pathways. Keynotes in Evolutionary 
Developmental Biology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 100–
119. 
Johnson, P. E. (1991). Darwin on trial. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press. 
Jones, F. C., Grabherr, M. G., Chan, Y. F., Russell, P., Mauceli, E., Johnson, 
J., … Kingsley, D. M. (2012). The genomic basis of adaptive evolution in 
threespine sticklebacks. Nature, 484(7392), 55.  
Judd, W. S., Campbell, C. S., Kellogg, E. A., Stevens, P. F., & Donoghue, M. J. 
(1999). Plant systematics: a phylogenetic approach. Ecologia 
Mediterranea, 25(2), 215. 
Kaplan, D. R. (2001). The science of plant morphology: definition, history, and 
role in modern biology. American Journal of Botany, 88(10), 1711–1741. 
Kauffman, S. A. (1993). The origins of order: Self-organization and selection in 
evolution. Oxford university press. 
Kihara, H., & Ono, T. (1926). Chromosomenzahlen und systematische 
gruppierung der Rumex-arten. Zeitschrift Für Zellforschung Und 
Mikroskopische Anatomie, 4(3), 475–481. 
Klingenberg, C. P., & Nijhout, H. F. (1998). Competition among growing organs 
and developmental control of morphological asymmetry. Proceedings of 
 256 
the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 265(1401), 1135–
1139.  
Kohn, D. (2009). Darwin’s Keystone : The Principle of Divergence. In M. Ruse & 
R. J. Richards (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the ‘Origin of 
Species’. Cambridge University Press. 
Kramer, E. M., & Jaramillo, M. A. (2005). Genetic basis for innovations in floral 
organ identity. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and 
Developmental Evolution, 304(6), 526–535. 
Kuratani, S., Kuraku, S., & Nagashima, H. (2011). Evolutionary developmental 
perspective for the origin of turtles: the folding theory for the shell based 
on the developmental nature of the carapacial ridge. Evolution & 
Development, 13(1), 1–14. 
Kutschera, U., & Niklas, K. J. (2004). The modern theory of biological evolution: 
an expanded synthesis. Naturwissenschaften, 91(6), 255–276. 
Lack, D. (1947). Darwin’s finches. CUP Archive. 
Laland, K. N., Sterelny, K., Odling-Smee, J., Hoppitt, W., & Uller, T. (2011). 
Cause and effect in biology revisited: is Mayr’s proximate-ultimate 
dichotomy still useful? Science, 334(6062), 1512–1516. 
Laland, K. N., Uller, T., Feldman, M., Sterelny, K., Müller, G. B., Moczek, A., … 
Strassmann, J. E. (2014). Does evolutionary theory need a rethink? 
Nature, 514(7521), 161–164.  
Laland, K. N., Uller, T., Feldman, M. W., Sterelny, K., Müller, G. B., Moczek, 
A., … Odling-Smee, J. (2015). The extended evolutionary synthesis: its 
structure, assumptions and predictions. In Proc. R. Soc. B (Vol. 282, p. 
20151019). The Royal Society. 
Lambertz, M., & Perry, S. F. (2015). The lung-swimbladder issue: a simple case 
of homology—or not? In G. Zaccone, (Ed.), Phylogeny, Anatomy and 
Physiology of Ancient Fishes. (pp. 201–211). CRC Press. 
Lande, R. (1980). Genetic Variation and Phenotypic Evolution During Allopatric 
Speciation. The American Naturalist, 116(4), 463–479.  
Laubichler, M. D. (2007). Evolutionary developmental biology. In The 
Cambridge companion to the philosophy of biology. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Laubichler, M. D. (2010). Evolutionary Developmental Biology Offers a 
Significant Challenge to the Neo-Darwinian Paradigm. In F. J. Ayala & R. 
 257 
Arp (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology. Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Laubichler, M. D., & Maienschein, J. (2007a). Embryos, Cells, Genes, and 
Organisms: Reflections on the History of Evolutionary Developmental 
Biology. In R. Sansom & R. N. Brandonn (Eds.), Integrating evolution 
and development: From theory to practice (pp. 1–25). 
Laubichler, M. D., & Maienschein, J. (Eds.). (2007b). From Embryology to Evo-
Devo: A History of Developmental Evolution. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
Laubichler, M. D., & Niklas, K. J. (2009). The morphological tradition in German 
paleontology: Otto Jaekel, Walter Zimmermann, and Otto Schindewolf. In 
The paleobiological revolution, essays on the growth of modern 
paleontology. (pp. 279–300). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its problems: Towards a theory of scientific 
growth. University of California Press. 
Lauder, G. V. (1981). Form and function: structural analysis in evolutionary 
morphology. Paleobiology, 7(4), 430–442. 
Lauder, G. V. (1986). Homology, analogy, and the evolution of behavior. 
Evolution of Animal Behavior, 9–40. 
Lauder, G. V. (1990a). Functional Morphology and Systematics: Studying 
Functional Patterns in an Historical Context. Annual Review of Ecology 
and Systematics, 21, 317–340. 
Lauder, G. V. (1990b). Functional morphology and systematics: studying 
functional patterns in an historical context. Annual Review of Ecology 
and Systematics, 317–340. 
Lauder, G. V., & Liem, K. F. (1989). The role of historical factors in the evolution 
of complex organismal functions. In Complex organismal functions: 
Integration and evolution in vertebrates (pp. 63–78). 
Lauder, G. V., & Thomason, J. J. (1995). On the inference of function from 
structure. Functional Morphology in Vertebrate Paleontology, 1–18. 
Lerner, I. M. (1954). Genetic homeostasis. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Levit, George S., Hossfeld, U., & Olsson, L. (2004). The integration of 
Darwinism and evolutionary morphology: Alexej Nikolajevich Sewertzoff 
(1866–1936) and the developmental basis of evolutionary change. 
 258 
Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental 
Evolution, 302(4), 343–354. 
Levit, Georgy S., Hossfeld, U., & Olsson, L. (2006). From the “modern 
synthesis” to cybernetics: Ivan Ivanovich Schmalhausen (1884–1963) 
and his research program for a synthesis of evolutionary and 
developmental biology. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: 
Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 306(2), 89–106. 
Levit, Georgy S., Meister, K., & Hossfeld, U. (2008). Alternative evolutionary 
theories: A historical survey. Journal of Bioeconomics, 10(1), 71–96. 
Levit, Georgy S., & Olsson, L. (2006). Evolution on rails”: mechanisms and 
levels of orthogenesis. Ann Hist Philos Biol, 11, 99–138. 
Levit, Georgy S., Simunek, M., & Hossfeld, U. (2008). Psychoontogeny and 
psychophylogeny: Bernhard Rensch’s (1900–1990) selectionist turn 
through the prism of panpsychistic identism. Theory in Biosciences, 
127(4), 297–322.  
Lewens, T. (2009). What Is Wrong with Typological Thinking?. Philosophy of 
Science, 76(3), 355–371.  
Lewis, E. B. (1994). Homeosis: The First 100 Years. In H. D. Lipshitz (Ed.), 
Genes, Development and Cancer (pp. 475–480). Springer US. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8981-9_33 
Lewontin, R. C. (1974). The genetic basis of evolutionary change (Vol. 560). 
Columbia University Press. 
Lewontin, R. C. (1980). Theoretical population genetics in the evolutionary 
synthesis. The Evolutionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the Unification of 
Biology, (787), 58. 
Liem, K. F. (1967). Functional morphology of the head of the anabantoid teleost 
fish Helostoma temmincki. Journal of Morphology, 121(2), 135–157.  
Liem, K. F. (1973). Evolutionary strategies and morphological innovations: 
cichlid pharyngeal jaws. Systematic Biology, 22(4), 425–441. 
Lloyd, E. (2017). Units and Levels of Selection. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017). Metaphysics 
Research Lab, Stanford University.  
Lombard, E. R., & Wake, D. B. (1976). Tongue evolution in the lungless 
salamanders, family plethodontidae I. Introduction, theory and a general 
model of dynamics. Journal of Morphology, 148(3), 265–286.  
 259 
Lombard, E. R., & Wake, D. B. (1977). Tongue evolution in the lungless 
salamanders, family plethodontidae. II. Function and evolutionary 
diversity. Journal of Morphology, 153(1), 39–79.  
Love, A. C. (2003). Evolutionary morphology, innovation, and the synthesis of 
evolutionary and developmental biology. Biology and Philosophy, 18(2), 
309–345. 
Love, A. C. (2005). Explaining evolutionary innovation and novelty: a historical 
and philosophical study of biological concepts. University of Pittsburgh. 
Love, A. C. (2006). Evolutionary morphology and evo-devo: hierarchy and 
novelty. Theory in Biosciences, 124(3–4), 317–333. 
Love, A. C. (2007). Morphological and paleontological perspectives for a history 
of evo-devo. In From Embryology to Evo-Devo: A History of 
Developmental Evolution (pp. 267–307). MIT Press. 
Love, A. C. (2008). Explaining Evolutionary Innovations and Novelties: Criteria 
of Explanatory Adequacy and Epistemological Prerequisites. Philosophy 
of Science, 75(5), 874–886.  
Love, A. C. (2009). Marine invertebrates, model organisms, and the modern 
synthesis: epistemic values, evo-devo, and exclusion. Theory in 
Biosciences, 128(1), 19. 
Love, A. C. (2010). Rethinking the structure of evolutionary theory for an 
extended synthesis. In Gerd B. Müller & M. Pigliucci (Eds.), Evolution, 
the extended synthesis (pp. 403–441). MIT press Cambridge, MA.  
Love, A. C. (2013). Teaching Evolutionary Developmental Biology: Concepts, 
Problems, and Controversy. In The Philosophy of Biology (pp. 323–341). 
Springer, Dordrecht.  
Love, A. C. (2015a). Conceptual Change and Evolutionary Developmental 
Biology. In Conceptual Change in Biology (pp. 1–54). Springer.  
Love, A. C. (Ed.). (2015b). Conceptual Change in Biology. Springer. 
Love, A. C., & Raff, R. A. (2003). Knowing your ancestors: themes in the history 
of evo-devo. Evolution & Development, 5(4), 327–330. 
Lynch, M. (2007a). The frailty of adaptive hypotheses for the origins of 
organismal complexity. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 104(Suppl 1), 8597–8604. 
Lynch, M. (2007b). The origins of genome architecture. Sunderland (MA): 
Sinauer  
 260 
Associates 
Mabberley, D. J. (1976). [Review of Review of Flowering Plants. Evolution 
Above the Species Level, by G. Ledyard Stebbins]. The New Phytologist, 
77(2), 527–529. 
Maienschein, J. (2007). To Evo-Devo Through Cells, Embryos, and 
Morphogenesis. In M. D. Laubichler & J. Maienschein (Eds.), From 
Embryology to Evo-Devo: A History of Developmental Evolution (pp. 
109–121). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Mallet, J. (2010a). Group selection and the development of the biological 
species concept. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London B: Biological Sciences, 365(1547), 1853–1863.  
Mallet, J. (2010b). Why was Darwin’s view of species rejected by twentieth 
century biologists? Biology & Philosophy, 25(4), 497–527.  
Manton. (1972). The evolution of arthropodan locomotory mechanisms. 
Zoological Journal of the Linnean Society, 51(3‐4), 203–400.  
Manton, S. M. (1977). The Arthropoda: habits, functional morphology and 
evolution. 
Maran, J. (1927). The study of the rudiments of the wings of the genera 
Pterostichus, Poecilus, Abax and Molops (Col Carabinae). Sborník 
Entomologického Oddelení Narodního Musea v Praze, 5, 121–139. 
Mayr, E. (1942). Systematics and the origin of species, from the viewpoint of a 
zoologist. Harvard University Press. 
Mayr, E. (1947). Ecological Factors in Speciation. Evolution, 1(4), 263–288.  
Mayr, E. (1954). Change of genetic environment and evolution. In J. Huxley, A. 
C. Hardy, & E. B. Ford (Eds.), Evolution as a Process (Allen & Unwin, pp. 
157–180). London. 
Mayr, E. (1958). Behavior and systematics. In A. E. Roe & G. G. Simpson 
(Eds.), Behavior and evolution (pp. 341–362). New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Mayr, E. (1959a). Isolation as an evolutionary factor. Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society, 103(2), 221–230. 
Mayr, E. (1959b). Where Are We? Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on 
Quantitative Biology, 24, 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1101/SQB.1959.024.01.003 
 261 
Mayr, E. (1960). The emergence of evolutionary novelties. In Sol Tax (Ed.), 
Evolution after Darwin (Vol. 1, pp. 349–380). 
Mayr, E. (1961). Cause and effect in biology. Science, 134(3489), 1501–1506. 
Mayr, E. (1963). Animal species and evolution. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press. 
Mayr, E. (1974a). Behavior Programs and Evolutionary Strategies: Natural 
selection sometimes favors a genetically ‘closed’ behavior program, 
sometimes an ‘open’ one. American Scientist, 62(6), 650–659. 
Mayr, E. (1974b). Cladistic analysis or cladistic classification? Journal of 
Zoological Systematics and Evolutionary Research, 12(1), 94–128.  
Mayr, E. (1976). The emergence of evolutionary novelties. In Evolution and the 
diversity of life: selected essays (pp. 88–113). Cambridge, Mass: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Mayr, E. (1980). Prologue: Some thoughts on the history of the evolutionary 
synthesis. In The evolutionary synthesis: Perspectives on the unification 
of biology (pp. 1–48). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Mayr, E. (1982a). Speciation and macroevolution. Evolution, 1119–1132. 
Mayr, E. (1982b). The growth of biological thought: Diversity, evolution, and 
inheritance. Harvard University Press. 
Mayr, E. (1992). Controversies in retrospect. Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary 
Biology, 8, 1–34. 
McAvoy, J. W. (1980). Induction of the Eye Lens. Differentiation, 17(1), 137–
149. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1432-0436.1980.tb01091.x 
McGinnis, W., Garber, R. L., Wirz, J., Kuroiwa, A., & Gehring, W. J. (1984). A 
homologous protein-coding sequence in drosophila homeotic genes and 
its conservation in other metazoans. Cell, 37(2), 403–408.  
Melville, R. (1960). A New Theory of the Angiosperm Flower. Nature, 
188(4744), 14–18. https://doi.org/10.1038/188014a0 
Meyerowitz, E. M. (2002). Plants compared to animals: the broadest 
comparative study of development. Science, 295(5559), 1482–1485. 
Meyerowitz, E. M., Smyth, D. R., & Bowman, J. L. (1989). Abnormal flowers and 
pattern formation in floral. Development, 106(2), 209–217. 
Milam, E. L. (2009). ‘The Experimental Animal From the Naturalist’s Point of 
View’: Behavior and Evolution at the American Museum of Natural 
 262 
History, 1928-1954. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 
99(1), 157–178. 
Milam, E. L. (2010). The Equally Wonderful Field: Ernst Mayr and Organismic 
Biology. Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 40(3), 279–317.  
Miller, Alden H. (1943). Mayr’s ‘Systematics and the Origin of Species’. The 
Auk, 60(2), 289–291.  
Miller, Alden H. (1949). Some ecologic and morphologic considerations in the 
evolution of higher taxonomic categories. Ornithologie Als Biologische 
Wissenschaft, 84–88. 
Minelli, A. (2015). Grand challenges in evolutionary developmental biology. 
Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution, 2. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2014.00085 
Minelli, A., & Pradeu, T. (2014). Towards a Theory of Development. Oxford 
University Press. 
Mitchell, S. D. (2003). Biological complexity and integrative pluralism. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mivart, S. G. J. (1871). On the genesis of species. London: Macmillan & Co. 
Moczek, A. P. (2008). On the origins of novelty in development and evolution. 
BioEssays, 30(5), 432–447. 
Morange, M. (2000). The developmental gene concept. The Concept of the 
Gene in Development and Evolution, 193–215. 
Morange, M. (2011). Evolutionary developmental biology its roots and 
characteristics. Developmental Biology, 357(1), 13–16.  
Moreno, A., & Mossio, M. (2015). Biological autonomy: a philosophical and 
theoretical enquiry (Vol. 12). Springer. 
Müller, G. B., & Streicher, J. (1989). Ontogeny of the syndesmosis tibiofibularis 
and the evolution of the bird hindlimb: a caenogenetic feature triggers 
phenotypic novelty. Anatomy and Embryology, 179(4), 327–339.  
Müller, G B. (1990). Developmental mechanisms at the origin of morphological 
novelty: a side-effect hypothesis. Evolutionary Innovations, 99–130. 
Müller, G B. (2002). Embryonic motility: environmental influences and 
evolutionary innovation. Evolution & Development, 5(1), 56–60. 
https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1525-142X.2003.03009.x 
 263 
Müller, G B. (2003). Homology: the evolution of morphological organization. 
Origination of Organismal Form: Beyond the Gene in Developmental and 
Evolutionary Biology, 51–69. 
Müller, G B. (2007a). Evo–devo: extending the evolutionary synthesis. Nature 
Reviews Genetics, 8(12), 943–949. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrg2219 
Müller, G B. (2007b). Six memos for evo-devo. In M. D. Laubichler & J. 
Maienschein (Eds.), From embryology to evo-devo: A history of 
developmental evolution (pp. 499–524). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT 
Press. 
Müller, G B. (2010). Epigenetic innovation. Evolution: The Extended Synthesis. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 307–333. 
Müller, G B., & Newman, S. A. (2005a). Editorial: evolutionary innovation and 
morphological novelty. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: 
Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 304B(6), 485–486. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/jez.b.21080 
Müller, G B., & Newman, S. A. (2005b). The innovation triad: an EvoDevo 
agenda. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and 
Developmental Evolution, 304(6), 487–503. 
Müller, G B., & Pigliucci, M. (Eds.). (2010). Evolution, the extended synthesis. 
MIT press Cambridge, MA. 
Müller, G B., & Wagner, G. P. (1991). Novelty in evolution: restructuring the 
concept. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 229–256. 
Müller, G B., & Wagner, G. P. (1996). Homology, Hox Genes, and 
Developmental Integration. Integrative and Comparative Biology, 36(1), 
4–13. https://doi.org/10.1093/icb/36.1.4 
Nagel, E. (1977). Functional explanations in biology. The Journal of Philosophy, 
74(5), 280–301. 
Neander, K. (1988). What Does Natural Selection Explain? Correction to Sober. 
Philosophy of Science, 55(3), 422–426. https://doi.org/10.1086/289446 
Neander, K. (1995). Pruning the Tree of Life. The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 46(1), 59–80. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.1.59 
Newman, S. A., Forgacs, G., & Muller, G. B. (2006). Before programs: the 
physical origination of multicellular forms. International Journal of 
Developmental Biology, 50(2/3), 289. 
 264 
Newman, S. A., & Müller, G. B. (2000). Epigenetic mechanisms of character 
origination. Journal of Experimental Zoology, 288(4), 304–317. 
Nichols, D. (1967). The origin of echinoderms. In Symposia of the Zoological 
Society  
of London (Vol. 20, pp. 209-229). The Society. 
Niklas, K. J. (1997). The evolutionary biology of plants. University of Chicago 
Press. 
Niklas, K. J. (2000). The evolution of plant body plans—a biomechanical 
perspective.  
Annals of Botany, 85(4), 411-438. 
Nyhart, L. K. (2002). Learning from history: Morphology’s challenges in 
Germany ca. 1900. Journal of Morphology, 252(1), 2–14. Pigliucci, M. 
(2007). Do we need an extended evolutionary synthesis? Evolution, 
61(12), 2743–2749. 
Olson, E. C. (1960). Morphology, paleontology, and evolution. In Sol Tax (Ed.), 
Evolution after darwin (Vol. 1, pp. 523–545). Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Olsson, L., Levit, G. S., & Hossfeld, U. (2010). Evolutionary developmental 
biology: its concepts and history with a focus on Russian and German 
contributions. Naturwissenschaften, 97(11), 951–969. 
Oppenheimer, J. (1955). Entwicklungsprobleme. Leopold von Ubisch. The 
Quarterly Review of Biology, 30(4), 403–403.  
Ostrom, J (1966). Functional morphology and evolution of the ceratopsian 
dinosaurs. Evolution, 20(3), 290–308. 
Panchen, A. L. (1994). Richard Owen and the concept of homology. Homology: 
The Hierarchical Basis of Comparative Biology, 21–62. 
Patterson, B. (1949). Rates of evolution in taeniodonts. In G. L. Jepsen, G. G. 
Simpson, & E. Mayr (Eds.), Genetics, paleontology, and evolution. (pp. 
243–278). New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Peichel, C. L., Nereng, K. S., Ohgi, K. A., Cole, B. L., Colosimo, P. F., Buerkle, 
C. A., … Kingsley, D. M. (2001). The genetic architecture of divergence 
between threespine stickleback species. Nature, 414(6866), 901–905. 
Penners, A. (1922). Die furchung von Tubifex rivulorum Lam. Zool. Jb. Abt. 
Anat. Ontog., 43, 323–367. 
 265 
Penners, A. (1930). Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen an marinen 
Oligochaten. II. Furchung, Keimstreif und Keimbahn von Pachydrilus 
(Lumbricillus) lineatus Mull. Zeitschrift Fur Wissenschaftliche Zoologie, 
137, 55–119. 
Perry, S. F., & Sander, M. (2004). Reconstructing the evolution of the 
respiratory apparatus in tetrapods. Respiratory Physiology & 
Neurobiology, 144(2), 125–139.  
Peterson, E. L. (2011). The Excluded Philosophy of Evo-Devo? Revisiting C.H. 
Waddington’s Failed Attempt to Embed Alfred North Whitehead’s 
‘Organicism’ in Evolutionary Biology. History and Philosophy of the Life 
Sciences, 33(3), 301–320.  
Peterson, T., & Müller, G. B. (2013). What is evolutionary novelty? Process 
versus character based definitions. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part 
B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 320(6), 345–350. 
Peterson, T., & Müller, G. B. (2016a). Phenotypic Novelty in EvoDevo: The 
Distinction Between Continuous and Discontinuous Variation and Its 
Importance in Evolutionary Theory. Evolutionary Biology, 1–22.  
Peterson, T., & Müller, G. B. (2016b). Phenotypic Novelty in EvoDevo: The 
Distinction Between Continuous and Discontinuous Variation and Its 
Importance in Evolutionary Theory. Evolutionary Biology, 1–22.  
Pigliucci, M. (2008). What, if anything, is an evolutionary novelty? Philosophy of 
Science, 75(5), 887–898. 
Pigliucci, M. (2009). An extended synthesis for evolutionary biology. Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences, 1168(1), 218–228. 
Popper, K. (1976). Unended quest. An Intellectual Autobiography Open Court. 
LaSalle, IL. 
Provine, W. B. (1978). The role of mathematical population geneticists in the 
evolutionary synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s. Studies in History of 
Biology, 2, 167–192. 
Provine, W. B. (1988). Progress in evolution and meaning in life. Evolutionary 
Progress, 49–74. 
Provine, W. B. (1992). Progress in evolution and meaning in life. In C. K. 
Waters & A. Van Helden (Eds.), Julian Huxley, biologist and statesman 
of science: proceedings of a conference held at Rice University, 25-27 
September 1987. Texas A&M University Press. 
 266 
Provine, W. B. (2001). The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics: With a 
New Afterword. University of Chicago Press. 
Provine, W. B. (2004). Ernst Mayr: Genetics and Speciation. Genetics, 167(3), 
1041–1046. 
Provine, W. B. (2005). Ernst Mayr, a retrospective. Trends in Ecology & 
Evolution, 20(8), 411–413.  
Prum, R. O. (1999). Development and evolutionary origin of feathers. The 
Journal of Experimental Zoology, 285(4), 291–306. 
Quiring, R., Walldorf, U., Kloter, U., & Gehring, W. J. (1994). Homology of the 
eyeless gene of Drosophila to the Small eye gene in mice and Aniridia in 
humans. Science, 265(5173), 785–789. 
Raff, R. (1996). The Shape of Life : Genes, Development, and the Evolution of 
Animal Form. University Of Chicago Press. 
Raff, R. A. (2000). Evo-devo: the evolution of a new discipline. Nature Reviews 
Genetics, 1(1), 74–79. 
Raff, R. A., & Love, A. C. (2004). Kowalevsky, comparative evolutionary 
embryology, and the intellectual lineage of evo-devo. Journal of 
Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution, 
302B(1), 19–34.  
Ramsey, G., Bastian, M. L., & van Schaik, C. (2007a). Animal innovation 
defined and operationalized. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(04), 
393–407.  
Ramsey, G., Bastian, M. L., & van Schaik, C. (2007b). On the concept of animal 
innovation and the challenge of studying innovation in the wild. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(04), 425–432. 
Rao, V., & Nanjundiah, V. (2011). J. B. S. Haldane, Ernst Mayr and the 
Beanbag Genetics Dispute. Journal of the History of Biology, 44(2), 233–
281. 
Reif, W.-E. (1986). The search for a macroevolutionary theory in German 
paleontology. Journal of the History of Biology, 19(1), 79–130.  
Reif, W.-E., Junker, T., & Hossfeld, U. (2000). The synthetic theory of evolution: 
general problems and the German contribution to the synthesis. Theory 
in Biosciences, 119(1), 41–91. 
Rensch, B. (1947). Neuere Probleme der Abstammungslehre: Die 
Transspezifische Evolution. F. Enke. 
 267 
Rensch, B. (1959). Evolution above the species level. New York: Columbia 
University. 
Rheinberger, H.-J., & Müller-Wille, S. (2018). The gene: From genetics to 
postgenomics. University of Chicago Press. 
Richards, R. A. (2009). Functional analysis and character transformation. Form 
and Function in Developmental Evolution, 176. 
Richards, R. J. (2012). Darwin’s principles of divergence and natural selection: 
Why Fodor was almost right. Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences, 43(1), 256–268. 
Rieseberg Loren H., Archer Margaret A., & Wayne Robert K. (2001). 
Transgressive segregation, adaptation and speciation. Heredity, 83(4), 
363–372.  
Robson, G. C., & Richards, O. W. (1936). The variation of animals. in nature. 
The Variation of Animals in Nature.  
Rosin, F. M., & Kramer, E. M. (2009). Old dogs, new tricks: Regulatory 
evolution in conserved genetic modules leads to novel morphologies in 
plants. Developmental Biology, 332(1), 25–35.  
Rudall, P. J., & Bateman, R. M. (2002). Roles of synorganisation, zygomorphy 
and heterotopy in floral evolution: the gynostemium and labellum of 
orchids and other lilioid monocots. Biological Reviews, 77(3), 403–441. 
Rudwick, M. J. S. (1964). The Inference of Function from Structure in Fossils. 
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 15(57), 27–40. 
Rudwick, M. J. S. (1970). Living and fossil brachiopods. Hutchinson. 
Rudwick, M J. S. (2017). The Fate of the Method of ‘Paradigms’ in 
Paleobiology. Journal of the History of Biology, 1–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10739-017-9501-z 
Rudwick, M J. S. (2018). Functional Morphology in Paleobiology: Origins of the 
Method of ‘Paradigms’. Journal of the History of Biology, 51(1), 135–178.  
Russell, E. S. (1916). Form and Function: A Contribution to the History of 
Animal Morphology. London: John Murray. 
Rutishauser, R., Grob, V., & Pfeifer, E. (2008). Plants are used to having 
identity crises. Cambridge University Press. 
Rutishauser, R., & Isler, B. (2001). Developmental genetics and morphological 
evolution of flowering plants, especially bladderworts (Utricularia): fuzzy 
 268 
Arberian morphology complements classical morphology. Annals of 
Botany, 88(6), 1173–1202. 
Sander, K. (1994). Of gradients and genes: Developmental concepts of 
Theodor Boveri and his students. Roux’s Archives of Developmental 
Biology, 203(6), 295–297.  
Sapp, J. (2003). Genesis: the evolution of biology. Oxford University Press New 
York. 
Satina, S., & Blakeslee, A. F. (1941). Periclinal chimeras in Datura stramonium 
in relation to development of leaf and flower. American Journal of 
Botany, 28(10), 862–871. 
Satina, S., & Blakeslee, A. F. (1943). Periclinal chimeras in Datura in relation to 
the development of the carpel. American Journal of Botany, 453–462. 
Satina, S., Blakeslee, A. F., & Avery, A. G. (1940). Demonstration of the three 
germ layers in the shoot apex of Datura by means of induced polyploidy 
in periclinal chimeras. American Journal of Botany, 27(10), 895–905. 
Sattler, R. (1988). Homeosis in plants. American Journal of Botany, 1606–1617. 
Sattler, R. (2012). Homology, homeosis, and process morphology in plants. 
Homology: The Hierarchical Basis of Comparative Biology Copyright, 
423–475. 
Schaeffer, B. (1965). The Role of Experimentation in the Origin of Higher Levels 
of Organization. Systematic Biology, 14(4), 318–336.  
Schaeffer, B., & Hecht, M. K. (1965). Introduction and Historical Résumé. 
Systematic Biology, 14(4), 245–248.  
Schickore, J. (2011). More thoughts on HPS: Another 20 years later. 
Perspectives on Science, 19(4), 453–481. 
Schindewolf, Otto H. (1993). Basic questions in paleontology: geologic time, 
organic evolution, and biological systematics. University of Chicago 
Press. 
Schindewolf, Otto Heinrich. (1936). Paläontologie, Entwicklungslehre und 
Genetik: Kritik und Synthese. Borntraeger. 
Schluter, D. (2000). The ecology of adaptive radiation. OUP Oxford. 
Schmalhausen, I. I. (1949). Factors of Evolution: The Theory of Stabilizing 
Selection. The University of Chicago Press. 
Schmitt, Stéphane. (2000). The work of Richard Goldschmidt: An endeavor to 
synthesize genetics, developmental biology and the theory of evolution 
 269 
with the help of the concept of homeosis. Revue d’histoire Des Sciences, 
53(3), 381–400. 
Schmitt, Stephane. (2004). Histoire d’une question anatomique : la répétition 
des parties. MNHN. 
Scholtz, G. (2005). Homology and ontogeny: Pattern and process in 
comparative developmental biology. Theory in Biosciences, 124(2), 121–
143.  
Schwenk, K., & Wagner, G. P. (2003). Constraint. Keywords and Concepts in 
Evolutionary Developmental Biology. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 52–61. 
Scudder, G. G. E. (1961). The Functional Morphology and Interpretation of the 
Insect Ovipositor. The Canadian Entomologist, 93(4), 267–272.  
Scudder, G. G. E. (1964). Further Problems in the Interpretation and Homology 
of the Insect Ovipositor. The Canadian Entomologist, 96(1–2), 405–417.  
Sewertzoff, A. N. (1931). Morphologische Gesetzmässigkeiten der Evolution. 
Jena: Gustav Fischer. 
Shubin, N., Tabin, C., & Carroll, S. (2009). Deep homology and the origins of 
evolutionary novelty. Nature, 457(7231), 818–823. 
Simpson, G G. (1944). Tempo and mode in evolution. Columbia University 
Press. 
Simpson, G G. (1949a). Essay-Review of Recent Works on Evolutionary 
Theory by Rensch, Zimmermann, and Schindewolf. Evolution, 3(2), 178–
184.  
Simpson, G G. (1949b). The meaning of evolution. New Haven, CT, US: Yale 
University Press. 
Simpson, G. G. (1953a). The Major Features of Evolution. Columbia Univ. 
Press, New York. 
Simpson, G G. (1953b). The Baldwin Effect. Evolution, 7(2), 110–117.  
Simpson, G G. (1964). This view of life. New York: Harcourt-Brace. 
Singh, G. (2016). Plant Systematics: An Intergrated Approach. CRC Press. 
Smit, P. (1962). Ontogenesis and phylogenesis: Their interrelation and their 
interpretation. Acta Biotheoretica, 15(1), 1–104. 
Smith, J. Maynard, Burian, R., Kauffman, S., Alberch, P., Campbell, J., 
Goodwin, B., … Wolpert, L. (1985). Developmental constraints and 
evolution: a perspective from the Mountain Lake conference on 
 270 
development and evolution. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 60(3), 
265–287. 
Smith, John Maynard, & Szathmary, E. (1997). The major transitions in 
evolution. Oxford University Press. 
Smocovitis, V. B. (1992). Unifying biology: the evolutionary synthesis and 
evolutionary biology. Journal of the History of Biology, 25(1), 1–65. 
Smocovitis, V. B. (1996). Unifying biology: The evolutionary synthesis and 
evolutionary biology. Princeton University Press. 
Smocovitis, V. B. (1999). The 1959 Darwin Centennial Celebration in America. 
Osiris, 14, 274–323. 
Smocovitis, V. B. (2007). Ernst Mayr (1904–2005), Darwin of the 20th Century, 
Defender of the Faith. Biological Theory, 2(4), 409–412.  
Smocovitis, V. B. (2009). The ‘Plant Drosophila’: E. B. Babcock, the Genus 
Crepis, and the Evolution of a Genetics Research Program at Berkeley, 
1915––1947. Hist Stud Nat Sci, 39(3), 300–355.  
Sneath, P. H., & Sokal, R. R. (1973). Numerical taxonomy. The principles and 
practice of numerical classification. 
Sober, E. (1995). Natural selection and distributive explanation: A reply to 
Neander. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46(3), 384–
397. 
Sokal, R. R. (1963). The principles and practice of numerical taxonomy. Taxon, 
190–199. 
Soltis, D. E., Chanderbali, A. S., Kim, S., Buzgo, M., & Soltis, P. S. (2007). The 
ABC Model and its Applicability to Basal Angiosperms. Annals of Botany, 
100(2), 155–163.  
Soltis, D. E., Visger, C. J., & Soltis, P. S. (2014). The polyploidy revolution 
then… and now: Stebbins revisited. American Journal of Botany, 101(7), 
1057–1078. 
Specht, C., & Bartlett, M. (2009). Flower Evolution: The Origin and Subsequent 
Diversification of the Angiosperm Flower. Annual Review of Ecology, 
Evolution and Systematics, 40, 217–243. 
Stamos, D. N. (2013). Darwin’s Species Concept Revisited. In I. Pavlinov (Ed.), 
The Species Problem - Ongoing Issues. InTech. 
Stebbins, G. L. (1950). Variation and evolution in plants. New York ; London: 
Columbia University Press. 
 271 
Stebbins, G. L. (1951). Cataclysmic Evolution. Scientific American, 184(4), 54–
59. 
Stebbins, G. L. (1956). Cytogenetics and Evolution of the Grass Family. 
American Journal of Botany, 43(10), 890–905.  
Stebbins, G. L. (1960). The comparative evolution of genetic systems. In Sol 
Tax (Ed.), Evolution After Darwin (Vol. 1, pp. 197–226). 
Stebbins, G. L. (1970). Transference of function as a factor in the evolution of 
seeds and their accessory structures. Israel J Bot.  
Stebbins, G L. (1974a). Flowering plants: evolution above the species level. 
London: Arnold 
Stebbins, G. L. (1974b). Adaptive Shifts and Evolutionary Novelty: A 
Compositionist Approach. In Francisco Jose Ayala & T. Dobzhansky 
(Eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology (pp. 285–306). Macmillan 
Education UK.  
Stebbins, G. L. (1980). Botany and the synthetic theory of evolution. In E. Mayr 
& W. B. Provine (Eds.), The evolutionary synthesis. Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard Univ. Press. 
Stebbins, G. L., & Babcock, E. B. (1939). The effect of polyploidy and apomixis 
on the evolution of species in Crepis. Journal of Heredity, 30(12), 519–
530.  
Stebbins, G. L., & Shah, S. S. (1960). Developmental studies of cell 
differentiation in the epidermis of monocotyledons: II. Cytological 
features of stomatal development in the Gramineae. Developmental 
Biology, 2(6), 477–500.  
Stebbins, G. L & Khush, G. S. (1961). Variation in the Organization of the 
Stomatal Complex in the Leaf Epidermis of Monocotyledons and Its 
Bearing on Their Phylogeny. American Journal of Botany, 48(1), 51–59.  
Stebbins, G. , & Yagil, E. (1966). The Morphogenetic Effects of the Hooded 
Gene in Barley. I. the Course of Development in Hooded and Awned 
Genotypes. Genetics, 54(3), 727–741. 
Stegmann, U. E. (2010). What can natural selection explain? Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 41(1), 61–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2009.12.002 
 272 
Steinberg, M. S., & Gilbert, S. F. (2004). Townes and Holtfreter (1955): Directed 
movements and selective adhesion of embryonic amphibian cells. 
Journal of Experimental Zoology Part A: Comparative Experimental 
Biology, 301A(9), 701–706.  
Stoltzfus, A. (2012). Constructive neutral evolution: exploring evolutionary 
theory’s curious disconnect. Biology Direct, 7, 35. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/1745-6150-7-35 
Stoltzfus, A. (2017). Why we don’t want another “Synthesis”. Biology Direct, 12, 
23.  
Stoltzfus, A., & Cable, K. (2014). Mendelian-Mutationism: the forgotten 
evolutionary synthesis. Journal of the History of Biology, 47(4), 501–546. 
Streicher, J., & Müller, G. B. (1992). Natural and experimental reduction of the 
avian fibula: developmental thresholds and evolutionary constraint. 
Journal of Morphology, 214(3), 269–285. 
Szathmáry, E. (2015). Toward major evolutionary transitions theory 2.0. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(33), 10104–
10111.  
Takhtajan, A. (1959). Die evolution der angiosperm. Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer. 
Tax, S., & Callender, C. (1960) Evolution after Darwin. Volume III. Issues in  
Evolution. University of Chicago Press 
Tax, Sol. (1960). Evolution after Darwin: The evolution of life (Vol. 1). University 
of Chicago Press. 
Taylor, E. B., & McPhail, J. D. (2000). Historical contingency and ecological 
determinism interact to prime speciation in sticklebacks, Gasterosteus. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological 
Sciences, 267(1460), 2375–2384. 
Theissen, G. (2006). The proper place of hopeful monsters in evolutionary 
biology. Theory in Biosciences, 124(3–4), 349–369. 
Theissen, G. (2009). Saltational evolution: hopeful monsters are here to stay. 
Theory in Biosciences, 128(1), 43–51. 
Theissen, G., & Melzer, R. (2007). Molecular Mechanisms Underlying Origin 
and Diversification of the Angiosperm Flower. Annals of Botany, 100(3), 
603–619.  
Theissen, G., & Saedler, H. (2001). Plant biology: floral quartets. Nature, 
409(6819), 469–471. 
 273 
Tomoyasu, Y., Wheeler, S. R., & Denell, R. E. (2005). Ultrabithorax is required 
for membranous wing identity in the beetle Tribolium castaneum. Nature, 
433(7026), 643–647. 
Torrey, J. G. (1955). On the Determination of Vascular Patterns During Tissue 
Differentiation in Excised Pea Roots. American Journal of Botany, 42(2), 
183–198.  
Torrey, J. G. (1957). Auxin Control of Vascular Pattern Formation in 
Regenerating Pea Root Meristems Grown In vitro. American Journal of 
Botany, 44(10), 859–870.  
Tschumi, P. (1954). Konkurrenzbedingte Rückbildungen der Hinterextremität 
von Xenopus nach Behandlung mit einem Chloraethylamin. Rev. Suisse 
Zool, 61(6), 177–270. 
Ubisch, L. V. (1923). Das Differenzierungsgefälle des Amphibienkörpers und 
seine Auswirkungen. Archiv Für Entwicklungsmechanik Der Organismen, 
52(3–4), 641–670. 
Ubisch, L. V. (1933). Keimblattchimären. Naturwissenschaften, 21(18), 325–
329. 
Ubisch, L. V. (1939). Keimblattchimärenforschung an Seeigellarven. Biological 
Reviews, 14(1), 88–103. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
185X.1939.tb00926.x 
Van Valen, L. M. (1982). Homology and causes. Journal of Morphology, 173(3), 
305–312. 
Varela, F. J. (1979). Principles of biological autonomy. North Holland 
Vaux, F., Trewick, S. A., & Morgan-Richards, M. (2016). Lineages, splits and 
divergence challenge whether the terms anagenesis and cladogenesis 
are necessary. Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 117(2), 165–
176.  
Vergara-Silva, F. (2003). Plants and the conceptual articulation of evolutionary 
developmental biology. Biology and Philosophy, 18(2), 249–284. 
Vervoort, M. (2014). Comparison of animal and plant development: a right track 
to establish a theory of development? Towards a Theory of 
Development, 203. 
Vogel, K. (1991). Concepts of constructional morphology. In Constructional 
morphology and evolution (pp. 55–68). Springer. 
 274 
Waddington, C. H. (1942). Canalization of development and the inheritance of 
acquired characters. Nature, 150(3811), 563. 
Waddington, C. H. (1948). The concept of equilibrium in embryology. Folia 
Biotheoretica, 3, 127–138. 
Wagner, A. (2008). Robustness and evolvability: a paradox resolved. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 275(1630), 91–
100. 
Wagner, A. (2011). The Origins of Evolutionary Innovations: A Theory of 
Transformative Change in Living Systems. Oxford University Press. 
Wagner, A. (2014). Arrival of the Fittest: Solving Evolution’s Greatest Puzzle. 
Penguin. 
Wagner, G P. (1989a). The biological homology concept. Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics, 20, 51–69. 
Wagner, G P. (1989b). The origin of morphological characters and the 
biological basis of homology. Evolution, 1157–1171. 
Wagner, G P. (2000). What is the promise of developmental evolution? part I: 
Why is developmental biology necessary to explain evolutionary 
innovations? Journal of Experimental Zoology, 288(2), 95–98.  
Wagner, G P. (2001). What is the promise of developmental evolution? Part II: 
A causal explanation of evolutionary innovations may be impossible. 
Journal of Experimental Zoology, 291(4), 305–309.  
Wagner, G P. (2007). The current state and the future of developmental 
evolution. In From Embryology to Evo-Devo: A History of Developmental 
Evolution (pp. 525–545). MIT Press. 
Wagner, G P. (2007). The developmental genetics of homology. Nature 
Reviews Genetics, 8(6), 473–479.  
Wagner, G P. (2014). Homology, Genes, and Evolutionary Innovation. 
Princeton University Press. 
Wagner, G P. (2015a). Evolutionary innovations and novelties: Let us get down 
to business! Zoologischer Anzeiger - A Journal of Comparative Zoology, 
256(Supplement C), 75–81.  
Wagner, G P. (2015b). Homology and the evolutionary process: reply to Haig, 
Love and Brown on “Homology, Genes and Evolutionary Innovation”. 
Biology & Philosophy, 30(6), 901–912.  
 275 
Wagner, G. P., & Altenberg, L. (1996). Perspective: Complex adaptations and 
the evolution of evolvability. Evolution, 967–976. 
Wagner, G P., Chiu, C.-H., & Laubichler, M. (2000). Developmental evolution 
as a mechanistic science: the inference from developmental mechanisms 
to evolutionary processes. American Zoologist, 40(5), 819–831. 
Wahlert, G. von. (1965). The Role of Ecological Factors in the Origin of Higher 
Levels of Organization. Systematic Biology, 14(4), 288–300.  
Waisbren, S. J. (1988). The Importance of Morphology in the Evolutionary 
Synthesis as Demonstrated by the Contributions of the Oxford Group: 
Goodrich, Huxley, and De Beer. Journal of the History of Biology, 21(2), 
291–330. 
Wake, D. B. (1982). Functional and Evolutionary Morphology. Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine, 25(4), 603–620. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/pbm.1982.0059 
Wake, D. B. (1991). Homoplasy: The Result of Natural Selection, or Evidence of 
Design Limitations? The American Naturalist, 138(3), 543–567.  
Wake, D. B. (2009). What salamanders have taught us about evolution. Annu. 
Rev.  
Ecol. Evol. Syst., 40, 333-352. 
Wake, D. B., & Dresner, I. G. (1967). Functional morphology and evolution of 
tail autotomy in salamanders. Journal of Morphology, 122(4), 265–305.  
Wake, M. H. (1992). Morphology, the study of form and function, in modern 
evolutionary biology. In D. J. Futuyma & J. Antonovics (Eds.), Oxford 
surveys in evolutionary biology (Vol. 8, pp. 289–346). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Wake, M. H. (2015). Hierarchies and integration in evolution and development. 
In Conceptual Change in Biology (pp. 405–420). Springer. 
Wallace, B., King, J. C., Madden, C. V., Kaufmann, B., & McGunnigle, E. C. 
(1953). An Analysis of Variability Arising through Recombination. 
Genetics, 38(3), 272–307. 
Walsh, D. M. (2013). Mechanism, emergence, and miscibility: the autonomy of 
Evo-Devo. In Functions: Selection and mechanisms (pp. 43–65). 
Springer. 
Warner, K. A., Rudall, P. J., & Frohlich, M. W. (2009). Environmental control of 
sepalness and petalness in perianth organs of waterlilies: a new Mosaic 
 276 
Theory for the evolutionary origin of a differentiated perianth. Journal of 
Experimental Botany, 60(12), 3559–3574. 
West-Eberhard, M. J. (2003). Developmental plasticity and evolution. Oxford 
University Press. 
Wettstein, R. (1908). Handbuch der systematischen Botanik (Vol. 2). F. 
Deuticke. 
Wigglesworth, V. B. (1963). Origin of Wings in Insects. Nature, 197(4862), 97–
98.  
Wigglesworth, V. B. (1973). Evolution of Insect Wings and Flight. Nature, 
246(5429), 127–129.  
Wijewantha, R. T., & Stebbins, G. L. (1964). Developmental and Biochemical 
Effects of the Agropyroides Mutation in Barley. Genetics, 50(1), 65–80. 
Wilbert, H. (1953). Experimentelle untersuchungen über material-kompensation 
bei der entwicklung von insekten. Zeitschrift Für Morphologie Und 
Ökologie Der Tiere, 41(4), 350–371. 
Wilkins, J. S. (2009). Species: a history of the idea. University of California 
Press. 
Williams, G. C. (1966). Adaptation and natural selection. A critique of some 
current evolutionary thought. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
Wilson, D. S., & Wilson, E. O. (2007). Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of 
Sociobiology. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 82(4), 327–348.  
Wimsatt, W. C. (2013). Evolution and the stability of functional architectures. In 
P. Huneman (Ed.), Functions: selection and mechanisms (pp. 19–41). 
Springer. 
Winge, Ö. (1917). The chromosome. Their numbers and general importance. 
Compt. Rend. Trav. Lab. Carlsberg., 13, 131–175. 
Winsor, M. P. (1995). The English Debate on Taxonomy and Phylogeny, 1937-
1940. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 17(2), 227–252. 
Winther, R. G. (2009). Character analysis in cladistics: abstraction, reification, 
and the search for objectivity. Acta Biotheoretica, 57(1–2), 129–162. 
Witteveen, J. (2015). “A Temporary Oversimplification”: Mayr, Simpson, 
Dobzhansky, and the Origins of the Typology/Population Dichotomy (Part 
1 of 2). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 54. 
 277 
Witteveen, J. (2016). “A temporary oversimplification”: Mayr, Simpson, 
Dobzhansky, and the origins of the typology/population dichotomy (part 2 
of 2). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 57, 96–
105.  
Witteveen, J. (2018). Typological thinking: Then and now. Journal of 
Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Developmental Evolution.  
Wouters, A. G. (2003). Four notions of biological function. Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 34(4), 633–668. 
Wouters, A. G (2005). The function debate in philosophy. Acta Biotheoretica, 
53(2), 123–151. 
Wray, G. A., Hoekstra, H. E., Futuyma, D. J., Lenski, R. E., Mackay, T. F., 
Schluter, D., & Strassmann, J. E. (2014). Does evolutionary theory need 
a rethink? No, all is well. Nature. 
Wright, S. (1931). Evolution in Mendelian populations. Genetics, 16(2), 97–159. 
Wright, S. (1932). The roles of mutation inbreeding, crossbreeding and 
selection in evolution. In Proc. 6th International Congress of Genetics 
(pp. 356–366). 
Yakimowski, S. B., & Rieseberg, L. H. (2014). The role of homoploid 
hybridization in evolution: A century of studies synthesizing genetics and 
ecology. American Journal of Botany, 101(8), 1247–1258.  
Yonge, C. M. (1969). Functional morphology and evolution within the 
Carditacea (Bivalvia). Journal of Molluscan Studies, 38(6), 493–527.  
Zachos, F. E. (2016). Species concepts in biology: historical development, 
theoretical foundations and practical relevance. Springer. 
Zeiger, E., & Stebbins, G. (1972). Developmental Genetics in Barley - Mutant 
for Stomatal Development. American Journal of Botany, 59(2), 143-.  
Zimmermann, W. (1934). Research on Phylogeny of Species and of Single 
Characters. The American Naturalist, 68(717), 381–384.  
Zimmermann, W. (1965). Die Telomtheorie. Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer. 
Zusi, R. L. (1962). Structural adaptations of the head and neck in the black 
skimmer. Publications of the Nuttal Ornithological Club. 
 
 
 278 
 
